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The United Nations University, an independent unit of the UN system located in Tokyo, approached me
in 1995 about carrying out a study of human rights in comparative foreign policy. I was eager to do so,
having long regarded human rights in foreign policy as an underdeveloped aspect of international human
rights. We had many studies on human rights and international law, and quite a few on human rights and
international organizations. But few authors had focused on human rights and foreign policy, and fewer
still had shown any interest in this topic on a truly comparative basis.
I am grateful to the leadership of the UNU for their interest in, and support for, this project: Rector von
Ginkel and his associates Takashi Inoguchi, Hideo Sato, and Ramesh Thakur. With much-appreciated
funding from the UNU, I assembled a steering committee whose diverse members included Peter Baehr,
Sanjoy Banerjee, Jack Donnelly, Cristina Eguizabal, and myself. With the help of the New York office of
the UNU, and especially of its director Jacques Fomerand, we hammered out a framework of analysis
that would be used by all authors. With the assistance of UNU headquarters in Tokyo, and especially of
Chiyuki Aoi and Yoshie Sawada there, we assembled a multinational team of authors who agreed to
utilize the common framework that had been established by the steering committee.
Many of the authors met in Washington in 1997 to review progress and compare approaches. Christopher
Joyner and Tony Arend of Georgetown University facilitated some of our meetings, and they joined Jack
Donnelly and myself in presenting extended critiques of the works in process. The American Political
Science Association gave us a couple of panel slots on their programme at the 1997 annual meeting,
which led to lively discussions. At a later stage, two independent referees gave us further critiques that
helped us improve the manuscript.
Along the way various graduate students and support staff at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln
provided invaluable editorial and other assistance: J. T. Smith, Barbara Ann Rieffer, Jennier Gutierrez,
Helen Sexton, and Monica M. Mason. UNL's computer experts were also most helpful: John Teets and
Gregg Frey.
The result is a book that breaks new ground in our understanding of internationally recognized human
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A review of the literature in English on international human rights in the mid-1990s concluded among
other things that more attention needed to be paid to state foreign policy and human rights, especially in
comparative perspective. 1 At about the same time as that bibliographic essay appeared, an overview on
human rights and foreign policy was published by a Dutch author which provided a useful primer. 2 Then
a couple of years later a Canadian author published a study about whether human rights considerations
affected the development politics of three industrialized states in their dealings with various lesser
developed countries. 3 The present project marks a further step toward responding to the challenge of
providing a relatively broad but reasonably detailed and advanced treatment of human rights and foreign
policy in comparative perspective.
The subject is important. We live in an era in which there is much discourse about the demise of the state
and the anachronism of state sovereignty. We chart the growth over time of intergovernmental
organizations, many of which deal with human rights. We note the proliferation of private human rights
groups, some of which are transnational in membership and scope of action. It has become commonplace
to note the power and presumed independence of multinational or transnational corporations. The
independent communications media are a factor of considerable importance. But the state remains central
to all such developments. It is states that create intergovernmental organizations, defining their authority
and perhaps loaning them some elements of power. When the United Nations Security Council declares
that to interfere with humanitarian assistance in Somalia is a war crime for which there is individual
responsibility, states collectively take that decision. States provide legal and political space for private
human rights groups to operate in the first place, give them access to international organizations, and
decide whether to cooperate with them and to what degree. States decide whether private for-profit
corporations can trade with Iraq, Libya, or Yugoslavia, and states implement economic sanctions and
assign penalties for their violation. States regulate the media and seek to manipulate them beyond that
point, even if in return the media pry into state behaviour and report what they can. It is certainly true
that the state shares the world stage with a variety of other actors. But the state is hardly withering away,
even if its de facto independence of policy-making is increasingly restricted by a variety of factors. Even
in Europe, where the state is considerably restricted by the European Union and the Council of Europe,
there is still the political reality of a Netherlands, for example, with a relatively independent foreign
policy on many issues — including global human rights.
Any state's foreign policy is the result of a two-level game in which domestic values and pressures
combine with international standards and pressures to produce a given policy in a given situation for a
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given time. This combination of domestic and international factors varies from state to state, from time to
time, and from place to place, making generalizations difficult to fashion with reliability. The West
European democracies are greatly affected on human rights by regional international developments,
especially the workings of the Council of Europe and also the European Union. There is also the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. By contrast, on human rights matters the United
States is more insular, and thus relatively more influenced by domestic factors. Unlike its democratic
partners in Europe, the United States is subject neither to a regional human rights court, nor to a regional
economic court that also makes human rights rulings on labour rights and other subjects affecting
economic activity.
Yet commonalities exist. One of the major themes of this book is to confirm that most nations, if not all
of them, harbour a self-image. 4 This self-image affects attention to human rights, both at home and in
foreign policy. National self-image may be part and parcel of a nation's political culture — the sum total
of a people's attitudes toward political values and processes. This self-image may be fruitfully discussed
in terms of the roles that states choose to play in international relations. Canada, seeing itself as a
progressive and middle-range power, chooses to play the role internationally as a major peacekeeping
nation and catalyst for treaties banning land mines or creating an international criminal court.
Dominant American political culture, for example, sees the United States as a global beacon and shining
example of personal freedom, regardless of evident blemishes on its national record concerning slavery,
racial and gender discrimination, and various forms of other bigotry. The dominant political classes in
the Netherlands tend to see that state as a progressive actor with a special history of support for
international law and free trade in peaceful international relations. The Dutch dominant self-image in
modern times provides support for human rights concerns in foreign policy, whether as linked to
development assistance to the poorer countries of the global south, especially former Dutch colonies, or
as linked to second-generation UN peacekeeping that contains human rights dimensions.
Some countries may contain a fuzzy self-image or conflicted political culture, as yet not fully distilled
into clear international roles. This is evidently the case in Russia. A strong Slavic tradition of
authoritarianism and suspicion of the West, inter alia, competes with a weaker Petrine tradition (from the
time of Peter the Great) endorsing cosmopolitan human rights and openness to the West. One result of
this conflicted political culture is vacillation in Russian foreign policy on various human rights issues,
especially those linked to cooperation with the West. Even when conflicted or less than fully distilled, the
notion of self-image as part of political culture is a useful way to begin to discuss the domestic or
national factors that affect a state's foreign policy on international human rights issues.
There are a few states such as Iran where reigning notions of self-image and the dominant political
culture mostly reject secular universal human rights. As an Islamic theocracy, Iran at times makes two
different arguments. It can be an outspoken advocate for cultural relativism and national particularism.
Thus it argues that internationally recognized human rights, not being grounded in Islam, do not apply to
it. It sees itself as a bulwark against the misguided notions of secular human rights, inspired by the
despised United States. On the other hand, in its revolutionary phase, Islamic Iran argues for its version
of Islamic universalism, and tries — if necessary by force and subversion — to compel others to follow
its religious vision.
But there are not many states in the world today that reject the very notion of secular and universal
human rights — at least at the level of principled debate. Even those states at the 1993 UN Conference
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on Human Rights at Vienna that raised questions about the applicability of the International Bill of
Rights to their states in the 1990s eventually accepted Conference language reaffirming the universal
character of human rights norms. By 1998 even China had ratified the 1966 International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and had promised likewise to endorse the companion Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. Thus all states, regardless of national history and mythology, were compelled
to confront the international law and diplomacy of human rights. Still, national history and resultant
political culture affected the interaction between national self-image and international human rights.
National domestic factors beyond self-image were almost always supremely important in the making of
foreign policy on human rights. In the United States, and most probably in other liberal democracies,
public opinion polls showed that the general public endorsed protection of human rights and
advancement of democracy abroad as legitimate and even important foreign policy goals. But at the same
time the general public was not inclined to support a costly crusade for human rights abroad. It was not
only the United States but also other Western states that had proven reluctant to engage in decisive —
and perhaps costly — intervention to protect human rights in places such as Bosnia prior to 1995 and
Rwanda during 1994. Even an evident pattern of gross violations of rights to personal security, including
genocide and systematic rape as a weapon of war, had not moved these countries to decisive action.
Readily available evidence, in addition to polls where they existed, showed that Western publics might
endorse human rights in the abstract and even support routine diplomacy for their advancement. But
expending national blood and treasure in their behalf was another matter. Public and legislative clamour
for an exit from Somalia after American casualties in the fall of 1993 was symptomatic of what the polls
were telling us about American public opinion and support for costly foreign ventures. Since Western
states were the motor to interventionary protection of human rights through the United Nations Security
Council and other international organizations, the nature of Western — especially American — public
opinion was an important brake on protective possibilities. Systematic sacrifice in behalf of international
human rights could be sustained in the liberal democratic states only with the support of public opinion
translated into legislative opinion. And, as noted, public support for costly foreign policy for human
rights was not much in evidence — especially after about 1993. If this situation prevailed in the liberal
democracies, it should not be so surprising if other states were less than daring and steadfast in their
efforts to see internationally recognized human rights implemented.
A certain public reserve about sacrifice for the rights of foreigners, which in other terms meant that moral
interdependence across nations seemed weaker than material interdependence, did not preclude action by
private groups active in support of international human rights. Indeed, in all the liberal democracies
numerous human rights groups, and other private groups such as labour unions and churches that became
active on certain human rights questions, were an evident feature of civil society. While maintaining their
"non-political" status, they tried to "educate" — or lobby — various state officials. Media coverage also
provided an independent if spasmodic spur to attention to human rights issues.
In states without a strong tradition of civic society, and particularly in those states dominated in the past
by illiberal governments, the activity of private human rights groups was weak. Economic difficulties
also impeded the development of a vigorous human rights network in the private domain. Yet almost
everywhere the historical trend was toward more rather than less education by human rights groups, and
more rather than less media coverage of the subject. Mexico was an interesting case in point. Long
hesitant about the role of international as well as truly independent domestic human rights groups, the
Mexican government in the 1990s found itself more and more having to explain its human rights record
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to a transnational or intermestic coalition made up of churches, the media, and human rights actors. 5 The
government finally agreed to meet with the Executive Secretary of Amnesty International from London,
and then later with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
This is not to say that private human rights groups always generated significant influence on the making
of foreign policy in a particular state. The groups themselves regularly complained about their
impotence. Other factors might be more important for a given time, place, or policy. Executive
preferences, military opinion, business interests, or national moods and traditions might control policy at
the end of the day. But the presence or absence, the number and resources, the emphases and orientations
of private human rights groups were subjects worthy of analysis in understanding foreign policy and
human rights.
Likewise, in a number of states the analysis of political parties and their position on human rights issues
was an important topic. In some states, such as the Netherlands, perhaps because of coalition
governments, it might be possible for the state to manifest a more or less enduring foreign policy on
human rights across time and changes in the coalition. Professor Peter Baehr appears to suggest this in
chapter 3. In presidential systems like that in the United States, institutional conflict between the
executive and legislative branches was at least as important for foreign policy and human rights as
differences between the Democratic and Republican parties. But in states like the United Kingdom and
India, party differences on human rights abroad were clear and important. In chapter 4, Sally Morphet
shows clearly that the British Labour Party was far more likely than its Conservative counterpart to take
numerous initiatives on international human rights. And the rise to power of the BJP or Hindu nationalist
party in India in the late 1990s carried with it the prospect of important departures from previous Indian
positions on several human rights subjects both at home and abroad, as shown in chapter 7 by Sanjoy
Banerjee.
Likewise the very structure of the state merits analysis for an in-depth understanding of human rights
policy abroad. On the one hand, a small state such as Costa Rica, with no military establishment and a
small foreign policy bureaucracy, might manifest a dominant presidency in foreign affairs. Cristina
Eguizabal is very clear on this point in chapter 11 on Latin America. The structure of the state might not
matter much in such countries. On the other hand, a superpower such as the United States, with a
sizeable military-industrial complex, presented quite different influences on the making of foreign policy
in general and foreign human rights policy in particular. In the United States in the late 1990s, difficulties
in Somalia reinforced the Vietnam syndrome, leading the Pentagon to try to continue to avoid
involvement in low-intensity armed conflict. The Pentagon clearly preferred operations like Desert Storm
(1991) rather than "operations other than war" in which political restrictions and objectives other than the
military defeat of an enemy might be important. Given the considerable influence of the Pentagon in
Washington, a President such as Clinton — who had no personal military record — could deploy
military force in places such as Haiti and Bosnia only with considerable political risk at home and strict
rules of engagement abroad. This situation hampered any move toward quick and decisive protection of
human rights abroad through military action. By comparison, in Japan, as shown by Chiyuki Aoi and
Yozo Yokota in chapter 5, a strong foreign policy bureaucracy wedded to strictly economic pursuits
might prove a formidable obstacle to the development of an active and broad national policy on human
rights abroad.
On the other hand, the United States did manifest a human rights bureau in the Department of State, as of
the late 1990s called the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. There was also a standing
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subcommittee of the House of Representatives, the lower house of the Congress, with explicit mandates
pertaining to international human rights. These permanent features of the policy-making process
enhanced the probability of regular review of foreign human rights issues, while giving those interested
in such issues a focal point for trying to influence legislative and executive decisions. Britain, by
comparison, had no such specialized agents in either the Foreign Office or Parliament, as Sally Morphet
shows in chapter 4. The Netherlands, by way of further comparison, manifested for a time a Citizens'
Advisory Council on Human Rights, which reported to the Foreign Minister, discussed by Peter Baehr in
chapter 3.
There were other features of state structure that could be important from time to time for international
human rights. The constituent states of the federal United States occasionally developed their own
unofficial foreign policies related to human rights. Many internal states, Nebraska being the first,
developed disinvestment and other financial policies designed to impede economic growth in the
Republic of South Africa under white minority government. 6 Cities, counties, and states within the
United States eventually blocked some US$20 billion in resources that might have been otherwise
transferred to South Africa during the era of apartheid. When the federal Congress voted economic
sanctions on South Africa in 1986, it explicitly decided to let stand, and not pre-empt on the part of the
federal government, this decentralized pressure on white authorities. Numerous sub-federal units in the
United States enacted similar policies designed to promote equitable labour rights and non-discrimination
in the private sector of Northern Ireland, a province of the United Kingdom. Also in the 1990s, some
internal states of the United States, such as Massachusetts, enacted legislation designed to curtail trade
with Burma/Myanmar because of the human rights situation there. Thus in some federal nation-states, the
sub-national governments might take action on human rights abroad that was uncoordinated by the
central or federal or national authorities. Such action was not possible in countries like Britain with a
unitary or centralized foreign policy process.
In a number of liberal democracies the corporate sector showed increased attention to international
human rights toward the turn of the century. 7 Heineken, based in the Netherlands, pulled out of Burma
because of the military government's continuing refusal to honour the outcome of elections a decade
earlier. Levi Strauss, based in San Francisco, refused for a time to utilize cheap Chinese labour in the
making of blue jeans, citing labour and other rights violations in that massive market. Reebok, based in
the United Kingdom, certified that its soccer balls were not manufactured using child labour in places
such as South Asia. Consumer boycotts in a number of states, as well as lobbying efforts by private
human rights groups, were closely linked to these corporate decisions.
It was certainly true that not all for-profit corporations showed the same sensitivity to human rights
issues noted above. A coalition of American companies combined to challenge the Massachusetts law on
Burma cited above, hoping that some court in the United States would strike down the law as a violation
of the US constitution, under which regulation of foreign commerce is arguably a prerogative of the
federal Congress. The Massachusetts law was also the subject of various challenges within the World
Trade Organization. Be all that as it may, the fact remains that, in a number of states, the role of the
corporate sector was changing. It could no longer be assumed that for-profit corporations would always
oppose attention to international human rights, or would always lobby against human rights legislation at
the state and federal levels of government. Indeed, some corporations were banding together, and
working with governments, to adopt codes of conduct for all corporations doing business in a particular
industry, country, or region.
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A review of the various domestic factors that frequently impinged on foreign policy-making regarding
human rights did not always lead to the conclusion that such factors were decisively controlling for the
fate of that policy. In Latin America, for example, it might be the case that at least governments in small
countries were more affected by relations with Washington than by their own domestic factors. Cristina
Equizabal stresses this point in chapter 11. That is to say, Latin governmental concerns about both
maintaining good relations with the hemispheric hegemon and resisting US tendencies toward
hemispheric intervention might outweigh the impact of at least some domestic factors at least some of the
time. To take another example, it might also be the case that the communications media and private
human rights groups generated less pressure on British governments than was the case in other North
Atlantic democracies. Sally Morphet suggests this interpretation in chapter 4. A British government with
majority support in the House of Commons could hold to a given policy despite criticism from the public
and interest groups. Also, British governments benefited from a long tradition of parliamentary rather
than popular sovereignty, and from a considerable tradition of widespread deference to the government
in foreign affairs.
Nevertheless, in general most foreign policy decisions on human rights usually reflected to some degree
various domestic influences beyond the calculations of national interest held by foreign policy officials.
In general, domestic politics beyond officials' preferences mostly mattered in the making of foreign
policy. 8 A nation's self-image, current public opinion, extent and nature of bureaucratic in-fighting,
legislative independence, political party platforms, authority of sub-federal units, and the like combined
to affect national human rights policy abroad.
These factors complemented, and frequently complicated, more strictly international influences on
human rights policy abroad that stemmed from other governments, international organizations, and
multinational corporations. Indeed, the very condition of anarchic international relations, lacking as it
does a supranational centre, generated its own structural pressures on foreign policy for human rights —
making coordinated policy difficult but not impossible. The operation of the principle of state
sovereignty meant that any given state might chart its own independent course, based on its own
perceived interests, rather than support a general policy in the name of human rights. Almost all
international efforts to apply economic sanctions in behalf of human rights, for example, were met by
some "cheating" or "sanctions busting" in pursuit of national economic advantage. Or to take another
example, almost all efforts to coordinate policy toward China on human rights issues in the 1990s
floundered on the hard rocks of varying perceptions of raison d'e¥tat. It was the nature of the
international relations, and its rule of state sovereignty, that gave rise to this persistent condition.
It is against this background of the interplay of domestic and international conditions and pressures that
we can chart state foreign policy and human rights.
 
I. Foreign policy and multilateralism
Very few states openly reject the International Bill of Rights and many of its supplemental treaties. No
state has ever sought to adhere formally to the United Nations Charter but reserve against Articles 55 and
56 dealing with human rights. Almost all of the eight states that abstained in voting on the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights have repudiated their position at that time — Saudi Arabia being
the notable exception. There is something about the intrinsic attractiveness of the abstract notion of
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human rights that deters formal rejection — even by states prone to violate specific human rights rules in
specific situations. This pattern may represent only the homage that vice pays to virtue. Nevertheless, we
should recognize the hegemonic quality of the idea of human rights.
Yet there is variation among states in how seriously they take international human rights instruments, in
which obligations they accept, and in the extent to which they attach reservations and other conditions to
their acceptance. Whereas Hungary's constitution, for example, proclaims the superiority of international
law, including human rights law, over national law, dominant legal tradition is otherwise in the United
States. In the latter state, it is only with considerable difficulty that the state agrees to be bound by
international human rights provisions, if at all. US subordination to the international law of human rights
certainly does not happen by constitutional proclamation. Other comparisons are useful. Whereas almost
all states accept economic and social rights in the abstract but treat them as "step-children" or "poor
cousins" in practice, the United States has never officially accepted economic and social rights as real
rights that the state is obligated to respect. Various states have appended various reservations to various
human rights treaties, but only the United States has so qualified its formal acceptance of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as to have other states call into question the validity
of its original acceptance under the international law of treaties.
We can also compare states in terms of the importance of regional arrangements on human rights. In
general, the states most affected by regional organizations on human rights are the European ones. While
all of them are now subject to the human rights standards and application measures in the Council of
Europe (CE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), especially affected
are the states that are members of the European Union (EU). These 15 states are subject to the
supranational human rights rulings of the both the EU's European Court of Justice and the CE's European
Court of Human Rights. The sum total of the effects of the EU, CE, and OSCE means that human rights
issues have a higher profile in Europe than in other regions. Most of the states in the western hemisphere,
Africa, the Middle East, and Asia do not have to face the prospect of binding judgments on human rights
by international courts, as is true in regard to the European Court of Human Rights and the European
Court of Justice. (There is the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, but it handles few cases compared
with Europe — and the United States is not subject to its jurisdiction.) Some states such as Britain may
be far more affected by the need to bring domestic laws and conditions into compliance with regional
standards than by the need to adjust national law to domestic pressures, although this particular
comparison is a difficult one to make with certainty.
It is also illuminating to compare the pattern of foreign policy regarding human rights in the international
financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank. Some states like Germany have obviously been in
favour of some "political conditionality" in which some loans are made conditional on certain human
rights developments. Other states, particularly the borrowing states like India, have objected. The latter
group of states tends to see such international human rights conditionality as a violation of the original
terms of agreement of the IFIs and as a violation of the state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction of the
borrowers. For those states in favour of linking developmental loans to human rights conditions,
important questions can be raised about whether or not such conditionality is being pursued with clarity
and consistency. The answer in general is almost assuredly in the negative, 9 raising the issue of whether
those states with paramount influence in IFI circles need to revisit their policy on this question.
During the first decade after the end of the Cold War, an important question concerned the interaction of
state foreign policy with the United Nations organs most active on human rights issues. Especially if
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states were permanent members of the UN Security Council or elected to it, were they in favour of
expanding the scope of Chapter VII and peace and security issues to encompass human rights matters?
Were they in favour of a new permissibility for "humanitarian intervention" and thus overriding state
consent in the interest of protecting persons inside states from gross and systematic violation of their
rights recognized in international law? Some states, such as India, were clearly opposed, fearing the use
of the discourse on human rights in the cause of rather narrow interests by the permanent five members.
After all, in the past several centuries it was difficult to discover very many, if any, cases of truly
principled humanitarian intervention in which the stronger powers acted for the real rights of foreigners
without pursuit of narrow commercial or strategic issues. Ironically, India had rationalized its forcible
dismemberment of old Pakistan in 1981 by reference to humanitarian intervention — namely, the need to
stop the slaughter of Bengalis. Other states, such as the United States, seemed supportive of new thinking
on humanitarian intervention at least during the 1991–1993 period, but more cautious after the 1993
events in Somalia. Still other states, such as Japan, in places like Cambodia, had certainly participated in
UN field missions with human rights components, but had sought to maintain as much deference to state
sovereignty as efficient politics would allow. The Japanese, for example, were not in favour of trying to
use force to secure the compliance of the Khmer Rouge with the human rights and other agreements they
had signed. Thus the matter of state cooperation with a Security Council sometimes prone to take a broad
interpretation of its rights under Chapter VII pertaining to "peace and security" remained an important
point of analysis.
Another important question was whether or not states really supported international criminal prosecution
for those who had engaged in grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, genocide, and crimes
against humanity. Which states were in favour of a standing UN criminal court, with an independent
prosecutor capable of initiating a broad range of indictments stemming especially from events in armed
conflicts? On the other hand, which states saw emerging international criminal law as a grave
infringement of the prerogatives of state sovereignty and sometimes an impediment to the diplomacy that
could put an end to atrocities by political rather than juridical means? Britain under a Conservative
government in the mid-1990s publicly endorsed international criminal justice in the former Yugoslavia,
but behind the scenes worked to block the operation of the relevant Tribunal. London preferred a
diplomatic rather than a juridical agreement that would end most of the fighting and associated violations
of human rights. The United States supported international criminal justice in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, but the Pentagon and key conservatives in the Senate vigorously opposed any notion that US
personnel should be subjected to trial by a standing international criminal court. Thus the United States
voted against the statute for such a court at a diplomatic conference in Rome during July 1998.
Yet another set of questions that was related to state foreign policy at the United Nations concerned the
use states made of the General Assembly. What initiatives, if any, did they take on human rights issues in
that forum? Costa Rica, for example, had initiated a draft resolution on human rights education. How
typical was this? Other states in the 1990s had introduced resolutions with wording favourable to a
collective international right to receive humanitarian assistance, especially in times of armed conflict and
similar situations. Which states supported such measures, and which states voted in opposition in the
name of traditional notions of state sovereignty? On the outcome of answers to such questions rested the
prospects of codification of new humanitarian principles.
In the UN Human Rights Commission, the traditional hub of UN routine diplomacy on human rights,
which states pursued which agendas with what results? Which states, for example, wished to adopt
resolutions critical of China's human rights record in order to pressure that permanent member of the
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Security Council to liberalize or perhaps even democratize? Which states wanted to pursue dialogue with
China on human rights through other, less confrontational means? And which states sided with China in
wanting to reduce as much as possible the international dialogue altogether about China and human
rights? What were the long-term trends regarding use of the UN Human Rights Commission to try to see
international human rights standards applied? And which states were primarily responsible for these
trends? Which states, for example, pressed for emergency Commission sessions on former Yugoslavia
and also Rwanda, with what results? To take another example, which states led the move toward
enhanced legal protections for indigenous peoples, and again with what results?
A closely related question focused on state policies toward the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). It was reasonably well known that the OECD states were the largest contributors to
UNHCR's budget, which in the 1990s was more and more devoted to humanitarian assistance. The
UNHCR increasingly sought to provide socio-economic help not just to conventional refugees fleeing
persecution, but also to those who found themselves in a refugee-like situation regardless of legal niceties
— such as displaced persons inside a country's borders and those fleeing disorder rather than individually
targeted persecution. But beyond financial support, which states — if any — afforded the UNHCR
remarkable influence in the awarding of refugee status and/or at least temporary asylum? Which states
most closely and consistently followed UNHCR guidelines for decision-making on these delicate
questions? Which states manifested considerable friction with the UNHCR, and over what issues?
Given that the promotion and protection of human rights increasingly constituted one of the main
activities of the United Nations, which was entirely consistent with its Charter adopted in 1945, it was
important to understand the intersection of state foreign policy with this principal purpose of the
Organization.
 
II. Bilateral policy and human rights
In the shrinking and interconnected world that exists as we prepare to enter the twenty-first century, it is
frequently not possible fully to separate multilateral from bilateral foreign policy. The difference is
frequently one of degree rather than an absolute kind. When a state seeks to undertake a foreign policy
apart from formal international organizations, increasingly it often seeks to coordinate that policy with its
political friends and usual allies. The old maxim about safety in numbers has some relevance to the
subject at hand, since collective approval and support, even outside intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs), confers some political legitimacy and otherwise helpful backing to a state's goals. Thus when, in
the early 1990s, the United States took up the possibility of some sanctions on military government in
Nigeria because of its continuing repression, Washington discussed matters with especially its European
political allies. (Finding little support for its ideas, the United States was not able to maximize its
objectives.) Nevertheless, states do pursue some foreign policy objectives largely on a bilateral basis,
even if at some point these national initiatives may become entangled in multilateral developments or
take place against the background of multilateral standards and organizations. This pattern certainly
holds for human rights abroad.
One of the more important questions in contemporary international relations is the extent to which
various states make the creation and consolidation of liberal democracy one of their salient foreign policy
goals. By liberal democracy we refer to a polity manifesting free and fair elections for national office, on
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the basis of almost universal suffrage, with the winners actually governing the country; accompanied by
the rule of law and constitutionalism (government limited by law); with protection of those civil and
political rights that reasonably protect against the tyranny of the majority. Whether a liberal democracy is
also a social democracy depends on its implementation of socio-economic rights. There are multilateral
programmes on this subject, such as supervision of elections by the United Nations and the Organization
of American States (OAS) and the OSCE. But here we are concerned with bilateral developments.
It can actually happen that an authoritarian state displays a foreign policy supportive of some type of
democracy abroad. Nigeria under military rule has operated in some neighbouring countries to oppose
coups that deposed elected officials (Sierra Leone), and to create elected governments out of failed states
(Liberia). But surely this is an exception that tends to prove the general rule that authoritarian foreign
policy is not much interested in the creation and consolidation of liberal democracy.
It is also unhappily true that liberal democracies do not always support democratic developments abroad
— certainly in the short term. It is well known, and reiterated in most of the chapters that follow, that
liberal democracies often perceive economic, strategic, and other reasons to support authoritarian and
otherwise repressive leaders in foreign countries. Historically it was war and other threats to national
security traditionally defined that caused democracies to support authoritarian states. Allied support for
Stalin's Soviet Union during the Second World War is a classic example.
In the modern world, however, many liberal democracies at least articulate a desire to create and
consolidate liberal democracy as part of their foreign policy. This may be because such a goal is seen to
reinforce global peace; the proposition of the democratic peace — that liberal democracies do not war
inter se — has received much attention. This articulation of support for democracy abroad may occur
because liberal democracies are seen to reinforce business and trade objectives; limited governments
with large private sectors and a free electorate may be good for business and international trade.
Articulating a pro-democracy foreign policy may occur because liberal democracies, at least in their
public pronouncements, find it difficult to practise democracy at home and not preach it abroad; states do
like to be, and do tend to be, similar in their domestic and foreign policies much of the time. 10 After all,
domestic and foreign policy are made by the same elected leaders in liberal democracies.
In any event, most of the Western liberal democracies go beyond rhetoric and take a position on liberal
democracy abroad in two ways. States such as the United States have a proactive, programmatic
approach to this subject, helping to fund various activities in foreign countries designed to promote
"liberal market democracies." The question arises as to the record of other states in this regard. Secondly,
when there is an attempted or real change of government abroad, Washington takes a position on whether
to recognize and otherwise support the new situation. The presence or absence of liberal democracy
informs US decisions on these matters. This is not to say that liberal democracy is the only question on
the agenda. It is to say that a discussion of liberal democracy is part of Washington's decision-making
process — whether the precise subject is an auto-golpe or attempt to seize excessive power by the
President in Guatemala in 1993, a coup in Sierra Leone in 1997, a change of government in former Zaire
in 1997, a grab for power by Hun Sen in Cambodia in 1998, and so on.
Given that liberal democratic rights are enshrined in the International Bill of Rights, as well as in various
resolutions by the United Nations, OAS, CE, EU, OSCE, etc., it is important to enquire into state foreign
policy and liberal democracy. International standards call for liberal democracy, whatever its impact on
international peace or free trade and prosperity. To what extent does a state seek to advance stable liberal
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democracy abroad on either a programmatic or an ad hoc basis? What resources, if any, are devoted to
this objective? What policies might substitute for this objective as a central goal of foreign policy, and
why? What is the state's pattern in finding reasons for recognizing, tolerating, or even actively working
with authoritarian and repressive regimes? Over time, does a state show more or less attention to the
question of democracy abroad, and why?
A related question is the extent to which a state will try to alter its various foreign assistance
programmes, and regulate foreign direct investment and/or trade by the private sector, because of human
rights issues. Again if we take the United States as an example, since the mid-1970s the Congress has
required that US economic and military assistance to foreign states be linked to several human rights
considerations or to unspecified human rights in general. Because of this legislation, and indeed because
of shifting executive desires, the United States has some 25 years of experience with trying to use the
levers of foreign assistance to advance certain human rights concerns. This is in addition to collective
economic measures taken through the United Nations and other IGOs in the name of human rights
protection. Washington has also sought on occasion to manipulate direct foreign assistance and trade by
the private sector because of human rights, although in general it is reluctant to do this. It did so,
however, regarding Uganda under Idi Amin and the Republic of South Africa under white minority rule
from 1986.
One would think a clear picture has emerged as to the relationship of foreign assistance and other
economic measures to human rights, and vice versa. Alas, as shown in chapter 2 on US foreign policy,
efforts to track these relationships have led to somewhat elusive conclusions. Other states, too, such as
Britain and the Netherlands, have from time to time made clear to other states that the latter should not
count on continued foreign assistance as long as certain human rights problems remain. In particular,
chapter 3 by Peter Baehr on the Netherlands shows that it is not always easy for a state to manipulate a
relationship involving foreign assistance into influence for the donor over human rights matters.
Nevertheless, states continue to try to manipulate foreign assistance and regulate foreign investment and
trade in the light of their foreign policy goals, including advancement of human rights. To generate
influence is arguably the main point of, especially, foreign assistance, pure altruism on the part of states
being in rather short supply. It is frequently difficult to sell a purely altruistic foreign policy to many
taxpayers at home, who demand or expect some expedient return. And in some situations, say US
relations with Guatemala in 1993, or US relations with Croatia during most of the late 1990s, the US
threat of or actual withholding of foreign assistance because of human rights issues did appear to have
some effect on the recipient state. The auto-golpe was rolled back (although more factors were at work
than just US foreign policy); the Tudjman government in Croatia did turn over some indicted and thus
suspected war criminals to the UN ad hoc criminal tribunal at The Hague. Thus it is important to
continue to make a comparative analysis of the extent to which states seek to protect human rights
through foreign assistance, and with what results. Likewise, although there is a large literature trying to
assess the effect of sanctions that interrupt investment and trade, there is much left to learn about, in
particular, prohibition of investment/trade on a bilateral basis and advancement of human rights.
States, because of political culture, geographical position, or constructed national interests, may take a
variety of essentially national initiatives on human rights in foreign policy. We would hypothesize that
the number of such initiatives is growing by an ever larger number of states, given the extent to which
the discourse on human rights, and at least diplomatic action in its behalf, has been institutionalized in
international relations. 11 We need to test that hypothesis with careful enquiry.
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III. Conclusions
The chapters that follow, undertaken on the basis of the questions outlined in this introduction, should
begin to give us a better picture of state foreign policy and human rights on a fairly broad scale. We
should arrive at a comparative evaluation of real as opposed to pro forma state views of the International
Bill of Rights and of the most important human rights treaties ancillary to that core standard. On the basis
of our enquiries, we should be able to say something about the prospects of consistency and perhaps even
coordination concerning human rights in foreign policy. Is it true that most states seek to address human
rights problems abroad only in small or weak states, or those perceived to be unimportant to national
interests — however defined? Is it true that most states, in so far as they take action on human rights
abroad through their foreign policies, do so almost exclusively in relation to civil-political rights rather
than socio-economic rights? Even with various problems and deficiencies in conceptualization and
execution, is it not true that more states are taking more action for international human rights than ever
before in their histories?
These are important questions. This volume seeks to make a first step in answering them. No doubt it
will not be the last word on the subject. Improvements will no doubt be made in conceptualization,
methodology, and substantive findings. Nevertheless, given the lack of studies of human rights and
foreign policy in comparative perspective to date, we are confident that the current project will provide a
useful foundation on which others can build.
With some 190 states in the world, it is unclear what a perfect sample would look like for the purpose of
examining the place of human rights in contemporary foreign policy. We wanted to include some major
powers, and thus we included the United States, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom.
We wanted to include some liberal democracies, members of the OECD, and thus we included the
Netherlands along with the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan. We wanted to include some
states in the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, and thus we included Hungary
and South Africa, along with Russia. We also wanted to include some states that were critical of
universal human rights as recognized through the United Nations, or critical of the way in which the
Security Council had acted in relation to these rights, and so we included Iran and India. We wanted to
pay attention to equitable geographical representation, and thus we included states from Latin America,
Africa, East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, and North America.
We wanted to include a collection of states that did justice to population factors, and thus we included
India, the United States, South Africa, and Russia, while not ignoring the smaller or middle range states
such as Costa Rica and the Netherlands. Our original plans included attention to Chinese foreign policy
and human rights, but for personnel reasons we were reluctantly forced to change course.
With an unlimited budget and a multi-volume project, we could have added numerous states that merit
study: France, Norway, Germany, Nigeria, Kenya, Mexico, Brazil, Pakistan, Israel, the Philippines, etc.
Constrained by finances and also by a desire to produce a single monograph at a reasonable price, so that
our analyses might indeed circulate relatively widely, a steering committee in consultation with UNU
officials finally decided upon the present 10 states. As stated in the earlier pages of this introduction, we
believe the results comprise a carefully considered advance in our understanding of human rights and
foreign policy in comparative perspective.
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Chapter 2: US foreign policy and human rights:
The price of principles after the Cold War
David P. Forsythe
 
The United States, like virtually all other states, has constructed a positive self-image. This self-image
centres on defence of personal freedom, understood as civil and political rights. The notion of the United
States as symbol of individual civil and political rights, an idea not without some relative and historical
validity, has been problematic enough in a domestic context — given such historical facts as slavery and
racial segregation, racist immigration laws, anti-Semitism, and gender discrimination, inter alia. But the
question of whether the United States should champion civil and political rights through an activist
foreign policy has been much more problematical, giving rise to considerable debate since the founding
of the Republic. Moreover, the United States mostly rejects any necessary relationship between
socio-economic rights and the classical civil and political rights so central to Western liberal philosophy
— aside from a commitment to the economic (civil?) right to private property. After the Cold War, the
United States has continued to identify with leadership for civil and political rights in world affairs. But it
has not always, or even very often, been willing to pay even a moderate price, in either blood or treasure,
to see these rights implemented in foreign countries — as seems true for other democracies as well. It has
also continued to reject a clear, consistent, and meaningful endorsement of most socio-economic rights.
The United States, although making some positive contributions to the advancement of internationally
recognized human rights through its foreign policy, still struggles to institutionalize attention to human
rights abroad, especially as defined in the International Bill of Rights, and especially when even
moderate costs are entailed.
 
I. Introduction
Rare is the ruling elite that does not manipulate national opinion to produce a positive self-image. The
United States is no exception to this generalization. The United States sees itself as standing above all for
personal freedom. In this view the American revolution from 1776 and especially its Constitution from
1787 represented the broadest and most practical endorsement of individual human rights then known to
political man. Given the subsequent cultural, economic, and political accomplishments of the United
States, most Americans accept the view that the country represents a shining city on a hill, a beacon to all
others; in this view the United States has much to teach others about the proper conduct of public affairs.
1 That other countries like France make similar claims to being a universal model for human rights with a
mission civilitrice has not diminished the United States' sense of itself as positively unique. The core
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conception of what it means to be American entails allegiance to the US Constitution and the personal
freedoms entailed in that document and its Bill of Rights. 2 Thus dominant American political culture is
inseparable from a conception of human rights within a rule of law. The notion of civil and political
rights is intrinsic to US political history.
Obvious defects in American society have done little to undermine the dominant view that the United
States stands for personal freedom and has constructed an admirable society based on this principle.
Systematic and legally approved discrimination against racial minorities, women, and certain foreign
nationalities trying to immigrate to the United States has not undermined an American informal ideology
that sees the country as representing equal freedom and opportunity for all. Part of this amorphous
ideology holds that, if an individual is assertive and works hard, individual freedom will produce
material good things. Thus there is little need for socio-economic rights, such as the right to publicly
provided national health care. 3 Dominant American opinion is not very sympathetic to the idea that there
can be too much personal freedom, so that those with power and wealth exploit those without. The
presence in the United States of inner cities and rural areas with a poor quality of life is mostly attributed
to the deficiencies of the inhabitants, not to any failings of the society or the political—legal system as a
whole. The alleged lack of an American sense of community, by comparison with countries such as
Canada, is not given much attention and is certainly not attributed to an excessive commitment to
individualism. 4 Criticisms of American individualism from various foreign parties, whether Canadian,
West European, or Asian, inter alia, have yet to make notable inroads on traditional thinking. After the
Cold War the Democratic Party joined the Republican Party in reducing welfare benefits for the poor and
vulnerable, while emphasizing the individual work ethic and the need to grow the economy through
governmental support for the business sector. The Reagan revolution persists, entailing an emphasis on
individual freedom and competition — and American greatness. At the 1997 Denver summit of the seven
largest industrialized democracies, plus Russia, President Clinton trumpeted this belief in the superiority
of the American example, to the obvious reserve of the other participants.
Despite this self-image of leadership for human rights, it is by no means clear that the United States is
easily given to moral crusades for personal freedom abroad in actual policy. It is true that distinguished
analysts such as George Kennan and John Spanier have identified a moral strain in American rhetoric
about foreign policy, such as Woodrow Wilson's "crusade" to make the world safe for democracy after
the First World War. 5 But the noted historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. has shown that from the
beginning of the Republic there has been debate about whether it should have an activist foreign policy
in behalf of individual freedom abroad, or should lead by the more introverted model of constructing the
good society at home. 6 A few examples suffice to make the point historically. The United States did not
actively support various democratic movements abroad, as in 1848, and was one of the last states of the
Western world to abandon slavery at home and then oppose it elsewhere. Neither in 1914 nor in 1939 did
the United States rush to defend its democratic partners in Europe, but rather clung to a commercially
inspired neutrality until attacks on its shipping and military installations, respectively, brought it into the
two world wars. During the Cold War the United States undermined a number of elected governments
and engaged in other anti-humanitarian interventions in order to increase its power vis-à-vis the Soviet
Union. 7 Although some authors feared that increased rhetoric in behalf of human rights during the 1970s
would lead to a moral crusade in US foreign policy, 8 the overall evidence strongly suggests that US
concrete support for human rights abroad is a matter to be demonstrated rather than assumed. 9 The
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United States, like other states with a relatively serious (but far from perfect) commitment to certain
human rights at home, may sometimes not be inclined toward a rights-supportive foreign policy — as
French policy toward various contemporary African states so clearly demonstrates. 10
 
II. Domestic factors
A variety of domestic factors in the United States combined after the Cold War to ensure some attention
to human rights in foreign policy, but also to ensure that the government did not pay a high price to see
those principles advanced in world affairs.
President Bush spoke of a "new world order" with increased attention to international law and human
rights, 11 and President Clinton spoke of enlarging the global democratic community as one of the pillars
of his foreign policy. 12 This was to be expected. Since the Nixon—Kissinger years (1969–1976), all
Presidents have paid lip-service to advancing international human rights as part of a moral dimension to
US foreign policy. Both principal political parties realized that a Kissinger-like emphasis on a realist or
power politics approach to world affairs did not resonate well with American society.
Public opinion polls showed that the general public as well as opinion leaders did indeed list promoting
and defending human rights in other countries, as well as helping to bring a democratic form of
government to other nations, as "very important" goals of US foreign policy. 13 But in 1995 these goals
were in 13th and 14th place, respectively, with only 34 percent and 25 percent of the general public
listing them as very important. In contrast, 80 percent or more of the general public listed stopping the
flow of illegal drugs into the United States, protecting the jobs of American workers, and preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons as much more important, inter alia. Analysts concluded that there was
considerable American popular support for pragmatic or self-interested internationalism, but not a great
deal of support for moral internationalism. 14
There were many non-governmental organizations active in Washington on human rights questions. Two
of the most prominent were Amnesty International-USA and Human Rights Watch. They were quite
different. AI-USA used a general figure of 350,000 for its American membership, relied on public
pressure to achieve its goals of specific protection on the ground, and manifested a restricted mandate
focusing on prisoner matters — a mandate that had displayed "mission creep" over the years since its
founding in the United Kingdom in 1961. Human Rights Watch relied on elite action rather than a mass
movement, focused traditionally on a broad range of civil and political rights with some slight attention
to socio-economic factors, and aimed more at affecting public policy than releasing specific prisoners.
Legally oriented groups, such as the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, were especially numerous.
Physicians for Human Rights frequently used forensic science to testify in Congress about such subjects
as political murder in places like El Salvador and Bosnia. American labour, ethnic, and religious groups
also were active on international human rights issues. And foreign-based human rights organizations,
such as Doctors Without Borders (Medecins Sans Frontieres), were much in evidence in various policy
debates. But Amnesty International, among others, bemoaned its lack of ability to orient US foreign
policy toward more support for various human rights issues. 15
The communications media based in the United States covered foreign human rights and humanitarian
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issues with such apparent influence sometimes that one spoke of "the CNN factor" in the making of US
foreign policy. This was especially true after media coverage of the Kurdish plight in Iraq in 1991 and
the plight of many starving Somalis in 1992 helped to produce US and international action on these
issues. But the failure of media coverage to propel international involvement in Rwanda in 1994 and in
eastern Zaire in 1997 showed the limits of the CNN factor. If an administration had a firm view of its
interests, and especially of the dangers of involvement, it might not be much influenced by media
coverage of foreign human rights problems.
The American business community is difficult to characterize on foreign human rights issues. Some
American corporations, such as Levi Strauss, had a clear human rights policy. Strauss, based in San
Francisco, refused to make blue jeans in China for human rights reasons. They were willing to pay
whatever costs were involved in such decisions. The American garment industry was under increased
pressure in the 1990s to do something about child labour and other issues about exploitation in its foreign
operations. But most American corporations seemed not to support the interruption of business as usual
for human rights purposes. Most American businesses interested in contracts in China, for example,
came down on the side of delinking China's human rights record from questions of trade and especially
questions about most-favoured-nation (MFN) status. Under heavy business lobbying, a majority in
Congress pushed for a delinking of China's human rights record from MFN status, and the Clinton
administration shifted gears to accept this orientation.
The Congress paid considerable attention to human rights in foreign policy from the mid-1970s, and on
the House side — but not the Senate — there was a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee that
tracked international human rights issues. The Congress acted in independent fashion on many foreign
policy issues, relative to other legislatures. It had pushed the executive branch into action on a variety of
human rights issues in the past in places such as Eastern Europe and South Africa. It had created a
special bipartisan and bicameral Helsinki Commission to work for human rights in communist Europe
during the Cold War. This Helsinki Commission continued its existence after about 1990 in efforts to
promote democracy and the protection of national minorities in Europe. But especially after 1994 the
Republican-controlled Congress seemed to reflect a certain fatigue with many foreign policy initiatives,
especially those involving expenditure of money. Forty years of Cold War produced a wave of
budget-cutting on foreign spending that made it difficult to undertake costly human rights programmes.
Although the Department of State manifested a human rights bureau from the mid-1970s because of
congressional instructions, this office — renamed the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
— had little special clout in most administrations whether Democratic or Republican. Foreign Service
Officers preferred assignment in other parts of the State Department as a faster track to career
advancement. The office did compile annual country reports on the human rights situation in all other
countries of the world, which received considerable domestic and foreign attention when submitted to
Congress each year. Under congressional pressure, itself generated primarily by American conservative
Christian groups, the office also started putting out an annual report on the persecution of Christians
abroad. This report contributed to the saliency of the issue of religious freedom, which had long enjoyed
a special status in the United States, given that many early settlers came to North America to escape
religious persecution in Europe.
More important was the general opposition at high levels of the Defense Department to involvement of
the US military in operations other than war or in low-level irregular warfare where the full power of the
US high-tech, industrialized military establishment could not be brought to bear. The Pentagon was more
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comfortable fighting the Persian Gulf War against Iraq than in deploying limited force for limited and
complicated human rights purposes in places such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Especially after
Madeleine Albright became Secretary of State, the Clinton administration was the scene of much debate
between a Secretary of State who favoured military deployment for human rights purposes on occasion,
and a Secretary of Defense and military staff who agreed with Michael Mandelbaum when he wrote that
foreign policy was not social work and the United States was not Mother Teresa. 16 The Pentagon's
reluctance to engage itself in less than all-out warfare led one commentator to observe that, since the
United States wanted no casualties except in defence of traditional and narrow national interests, which
was true of major European states as well, there were no Great Powers any more. 17 No state wanted to
pay any significant price to control the outcome of most controversies that arose in international
relations.
Because of this mix of domestic factors, one can better understand why human rights remained a fixture
on the agenda of US foreign policy, but also why there were no crusades for human rights abroad
entailing even moderate, much less high, financial and human costs. One can thus understand why the
United States was reluctant to engage decisively while killing raged in places such as Bosnia and
Rwanda, especially after American loss of life in Somalia. One can equally understand why the Clinton
administration was mostly hesitant to pursue the arrest of war criminals, especially in the former
Yugoslavia, fearing costly retaliation that would undermine public, congressional, and military support
for the presence of US military forces in that complicated and unstable situation. One could fashion
moral, legal, and even pragmatic arguments for US activism on a number of human rights issues abroad.
One could argue, for example, that it would have cost the United States less money to stop the genocide
in Rwanda than it paid out in subsequent years to help care for the refugees from genocide. The Clinton
administration did take politically risky action for human rights in Haiti, since there was little support for
that action in Congress and the Pentagon, although it was also pushed toward military deployment by
domestic political forces — i.e. the congressional Black caucus demanding attention to the plight of
Haitians, and politicians from south Florida demanding an end to unwanted Haitian immigration. But the
central fact remained. Important parts of the American body politic — the general public, the business
community, the Pentagon, and the Congress — were highly pragmatic and prudent about any costly
crusade for international human rights. Clinton himself, a capable domestic politician and one not much
given to sustained interest in foreign affairs, demonstrated no great personal passion on the issue of
internationally recognized human rights.
 
III. Multilateral human rights policy
The International Bill of Rights
Although the United States pictures itself as a leader for human rights in the world, it has long
manifested an uneasy relationship with the International Bill of Rights, made up of the human rights
provisions of the United Nations Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights. In 1945 the United States was in favour of general human rights language in
the UN Charter, but opposed more specific language creating enforceable legal obligations. Likewise, the
United States took the lead in the UN Human Rights Commission in pressing for the adoption of the
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Universal Declaration, but insisted it was only a statement of aspirations.
The two basic Covenants, and other UN human rights treaties like the one on genocide, have been
especially controversial in Washington. 18 American nationalists fear that the preferred status of the US
Constitution will be superseded by treaty law. Those in favour of internal states' rights fear that treaty law
will excessively empower the federal government. Conservatives fear that international human rights
principles will weaken American individualism and respect for private property. Racists fear further
attention to principles of racial equality and multiculturalism. Unilateralists fear the further enmeshment
of the United States in international (read, foreign) decision-making.
The prominence of these views during the 1950s, reflected in lobbying by the American Bar Association,
caused the Eisenhower administration to eschew ratification of human rights treaties and to abandon a
leadership role in human rights within international organizations. 19 The Kennedy administration
successfully obtained ratification of several non-salient human rights treaties. The Carter administration,
after Congress partially reversed itself and began to emphasize human rights abroad in some of its
legislation from 1974, 20 submitted the two basic Covenants to the Senate for advice and consent, but did
not lobby effectively for them. Things began to change superficially thereafter.
The Reagan administration, despite being the most unilateralist administration since the Second World
War, secured ratification of the 1948 Genocide Convention in 1989. The Bush administration secured
ratification of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992. Both formal adherences were
accompanied by senatorial reservations, understandings, and declarations of a highly restrictive nature. 21
In fact, the Dutch government challenged US actions as being violative of international law. In the Dutch
view, shared by others, the reservations, understandings, and declarations were incompatible with the
basic purposes of the treaties in question. It appeared to these critics that the United States was trying to
appear to accept the human rights treaties in question without actually having to incur any real and
specific legal obligations. It was clear that, on the subject of civil and political rights, the United States
did not want to expand on the provisions in the US Constitution and Bill of Rights. Moreover, the United
States did not want to give the International Court of Justice at The Hague the jurisdiction to handle
genocide petitions, or the UN Committee on Human Rights in Geneva the jurisdiction to receive
individual complaints from Americans. The United States did finally agree, under the Civil and Political
Covenant, to submit a report on its civil and political rights to the UN Committee on Human Rights and
to respond to questions about that report. Such a process transpired for the first time during the Clinton
administration. This exchange immediately led to conflict between the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the UN Human Rights Committee. Senator Jesse Helms, the Chair of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, challenged the right of the UN Human Rights Committee to make general
statements about US policy decisions.
Although both the Carter and Clinton administrations have endorsed the UN Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, it remains especially controversial in Washington. Its values are in fact quite
different from traditional American values, as noted above. The Republican Party and conservatives in
general remain strongly opposed to the notion that the US government should be obligated, without the
fundamental discretion to choose otherwise, to provide such things as food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care to those who cannot purchase them in private markets. There is zero prospect, as of 1999, that the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee would recommend to the full Senate that the latter give its advice
and consent to this treaty. Even absent the Chair of that committee in 1997, Senator Jesse Helms of North
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Carolina, a strong critic of the United Nations and its human rights activities in general, Senate approval
would be highly difficult to obtain. 22 Thus far no President, including Carter, wanted to use up limited
presidential influence vis-à-vis Congress in fighting for ratification of this Covenant.
Regional developments
The United States is a member both of the Organization of American States (OAS) and of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). In the former it has displayed sporadic
diplomacy for human rights while avoiding as many legal obligations as possible under both the
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and the Inter-American Convention on Human
Rights. In the OSCE, including its predecessor diplomatic process, the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the United States has been highly active on human rights. One sees in
these two regional organizations the same US pattern in foreign policy that one finds more generally. The
United States frequently pushes civil and political rights for others through diplomacy, but is reluctant to
reconsider its domestic laws and policies under international human rights instruments.
The inter-American system for the promotion and protection of human rights is complicated. 23 The
United States has not been, and is not in the 1990s, a hegemonic leader for human rights in this regional
arrangement. 24 The same domestic factors that caused reserve toward the International Bill of Rights at
the United Nations caused the United States to reject the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights,
with its attendant Court, and to contest the judgment that the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man was legally binding on members of the OAS. Also, the United States during the Cold War
saw the OAS as primarily a security arrangement for the containment if not rollback of communism. This
view required the United States to downgrade the importance of specific human rights in the hemisphere,
since many of its security allies were also brutal authoritarians. Moreover, given the history of US
military interventions in the hemisphere, many hemispheric states refused to defer to US leadership on a
variety of issues including human rights, fearing US motivations and intentions.
From time to time the United States has utilized the OAS to advance human rights concerns. The Carter
administration did so in its efforts to oust the dictator Anastasio Debayle Somoza from Nicaragua in the
1970s, supporting the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in its critical reports and
diplomacy. The Bush administration did so in supporting the Santiago Declaration that declared any
attack on democratic government in states of the hemisphere to be an international, and not domestic,
matter — meriting a regional response. The Bush and Clinton administrations utilized the OAS, along
with the United Nations, for electoral assistance and expanded peacekeeping operations (which include
additional human rights programmes) in such countries as Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Haiti.
Although the OAS has few programmes on the ground in the hemisphere and is not an organization that
one can rely on for either military security or sustainable economic development, its human rights
programme is the bright spot of the organization. This programme the United States has supported as it
sees fit, but without fully integrating itself into OAS human rights activities — much less being a
hegemonic leader for human rights. If US deployment of force is contemplated in relation to hemispheric
human rights, as in Haiti or El Salvador, for example, the United States normally acts via the United
Nations. This is because of OAS sensitivity to past uses of force in the hemisphere as controlled by the
United States.
The old CSCE from 1974 manifested a human rights focus as one of its three main areas for diplomacy
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between the European communist and democratic states (with the United States and Canada as honorary
Europeans). The third section of the Helsinki Accord (Basket Three) on human rights was devised by
certain West European states, with the United States, under the influence of Henry Kissinger, being
reserved about the wisdom of discussing such "internal" questions as human rights violations by the
Soviet Union and its allies. 25 Once established, Basket Three came to be warmly endorsed by
subsequent US administrations, which, prodded by private human rights groups such as Helsinki Watch,
found it desirable to press the European communists on their human rights records. Because the old
Soviet Union wanted certain security and economic arrangements from the West, a number of Western
parties found it logical and advantageous to press the communists on human rights as a quid pro quo.
From the mid-1970s to about 1990, the European communists obtained very little through the CSCE
pertaining to security and economics. But, although scientific analysis is difficult, there is reason to
believe that constant US and Western pressure for human rights via the CSCE helped erode the
legitimacy of communist authority in Europe. It is plausible to argue that communist endorsement of the
Helsinki Accord, with its human rights and humanitarian provisions, including an obligation to
disseminate the accord in all CSCE states, encouraged dissent from communist authoritarian rule.
Numerous observers and participants have concluded that the CSCE process encouraged East European
defection from the Soviet alliance circa 1989, and helped undermine the very existence of the Soviet
Union up to 1991. 26 Many factors were at work, not least the many defects of the communist systems.
And the United States was only one of many actors involved in highlighting communist deficiencies.
Nevertheless, US foreign policy should be given some credit for developments, even if the CSCE
provisions on human rights and humanitarian affairs were of West European origin.
After the Cold War, the United States was hesitant to transform the CSCE into the OSCE, given US
concerns about the growing number of international organizations, bureaucracies, and budgets. Once the
OSCE was created, however, the United States supported its efforts to protect minorities and advance
human rights more generally throughout member states. The OSCE was especially active on human
rights issues in countries of the former Yugoslavia. These efforts drew strong US support, as Washington
was the primary player trying to make effective the provisions of the 1995 Dayton Accord. The Clinton
administration had brokered that accord and had self-interested reasons for making it work. It thus
welcomed efforts by the OSCE, along with others, to secure a liberal democratic peace in especially
Bosnia and Croatia.
Space limitations preclude analysis of two other regional developments. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) included provisions affecting labour rights in the United States, Canada, and
Mexico. And the US push for an expanded North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) sometimes
entailed human rights arguments, namely that such expansion would provide another international
framework for advancing democracy and managing minority problems. Significantly, the argument was
made in connection with an expanded NATO that international security ultimately meant the security of
persons inside states through protection of their human rights. 27
International financial institutions
For anyone concerned with the implementation of internationally recognized human rights, one of the
great problems has been the role of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These
international financial institutions (IFIs) have historically seen themselves as strictly economic
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organizations that are precluded from acting on political grounds. Human rights, including
socio-economic rights to adequate food, clothing, shelter, and health care, have been considered political
factors by these two agencies, which control sizeable resources. The World Bank has come to accept that
ecological concerns should be incorporated into its loan decisions as a regular part of its policy. The
Bank has not come to a similar conclusion about various human rights. The Bank began to address issues
of good governance, but tended to define this concept in accounting terms such as transparent economic
decision-making. The IMF has been even more resistant than the Bank in addressing human rights issues,
although some (inconsistent) shift might be taking place by the late 1990s. The United States has always
been the most important state in these two IFIs and bears considerable responsibility for their record on
human rights.
The crux of the problem is that the World Bank and the IMF may adopt loan policies that make it more
difficult, rather than less, for a state to consolidate liberal democracy and protect a wide range of
socio-economic human rights. The Bank and/or the IMF may insist on structural adjustment programmes
(SAPs) that cause the state to shrink programmes and services to the people, particularly the most
vulnerable people, for the sake of balancing the national budget, and thus increasing the private sector
and particularly its exports. Such SAPs may cause popular dissatisfaction with, even riots or rebellions
against, weak democratic governments. The Bank may make social assessments and provide some relief
for social adjustments, but continues to resist the idea that it is obligated under international law to meet
internationally recognized human rights. There is some evidence that IMF policies correlate with
increased governmental repression in the short term, as governments under SAP conditionality seek to
suppress popular discontent about harsh readjustment programmes. 28 If a weak democratic government,
as in El Salvador, needs resources to carry out land reform and other costly programmes in order to
satisfy various parties that have been in rebellion against past injustices, SAPs are definitely contrary to
the implementation of socio-economic rights within a democratic framework. 29
The United States has frequently pursued a contradictory foreign policy in a number of situations,
working in general for civil and political rights but voting for SAPs in the two IFIs under discussion that
undermine the prospects for implementation of international human rights standards. In some cases the
United States has resolved this contradiction by using the Bank as leverage to advance civil and political
rights. Thus, in a limited number of instances, the United States has joined some of its democratic
partners in the Bank to bring pressure on governments in places such as China, Kenya, or Malawi to
improve the implementation of these rights. Yet in other situations the United States and its democratic
allies have not insisted on political conditionality via the Bank. The overall record of the Bank on these
matters is thus highly inconsistent. The Bank staff, composed mostly of traditional economists, resists
systematic linkage with internationally recognized human rights, being willing to address social
assessment only in the form of increased public participation in Bank projects. In this connection the
Bank has created an Inspection Panel that can be triggered by private complaint. Periodically, state
members of the Bank, however, compel it to delay or suspend loans because of massacres, repression, or
authoritarianism. 30 In 1997 the United States succeeded in blocking an IMF loan to Croatia, because of
that state's failure to do such things as protect minorities and arrest those indicted for international
crimes. The United States had previously held up a Bank loan to the Serbian Republic within federal
Bosnia, for similar non-implementation of the Dayton Accord. Thus under US pressure the Bank and
Fund addressed some human rights factors, but on an inconsistent basis. The fact that the United States
has never accepted the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights contributes to this highly
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problematic situation.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which was supported by the United States
diplomatically and financially, contained an explicit clause on human rights in its articles of agreement.
Thus this European regional bank was always supposed to factor human rights considerations into its
loan decisions. On the other hand, the Inter-American Development Bank, which was greatly affected by
US policy, was similar to the World Bank, with only sporadic and inconsistent attention to human rights
considerations. 31
United Nations action
We have noted the United States' ambivalent attitude toward the International Bill of Rights. There has
been more general US ambivalence toward the United Nations as a whole, especially with the increased
influence of conservative circles of opinion in Washington in the 1980s and 1990s. 32 This ambivalence
toward the United Nations was deepened when, during the Cold War, the majority of states in the UN
General Assembly used the language of human rights to try to undermine governments allied with the
United States in South Africa, Israel, and Portugal and its colonial territories.
Since the ending of the Cold War, the United States has persistently sought to advance its views about
human rights through the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Human Rights Commission.
As the one putative superpower during this era, it has met with considerable success in its policy
objectives at the United Nations, and has broken some new legal and political ground in the process.
Although the United States has been primus inter pares in the Security Council, it has met with more
opposition in the Commission. In this latter body a strong undercurrent of reserve about US human rights
policy has surfaced, articulated primarily by non-Western critics.
In the Council during the first decade after the Cold War, the United States has pushed with some
success for three changes of major importance involving human rights. First, it has led in expanding the
scope of Chapter VII of the Charter, involving matters on which the Council can take a binding decision,
if necessary entailing coercive measures. In the process, the Council has shrunk the domain of exclusive
state domestic jurisdiction. In dealing with Iraq's repression of Iraqi Kurds in 1991, Somalian starvation
in 1992–1994, the breakup of former Yugoslavia during 1992–1995, the nature of government in Haiti
during 1993–1996, and genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the United States led the Council in adopting a very
broad scope to the notion of international peace and security. In effect, many human rights violations
essentially inside states came to be viewed as constituting a threat to or breach of international peace and
security, permitting authoritative Council decisions including the deployment of force and sometimes
limited combat action. The 1992 Security Council summit of heads of state officially endorsed this
expanded view of international responsibility, declaring that international peace could be disrupted by
economic, ecological, and social developments, not just by traditional military developments. 33 The
consequences of these Council decisions are potentially quite far reaching, leaving much less subject
matter to be essentially within the exclusive domain of supposedly sovereign states. The United States
has been central to all these developments, taking the lead in dealing with Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, and
being supportive of broad-reaching Council resolutions in the other relevant cases.
Secondly, the United States has also led in expanding the notion of UN peacekeeping that occurs mostly
under Chapter VI of the Charter pertaining to the peaceful settlement of disputes. At the end of the Cold
War the Council began to authorize complex or second-generation peacekeeping missions in countries
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such as Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia. Lightly armed military contingents, deployed with the
consent of the parties in conflict, were increasingly accompanied by civilian personnel, and entailed
considerable human rights duties. In places like El Salvador, deployments of human rights monitors
actually preceded cease-fire agreements and the deployment of cease-fire monitors. Especially in internal
rather than interstate conflicts, where the behaviour of the preceding government was a major cause of
unrest, UN peacekeeping was mostly directed to improvement of human rights conditions and the
creation and consolidation of a liberal democratic peace. Electoral assistance in various forms was
frequently a part of these field missions. Narrow military or quasi-military functions were only a small
part of most complex peacekeeping operations, although some of the operations were expanded to
limited enforcement operations under Chapter VII. While the United States might or might not provide
military elements to these field missions, it was always a key player in the authorization of
second-generation peacekeeping. It was still true that the UN Security Council had never in its history
deployed military force without the support of the United States. 34 Thus in many situations the United
States led the United Nations in seeking not just peace based on the constellation of military power, but a
liberal democratic peace based on many human rights.
Thirdly, the United States led the Council into the creation of two international criminal courts, one for
the former Yugoslavia and one for Rwanda, the first such courts since 1946 and the international
tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo. 35 In using the Council to create the 1993 and 1995 ad hoc courts
with jurisdiction to prosecute and try individuals for certain violations of international law, the United
States displayed mixed motives. On the one hand the United States did not want to engage in a costly
intervention into the complicated situations of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where people of ill-will
showed little hesitation in committing gross violations of human rights. In October 1993, events in
Somalia had demonstrated to the United States that good intentions could lead to further death and
injury. The two courts were created precisely because the United States in particular eschewed more
decisive action. Here was further evidence that the United States was not interested in a costly crusade
for human rights. On the other hand, the United States led the way in believing that some response had to
be made to the evident killing and abuse of civilians on a massive scale. Thus the United States
rejuvenated the idea of individual criminal responsibility for violations of the laws of war, crimes against
humanity, and genocide. It provided more financial and personnel support to the two courts than any
other state did. The United States eventually but successfully got agreement that NATO, embodied as
SFOR, should arrest indicted suspects in the former Yugoslavia from mid-1997.
At the same time, the United States as a whole displayed consistent caution about a permanent UN
criminal court. 36 It participated in negotiations for such a court, but in July 1998 it voted against the
draft statute for such a court, which was approved by 120 states. Only six other states, mostly repressive,
voted in the negative. The United States had tried to weaken the projected court, and had engaged in
heavy-handed lobbying in defence of its views. But Washington found itself isolated at the Rome
diplomatic conference, much as it had been isolated at the 1997 Ottawa diplomatic conference that
agreed to ban anti-personnel land mines. Clinton essentially caved in to a Pentagon that did not want an
international criminal court pressing it to court-martial US military personnel who might commit war
crimes. Clinton was also under pressure from the nativists in the Congress like Jesse Helms who refused
to accept in principle that US personnel and policies should be subject to international review and
control. Once again we see the United States using the United Nations when the issue is human rights for
others, as in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but hesitant to put itself under UN human rights law and
Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy: Chapter 2
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/forsythe/chapter02.html (11 of 22) [8/11/2002 10:03:58 PM]
authoritative agencies.
Since the ending of the Cold War, the General Assembly has not been terribly important to US foreign
policy. The United States prefers to focus on the Security Council, where it has a preferred position,
where it has important allies making up a high proportion of members, and where it can utilize the
authority of Chapter VII. From time to time the United States has supported certain initiatives in the
Assembly, such as the attempt to have clarified a presumed right to humanitarian assistance for
individuals in armed conflict and what at the United Nations are called complex emergencies. This
initiative resulted in several Assembly resolutions whose combined effect was ambiguous. Whereas the
United States and others succeeded in having adopted by consensus some language addressing
humanitarian need in these situations, developing countries insisted on including language endorsing
state consent before assistance could proceed. 37 The United States has supported other Assembly
resolutions on human rights and humanitarian affairs, but their impact on world politics has been mostly
marginal.
The United States used the Assembly to create the new office of High Commissioner for Human Rights
during fall 1993. The United States lobbied hard for this position, but so did other actors both public and
private. The United States was especially pleased when Secretary-General Kofi Annan named the former
Irish President, Mary Robinson, as the second High Commissioner. However, the United States has not
been a leader in efforts to increase the UN human rights budget, which remains at about 1 per cent of UN
regular spending, or under US$20 million. Congressional pressures have sought to reduce, not increase,
most UN finances.
In recent decades the United States had displayed a highly active diplomacy in the UN Human Rights
Commission. In the 1940s and 1950s in the Commission, to which the United States has always been
elected by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), Washington was content with the
Commission's self-denying ordinance by which it refused to take up specific human rights problems in
specific states. The executive's policy was shaped by its attempt to appease a non-cosmopolitan Congress
in the 1950s and 1960s, noted above. From about 1970 the United States was part of the bargaining that
led the Commission to shift its orientation, as it agreed to address human rights issues not only in Israel,
South Africa, and, somewhat later, Chile, but also in other countries such as Greece and Haiti. 38 From
that time the United States has, in principle, led or supported efforts to create a focus on particular
countries and subject matter through such mechanisms as rapporteurs and working groups. The United
States cooperated with the UN rapporteur on racial discrimination when he paid an extended visit to the
country, but the subsequent report resulted in very little American media coverage. The United States has
also supported the 1503 resolution, by which ECOSOC authorized the Commission to process private
petitions alleging a systematic pattern of gross violations of human rights, and eventually to give some
sort of publicity to offending states. The main exception to this US record of support for Commission
diplomacy of a specific nature occurred during the first Reagan administration when Washington sought
to block attention in the Commission to some of its more brutal authoritarian allies in places such as
Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
If one looks at the list of countries during the Cold War targeted by way of Commission resolutions and
decisions to create rapporteurs and working groups, that list is more or less balanced according to
geography and ideology. This suggests some US success, along with the Western Group, in directing
attention to a number of communist states and other adversaries. Since the Cold War, the overall list of
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states that has drawn Commission concern remains a reasonable one. However, the United States has
been unable to get the Commission to adopt a resolution critical of China's human rights record. China
has effectively mobilized a blocking coalition of states, appealing to a number of non-Western states with
the argument that the United States and certain other Western states focus too much on individual civil
and political rights, without sufficient attention to underdevelopment and cultural differences. In
historical fact, the Commission has focused mainly on civil and political rights since about 1970, with
relatively little attention to economic, social, and cultural rights. China has also utilized its growing
economic leverage to threaten states with loss of business contracts if they vote for critical resolutions in
the Commission. These threats were quite explicit with regard to Denmark and the Netherlands in 1997.
While these and other states like Britain continued to align with the United States in efforts to censure
China, other European states such as France, Germany, Italy, and Greece refused to support the United
States in the Commission during 1997 on the China question.
At the 1993 Vienna Conference on Human Rights sponsored by the United Nations, these same sorts of
debates were played out. 39 The United States took the lead in trying to reaffirm the validity of universal
human rights — while reserving to itself the discretion not to become a party to the Socio-Economic
Covenant, not to allow individual petitions under the Civil—Political Covenant, not to ban the death
penalty for common crimes, and not to give special protection to convicted minors under the age of 18.
The Clinton administration did rhetorically endorse a right to development, although previous
administrations had contested such a right in UN debates. A group of states led by China, Indonesia,
Singapore, and Malaysia, inter alia, argued for a strong version of cultural relativism and national
particularism, suggesting that universal human rights should yield to local conditions. At the heart of the
public debate was the argument that the US conception of human rights was too individualistic and
strictly Western, and thus inappropriate to, in particular, crowded Asian countries with a history of
elevating duties to the community over individual rights. The final document of the Vienna Conference
proved more satisfying to the United States than the Commission debates on China in the mid-1990s.
The Vienna Final Act reaffirmed universal human rights for all, stating that all countries had the
obligation to respect them. The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question. But
some language in the Final Act indicated that national and regional particularities and various historical,
cultural, and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind.
The United States, with the world's largest economy, is usually among the leading countries, or is the
leading country, in supporting certain agencies that work for human rights and humanitarian progress. It
is, for example, the largest contributor to both the International Committee of the Red Cross, which
works for victims of war and of complex emergencies, and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, which works with not only legal refugees but those who find themselves in a refugee-like
situation. It should be noted, however, that the United States supports certain humanitarian programmes,
which can be said to implement various human rights, precisely as a substitute for more decisive
involvement. Some observers have estimated that it would have cost the United States less money to lead
a military deployment in Rwanda in 1994 to stop genocide than it subsequently spent in helping to
provide for the refugees from genocide. This type of analysis omits from the calculation of cost the
probability of American military casualties from such an enforcement operation.
 
IV. Bilateral policy
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Foreign assistance
From the mid-1970s the US Congress, in an ironic volte-face, required the executive to link US foreign
security assistance, then later economic assistance, to internationally recognized human rights. 40 These
laws were permissively written, with the executive able to utilize loopholes to avoid applying the
statutes. Congress also lacked the will power, through follow-up oversight legislation, to compel various
administrations to comply with the general standards that had been established in law. Congress then
turned to more specific legislation. Perhaps the best known of these provisions was the so-called
"Jackson—Vanik" amendment, requiring communist states desiring most-favoured-nation trading status
with the United States to permit reasonable emigration. In addition to these and other congressional
initiatives, various administrations on their own have manipulated US bilateral foreign assistance to
reflect some concern with human rights.
Since 1981 a number of scholars have sought to establish the effect of human rights considerations in
decisions about bilateral US foreign assistance. A general or summary effect has been difficult to prove.
Some students of the issue have found that human rights concerns are evident in a first stage of
decision-making, called the gate-keeping function, about which countries are eligible to receive foreign
aid. Other studies looking at a one-stage process of foreign aid allocation have found little general and
persistent influence from human rights considerations. A 1994 study covering Latin America found that
human rights considerations did affect the disbursement of US economic and security assistance, as one
factor among several, as long as a country was not deemed of major importance to the United States. But
if a country, such as El Salvador in the 1980s, was considered highly important to US security, then other
considerations like human rights fell by the wayside. 41 A 1995 study found that, with regard to US
economic assistance to a broad range of countries, there was no correlation between levels of that
assistance and the human rights record of recipient countries. 42 Likewise, a 1989 study showed no
correlation between levels of US economic assistance and recipient countries' records on either political
rights (democracy) or right to life (summary executions and forced disappearances). 43
A study published in 1999 argued that "human rights considerations did play a role in determining
whether or not a state received military aid during the Reagan and Bush administrations, but not for the
Carter and Clinton administrations. With the exception of the Clinton administration, human rights was a
determinant factor in the decision to grant economic aid, albeit of secondary importance ... Human rights
considerations are neither the only nor the primary consideration in aid allocation." 44
Moving away from macro or summary interpretations, one can easily observe that on any number of
occasions the United States will at least temporarily link economic and security assistance to various
human rights concerns — almost always pertaining to civil and political rights. 45 In 1997 the United
States suspended foreign assistance to Cambodia after the Hun Sen coup that interrupted coalition
government in a fragile and imperfect democratic political system. In that same year the United States
made foreign assistance to the Kabila government in Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo dependent
upon progress concerning several human rights issues, including an investigation into alleged massacres
of refugees during fighting to oust the Mobutu government. As suggested by the broader studies, rarely is
such US decision-making decisive in fully controlling a situation. Other states may not follow the US
lead, thus lessening the impact of Washington's policy. The US aid programme may not be large enough
to affect foreign decision-making. But in some cases the US impact is great enough to cause foreign
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leaders to think seriously about whether or not they wish to forgo Washington's support in order to
continue their policies of the past. In 1993 the United States helped preserve movement toward liberal
democracy and a winding down of civil war in Guatemala by suspending foreign assistance after an
auto-golpe or attempt to seize excessive power by the existing President.
Humanitarian intervention
Historically the United States has made claims to a unilateral right to humanitarian intervention in order,
presumably, to protect lives and property in foreign states. Recent Presidents did so, for example, in 1965
in the Dominican Republic, in 1983 in Grenada, and in 1989 in Panama. President Carter, in authorizing
the attempted rescue of Americans from Iran in 1980, made claims to self-defence rather than
humanitarian intervention. 46 There being no codified right of humanitarian intervention in international
law to rescue either one's own nationals or foreigners, owing to the widespread and well-justified fear of
its misuse, the United States is left with consideration of controversial exercises of power accompanied
mostly by claims of self-defence (Iran, 1980) and/or of invitation to act by the consent of the government
(Grenada, 1983). President Bush's assertion of an additional right to use force to restore a properly
elected government in Panama was met with widespread opposition. President Clinton later side-stepped
this issue in Haiti by obtaining UN Security Council authorization to use all necessary means to remove
an unelected government, which had deposed an elected one, because of an alleged threat to international
peace and security. Some uses of the US military to rescue both US nationals and foreigners have not
been controversial in places such as Liberia and Somalia, because US action was met by widespread
deference.
Democracy assistance
The United States has manifested a long history of concern with democracy abroad — at least via
rhetoric. 47 Since the end of the Cold War the United States has stitched together a crazy-quilt of bits and
pieces of legislation and executive decisions that with some overstatement can be called a programme of
official democracy assistance. 48 Because of its disjointed nature, no one in Washington could give a
firm figure of how much was being spent in toto to advance liberal democracy abroad. The Agency for
International Development estimated that it was spending almost US$500 million per annum as of 1995.
The State Department and the Justice Department also had their own programmes and budgets. Funding
remained small relative to benchmarks such as the Marshall Plan of the late 1940s, or German spending
on democracy in the area of former East Germany and its 17 million persons. The George Soros
foundations spent more money for democracy and civic society in Russia than did the United States.
These official US activities were directed at three general targets: support for civic societies and the
private groups found therein; support for state building, primarily via strong legislatures and independent
courts; and support for free and fair elections with party competition. The absence of a compelling theory
about what factors produced stable liberal democracy over time and place contributed to a lack of
systematic governmental planning. The variety of conditions evident in Russia, Eastern and Central
Europe, and the Western hemisphere, the principal areas of US interest, also led to a scatter-shot
approach.
Evaluating the impact of the US democracy assistance programme is no easy task. The US role is
intertwined with intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the OSCE, and the OAS.
The United States shares objectives with numerous private groups. US programmes are quite similar to
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those of the National Endowment for Democracy, a quasi-independent Washington-based agency funded
by congressional appropriation. Other states have their own pro-democracy policies. Even in one country
such as Romania, it is difficult to say what is the precise influence of US decisions for democracy, given
the short time-frame so far, the plethora of other influences, and the absence of a proven theory of
causation as a check-point. 49
Several hypotheses suggest themselves for further enquiry. Particularly in the new states emerging from
the former Soviet Union, and in much of Eastern Europe, US programmes in the name of democracy
seemed more oriented to market restructuring for privatization than for democracy per se. Washington's
semantics about market democracies seemed designed to legitimize this emphasis on economic reform.
Some research suggests no automatic correlations between economic growth via markets and liberal
democracy. 50 Absent a concerted push to make privately generated wealth compatible with democracy,
private wealth can be easily combined with authoritarianism. This line of research and reasoning casts
some doubt on the US emphasis on extensive privatization as a necessary precondition for liberal
democracy. Although all stable democracies are based on some version of capitalism, a number of
relatively stable democracies, such as France and Sweden, manifest relatively large public sectors.
In the Western hemisphere especially, relative lack of US attention to the economic resources of the
public sector has hampered the consolidation of liberal democracy in places like El Salvador. This was
noted above in the section on international financial institutions. US determination to shrink the public
sector, in the name of an efficient private and for-profit sector, may not be what emerging democracies
need in order to obtain popular support through expensive programmes of land reform, education, etc. In
Eastern Europe, several electorates have returned to power a somewhat reformed communist party in
protest against shrinking public services and in quest for a better quality of life. US democracy assistance
may be driven as much by a bias against big government and in favour of big markets as by a programme
that is appropriately tailored to the needs of the recipient. The fact that the United States is not a social
democracy and does not recognize socio-economic human rights contributes to this situation. 51
The amount of US spending for democracy abroad, and in general the real importance of this objective in
US foreign policy, may be too small to generate profound influence in many countries. In a number of
countries the United States may be more interested in traditional military security and economic
arrangements advantageous to the United States than in liberal democracy. This hypothesis is difficult to
test. Is the expansion of NATO to provide a check on the Russian Bear in the event of a more
nationalistic and militarized government in Moscow, or is that expansion to provide an additional
framework for the management of problems of democracy and other human rights in former European
communist states? In any event, it is highly probable that, given the absence of congressional and public
sentiment in support of further spending on foreign assistance, it would be desirable for the United States
to concentrate on certain key or pivotal states. If the United States decides to leave the basic question of
guaranteeing public order in Albania to an Italian-led coalition of European states, it is difficult to
understand why the United States should have a democracy assistance programme in Albania rather than
transferring that spending to Indonesia.
Finally, it should be noted that the United States takes many decisions in its foreign policy apart from
official democracy assistance that have an impact on democracy abroad. We noted above the US reaction
to Hun Sen's coup in Cambodia in 1997, and to the Guatemalan auto-golpe in 1993. We could also note
US deference to French policy in supporting the cancellation of national elections in Algeria in 1992; or
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US support for controlled Algerian elections in 1997. These ad hoc or reactive decisions do not present
one pattern in support of, or opposition to, free and fair national elections. In some cases, e.g. Syria or
Saudi Arabia, the United States does not push for liberal democracy, giving preference to traditional
security and economic interests. In other cases, e.g. Albania or Kenya, the United States does support
electoral freedoms. In still other cases, e.g. Nigeria, the United States endorses liberal democracy in the
abstract but does not much push for it in quotidian diplomacy.
 
V. Conclusions
The United States professes to be a leader for human rights in the world but displays an ambivalent
attitude toward the International Bill of Rights and numerous other international human rights
documents. In American society there is much scepticism not only about international rights standards in
general, as compared with US constitutional norms, but also about economic rights and a claimed
collective human right to development in particular. Nevertheless, in the United Nations, the OAS, and
the OSCE the United States has either initiated or supported much diplomacy at least for civil and
political rights. And in Somalia President Bush took significant action to respond to starvation and
malnutrition, even if he did not address the issues in terms of socio-economic rights. Somalia
notwithstanding, however, by emphasizing civil and political rights to the almost total exclusion of
socio-economic rights, US diplomacy tends to spotlight repression while mostly ignoring oppression. 52
Particularly noteworthy was US leadership, at least during 1991–1993, for an expanded UN programme
of complex peacekeeping with overtones of Chapter VII enforcement action on issues that were
substantially human rights issues. In other words, the United States agreed that international peace and
security could sometimes refer to the security of persons inside states. This latter view logically entailed
a far-reaching consideration of human rights. 53
The United States appears to be belatedly addressing the interplay of economic and political rights
through a debate about policy toward the international financial institutions. The United States, like its
democratic partners, appears to be slowly moving away from the view that the World Bank and the IMF,
inter alia, should be strictly economic organizations without a human rights component. As noted, the
United States has sought to link both the Bank and the Fund to its human rights concerns in the former
Yugoslavia (where human rights are intertwined with security issues). The United States may even
eventually recognize that in places such as El Salvador, shrinking the resources of the public sector in the
name of private markets and export-led economic growth, under the umbrella of structural adjustment
programmes, may in fact impede the consolidation of liberal democracy. On balance, US foreign policy
makers in various administrations and political parties do not display a consensus on the relationship
between economics on the one hand and civil and political rights on the other. The bias is toward the
primacy of market restructuring. This is evident in US bilateral programmes for democracy abroad,
where more funds have been spent on market reform than on civic society, state building, and electoral
assistance. In part this lack of careful attention to the interplay of economics and democracy is because
social scientists lack consensus on the same subject.
The most notable feature of US foreign policy on human rights after the Cold War, whether multilateral
or bilateral, is the desire to avoid significant costs of either blood or treasure. This is quite evident in
Washington's desire to avoid even small-scale casualties after its Somalian experience, and in spending
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for official democracy assistance that falls far short of the expectations generated by the accompanying
rhetoric. It is one thing for the United States to engage in the easy diplomacy for human rights that is
detached from finances and coercion. It is another thing to take rights so seriously in foreign policy that
one's diplomacy on the subject is in fact linked to means of implementation, beyond jawboning, in the
face of obstacles.
It is persuasive for moralists to argue that, in the twenty-first century, an age of rights should demand at a
minimum that there be no mass murder and no mass starvation. Insofar as the 1990s are concerned, when
we review US foreign policy in places such as Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda, we are forced to conclude
that one cannot rely on US foreign policy consistently to help ensure this minimal respect for
international human rights. Some countries, like Rwanda, seem beyond the scope of American
humanitarian concern. Others, like Bosnia, seem not worth the candle — too costly in terms of American
vested interests. A third problem, evident in places such as Turkey and China, is that American economic
and security interests dictate a lower priority to human rights. 54 This record cannot help but detract from
a more positive US record, at least for civil and political rights, in some countries like Guatemala and
Burma.
The most fundamental problem blocking a consistently progressive stand on international human rights
issues stems from a lack of political will at home to pay the necessary price to see even American, much
less international, rights principles realized abroad. The real problem is the danger not of moral crusade
but of moral abnegation. In this sense the American self-image of a nation standing for individual
freedom for all is at considerable variance with international reality. The world is still a large and
imperfect place, but states can set priorities and distinguish between gross and more minor violations of
human rights. Extensive rhetoric about universal human rights, however, generates its own pressures
over time to close the gap between rhetoric and reality.
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Certain West European countries have the reputation of pursuing an active human rights policy. They are
often referred to as "like-minded" in their foreign policy. The Scandinavian countries — Denmark,
Finland, Norway, and Sweden — are mentioned in this regard. The Netherlands has, for many years, had
a similar reputation. The Norwegian human rights activist and present deputy foreign minister Jan
Egeland once described this as follows:
The Netherlands has probably become the most effective human rights advocate today, because she
ambitiously combines her favourable image as small state with allocating considerable resources to the
planning, implementation and follow-up to an innovative and ambitious policy.... In the UN Human
Rights Commission, the General Assembly and other UN bodies, the Dutch are always in the forefront in
initiating new substantive mechanisms to monitor, mediate or improve when human rights problems are
on the international agenda. 1
To what extent is Egeland's positive description — positive as seen from the perspective of the
promotion and protection of human rights — still true?
This chapter does not pretend to cover the subject of Dutch human rights policy in its entirety. An effort
has been made to present material that gives a picture that is representative of the subject. Inevitably, a
selection had to be made. In the multilateral area, emphasis is put on activities in the United Nations,
including the Netherlands' role in the former Yugoslavia under the auspices of the United Nations. Some
attention is also paid to relations within the European Union, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe. The section on bilateral relations deals with Turkey
and with the linkage between human rights and development assistance policy, with particular reference
to the former Dutch colonies of Indonesia and Surinam.
 
II. Historical background
The foreign policy of the Netherlands is characterized by a sense of international engagement. In the
Netherlands — perhaps more than in other countries — there has always been a strong interest in events
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abroad. This phenomenon, which has been observed by many commentators at home as well as abroad, 2
has been explained in various ways. There is the physical location of the Netherlands on the shores of the
North Sea, in the Rhine estuary, in the immediate neighbourhood of the three most important West
European powers, Germany, France, and Great Britain. This location, with relatively few natural
resources, in combination with a relatively large population in a small area, 3 led to an early emphasis on
international trade as a source of income. This explains the great interest in the development of the rule
of law in the world — a traditional feature of Dutch policy dating back to the time of Hugo Grotius
(1583–1645). From time immemorial, the Dutch economy has been dominated by its dependence on
international trade. This trade has always greatly depended on the freedom of the high seas — mare
liberum. The development of international law was not only a fine principle, but also in the national
interest of a small, militarily weak state such as the Netherlands. The seventeenth-century statesman
Johan de Witt summarized the Dutch position in the following often-quoted sentence: "The interest of the
State demands that there be quiet and peace everywhere and that commerce be conducted in an
unrestricted manner." These words have remained a maxim of Dutch foreign policy ever since.
Since the seventeenth century, that maxim has been translated into the maintenance of international
peace and the furtherance of international trade as tenets of Dutch foreign policy. The achievement of
international peace and prosperity was seen as a national interest of the Netherlands. In modern times,
this has received a new application in the form of furnishing development aid to poor countries and the
promotion and protection of human rights. The long-standing international legal tradition and the desire
to contribute to the improvement of international living conditions were mutually reinforcing factors that
were expressed in the Dutch support of international organizations. 4 This idea has been given a legal
foundation in the Netherlands Constitution (article 90): "The government promotes the development of
the international legal order."
The implementation of these objectives has not always been easy. Dutch foreign policy has often been
compared to a struggle between the clergyman and the merchant: although wanting to do good all over
the world, commercial interests are never lost sight of. In the early 1960s, in political circles to the left of
the political spectrum, it was customary to describe the Netherlands as a gidsland, a "guiding country,"
that was expected to provide guidance to the world. 5 In the end, however, commerce usually gained the
upper hand. 6
In 1947 and 1948, the Netherlands was confronted with its own principles regarding the establishment of
the rule of law, when the question of Indonesian independence came before the United Nations. The
Netherlands considered its two "police actions" against the newly established (but not yet internationally
recognized) Republic of Indonesia as strictly a matter of domestic jurisdiction over which the Security
Council had no authority. Furthermore, in the view of the Dutch government, the situation did not
present a threat to international peace and security. The majority of the members of the Security Council
were not, however, convinced by the Dutch arguments. Under considerable pressure from the United
States and other Council members, the Netherlands was eventually forced to agree to the transfer of
sovereignty over the Indies to Indonesia. For a number of years, it held on to Western New Guinea
(nowadays called Irian Jaya), but in 1962 it was forced to give up its rule over this remnant of its former
colony.
To this day, the events leading to Indonesian independence in the years 1945–1949 have remained an
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issue of controversy in the Netherlands. Not so long ago, proposals were launched (and subsequently
rejected) to hold a "national debate" to come to terms with the issue. The immediate cause for the
controversy was the granting of a visitor's visa to a former Dutch soldier who had defected to the
Indonesian forces back in 1948 and who had subsequently adopted Indonesian nationality and become a
well-known human rights activist in Indonesia. The discussions on this issue and the emotions it entailed
illustrate that for the Netherlands the relationship with Indonesia remains a very special one. 7
Voorhoeve has linked the internationalist attitude of the Dutch to "a tinge of Calvinist penance." He
refers to similar attitudes in countries such as Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, which share with the
Netherlands a Northern Protestant political culture that tells them to do good in the world. 8 In the case of
the Netherlands, an additional factor is undoubtedly its colonial past. This has two aspects. On the one
hand, next to hard-boiled commercial interests, there was always an aspect of moralism in the way the
Dutch approached their colonial burden, fuelled not in last instance by the Roman Catholic and
Protestant churches, which laid great emphasis on their missionary activities in the colonies. On the other
hand, since the loss of the colonies, there has also been, at least in some circles, a certain feeling of guilt,
of wanting to make up for the past, which is translated into efforts in the fields of development assistance
and the promotion of human rights. The traditional Dutch interest in human rights policy stems from the
same roots — what Voorhoeve has called the Dutch internationalist—idealist tradition. 9 This has been
strongly pushed by national domestic actors. But before turning to these domestic actors, we shall discuss
some basic elements of Dutch human rights policy.
 
III. Basic elements of Dutch human rights policy
The government of the Netherlands has expressed its ideas about human rights in foreign policy in a
formal policy document. 10 That document was issued in 1979 and updated in 1986, 1991, and 1997.
According to the present Foreign Minister, it still contains the basic elements of government policy in
this field. 11
General principles
The government of the Netherlands has stated that in "international relations the conduct of States may
be examined in the light of their observance of the elementary rights of their own subjects." 12 This is
based on the principle that "man does not exist for the state but that the state exists for man." 13 The
government considers civil and political rights of equal importance to economic, social, and cultural
rights: "A person who has material prosperity but no political freedom and who is defenceless against
arbitrary action by the State does not enjoy an existence worthy of human dignity any more than does a
person who is free in formal terms but has neither work nor shelter and is on the verge of starvation." 14
It has opted for evenhandedness and non-selectivity in applying the principles of its human rights policy:
"A policy which seeks to counter specific human rights abuses should be impartial and non-selective in
that it must not concentrate on abuses in countries of one particular political colour." 15 A final point of
consideration is the extent to which Dutch economic, cultural, or other interests restrain the raising of
human rights considerations. Although the government "regards the promotion of human rights as an
essential part of its foreign policy," that "does not alter the fact that this is a part of its total policy and
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cannot under all circumstances enjoy priority over the other aims of that policy." 16 Such limitations are
for instance (1) "the promotion of other values and interests the government has to care for," and (2) the
political sensitivity of the issue, "because in principle human rights affect profoundly the internal affairs
of all States. A policy which seeks to counter specific abuses abroad regarding human rights ought to
avoid arrogance. One should have understanding for the problems that other countries are faced with. At
the same time one should be free from moral complacency." 17
The human rights discussed so far all refer to the rights of individuals. The Netherlands government, like
most other Western governments, has been reluctant to accept the notion of collective rights, considering
collectivities such as nations, peoples, or indigenous peoples as beneficiaries but not as bearers of human
rights. In a letter to the Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, which at his request
had reported on the notion of collective rights, 18 the Foreign Minister explicitly rejected the notion of
collective rights as human rights:
I am not inclined to add the category of collective rights to the human rights catalogue.... [C]ollective
actions to protect individual human rights can meet existing needs. Solutions should be sought departing
from that approach. I prefer a strengthening of existing mechanisms to protect already existing human
rights, giving specific attention to the position of collectivities. 19
I have already mentioned the principle that man does not exist for the state, but that the state exists for
man. From this principle the government concluded that "the individual as an autonomous entity [is]
entitled to certain rights and freedoms" because "he is a human being and not from his being part of a
larger whole such as a title, a class, a people or a State." 20 Therefore, when collective rights do not
coincide with individual rights, the government will give priority to individual human rights. 21
Development aid and human rights
Should development assistance policy be used as a means for promoting human rights elsewhere? The
government considered "that there is an indissoluble connection between human rights and development
policy, as the aim of the latter is to create the basic preconditions for human development in the third
world, both materially and spiritually." 22 The government has emphasized that human rights involve all
the elementary preconditions for an existence worthy of human dignity, which "requires not only
protection from oppression, arbitrariness and discrimination but also access to such matters as food,
housing, education and medical care." 23 Should aid be used to reward countries that respect human
rights and conversely withheld to punish countries that disregard such rights? In the shaping of
development cooperation, one must consider in what ways development aid could be made to serve the
best possible realization of human rights. In this respect it may be necessary to take account of the human
rights situation in recipient countries, including the policy pursued by the authorities. The aid-giving
countries should, however, "act with a certain restraint and without presumption in this delicate area. In
cases where abuses derive directly from government policy, one should take care at any rate to ensure
that aid does not contribute directly to the perpetuation of repression. Where there is a pattern of gross
and persistent violations of fundamental human rights, non-allocation or suspension of aid may be
considered, but other relevant policy considerations must be taken into account before such exceptional
measures are taken." 24 In general, however, development aid will not be used "as an instrument for
manipulating recipient countries" because "the government rejects the idea that aid should be used to
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reward countries which respect human rights and conversely withheld to punish countries which
disregard those rights." 25 The human rights situation in the recipient country is on the other hand
relevant at the moment of shaping development cooperation. The more positive a country's human rights
policy, the greater the chance that it will be selected as a target country for development cooperation. 26
Mr. Jan Pronk, who was the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation from 1973 until 1977
and again from 1989 until 1998, was one of the main architects of policy in this field. In his 1990 policy
paper, A World of Difference: A New Framework for Development Cooperation in the 1990s, 27 human
rights received a great deal of attention. 28 An explicit choice was made for freedom and human rights.
Human rights were said to play an essential role as a guiding principle and moral foundation for
democratization processes. Classic human rights are the basis of democracy and provide opportunities to
the lower levels of society to present and, if possible, legalize their justified claims and interests. 29 The
argument that governments must be allowed to restrict civil and political rights in order to make progress
in the field of socio-economic rights is explicitly rejected: "There is no freedom without food, but
freedom prevails." 30 Political and civil rights are seen as preliminary conditions for achieving social and
economic rights. Poverty must be fought by strengthening the autonomy of marginal groups. An explicit
choice is made in favour of "development of, for and by the people." 31
At the same time, the paper noted the weak position of the state in many developing countries, which
makes it impossible for governmental bodies to prevent violations of human rights. Therefore, a plea is
made for strengthening institutional frameworks. In that respect, the training of judges and public
prosecutors and support for human rights organizations should be given priority. 32
The 1993 government paper, also written by Mr. Pronk, A World in Dispute, 33 stated that freedom and
democracy are necessary to achieve manageable growth in the world. "Good governance" must be
stimulated, which means support for governmental services and private organizations in developing
countries that aim for sustainable growth of legal security and of civil and political liberties.
"Furthermore," Mr. Pronk wrote, "it is justified on grounds of development policy, in case of a serious
relapse of democratization or in case of sustained excessive military expenses, to cut or stop fully the
giving of aid to the country in question." 34
The two policy papers clearly emphasize the importance of promoting human rights on the one hand, and
of emphasizing aid to poor countries on the other, and their mutual relationship. The Netherlands
government directed its development aid policy in the 1980s to the promotion of human rights as well. It
did not exclude that, in the case of serious violations of human rights, development aid might be
decreased, suspended, or even fully terminated.
Economic relations may affect human rights in two major ways. They may have a direct negative effect
on human rights in the country in question, or they may on the contrary be used to contribute in a
positive way to improve that situation. In the end, international economic relations may be used to
improve respect for economic, social, and cultural human rights in another country. That is especially
true in the case of trade relations with developing countries. Seen from that perspective, there is indeed a
direct relationship between economic relations and respect for human rights.
Grave and systematic violations of human rights may under certain conditions constitute grounds for
Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy: Chapter 3
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/forsythe/chapter03.html (5 of 33) [8/11/2002 10:05:42 PM]
restrictions on economic relations with the country in question. One of those conditions is that other
methods of improving the human rights situation concerned have proved clearly inadequate. Another
condition is that economic restrictions can genuinely be expected to lead to improvements.... An
interesting as well as very important observation is the caveat that the measures must not
disproportionately damage Netherlands interests. 35
Preconditions for action
The government of the Netherlands tried to clarify in the 1979 memorandum when, where, at what time,
how, and under what restrictions it would react to specific situations in which human rights are abused:
"Wherever possible the government wishes to help counter specific human rights abuses abroad,
particularly in cases of gross and persistent violations." 36 Its efforts are "in principle concentrated on
cases where there are grave violations of fundamental human rights, particularly when such violations
appear to proceed from a systematic policy." 37 This can be considered a necessary condition for any
Dutch reaction. To break diplomatic relations completely 38 or to refrain from customary
export-promoting actions 39 are two instruments that the government has excluded from any reaction.
The next step in decision-making is "to take account of the other values and interests which the
government has to promote" and "the repercussions on bilateral relations" 40 of any Dutch reaction to
human rights violations. There is a constant need to examine the possibility of a reaction in relation "to
other considerations of government policy." 41 The reaction "should be impartial and non-selective" and
free from moral complacency. 42
Considering all these constraints on a governmental reaction, the government prefers "to combine forces
with other countries: this applies both to confidential approaches and to public action" 43 "through
international organizations such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations." 44 Common action is
preferred because "our country can exert only limited influence through bilateral channels," 45 while "the
chance of finding a positive response" when specific human rights situations are raised in confidential
talks "is greatest in the case of governments with which the Netherlands had a certain relationship of trust
as a result of cooperation between the two countries." A further consideration is "whether action by the
Netherlands is likely to have any effect at all on the situation concerned" 46 and "it must not be
counterproductive by unintentionally harming those whom one is trying to help." 47
When all or most of these deliberations have resulted in an affirmative answer towards action, the action
itself will be restricted, because only in "exceptional circumstances there may be reason to restrict
diplomatic relations temporarily with the country concerned." 48 Economic sanctions will be applied only
if "other methods of improving the human rights situation concerned have proved clearly inadequate"
and these "economic restrictions can genuinely be expected to lead to improvements" whereas "it can be
assumed that maintaining these relations would contribute towards a continuation or increase of the
human rights violations." 49
The most recent follow-up memorandum, issued in 1997, basically reaffirmed the principles listed in the
1979 paper. The government reiterated human dignity as the nucleus of the concept of human rights. It
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stated that it continued to subscribe to the equivalence of the different categories of human rights. In its
policy, it would continue to emphasize the right to life and the inviolability of the human person. These
rights were seen as specimens of the universality of human rights, which remained the point of departure.
Thanks to the disappearance of the East-West conflict, human rights are now seen as one of the regular
"tracks" of foreign policy: there is a responsibility to ensure that this human rights track has a content and
is not marginalized in relation to other tracks of foreign policy. In addition, ways must be found to raise




In the Netherlands, as in other countries, the issue of human rights has been put on the political agenda
mainly thanks to the efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). More than the traditional
political parties, NGOs have stimulated activities in this field and reminded the government of its
obligations in this area. It is not an overstatement to suggest that it is largely owing to their efforts that
the Netherlands began to play a leading role in the international human rights debate.
In the period 1960–1980, activities in the field of human rights mainly concerned situations in particular
countries, such as apartheid in South Africa, the struggle for liberation in the Portuguese colonies in
Africa, the military junta in Greece, human rights violations by military regimes in Chile and Argentina,
and the suppression of political opponents by the Suharto regime in Indonesia. In all of these cases,
"country committees" were formed in the Netherlands that concentrated their activities on the political
and human rights situation in their country of concern. Herman Burgers, who was at the time himself an
official with the Foreign Ministry, even calls the Vietnam protest movement "essentially ... a human
rights campaign, although it was seldom presented in those terms." 51
The activities of NGOs that deal with human rights concerns of a more general nature, such as Amnesty
International, date mainly from the late 1970s, when the Netherlands government issued its policy paper
in which it set out the principles of Dutch human rights policy. Since then, NGOs have played an
important role in the formation of Dutch human rights policy. They submit suggestions and proposals for
strengthening human rights as part of foreign policy. The papers and memoranda of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs are commented on. NGO representatives appear at hearings and approach officials of the
ministry and members of parliament. The ministry usually pays a great deal of attention to the views of
these organizations. For example, the Dutch delegation to the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights
in Vienna included two NGO representatives.
Among the non-governmental organizations in this field is the Dutch section of Amnesty International.
This important organization has over 185,000 members in the Netherlands. In table 3.1, membership data
are given for a few comparable West European countries.
Other important human rights organizations are the Netherlands Jurists Committee for Human Rights
(NJCM), which is the Dutch section of the International Commission of Jurists, and the Humanist
Committee on Human Rights (HOM). These and similar organizations 52 work together with
organizations in the field of foreign policy in the Breed Mensenrechten Overleg (BMO, or "Broad
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Human Rights Platform"). This is a loose form of cooperation that meets periodically. Its activities
become more intensive at times, for instance during the debates over the 1979 government memorandum
(for which purpose it was actually established) and subsequent policy memoranda, in the preparation for
the 1993 World Conference, and in the preparation of the activities on the occasion of the fiftieth
anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in December 1998.
Advisory Committee
Between 1983 and 1996, an Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy provided the
Foreign Minister with advisory reports on human rights issues, at his request or on its own initiative. 53
The Advisory Committee had been the result of intensive lobbying activities on the part of human rights
organizations. Its independent members came from the ranks of non-governmental organizations, former
diplomats, labour unions, employers' organizations, and academics. The Committee published 23
advisory reports 54 plus a number of shorter advisory letters. The Minister of Foreign Affairs issued
written commentaries on most of the advisory reports, which sometimes led to further oral
communications. The Committee acquired a position of its own by the quality of its reports as well as by
serving as an intermediary between the ministry and non-governmental organizations.
In 1993, however, the government decided on a major reform of the entire system of policy advisory
committees. Henceforth there would be only one advisory committee per ministerial department. For the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs this meant that its three advisory committees (peace and security,
development cooperation, and human rights) were merged. By the end of 1996, the advisory committees
were replaced by a new Advisory Council on International Affairs, which was to be assisted by four
consultative committees: peace and security, development cooperation, human rights, and European
affairs. The result seems to be mainly an administrative downgrading of the previous system, basically
maintaining the original advisory structure.
Political parties
The four major political parties represented in parliament 55 emphasize their commitment to the place of
human rights in Dutch foreign policy. The radical liberal party D66 devotes comparatively the largest
segment of its electoral programme to human rights, while the more conservative Liberal Party (VVD)
has the shortest text on the subject.
The Christian Democratic Party (CDA) states that the promotion of respect for human rights must have a
central place in foreign policy. Human rights are universal, because the dignity of every human being is
not related to his or her country or culture. The human rights situation in a country serves as a criterion
for giving bilateral aid. Gross and systematic violations of human rights are a threat to international
peace and security and may be reason for international intervention. Such intervention may vary from
diplomatic steps to economic sanctions and in the last instance to military action. 56
The Labour Party (PvdA) sees foreign policy as the promotion of not just national economic interests,
but also pluriformity, tolerance, democracy, and openness. In view of changing international power
relations, the promotion of human rights may cost an ever higher price. The recent conflicts with
Indonesia and China serve to show that in order to promote human rights one needs allies. The
Netherlands must make an effort to intensify European cooperation in the field of human rights as well.
This is the only way to avoid becoming isolated. 57
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The Liberal Party (VVD) states that serious and continuing violations of human rights may lead to
interference in the domestic policy of other countries. To achieve a positive outcome, caution is
prescribed. Interference by a group of states is to be preferred. 58
Finally, the draft electoral programme of the radical liberal party D66 devotes eight paragraphs of its
section on foreign policy to human rights, the protection of which should be "fully integrated in foreign
policy." It is the task of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to raise human rights aspects with other
ministries. Human rights policy should be conducted with the use of all national and international
bilateral and multilateral instruments. Effectiveness should determine the selection of such instruments.
Universal human rights should be valid always and everywhere and must not depend on culture-bound
interpretations by national authorities. If in a certain country terror reigns against its own subjects and
neither the use of customary diplomatic channels nor NGO activities result in sufficient progress,
international isolation of such a country may be considered. 59
Parliament
Dutch members of parliament used to be very active in human rights matters. On the basis most often of
information provided by non-governmental organizations or of what they had seen or read in the media,
they questioned the Foreign Minister on such matters. As already noted, NGOs direct a considerable part
of their activities toward maintaining contact with, and trying to influence, members of parliament. The
1979 policy paper on human rights and foreign policy was the direct result of a parliamentary request.
Sometimes, parliament gets directly involved in the organization of the governmental machinery. When
it debated the 1979 paper, it asked for the appointment of a high-level officer within the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to deal with human rights. From then on, the deputy director-general for international
cooperation, later the director-general himself, was charged with human rights affairs. His "high-level"
position meant that he had also to deal with a great number of other issues and therefore could not give
human rights his undivided attention. Consequently, in day-to-day practice it was a deputy coordinator
who dealt with human rights matters in the ministry. 60 Parliament was also instrumental in the
reactivation of the defunct Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy. It was less
successful in its efforts to have the ministry publish annual reports on the human rights situation in other
countries, following the model of the US State Department. Then Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek
rejected this request, because in his view enough public information was already available and Dutch
diplomatic posts abroad should continue to provide him with confidential information. Public reports
would expose them too much in their country of accreditation — something that the United States as a
major power could afford, but the Netherlands could not. 61
Under the Dutch constitutional system, government ministers are accountable to parliament. As no
political party has ever achieved an absolute majority in the parliamentary elections, cabinets are always
formed on the basis of party coalitions that reflect the composition of parliament. That makes their
position relatively secure. Government ministers are seldom forced to resign during their term of office.
The position of the Foreign Minister is even stronger, because it is recognized that he is often engaged in
sensitive negotiations with other governments, which may not always make it possible for him to give a
full account to parliament. 62 Members of parliament tend to give the Foreign Minister considerable
political freedom. Although non-governmental human rights organizations tend to be critical of what
they perceive as parliamentary weakness, it is in fact a reflection of the Dutch constitutional system. This
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having been said, it remains a fact that parliament seems to pay less attention to human rights matters
now than it did in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 63
Conclusion
On the whole, it can be said that in the Netherlands domestic public opinion, 64 as expressed by political
parties and NGOs, favours human rights. At times, pressure is put on the government to react strongly to
human rights violations abroad or to take initiatives to extend the international promotion and protection
of human rights. This means that the government could ill afford to ignore human rights altogether, even




From 1980 until 1986 and again from 1992 until 1997, the Netherlands served as a member of the UN
Commission on Human Rights. In that capacity it developed a considerable number of initiatives and
proposals. 65 The Netherlands was active in the drafting of the Principles of Medical Ethics in Relation to
Detained Persons. During the 1979 session of the General Assembly, it requested the Secretary-General
to send these draft principles to the Member States for comment and then repeatedly requested
consideration of the draft text. This led in 1981 to an unusual procedure: together with Sweden,
Denmark, Portugal, and the United States, the Netherlands took the initiative to incorporate the
comments that had been received into a new draft text. This revised text was again sent to the Member
States for comment, and then discussed in a working group of the Third Committee under the
chairmanship of the Dutch delegate. He succeeded in drafting a final version which was then adopted by
the General Assembly. 66
Another major initiative was its collaborative effort with Sweden to steer a draft Convention against
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment through the Commission. In
the General Assembly, it was again the Dutch delegation, with considerable help from a number of third
world countries, that managed to achieve agreement on a text that was adopted by consensus on 10
December 1984. 67
Furthermore, the Netherlands was one of the countries that worked on drafting the (Second) Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the Abolition of the Death Penalty
as well as the draft principles on Conscientious Objection to Military Service. For many years the
Netherlands has endeavoured to get included such principles in the right to freedom of conscience. In
1985, the Netherlands introduced a draft text that established the possibility of refusing to perform
military service and of creating an alternative service. Faced with strong opposition from some of the
East European states, the delegation proposed to adjourn the discussion of the proposal. In 1987,
however, the Commission adopted a text, co-sponsored by the Dutch delegation, in which conscientious
objection to military service was defined as a legitimate exercise of the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion. 68
In 1979, a working group of the Commission on Human Rights was established to prepare a draft
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Convention on the Rights of the Child, originally a Polish draft. The Netherlands supported the adoption
of such a Convention and made considerable contributions to the draft. It took until 1989, however,
before the draft text was finally adopted by the Commission on Human Rights and referred to the
General Assembly, which adopted it by consensus on 20 November 1989. It was ratified by the
Netherlands as late as 1995. The Netherlands delegation also played an important role in the drafting of
the Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with special reference to foster
placement and adoption, nationally as well as internationally.
Another issue in which the Netherlands was actively involved was the Declaration on the Right to
Development, in which it played the role of mediator between the third world countries on the one hand
and the Western countries on the other. In 1979, the General Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored
by a number of third world nations that named the right to development a human right. In following
years, the Dutch expert Paul de Waart was one of the key negotiators in the drafting of the Declaration on
the Right to Development, which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1986.
The Netherlands played a role in the drafting of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981). As early as 1962, the General
Assembly had asked the Commission on Human Rights to draft such a declaration. Although there was
still a considerable amount of opposition on the part of the East European countries, the Dutch delegation
to the Commission on Human Rights introduced a draft resolution aimed at the adoption of the
declaration. In the General Assembly, the Dutch delegation, acting as coordinator of the group of
Western countries, succeeded, after intensive negotiations with the Islamic states, in getting the
declaration adopted.
The Netherlands was also very active in further developing the role of UN organs in the supervision of
respect for human rights. The proposal for a Special Rapporteur on Torture of the Commission on
Human Rights was drafted by the Dutch delegation. The chairman of the delegation, Professor
Kooijmans, was the first person to be appointed to that position. 69 In 1980, the Commission on Human
Rights decided, on a proposal mainly developed by the Australian, Canadian, and Dutch delegations, to
establish a Working Group on Involuntary Disappearances. Since its establishment, the Netherlands has
actively supported the annual renewal of its mandate. A Dutch Foreign Ministry official, Toine van
Dongen, served as a member of the Working Group between 1984 and 1993. Similar strong support was
given to the establishment of a Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions (1982). Dutch
support for this organ received additional stimulus from the summary execution of 15 political opponents
of the military regime in the former Dutch colony of Surinam in December 1982 (see further below).
On the whole, it can be said that the Netherlands government gave support to most of the proposals to
strengthen UN supervision mechanisms. In 1996, it adopted and circulated among members of the UN
Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities a report from the
Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy on "The Role of the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities." 70 A second report from the Advisory
Committee, which dealt with reporting procedures, complaints procedures, inquiry procedures,
Charter-based procedures, and mechanisms, 71 was adopted by the government and circulated as a
document of the UN General Assembly. 72
Former Yugoslavia
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Since 1963, the Netherlands has put military units on stand-by to be used for UN peacekeeping
operations. Between 1979 and 1985 Dutch military units participated in the UN peacekeeping operation
in Lebanon (UNIFIL). After the end of the Cold War, the Netherlands contributed military units,
observers, and police monitors to UN peacekeeping operations in Namibia, Angola, Cambodia,
Uganda—Rwanda, and Mozambique. It was directly confronted with the practice of gross human rights
violations 73 through its involvement in the United Nations peacekeeping efforts in the war in
Yugoslavia. As part of its contribution to the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia
(UNPROFOR), the Netherlands government decided in early 1994 to station a lightly armed small
military unit (630 persons, later reduced to 430) in the Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica, which had been
named a "safe area" by the Security Council. The idea was that such a safe area should be free from any
armed attack or any other hostile act. 74 The enclave was overrun by Serb Bosnian forces on 11 July
1995. NATO aircraft stationed in Italy, which included Dutch fighter aircraft that might have repelled the
attack, were not called into action. It has remained unclear whether this was due to inaction on the part
mainly of the United Nations command or of the Dutch government. One Dutch soldier was killed when
the town was taken, and the Dutch contingent was allowed to leave the enclave without further losses. 75
During the first two weeks of July, the Serbs expelled 23,000 Bosnian Muslim women and children and
captured and executed several thousand Muslim male civilians. 76 The degree to which the Dutch
government and the Dutch forces share indirect responsibility for this war crime has been the subject of
public debate in the Netherlands ever since. The government managed to survive a number of
parliamentary debates, among other reasons because a parliamentary majority shared responsibility,
because it had in the past always given its support to the government's policy in regard to the former
Yugoslavia. At the request of parliament, the government approached the United Nations Secretariat and
some members of the Security Council to conduct a thorough study of the matter. This request was,
however, turned down. 77 Thereupon, the government requested the National Institute for War
Documentation in Amsterdam (RIOD), which has a reputation for its specialized knowledge on the role
of the Netherlands in the Second World War, to undertake a major study of the issue. This action on the
part of the government was widely interpreted as a move to take the issue out of the political debate. 78
The Srebrenica operation was a disaster because of the massacre of thousands of unarmed Muslim
civilians, who, though residents of a UN-proclaimed "safe area," did not receive the necessary protection
from the UN troops. For the Dutch it was a truly traumatic experience, 79 as it ran counter to cherished
Dutch views in favour of contributing to UN peacekeeping operations and undertaking activities on
behalf of human rights and humanitarian law. Many questions have so far remained unanswered:
Could and should the Dutch battalion have tried to resist the Serbian onslaught, at the risk of major
losses among Dutch soldiers?
●   
If it was impossible to defend the enclave, could and should the Dutch soldiers have done more to
prevent the massacre of the Muslims?
●   
Why was the Dutch unit only lightly armed, which included the dismantling of the 25 mm cannons
on its armed personnel carriers and their replacement by machine guns? 80
●   
What truth is there in newspaper reports that the Dutch military displayed considerably more
sympathy for the supposedly well-disciplined Bosnian Serbs than for the Muslim civilian
●   
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population, whom they were meant to protect?
Why was no NATO air support given to the Dutch at the time of the Serbian onslaught? 81●   
Why were the Dutch soldiers not immediately debriefed on their return to the Netherlands, but sent
on leave first? 82
●   
Who should ultimately be held responsible: the United Nations or the Dutch government?●   
It remains to be seen whether the study by the Amsterdam institute will provide answers to these and
many other sensitive questions. At the time of writing this chapter, the study is still under way.
In a more positive vein, also relating to Yugoslavia, since 1993 the Netherlands has hosted the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. In addition to making available
courtroom and other facilities to the Tribunal, the Netherlands supplies detention facilities for the
accused. This involved considerable costs to the Dutch taxpayer. 83 The position of Registrar of the
Tribunal is held by a Dutch citizen. 84 Whatever one may think of the achievements of the Tribunal so
far, 85 the Netherlands government considers it of great importance to make The Hague, which also
houses the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and will house the soon
to be established Permanent International Criminal Court, into what former UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali once called the "international legal capital of the world."
The European Union
The original treaties that form the basis of the European Community (nowadays the European Union) did
not contain specific references to human rights. Gradually, the main European organs, the Council of
Ministers, the European Commission, and the European Parliament, began to pay greater attention to the
subject. This resulted in a number of declarations 86 and in the provisions of a Common Foreign and
Security Policy of the Treaty on European Union (the "Maastricht Treaty"), which entered into force in
1993. Its objectives include explicitly "to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." Most of this Common Foreign and Security Policy
is still in a preparatory stage. For the time being, foreign policy-making remains more a matter of
intergovernmental cooperation than of real common European policy. 87
At meetings of international organizations and at international conferences, EU member states meet on a
regular basis to consult with each other and exchange information. At meetings of the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, joint statements are delivered by the government that holds the
presidency of the European Council of Ministers and on occasion the EU members may jointly sponsor
draft resolutions. In 1997, the Netherlands, on behalf of the European Union, co-sponsored draft
resolutions on Iran, Iraq, Burma, Zaire, East Timor, Nigeria, and the rights of the child. 88 Also in 1997,
the European Commission addressed the session of the UN Commission on Human Rights for the first
time. Commissioner Hans van den Broek, himself a former Dutch Foreign Minister, spoke about various
aspects of the Union's human rights activities. These included its support for international and regional
initiatives (international tribunals, human rights observation missions), positive measures to promote
human rights in developing countries, election assistance, and conflict prevention and limitation. 89
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On occasion, however, such efforts may fail, as the Netherlands found to its regret in the case of its
attempt to introduce a joint resolution on China during the 1997 session of the Commission on Human
Rights. The Netherlands, as President of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, proposed to
introduce a resolution on behalf of the EU criticizing China's record in human rights. Such a resolution
had been proposed — and not acted upon by the Commission — by the EU during previous sessions. 90
This time, however, France, later joined by Germany, Italy, Spain, and Greece, refused to support this
initiative. 91 It was left to EU member Denmark to introduce the resolution on its own behalf. As in
previous years, China managed to block consideration of the resolution by having a "no action" proposal
adopted. The lack of agreement among the European partners was widely assumed to be connected to a
planned visit by French President Jacques Chirac to China, during which he was to conclude a profitable
contract for the European Airbus company. Denmark and the Netherlands were strongly criticized by
China for what it considered as involvement in its domestic affairs. China cancelled a number of visits by
Danish and Dutch ministers and threatened to suspend trade relations.
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
The Netherlands played a leading role in the adoption of supervision mechanisms with regard to the
"human dimension" in the 1989 Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; now the OSCE). The Dutch proposal for a High Commissioner on
National Minorities was adopted by the summit meeting of the CSCE participating states in Helsinki in
July 1992. A Dutchman was the first — and up till now the only — person to be appointed to that
position: former Foreign Minister Max van der Stoel. He conducts most of his activities beyond the glare
of publicity, laying emphasis on an approach of quiet diplomacy. As an instrument of conflict prevention
he must call for early warnings and, if necessary, for early action, whenever the position of national
minorities might lead to tensions. This presents him with a dual task: he must try to contain the tensions
that fall within his mandate and he must warn the OSCE when the tensions could escalate to a level that
he can no longer contain with the tools at his disposal. 92 Mr. van der Stoel's role has been widely
appreciated and he is reputed to have helped to contain a number of potential conflicts. His success is
hard to estimate, however; it lies in the non-occurrence of events that would have taken place had he not
acted. The number of states in which he has been involved is to say the least impressive. Among these
were: Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Macedonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,
Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. 93 The establishment of his office has probably been the most
successful Dutch initiative within OSCE.
The Council of Europe
The Council of Europe has built up a reputation of harbouring the most effective regional instrument of
human rights supervision: the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. The findings of its main organs, the European Court of Human Rights and the
European Commission of Human Rights, 94 are generally respected by the States Parties. In recent years,
the number of states that are party to the Convention has greatly increased through the accession of the
former members of the communist bloc in Eastern Europe. Admission to membership of the Council of
Europe used to be seen as a seal of approval by the European states that the new member had met certain
minimum criteria of democratic government and observance of human rights. This seems nowadays to be
no longer true. Experts have questioned whether such newly admitted member states as Croatia,
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Romania, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation have actually met these minimum requirements. The
Netherlands, together with Greece, was at first opposed to Romania's membership, but in the end sided
with the majority. After that, the admission of the other states mentioned was politically more or less a
foregone conclusion. Many of these states see membership of the Council of Europe as an approach
toward membership of the European Union — which may be legal nonsense, but is politically sound
reasoning. With the accession of these new members, the nature of the Council and its organs may
change drastically, moving away from the strict application of the human rights rules of the European
Convention.
The Netherlands government has said that it will continue to support the human rights activities of the
Council and try to prevent duplications with the European Union and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. It will continue to bring about the best possible effectiveness of the supervisory
mechanisms. 95
In 1996, 12,143 cases were lodged with the European Commission on Human Rights. At the moment,
140 cases against the Netherlands are being dealt with by the European Commission. Annually, about
five such cases reach the European Court. 96
 
VI. Bilateral policy
In a parliamentary debate in June 1997, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans van Mierlo, made
the point that, in the field of human rights, multilateral policy had a greater chance of success than
bilateral policy:
Although the government does not tend to let the bilateral policy disappear altogether, it remains a fact
that a powerful state can achieve more bilaterally than a less powerful state. It should not be forgotten
that the Netherlands is a member of the EU [European Union], a forum that gives more and more
emphasis to the field of human rights. 97
Turkey
One case in which the tension between considerations of human rights and other foreign policy
considerations was at issue has been relations with NATO ally Turkey. For many years, Turkey has been
criticized for its violations of fundamental human rights, for example through the practice of torture
occurring in places of detention. The Western states have on the whole been rather reluctant to express
public criticism of Turkey. A state complaint, which was lodged under the rules of the European
Convention on Human Rights by Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands in 1982,
ended in 1985 with a friendly settlement. In this settlement, Turkey committed itself to submit three
reports on the measures it had taken to ensure the prohibition of torture practices. Critics felt at the time
that the Turkish government had made little or no commitment to improve the human rights situation and
was let off far too easily. 98 Recent efforts by non-governmental organizations to revive the state
complaint have so far come to naught. 99 Although human rights violations in Turkey have continued,
especially with regard to the Kurdish population, it seems obvious that security interests have prevailed
over human rights considerations.
Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy: Chapter 3
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/forsythe/chapter03.html (15 of 33) [8/11/2002 10:05:42 PM]
Human rights and development assistance
In its bilateral policy, the Netherlands has found it especially hard to combine the two policy objectives
of the promotion and protection of human rights on the one hand, and the giving of financial support to
poor countries in the form of development assistance on the other. 100 Other countries, such as Norway,
struggle with the same problem. 101 Should aid be continued in the face of gross and systematic human
rights violations? Should it be used as an instrument on behalf of the promotion of human rights? The
Minister for Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk, mentioned in a parliamentary debate the following
examples of such policy: to certain countries, such as Syria, Burma, Zaire, and Kazakhstan, no
development assistance was given because of the human rights situation in those countries; in respect of
other countries, such as Chile, Mauretania, Sri Lanka, Mali, Sudan, Niger, and the Gambia, development
assistance was suspended because of the human rights situation; because of the improvement in the
human rights situation, aid to Cambodia, 102 Haiti, Malawi, Chile, and Guatemala was resumed. 103
Relations with Indonesia
The problem of the linkage between human rights and development assistance has manifested itself
especially in the relationship of the Netherlands with two former colonies, Indonesia and Surinam. 104
The suppression by the Indonesian army of a coup d'Ètat of left-wing officers on 30 September 1965 led
to a period of gross violations of human rights. Between 1965 and 1968 more than 1 million people were
killed. 105 Arrests took place on a massive scale. According to official statistics, 750,000 people were
arrested in this period. These huge numbers of political prisoners were not put on any kind of trial, or
only after a long time. Many were detained in camps and tortured, which often led to their death.
Hygiene and nutrition in the camps were grossly deficient. The survivors were only gradually released,
often after many years of detention. After their release, these "ex-Tapols" remained subject to all sorts of
restrictions. 106
At the time, the question was raised in the Netherlands whether and to what extent development aid
should be used to put pressure on the Indonesian authorities to get the political prisoners released. The
international position of the Netherlands was strengthened when it became chairman of an international
donor consortium for Indonesia, the InterGovernmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), established in 1967.
Non-governmental human rights organizations repeatedly requested that the human rights situation in
Indonesia be put on the IGGI agenda, but this was rejected by the Netherlands and the other IGGI
members. The human rights situation in Indonesia deteriorated further in the early 1970s, when death
squads wantonly killed opponents of the Suharto regime. In 1975, Indonesia invaded and incorporated
the former Portuguese colony of East Timor, suppressing the East Timorese independence movement.
The Indonesian army also acted mercilessly against separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya.
What should the Netherlands do in these circumstances? Economic and business relations with Indonesia
had improved after 1966. Almost 10 per cent of Dutch development aid went to Indonesia. Trade with
Indonesia rose from 450 million guilders in 1966 to more than 1,500 million guilders in 1984. Cultural
relations showed a growing improvement. In 1970, President Suharto paid an official visit to the
Netherlands, which was returned by Queen Juliana in 1971.
On the other hand, non-governmental organizations urged the Dutch government to do something about
the deteriorating human rights situation in Indonesia. Also, within the Dutch Labour Party and the
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smaller Radical Party (Politieke Partij Radicalen), both of which formed part of the governing coalition,
voices were heard in favour of cutting or suspending development aid to Indonesia to express Dutch
concern about the human rights situation. In 1975, Minister Pronk did indeed cut development aid to
Indonesia, claiming that Indonesia's need for aid had decreased. He announced that he would shortly
review the entire development aid programme for Indonesia in a policy review paper. The government
fell before Pronk's policy review paper was issued, but its contents were widely leaked. He concluded
that he would not discontinue development aid to Indonesia because the Indonesian government, under
international pressure, had announced that it would do something about the problem of the political
prisoners. He did argue in favour of the dissolution of IGGI and its replacement by a development
consortium of the World Bank, which would not be chaired by the Netherlands. 107 The latter
recommendation was not taken up by the successor government, in which the Labour Party was not
represented. The development aid programme for Indonesia was continued without changes.
The human rights situation in Indonesia received renewed international attention in 1985 when four
former bodyguards of President Sukarno, who had been detained because of their involvement in the
1965 military coup, were executed. Many people felt that it was against basic humanitarian principles to
execute them after so many years of detention. Other aspects of the human rights situation in Indonesia
caused international concern as well. Between 1982 and 1984, a number of "mysterious murders" took
place, which President Suharto, in his autobiography published in 1989, later said had occurred on
official orders. There were reports of human rights violations by the security forces in Irian Jaya, Aceh,
and East Timor. On East Timor, matters came to a head when the Indonesian military opened fire on a
funeral procession in the East Timorese capital of Dili, killing an estimated 100 people. 108 Since then,
both intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations have reported on continued human rights
violations in East Timor.
In the Netherlands, Mr. Pronk had returned as Minister for Development Cooperation in 1989. He
reacted to the execution of another four former bodyguards of President Sukarno by withdrawing 27
million guilders of additional aid for Indonesia. This announcement was of little financial importance,
but it was generally seen as a cause for renewed tension between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The
announcement that Indonesia was planning to execute another six former bodyguards — later denied by
the Indonesian authorities — led to demarches by the President of the Council of Ministers of the
European Communities as well as by the governments of the Netherlands and other European countries.
Pronk discussed the matter during his visit to Indonesia in April 1990 and in informal meetings at the
IGGI meeting in June 1990. Pronk was perhaps encouraged by his alleged "success" when the
bodyguards were in fact not executed. 109 He publicly expressed his aversion to the human rights
situation in Indonesia.
A first preliminary investigation of the Dili affair by a national Indonesian commission was widely seen
as inadequate. In the Dutch parliament and the press critical questions were raised. The Netherlands
government reacted by suspending another 27 million guilders of aid for 1992. At first, the Netherlands
did not stand alone in this. Two other donor countries, Denmark and Canada, announced that they would
stop their aid programmes for Indonesia. However, no consultations about this took place among the
three countries. Portugal, the former colonial ruler over East Timor, led the efforts to arrive at an
international condemnation of the Dili massacre. Also the European Communities suspended its aid
programme and in the European Parliament the establishment of an arms embargo was being urged. 110
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A second investigation took place, this time by the military, which by Indonesian standards was very
critical: the military response to the demonstration in Dili was described as excessive and not in line with
instructions. President Suharto reacted by firing two generals and by having a number of lower-ranking
officers prosecuted.
In these circumstances, the Netherlands government announced in January 1992 its willingness to resume
its aid programme for Indonesia. It stated that it assumed that the Indonesian—Portuguese negotiations
about the future of East Timor, which were to take place under the supervision of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, would lead to a satisfactory solution. But it added that, should these negotiations
not lead to satisfactory results, it would discuss possible consequences with its European partners. This
threat caused Indonesia to postpone negotiations about the distribution of the new Dutch development
money and to start a diplomatic offensive in order to prevent other donor countries from associating
themselves with the Dutch approach. The Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Alatas, visited a
number of foreign capitals and succeeded in receiving the support he requested. On 13 February 1992,
President Suharto, on the occasion of accepting the credentials of the new Dutch ambassador, spoke of
Dutch "colonial" behaviour, as had become apparent from the continued Dutch interference in the
domestic affairs of Indonesia. The establishment of a link between human rights and economic aid he
termed "typically Western." At the same time, Mr. Pronk made preparations for his annual visit to
Indonesia, which this time was to include Aceh, where human rights violations by the Indonesian army
were allegedly still taking place. He was clearly not prepared for the announcement by the Indonesian
government on 25 March 1992 that henceforth it did not want to receive Dutch aid any more and that it
had asked the Netherlands to discontinue its chairmanship of IGGI. By way of explanation, Indonesia
referred to the "reckless use of development aid as an instrument of intimidation or as a tool to threaten
Indonesia." 111
Double standards?
Non-governmental criticism of the Netherlands attitude towards Indonesia did not diminish when, in
December 1982, the Netherlands government unilaterally suspended its development aid to Surinam,
another former Dutch colony, where 15 known opponents of the military regime had been killed in cold
blood. 112 The then Minister for Development Cooperation, Mrs. Schoo, informed parliament that the
bilateral treaty 113 had been suspended, because circumstances had changed so much that the continued
supply of development aid could not be demanded of the Netherlands.
From the beginning, it was alleged by critics of the government that the suspension of aid to Surinam,
when this was initially not done in the case of Indonesia, reflected a policy of double standards. The
Netherlands government has, however, steadfastly denied that such was the case. It emphasized the
unique, treaty-bound character of the development relationship with Surinam. Aid to Surinam not only
was very extensive, but also formed the lion's share of total international aid to that country. A further
important consideration for suspending aid was the seriousness of the human rights violations in a
country that had always had a tradition of an absence of violence in politics. The December 1982
assassinations destroyed in one blow the core of the political opposition in Surinam.
Apart from these factors mentioned by the government, there were undoubtedly other political
considerations as well. Surinam is a relatively small, powerless country, and the Netherlands is one of the
few foreign states that has shown some real interest in its fate. The case of Indonesia is entirely different.
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That country is large and potentially powerful, located in a geographically important strategic position.
For Dutch business interests Indonesia is far more important than Surinam. 114 Annual Dutch aid to
Indonesia was small in comparison to the size of its population and represented only a small proportion
of total international aid given to Indonesia.
To a certain extent the Netherlands government has definitely applied double standards with reference to
Surinam and Indonesia. It claimed at the time that the assassinations in Surinam had changed the
situation so drastically that continuation of the aid effort was impossible. It also pointed out that,
according to its policy principles adopted earlier, development aid should never be used to support
repressive regimes or lead to complicity in gross violations of human rights. The government did not say,
however, that it had suspended the treaty with Surinam in order to improve the human rights situation in
that country. It mentioned other means that it had used for that purpose, including the circulation of a
memorandum at the 1983 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. In Surinam,
however, the suspension of aid was seen as a sanction in reaction to the violation of human rights. It
certainly did not contribute to the credibility of Dutch human rights policy, especially as in both cases the
same kinds of violations of human rights (summary and arbitrary executions, disappearances, torture,
arbitrary arrests) were at stake.
The Dutch argument that the situation in Surinam had changed so much that, according to the
international law principle "rebus sic stantibus," it was not obliged to continue its aid programme has
been questioned. 115 For instance, the Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy has
pointed out that the picture offered by Surinam before the events of 8 December 1982 was one of a
continuing deterioration in the human rights situation: "The December murders should thus not be seen
as an isolated incident, but as a climax in a chain of events." 116
No doubt, the Netherlands government exposed itself to criticism by suspending aid to Surinam while at
the time not doing so in the case of Indonesia. It "solved" this dilemma by denying the similarity of the
two cases. This did not of course silence its domestic critics. One may wonder, however, whether the
government had any viable alternative. It could have avoided the accusation of applying double standards
either by suspending aid to Indonesia, which at that time it did not want to do, or by continuing aid to
Surinam, which was domestically not acceptable. 117 Theoretically, there was a third possibility: to admit
that it was indeed applying double standards, which in the circumstances would have been the most
sensible thing to do. It is not likely, however, that this third possibility was ever seriously considered.
Governments prefer to present their policies as consistent and coherent. Applying double standards has
no place in such a presentation.
The Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy has called development aid to Surinam a
"classic example of a dilemma," stemming from the 1979 policy paper Human Rights in Foreign Policy.
On the one hand, the Netherlands did not want to use development aid or its suspension as a reward or
sanction for human rights performance (policy conclusion no. 35). On the other hand, it did not want its
development aid to contribute to the continuation of repression (policy conclusion no. 38). 118
Nevertheless, the Dutch measure was widely interpreted as a form of sanction. The dilemma received
extra emphasis because of the obvious comparison with the situation in Indonesia.
The Netherlands government had to face strong domestic political pressure at times. Human rights
organizations have repeatedly pointed to the deficiencies in the human rights situation in Indonesia. This
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criticism was led by the non-governmental Indonesia Committee, which has exerted constant pressure on
the Dutch government. In addition, within the Dutch Labour Party — which at times formed part of the
governing coalition — and the smaller political parties of the left, continued reference was made to
Dutch commitments to human rights and the consequences thereof for its relations with Indonesia. On
the other hand, the Netherlands had clear economic interests that demanded extension of trade relations
with Indonesia and an improved climate for investments. These interests were not served by explicit
criticism of Indonesian government policies, in the realm of human rights or elsewhere.
The various Dutch governmental agencies did not always see eye to eye. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
was traditionally strongly engaged in the promotion of human rights, while at the same time pursuing a
policy of combating poverty as a main aim of development policy. The Ministry of Economic Affairs
was mainly interested in restoring mutual trade relations. The Ministry of Education and Sciences
stressed cultural relations, while the Ministry of Justice wanted to be involved in the elaboration and
extension of the Indonesian legal system, which is mainly based on the old Dutch system.
 
VII. Conclusions
On the whole, the Netherlands government has given strong support to internationally recognized human
rights, especially in the field of civil and political rights. Although it has repeatedly claimed that
economic, social, and cultural rights should hold a position of equality with civil and political rights, this
has been less the case in actual policy decisions. For example, the Netherlands — like most other
governments — has so far refused to support the idea of an optional protocol to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights on a right to complaint for individuals. 119 In its
support for human rights, the Netherlands government has on the whole preferred individual over
collective rights.
Is there going to be a future for Dutch human rights policy? That remains to be seen. The member states
of the European Union have lost some of their former ability to carry out a policy of their own. For
instance, in the field of international commercial policy the European organs hold exclusive authority.
This means that the member states cannot independently impose economic sanctions. Also the extension
of common external powers has limited the possibilities of the member states to carry out a foreign
policy of their own. This does not mean, however, that a joint European foreign policy already exists.
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992) states that there is a Common Foreign and Security
Policy that explicitly includes human rights. The recent Treaty of Amsterdam has reaffirmed that
position. Whether this will indeed lead to such a common foreign policy is still very much a matter of
speculation. So far, this common foreign policy has been more a matter of pious sermons than of
concrete actions. 120 The failure on the part of the member states to sponsor a joint resolution on China at
the 1997 session of the UN Commission on Human Rights serves as an illustration of the failure to reach
a common position on an issue of human rights. It seems fair to assume that, at least in the near future,
there will be room for the Netherlands to conduct a human rights policy of its own. One of the more
"positive" consequences of the China incident was that the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van Mierlo,
who had been the target of domestic criticism before for his alleged lack of initiative in the area of
human rights, from now on was regarded at home as an active figure in the struggle for human rights in
China. His third follow-up memorandum on human rights and foreign policy, which was shortly
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afterward debated in parliament, consequently met with little comment or criticism. With regard to
human rights violations in Turkey, the Netherlands has in recent years been as cautious as most other
Western governments.
In Dutch political life, human rights — and development assistance policy — remain an almost sacred
subject. The least the government must do — like many other governments — is to pay lip-service to the
issue. Members of parliament, the press, and informed public opinion want more than that, however. The
government is expected to take initiatives on a world-wide scale to show its commitment to human
rights. However, there are also countervailing tendencies to put more emphasis on national (economic)
interests. In the original report that resulted from the major review of foreign policy, more attention was
paid to such interests than to human rights. Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a thematic directorate
for "conflict, humanitarian assistance and human rights" was to be created, which was to combine
perspectives of foreign policy, development cooperation, and military considerations. 121 The protests,
especially from human rights NGOs, with which these proposals were received forced the government to
revise them. What resulted was the creation of a thematic directorate "Human Rights, Good Governance
and Democratization," whose aim is "to promote a strong and consistent bilateral and multilateral policy
in the field of human rights, good governance and democratization." 122 This directorate comprises 21
people, which makes it — at least quantitatively — one of the stronger sections within the ministry. A
separate directorate now deals with Crisis Management and Humanitarian Assistance. The incident does
not necessarily prove that more attention will be paid to human rights — that depends in the end on the
political leadership given by the Foreign Minister. But it does show that the activities of the minister in
the field of human rights, including the organization of his department, are closely watched by the human
rights community, which continues to possess a considerable amount of political leverage. The amount of
attention that is paid to issues of human rights does not tell us much about what policy decisions will be
taken.
Foreign policy in general and human rights policy in particular generate policy dilemmas that are not
easy to resolve. 123 An illustration is the conflict that can arise between human rights policy and
development assistance policy, as occurred in the relations of the Netherlands with its two former
colonies, Indonesia and Surinam. Its policy toward both countries has not been very successful.
Indonesia showed its disdain for Dutch human rights considerations by unilaterally breaking off the
development aid relationship. In the case of Surinam, the Netherlands seems to have influenced the
domestic political situation only marginally — if at all. 124 If there was a case of applying double
standards, as has widely been suggested, this has not helped the credibility of Dutch policies. However,
in the case of foreign policy, some degree of double standards is not always avoidable. It may be true that
Dutch policy-makers lacked a degree of subtlety and refinement in dealing with Indonesia, but that was
mainly a matter of political style, not of content. The content of human rights policy towards Indonesia
was fully in accordance with the principles and objectives set out in the 1979 policy memorandum.
In the case of Srebrenica, Dutch foreign policy-makers 125 were, for the first time since the failed
reaction to the Indonesian independence movement in the late 1940s, directly confronted with gross
human rights violations. It is difficult to say whether the civilian and military leaders, the officers, and
the enlisted men could or should have done more. What may be learnt from the experience is that, before
becoming engaged in such an operation, one should weigh the political and military risks one is going to
face even more carefully. It seems to be certain that the Dutch military in the field were singularly
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unprepared for what eventually happened. With the benefit of hindsight one can say that it might have
been wiser or smarter not to participate in UNPROFOR in the first place. However, for a country that
prides itself on international engagement and its role in the promotion and protection of human rights,
what is smarter is not necessarily the most noble policy. The experience in Srebrenica created a
collective trauma that will not easily be overcome.
Has the human rights policy of the Netherlands lived up to the admiring description by Jan Egeland,
quoted at the beginning of this chapter? It may be that Egeland was already exaggerating a bit when he
wrote his article in 1984. The Netherlands is not a holy country and the dilemmas it faces are not easier
to resolve than those of other countries. It may be true that the Netherlands government pays somewhat
more attention to the views of an enlightened public opinion, which does not mean that it always acts
according to the wishes of that public opinion. As has been shown in this chapter, the record has been
one of successes and failures. Therefore, rather than subscribing to Egeland's glowing account, it seems
to be more correct to describe the Netherlands human rights policy as one of trials and errors. Both
should be seen as part of a learning experience.
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Chapter 4: British foreign policy and human




British foreign policy on human rights has been driven primarily by three factors: Britain's own national
development; its perceived national interests; and international discourse and action on human rights.
Understanding Britain's national development helps to explain why there is no general consensus on
human rights within Britain and how this has affected the main political parties. In general there are both
differences and similarities between British human rights foreign policy and that of its main partners —
certain continental Europeans and the United States. British governments have normally concentrated on
the promotion and protection of civil and political rights plus occasionally a few economic and social
rights (e.g. the right to education). 1 Arms sales and aid policy in the 1990s are discussed in the section
on bilateral policy.
The chapter begins by looking at the historical development of Britain's interest in human rights both
domestically and internationally before it joined the European Economic Community (EEC, now the
European Union) in 1973 and became a founding member of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) in 1975. It goes on to discuss the presentation of British
foreign policy in this area in three Foreign Policy Documents of 1978, 1991, and 1996 following British
ratification of the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1976, and the new directions introduced by the incoming Labour
government in 1997 and the means through which it operates. It then explores the major domestic factors
influencing British human rights foreign policy and goes on to delineate British multilateral and bilateral
human rights policy (on both a global and a regional level).
In many ways the analysis bears out the contention that foreign policy may be most usefully considered
not in terms of the legal and constitutional framework of sovereignty and statehood, of law-making and
war-making, but rather as the product of a complex interplay of international, transnational, and domestic
influences. 2 But, as will also be seen, law (both national and international) and respect for law remain
central to the development of human rights foreign policy in Britain 3 for all political parties. This is why
the main emphasis in this chapter is given to the rights from the Universal Declaration that were put into
legally binding form in the ICCPR and the ICESCR and the similar rights in the European Convention on
Human Rights and its concomitant Social Charter.
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II. The historical context
In terms of human rights Britain has been particularly influenced by its distinctive history and its concern
for precedent as well as by its general Western and conservative orientation on human rights questions.
The basic history
The English Bill of Rights of 1689 is usually regarded as the first major document of modern
constitutional history. Lauterpacht argues that, although it was the work of Churchmen and of the rich
Whig gentry who perpetuated their hold on the country to the exclusion of the masses of the people by
submitting the Crown to the supremacy of Parliament and by enthroning the right of resistance as part of
a fundamental constitutional document, it accomplished the greatest thing done by the English nation. 4 It
contained such civil rights as equality before the law, trial by jury, and the prohibition of inhuman
treatment and of excessive bail or fines. 5 (Freedom from arbitrary arrest had already been secured by the
Habeas Corpus Acts of 1640 and 1679.) Political rights proclaimed included the prohibition of the
levying of money without the consent of Parliament, and provision for the free election of Members of
Parliament, for frequent sessions, and for immunity of the proceedings of Parliament. However the Bill
was not designed to "establish a comprehensive set of rights for the people as a whole" and tended to
reinforce "existing inequalities and discriminations" by, for example, giving special rights to Protestants,
"who alone were allowed to bear arms." 6
Freedom of the press was established by the decision not to renew the Licensing Act in 1695, and the
beginning of religious freedom was established by the Toleration Act of 1689. Independence of the
judiciary was established by the Act of Settlement (1700).
This British tradition stemmed from constitutional charters of liberty (in particular the Magna Carta), a
strong legal framework, and the ideas of men like Locke who considered that sovereignty pertained to
the people as a whole and that the individual conveyed to society as a whole the right to exercise certain
functions best exercised collectively. 7 This tradition was one of the principal factors behind the major
eighteenth-century declarations on rights in the United States (the 1776 Virginia Bill of Rights and the
Declaration of Independence) and France (the Declarations of 1789 and of 1793, which included
references to economic and social rights). 8
These latter influenced a number of European and Latin American constitutions in the nineteenth
century. By contrast, the rights that came to the fore in Britain and the United States at the same time
were those concerned with political participation, a transformation linked to democratization. 9 Solutions
to the problems posed by the industrial revolution were often couched in terms of economic and social
rights. Trade unions were legalized in Britain progressively from 1871. The International Labour
Organization (ILO; now a UN specialized agency) was set up by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, though
it was not controlled by the League of Nations.
These developments had been enriched by a long-standing tradition of Western thinking going back to
the Greeks, followed by Stoic conceptions of natural law and the emergence of Christianity with its
assumption that Christians must distinguish between service to God and the State; to the affirmation of
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the existence of a natural higher law in the Middle Ages and its tradition of charters of liberties, rights,
and franchises; and to Vitoria, who in the sixteenth century argued that primitive peoples were entitled to
the protection of law. These ideas were put into a modern international context with the Peace of
Westphalia (1648), which contained provisions about the rights of religious groups and ushered in the
system of equal sovereign states with the ending of the Thirty Years War and the claims of superiority of
the Holy Roman Empire. Grotius had already maintained (1625) that standards of justice applicable to
individuals were valid in relation to states and originated the idea of humanitarian intervention for the
protection of individual rights. Ideas on self-determination for states began to be expressed during the
nineteenth century with the setting up of states such as Greece and the unification of Germany and Italy.
They were given an even greater prominence by President Wilson after the First World War and were
behind the institution of mandates by the League of Nations.
The 1940s to the 1960s
The carnage of the Second World War propelled human rights ideas forward, giving rise to the making of
the UN Charter (1945), the Universal Declaration (1948), and the two succeeding major Covenants —
the ICCPR and the ICESCR — which put the rights in the Human Rights Declaration into binding legal
instruments. Britain played a major part in this standard-setting and in the making of similar regional
instruments — the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) of 1953, which set up a Court of
Human Rights, and its accompanying Social Charter (1965).
One major British interest that then needed to be protected was its colonial inheritance. Both its major
political parties considered in the 1940s that colonial rule was not an oppressive relationship, but rather a
partnership between Britain and its dependent territories. 10 This concern influenced British policy
towards the right of individual petition and self-determination. The government feared that individual
petition might be used as a weapon of political agitation in the Cold War and that it might subvert the
respect of dependent peoples for the established imperial authorities. 11 They therefore made sure that
individual petition was added to the first Protocol of the ICCPR (which Britain has never ratified) and
not to the ICCPR itself or to the draft ECHR. 12 The government also tried, unsuccessfully, to ensure that
the article on self-determination was not added to the draft Covenants by the United Nations' third world
constituency. By the early 1960s, however, decolonization had made the issue less urgent and the
political implications of the articles on self-determination seemed less important.1 13 Britain accepted the
right of petition for individuals in Britain under the ECHR as early as 1966, 14 and for individuals in its
Crown Dependencies and dependent territories in 1967. It signed both the Covenants in 1968.
By the 1960s human rights were given more publicity as international outrage over the South African
government's apartheid policies grew in the United Nations (particularly after the admission of 16 Black
African states in 1960) and in the Commonwealth — fanned by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
such as the British-based Anti-Apartheid Movement founded in 1959. 15 The British government voted
for the preparation of a UN Convention against Racial Discrimination in 1963, 16 and in 1965 passed the
first British Race Relations Act and voted for the ensuing Convention. In 1966 it decided "that Articles
55 and 56 of the Charter impose on member Governments of the United Nations a positive obligation to
pursue a policy designed to promote respect for and observance of human rights and to co-operate within
the United Nations to that end ... The South African government's policy over apartheid is a clear breach
of obligation according to this interpretation." This generous interpretation of Articles 55 and 56 enabled
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the British government both to avoid using Article 2.7 (on intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of a
state) and to express concern more appropriately over human rights breaches in other states. The British
government went on to ratify the Racial Discrimination Convention in 1969 and presented its first report
to the monitoring Committee in 1971.
 
III. Basic elements of British human rights foreign policy
There is much continuity between aspects of British human rights policies in the 1970s and subsequently.
Britain was influenced by its new membership of the European Economic Community, which it joined in
1973, and its participation in the 1973–1975 diplomatic meeting that launched the on-going Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Overall the main thrust of its policy moved from concern with
colonial issues and standard-setting to the problems raised by the implementation of human rights legal
standards at both international and regional level, and the continuing debate on the place of human rights
in foreign policy following British ratification of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR in 1976 — the year
they came into force. In 1977, a Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) minister, Evan Luard, began
a detailed examination of British human rights policy. This, in a new departure in 1978, was given a
partial public airing in a Foreign Policy Document on British Policy towards the United Nations. 17 This
document and two subsequent Foreign Policy Documents of 1991 and 1996 (both called Human Rights
in Foreign Policy) issued after the end of the Cold War, described below, remain some of the most useful
sources for British government thinking about human rights and foreign policy over this period. They
have been built on by the new Labour government since May 1997.
The Foreign Policy Documents — 1978, 1991, 1996
The 1978 Foreign Policy Document included a 13-page British paper on "Human Rights and Foreign
Policy," which tried to answer a number of questions on a range of human rights foreign policy issues.
What steps can be taken in relation to other countries where glaring violations of human rights occur?
This looked at 14 categories of possible actions that could be taken, as well as the United Kingdom's
legal and political standing to raise human rights with foreign governments; policy considerations;
possible aid adjustments; arms exports; and trade sanctions. Should the government attempt a consistent
application of rules or treat each country on an ad hoc basis? The important answer was that Britain
should have a consistent posture on human rights throughout the world; the government should undertake
an annual consideration of the performance of each country and the implications for British policy
towards it; posts should include regular reports on this area; submissions and briefings to ministers on,
for instance, arms and aid should refer to human rights issues. Should the government concentrate
particularly on the worst offenders of all? The FCO should consider this but should avoid the appearance
of a vendetta. It should work with the EEC, the United States, and Commonwealth partners.
On the UN side it asked: What action can Britain take to improve the effectiveness of the UN
Commission on Human Rights in dealing with such questions? The government should try to improve
the effectiveness of the Commission in conjunction with other Western countries. What other actions are
open to the government to improve the United Nations' performance in this field? It should continue to
press for a High Commissioner for Human Rights and find ways of improving the United Nations'
performance on human rights by pressing the British General Assembly initiative of 1974 on alternative
ways of improving the enjoyment of human rights in the UN system.
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On other possibilities it noted, could the government expand the activities of other organs? It should
explore the possibility of establishing regional commissions with Britain's EC partners, beginning in
Africa. Are there particular human rights issues and abuses that the government should press particularly
hard to discuss? The British priority should remain violations against the integrity of the person. Britain
should recognize the third world emphasis on economic rights but should not allow this as an excuse for
the violation of basic human rights.
What can the government do to support the non-official organizations, such as the International
Commission for Jurists, Amnesty International, and so on? It should continue to support them without
infringing their independence. What more can or should Britain do in public statements to demonstrate
its concern on such matters? The government should continue making statements in appropriate venues,
including the House of Commons. What steps should it take to consult and cooperate with other
governments, especially its EEC partners and the United States, in any or all of these actions? Britain
should continue to work with the EEC, the United States and other NATO allies, the Commonwealth and
like-minded nations including non-Western countries with excellent human rights records.
The 1978 Foreign Policy Document went on to give details of British bilateral human rights policy in the
context of aid, arms exports, and trade. On aid it revealed that ministers had privately urged Indonesian
leaders to release detainees, and that at a recent meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia
(an international aid donors' consortium) the leader of the British delegation had pointed out that the
early release of detainees would make it easier to defend its aid to Indonesia. It noted that the
government had decided not to offer aid to the mining equipment sector in Bolivia or to enter into new
aid commitments to Ethiopia. In two cases (both under the previous Conservative government) Britain
had phased out its aid entirely following serious human rights violations: Uganda in November 1972 and
Chile 18 in March 1974 (except for a small educational technical cooperation programme). Britain had
also used its influence in the EEC on Uganda and Equatorial Guinea. On arms exports it stated that there
had been embargoes on arms sales to South Africa since 1964 and to Chile since 1974. Exports of arms
and military equipment were subject to license by officials at the Department of Trade after consulting
the Ministry of Defence, the FCO, and, sometimes, ministers. More problems occurred in the context of
trade, where the only example was the special case of Rhodesia. Using trade as a means of putting
pressure created problems: the mechanics were difficult; markets could also simply be handed to British
competitors; retaliation against British investments or exports could also be expected.
The pamphlet also supported the use of the confidential ECOSOC 1503 procedure (examining
complaints against countries sent to the UN Secretary-General by individuals and NGOs) by the UN
Human Rights Commission. It noted that Britain had used it to pursue the cases of both Uganda and
Chile.
The Labour government felt comfortable with the US Carter administration, 19 which had both written
the first comprehensive Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and, in October 1977, signed both
Covenants. In the section on human rights at the United Nations in the Foreign Policy Document, the
government welcomed the increased attention being devoted to human rights and its agencies and shared
the US appreciation of regional human rights bodies. It considered that measures to expand UN human
rights activities should be based on existing machinery and systems. It thought that the ECOSOC 1503
procedure was the most effective way of investigating human rights abuses in the UN machinery, that the
Human Rights Commission should concentrate on the effective implementation of international
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instruments on human rights, and that Britain should continue to press for a High Commissioner on
Human Rights.
This initiative was not repeated until January 1991, when detailed guidelines summarizing British policy
and practice on human rights as they had evolved in recent years were published in a further Foreign
Policy Document. 20 They reflected not so much a change of policy as a recognition on the part of
ministers and officials, at home and abroad, that there is a need for greater emphasis on the human rights
dimension of UK foreign policy. As its introduction pointed out, "developments in Eastern Europe have
demonstrated both the corrosive effect that a prolonged record of human rights abuses can have on the
stability of a regime and that a consistent Western policy of support for human rights can over time lend
powerful impetus to forces working for political pluralism and the rule of law."
The 1991 Foreign Policy Document went on to discuss universal human rights standards; the
government's standing to raise human rights; ways in which the government raises human rights
(bilateral action, joint action with the EU, and multilateral action in the context of the United Nations, the
Commonwealth, the Council of Europe, and the CSCE — details are given in the sections on multilateral
and bilateral policy); aid; defence sales; responding to public and parliamentary concerns; raising human
rights with other governments; responding to questions about Britain's own human rights performance, as
well as the responsibilities of posts abroad and departments within the FCO. A further Foreign Policy
Document on Human Rights in Foreign Policy was issued in 1996. 21 This, as in 1991, noted that it
reflected a recognition on the part of ministers and officials that there was a need for greater emphasis on
the human rights dimension of British foreign policy. It stated that Britain and other UN members had a
legal obligation under the UN Charter to promote and protect human rights.
The new Labour government and human rights, 1997
On 12 May 1997 the new Labour Foreign Secretary issued a Mission Statement for the FCO whose aim
was to promote the national interests of the United Kingdom and to contribute to a strong world
community. Four benefits were sought: security; prosperity; quality of life; and mutual respect. For
mutual respect it noted: "We shall work through international forums and bilateral relationships to spread
the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy which we demand for ourselves." He opened
the press conference launching the Statement by stating: "the Labour Government will put human rights
at the heart of our foreign policy and will publish an annual report on our work in promoting human
rights abroad." The government also announced that it would incorporate the ECHR into British
domestic law. 22
In early July 1997, a major review of British policy towards international human rights instruments was
announced, including the question of accession to Protocols to the ECHR and the ICCPR and the
acceptance of the right of individual petition under other human rights treaties. The government would
also consider whether any of Britain's reservations to human rights treaties could be withdrawn. Britain
would work to strengthen the UN Register of Conventional Arms. This was followed by a major speech
23 by the Foreign Secretary on 17 July in which he discussed six core civil and political rights from the
Universal Declaration that he considered Britain had a duty to demand for those who did not yet enjoy
them. He noted that the World Bank had recently concluded that the economies with faster growth were
those where political equality has produced the fairest shares of income, and that the separate Department
for International Development would soon publish a White Paper setting out policies for tackling global
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poverty and promoting sustainable development.
He then set 12 policies to put into effect the British human rights commitment, including: giving support
to measures within the international community to condemn regimes that grotesquely violate human
rights; supporting sanctions applied by the international community; refusing arms equipment to
problematic regimes; ensuring trade measures did not undermine human rights (e.g. in the context of
child labour); supporting measures at multilateral conferences and in bilateral contacts that criticize
abuses of human rights; calling for observance of universal standards; supporting a permanent
International Criminal Court and providing more resources for international criminal tribunals; ensuring
that the UK Military Assistance Training Scheme better supports UK human rights objectives; giving
stronger support to the media under threat from authoritarian regimes; publishing an annual report on the
government's activities; and ensuring that Britain's own record can be respected.
Means
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), formed in 1968, 24 takes the lead on questions of human
rights and foreign policy, though certain legal issues may be discussed with the Lord Chancellor's
Department and the Home Office. Human rights foreign policy is, of course, ultimately set by ministers
in the context of British legal obligations under the human rights instruments to which Britain is a party.
The Human Rights Policy Department (formerly part of the United Nations Department) within the FCO
deals with human rights issues on a regional level and throughout the UN system. This was set up as a
Human Rights Policy Unit in 1992 and became a Department (HRPD) two years later. Like other FCO
departments, it is advised by a Legal Adviser and has access to researchers.
Members of HRPD and diplomats from New York and Geneva discuss human rights questions at the UN
Human Rights Commission (in the spring); the resolutions adopted there are then discussed in the United
Nations' Economic and Social Council (in the summer), and subsequently discussed in the Third
Committee of the UN General Assembly. HRPD also takes the lead for Britain at major conferences on
human rights issues (e.g. Vienna in 1993). It provides briefing and advice to ministers and organizes the
submission of the British reports to the different monitoring committees, which usually include major
contributions from appropriate domestic departments. Britain now reports to six such committees. 25
HRPD officials also cover major meetings of EU members on human rights and liaise closely on human
rights matters with the department that covers the Council of Europe (CoE) at Strasbourg (FCO Legal
Advisers are closely involved, particularly with proceedings under the ECHR in which they act as agent
for the government) and the OSCE. The ILO, which deals inter alia with trade union human rights
matters, is covered by British diplomats at Geneva (as well as the Department for Education and
Employment, which send officials to its annual meetings). UNESCO, which also deals with certain
human rights questions, is (when Britain is a member) handled by diplomats from the British Embassy in
Paris under the aegis of the Department for International Development.
Human rights matters at a country level are reported on from posts, who send reports to appropriate FCO
geographical departments, to the HRPD, and to the OSCE/CoE Department. Civil servants in these and
previous departments have worked closely with certain NGOs since the mid-1970s (see below). FCO
researchers and others maintain close contacts with academics.
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IV. Domestic factors
British citizens and their governments, both Labour and Conservative, have been highly influenced by
their evolutionary inheritance, which can be contrasted with the comprehensive codes dear to many
continental Europeans. As one recent book dealing with civil and political rights notes, "Citizens of the
United Kingdom believe that they are among the freest people in the world, a belief going back to the
ancient resistance of Anglo-Saxons to the ´Norman yoke' and the Magna Carta ... Yet the British tradition
of ancient ´constitutional rights' is a double-edged legacy. This tradition conflates ideas of ´strong'
government and public order with civil liberties, and the first two are usually paramount in the minds of
the country's rulers." 26 It has also meant that "the revolutionary ideas of collective enforcement and the
right of individual petition to independent outside bodies ... have undoubtedly proved unwelcome to
British governments." 27
Another contemporary author notes the "philosophical gulf" between the British and their fellow
Europeans. She argues that British cases in which the European Court of Human Rights has found a
violation are most often "cases involving people in the custody of the state or who have turned to it for
help," and she suggests that these cases "stem from a failure to recognize that what are at issue are rights.
In so far as the constitutional system in the United Kingdom regards the interests as privileges, which
need to be earned or which are residual and vulnerable to legislative or executive removal, it denies their
character as rights."
She suggests that the incorporation of the ECHR will not provide a solution to the failure to recognize
that what are at issue are rights. "What is needed is a change of attitude on the part not only of the
institutions of government but also of the public at large. They need to learn to think in terms of rights:
the incorporation of the Convention could play an educational role." 28
Another laments "the absence of a charter of fundamental rights" to provide "a framework for individual
identity and action when the elements of identity provided by custom and manners no longer suffice." 29
Political parties
The intellectual inheritance noted above has affected both main political parties and meant that rights
language comes more naturally to Labour supporters than to Conservatives. As will already be apparent,
most of the initiatives on human rights since the Second World War have been taken by Labour rather
than Conservative governments, though they have subsequently been accepted by Conservative
governments. 30
Certain differences between the parties are illustrated by their 1997 election manifestos. The
Conservative manifesto did not mention human rights except to state in the section on Parliament that a
new Bill of Rights would risk transferring power away from Parliament to legal courts — undermining
the democratic supremacy of Parliament as representative of the people. The Liberal Democrats inter alia
called for the incorporation of the ECHR into British law, for the setting up of a Human Rights
Commission to strengthen protection of individual rights, and for the promotion of an enforceable
framework of international law, human rights, and the environment. Labour called for the incorporation
of the ECHR into British law, stated it would make the protection and promotion of human rights a
central part of British foreign policy, and indicated it would work for a permanent international criminal
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court to investigate genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Parliament
Parliamentary interest in human rights questions has become greater over the years as the subject has
gained in political importance. A cross-party Parliamentary Human Rights Group was formed in 1976.
And a colloquium sponsored by British and United States NGOs on "Human Rights in United States and
United Kingdom Foreign Policy" was held in the Palace of Westminster in November 1978. 31 Until
1997 the House of Commons had never focused on human rights overall. The House of Lords examined
the question of human rights, democracy, and development in the context of the Council of Europe in
1992. 32 Questions of human rights, of course, also came up in, for instance, the House of Lords'
examination of relations between Britain and China in 1994. The Parliamentary Foreign Affairs
Committee decided, in 1997, to conduct an inquiry on foreign policy and human rights. The report,
which came out in December 1998, covered international obligations, policy objectives, and policy
implementation. 33 It attempted to assess the implementation and effects of government policies against
the initial policy commitments made by the Foreign Secretary in July 1997 and made 47 specific
conclusions and recommendations. The government's reply of March 1999 welcomed the endorsement of
the positive changes that had been made and set out further detailed observations on the conclusions and
recommendations. 34
Non-governmental organizations
Domestic pressure groups (now often acting transnationally) have played a role in the making of human
rights foreign policy since the 1940s. Pressure from pro-European groups appears to have been
particularly effective in the early 1950s. 35 Other well-known pressure groups often date back to the
1960s (e.g. Amnesty International founded in 1961). The first parliamentary question that referred to
these new pressure groups was asked in 1966. 36 British governments have been working closely with a
number of these groups in the human rights arena since the Labour government of the late 1970s first
began to meet with them and discuss aspects of human rights. Many are extremely involved with aspects
of the United Nations and the committees monitoring the major human rights instruments. 37 NGO
representatives often meet Foreign Office officials; for example, there is an annual meeting between the
leader of the Human Rights delegation to the Human Rights Commission a few weeks before its Geneva
session begins. Important human rights NGOs active in British politics (not all of which are
headquartered in Britain) include Amnesty International, the Anti-Slavery Society, Article 19, Human
Rights Watch, Interrights, International Alert, the International Commission of Jurists, the Minority
Rights Group, Rights and Humanity, the Charities Aid Foundation, Penal Reform International, British
Refugee Council, the Jubilee Campaign, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Index on
Censorship, and the National Alliance of Women's Organizations.
NGO representatives have, on occasion, served as members of British delegations to major conferences
with a major human rights aspect (e.g. the 1995 Women's conference at Beijing) and have been involved
with the drafting of major conventions (e.g. the Convention on the Rights of the Child). 38 They also play
a big part in hearings of the main committees monitoring British reports. In July 1995 the UN Human
Rights Committee reported that the evidence from "a wide range" of organizations committed to human
rights and democracy during its hearings on the UK human rights record "not only greatly assisted the
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Committee, but [was] also a tribute to the democratic nature of UK society" (CCPR/C/798/Add.55, para.
3). 39
The media
The British media do not give a consistent picture of the human rights activities of the British
government. Governmental reports to the major monitoring committees are usually not covered, and
media reporting of British government activity on human rights questions is exceptionally patchy.
However, on some issues which resonate emotionally, such as apartheid, certain media campaigns have
had a major influence on public opinion.
 
V. Multilateral policy (regional and international)
It is important to emphasize the fact that British governments' policy towards human rights questions,
both past and present, has also been influenced by international factors and the international context (or
climate of opinion) in which it operates. I share the analysis put forward by Martha Finnemore in which
she suggests that states are more socially responsive entities than is recognized by traditional
international relations theory. State policies and structures are influenced by intersubjective systemic
factors, specifically by norms promulgated within the international system. 40 Since the late 1970s when,
it can be argued, human rights started to become part of high politics (through British ratification of the
human rights covenants in 1976 and the major speech by the Foreign Secretary in 1977), Britain has
worked with regional and a variety of multilateral partners to put the major norms into practice.
Britain and regional organizations
The Council of Europe
The parties to the 1948 regional Brussels Treaty (including Britain), which reaffirmed "their faith in
fundamental human rights ... and in the other ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations," 41
agreed, in London in May 1949, to establish the Council of Europe. After a series of complex
negotiations at official and cabinet level (and pressure from pro-European NGOs), the government
signed the ECHR (negotiated through the Council) in November 1950 and ratified it in February 1951.
This outcome transpired despite the Lord Chancellor's view "that we were not prepared to encourage our
European friends to jeopardize our whole system of law, which we have laboriously built up over
centuries, in favour of some half-baked scheme to be administered by some unknown court." 42 The
ECHR was subsequently complemented by the European Social Charter, dealing with 19 economic and
social rights similar to those in the draft ICESCR. This was opened for signature in 1961, ratified by
Britain in 1962 (14 years before it ratified the ICESCR), and came into force in 1965. Britain signed the
revised, updated Social Charter in November 1997.
The European Court of Human Rights was inaugurated in January 1959 and, as has already been noted,
the British government allowed petitions from individuals from Britain in 1966 and from its Crown
Dependencies and dependent territories in 1967. It also played a major part at the first Council of Europe
Ministerial Conference on Human Rights in March 1985 just after it had ratified the Eighth Protocol to
the ECHR designed to reduce delays in the institutions. (In 1987 ministers decided to "Strasbourg proof"
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all British legislation, i.e. ensure that it could not be subject to a case in the European Court of Human
Rights.) 43 Britain also ratified the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 1988.
The revival of nationalism in post-Cold War Europe soon led to concern about minority questions in
Eastern Europe. In February 1995 the British government signed the Council of Europe Framework
Convention for the protection of national minorities. The government also raised concerns about the
future constitution and functioning of the machinery of enforcement for the ECHR in 1996. The Lord
Chancellor visited Strasbourg to discuss the question with the President of the European Court in
November. He said that he considered that it was important that when Protocol 11 of the Convention was
implemented and the Commission and Court were combined, its procedures should be such as not only to
facilitate the work of the Court but also to be demonstrably fair to all parties. The British government
then opened discussion on the selection of judges, court procedure, and the application of the doctrine of
margin of appreciation — which it saw as important for the continuing support of the member states. 44
In 1997 the incoming Labour government announced that the ECHR would finally be incorporated into
British law.
The European Union
Since Britain finally joined the EC (now the EU) on 1 January 1973 it has worked primarily with its EU
colleagues in the United Nations and, of course, in the EU itself on human rights matters. It was also in
the Chair in July 1986 when EC foreign ministers made their first major overall Declaration on human
rights (the 1957 Treaty of Rome had made no specific reference to human rights). Ministers reaffirmed
that respect for human rights was one of the cornerstones of European cooperation. They noted that "the
promotion of economic, social and cultural rights as well as of civil and political rights is of paramount
importance for the full realization of human dignity and for the attainment of the legitimate aspirations of
every individual." 45 EC divisions on the right to development were, however, noticeable in the vote on
the Declaration in the General Assembly in December 1986. Denmark, Germany, and the United
Kingdom abstained; the other EC members voted in favour. Britain finally accepted the right to
development in 1993 at the Vienna Conference.
The 1991 Foreign Policy Document 46 on Human Rights in Foreign Policy noted that the EC partners
had taken action on human rights through Declarations both general (e.g. on Sudan in March and
November 1989) and specific (e.g. on the murder of six Jesuit priests in El Salvador in November 1989),
and demarches (around 70 in 1989 in all regions of the world) by the Presidency, the Troika or all
ambassadors of the EC Twelve resident in a capital. These were usually confidential, though officials
were able to refer to them in correspondence with MPs, NGOs, etc. On a multilateral level the EC states
had taken joint and separate action at relevant UN and CSCE meetings. In a limited number of cases,
concern among the EC states at human rights abuses had led to decisions on common action. These
usually took the form of coordinated diplomatic measures, for example against Burma, China, and
Noriega's Panama, but could extend to actual measures taken by the Council (e.g. the decision to rescind
Romania's benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences before Ceaus«escu's fall in 1989 and the
Council decision in April 1989 to suspend negotiations on an EC/Romanian agreement). In 1998 the EU,
now with 15 members, took the common position that it would not support a resolution in the UN
Human Rights Commission condemning China's human rights policies. The previous year, EU members
had been badly divided on that same issue.
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The 1991 Foreign Policy Document went on to explain that action by EC states often followed from
recommendations made by Heads of Mission in joint reports on human rights. Such reports were usually
commissioned by the Twelve's regional working groups or when agreement on the need for a report was
reached. Guidelines for the preparation of these reports were drawn up in 1987 by the EC Working
Group on Human Rights.
The subsequent 1996 Foreign Policy Document referred to the further comprehensive EU Declaration on
Human Rights adopted in June 1991 and stated that to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of
law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms was also one of the declared objectives of
Common Foreign and Security Policy. It also noted that joint action by the EU often carried greater
weight than bilateral action. It stated that the European Union had made around 85 statements in 1995
besides taking coordinated diplomatic action against Burma and Nigeria and issuing confidential
demarches.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Five of the 10 Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States in the final Helsinki Act
(August 1975) of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are to be found in the 1970 UN
Friendly Relations Declaration, which was the fruit of a study of certain Charter principles, including the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples "with a view to their progressive development
and codification, so as to secure their more effective application." The negotiators were also able to use
language already agreed in the two main human rights Covenants. This explains why it was relatively
easy to add a further Principle VII on respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including
freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, to the Act. The Helsinki Final Act also had similar
participants (the third world being represented by its European non-aligned members — Yugoslavia,
Cyprus, and Malta); it provided useful agreed language including on aspects of human rights; and it
showed that negotiation on these kinds of issues could be brought to fruition. 47
The achievements of the Conference, outlined in a House of Commons debate by a Labour FCO minister
in February 1976, were: the establishment of a code of conduct between European states; the creation of
confidence-building military measures; and the fact that the CSCE had "stipulated a number of ways in
which the rights of individuals — the right to free movement, the right to be reunited with their families,
and the right to receive information — should be safeguarded." 48 This change from low politics towards
high politics was highlighted in a speech given by the new Labour Foreign Secretary, David Owen, in
March 1977. In it he discussed the usefulness of the Helsinki Final Act, saying that it had already begun
to be an inspiration and a point of reference for those who wanted to see their societies evolve peacefully
and constitutionally in a more open direction. He went on to affirm that the Charter, the Universal
Declaration, the Covenants, and the Final Act "demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that abuses of
human rights, wherever they may occur, are the legitimate subject of international concern. The dignity
of man stands on values which transcend national frontiers. And in the democracies of the West it is
inevitable and right that foreign policy should not only reflect the values of society, but that those who
conduct foreign affairs should respond positively to the weight of public opinion and concern. In Britain
we will take our stand on human rights in every corner of the globe ... We will apply the same standards
and judgments to Communist countries as we do to Chile, Uganda and South Africa." 49
The incoming Conservative government in 1979 continued to play a similar role on the question of
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human rights and foreign policy to its Labour predecessor, though it did not give the issue such a high
profile and it shifted the emphasis, even more, to East-West relations by underlining the human rights
dimension of the CSCE process. In December 1980 the British minister at the CSCE Madrid review
conference suggested that the meeting should first consider matters in which the framework of conduct
had not been fully respected; and secondly insist on better implementation of the seventh principle on
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms — particularly freedom of thought, religion,
information, and movement. 50
The Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting ended in January 1989 with agreement on a new and continuous
monitoring mechanism on human rights within the CSCE process — the Conference on the Human
Dimension (CHD) mechanism. This provided four separate ways of raising with any other CSCE state
specific human rights cases and situations within that state's territory. The mechanism has been invoked
on a number of occasions by Britain nationally as well as jointly by the Twelve. CHD meetings assess
among other things the functioning of this mechanism, and also offer a forum for reviewing other CSCE
member states' overall implementation of their human rights commitments.
Britain and global international organizations
The United Nations
Britain, as one of the main Allied victors at the end of the Second World War, was able to ensure that the
language in its memorandum setting out proposals for the proposed new UN Organization's purposes and
principles (including human rights) was incorporated with little change into Article 1 of the UN Charter.
These proposals were designed to appeal to smaller powers because they would in theory prevent the
Great Powers from acting like tyrants. 51 The ensuing UN Human Rights Commission's Drafting
Committee agreed in June 1947 that the articles in a British draft could be submitted as a basis for a draft
convention with the addition of articles on torture, the right to a legal personality, and asylum. 52 This
draft bill, agreed by a Cabinet Office committee, covered only civil and political rights, and did not
include provision for either individual appeal or enforcement mechanisms. Economic and social rights
(e.g. the right to work and to social security) were mentioned in a further draft General Assembly
resolution, but it was noted that they could not by their nature be defined in the form of legal obligations
for states. Britain voted for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948 even
though it included references to economic, social, and cultural rights, which were not in its draft bill.
Britain continued to take a prominent role in putting the rights set out in the 1948 Universal Declaration
into legal form. It also continued to accept, though not enthusiastically, economic, social, and cultural
rights. The Human Rights Commission submitted draft texts of the articles on economic, social, and
cultural rights to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the General Assembly in 1954.
Between 1956 and 1958 these draft articles were approved in the General Assembly with little major
amendment. These negotiations undoubtedly had an effect on the negotiations then going on to
complement the ECHR with a European Social Charter.
The two Covenants on civil and political and economic, social, and cultural rights were signed by Britain
in 1968. This "implied an expectation that the United Kingdom would ratify the Covenants in due course.
It was also consistent with the United Kingdom's view that its internal law and practice must be carefully
assessed and, if necessary, amended before undertaking international obligations." 53 The Labour Foreign
Secretary, in his speech to the General Assembly in September 1976, called on all states to join Britain in
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ratifying the Covenants and to give full support to its monitoring committee. "Our task is to create a
world in which all men can live in peace, prosperity and freedom, guaranteed by the rule of law." 54
The Conservative government continued to press human rights considerations in a number of forums and
supported the appointment of a Rapporteur in Afghanistan at the Human Rights Commission in early
1984. 55 It ratified the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in 1986 and the
Convention against Torture in 1988. On the United Nations, it noted in the 1991 Foreign Policy
Document that UN mechanisms are inevitably cumbersome and slow but the cumulative effect of the
criticism at the United Nations can bring considerable pressure on governments. It also ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child in December 1991 (it had come into force in 1990). 56
A Foreign Office minister, as is normally the case, addressed the UN Human Rights Commission in
February 1995. He pointed out that a year ago they were celebrating both the outcome of the 1993
Vienna World Conference on human rights and the creation of a High Commissioner for Human Rights.
At the conference the British government had accepted both the right to development (as it had not in
1986) and also that "all human rights are universal, indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated." He
hoped that the Commission would discuss the vital relationship between democracy, development, and
human rights. He suggested that the Commission needed to pay close attention to economic, social, and
cultural rights, as well as to civil and political rights and to look in particular at how governments
implement them. 57
After the Labour government came into office in May 1997 it ended the ban on free association, which
had been applied to the civil servants at the Government Communications Headquarters against ILO
standards.
The Commonwealth
The 1971 Declaration of Commonwealth Principles at the Heads of Government meeting at Singapore
noted, inter alia: "We believe in the liberty of the individual, in equal rights for all citizens regardless of
race, colour, creed or political belief, and in their inalienable right to participate by means of free and
democratic political processes in framing the society in which they live." This was reaffirmed at the 1981
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting. Participants were urged to accede to the relevant global
and regional instruments. The Heads of Government also endorsed in principle the recommendation of a
Commonwealth Working Party on Human Rights concerning the establishment of a special unit in the
Secretariat for the promotion of human rights within the Commonwealth. This was eventually set up in
1985. 58
Within the Commonwealth, Britain was working after the end of the Cold War to strengthen the
Commonwealth role in promoting human rights, notably by assisting the development of legal and
administrative infrastructures, by increasing understanding of the major international human rights
instruments, and by encouraging ratification of these instruments by Commonwealth countries. 59 In
1991 the Commonwealth Heads of Government issued a Declaration at Harare stressing the need to
protect and promote democracy, the rule of law, just and honest government, and the independence of the
judiciary; fundamental human rights including equal rights and opportunities for all citizens regardless of
race, colour, creed, or political belief; equality for women so that they can exercise their full and equal
rights; provision of universal access to education; and continuing action to bring about an end to
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apartheid and the establishment of a free, democratic, non-racial, and prosperous South Africa. 60
The G7
It is important to note that the Group of 7 industrialized nations (now a Group of 8 including Russia), of
which Britain is a member, also uses human rights language. At Houston in July 1990 the governments
stated: "We welcome unreservedly the spread of multiparty democracy, the practice of free elections, the
freedom of expression and assembly, the increased respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the
increasing recognition of the principles of the open and competitive economy. These events proclaim
loudly man's inalienable rights: when people are free to choose, they choose freedom." 61
 
VI. Bilateral policy
Before the end of the Cold War
Many British bilateral actions on human rights questions were, and continue to be, enacted behind the
scenes. A number on aid (relating to Bolivia, Chile, Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Uganda), arms exports
(Chile and South Africa), and trade (Rhodesia) were noted in the 1978 Foreign Policy Document (for
more detail see section III). Since then, more and more attention has been given to human rights in the
House of Commons. In the 1980–1981 session there were six subject entries, two of which were devoted
to specific countries (Pakistan and Syria). In the 1988–1989 session there were 74 such entries, 51 of
which were devoted to specific countries.
The Foreign Secretary gave an account of the December 1984 guidelines for arms exports to Iran and
Iraq in October 1985. 62 Britain would continue not to supply any lethal equipment but, subject to this, it
should attempt to fulfil existing contracts. In March 1986 the House was told that the government had not
provided any new aid to the governments of Vietnam or Afghanistan since 1979 because of human rights
violations and related issues. 63
The British government's response to the violent suppression of peaceful demonstrations in Tiananmen
Square was announced in the House of Commons on 6 June 1989. The Foreign Secretary stated that all
Members of Parliament shared the worldwide sense of horror and would join in the international
condemnation of the slaughter of innocent
people. They condemned "merciless treatment of peaceful demonstrators, and deeply deplored the use of
force to suppress the democratic aspirations of the Chinese people." The government looked to the
Chinese to fulfil their obligations to Hong Kong in the 1984 joint declaration. There could be no question
of continuing normal business with the Chinese authorities. The government had decided that all
scheduled ministerial exchanges between Britain and China would be suspended; the proposed visit of
the Prince and Princess of Wales to China in November would not take place so long as those responsible
for the atrocities remained in control of the Chinese government; all high-level contacts with China
would be suspended; and all arms sales to China would be banned. 64
After the end of the Cold War
Since the 1990s, British bilateral policy towards human rights issues has been mainly confined to
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questions of arms sales and certain aspects of aid policy. Other bilateral action is often carried out in
conjunction with other regional or multilateral action. In 1991 these included attendance at trials (e.g. in
Iran) and supporting training courses (in Honduras for public security forces) and seminars (e.g. in the
Cameroons). The 1996 Foreign Policy Document mentioned instances of confidential representations up
to and including the prime ministerial level; public statements; curtailment of aid; enquiry about
individual cases of concern to the British public or Parliament; attending trials; sending observers to
elections; looking for opportunities to support local human rights work; arranging sponsored visits of
human rights related workers; and maintaining contacts with and supporting local human rights
organizations.
One major exception was the question of the former head of state of Chile, General Pinochet. His
extradition was sought by Spain to face trial for various crimes against humanity allegedly committed
while he was head of state. Two provisional warrants for his arrest were issued by magistrates under the
1989 Extradition Act. These were quashed by the Divisional Courts but the quashing of the second
warrant was stayed to enable an appeal to the House of Lords on the question of the proper interpretation
of the immunity enjoyed by a former head of state from arrest and extradition proceedings in the United
Kingdom in respect of acts committed while he was head of state. Amnesty International was granted
leave to intervene in the proceedings. On 25 November 1998 the House of Lords allowed the appeal by a
majority of three to two and the second warrant was restored. The Home Secretary subsequently gave
authority to proceed. However, this second order was set aside on 15 January 1999 on the ground that
one of the Lords giving the judgment had links with Amnesty International, which could give the
appearance of possible bias. 65 The House of Lords decided on 24 March that a former head of state had
no immunity from extradition from the United Kingdom to a third country for acts of torture committed
in his own country while he was head of state and after the date that the Torture Convention came into
legal force in all three countries. At the time of writing the matter had been referred back to the Home
Secretary.
The 1991 and 1996 Foreign Policy Documents have practically identical statements on policy regarding
British arms exports. They "require an export licence and every proposed sale of defence or internal
security equipment is subject to strict vetting procedures," which take into account inter alia the human
rights situation in the country concerned. They did not sanction the export from the United Kingdom of
any defence or internal security equipment likely to be used for internal repression.
Under the Labour government, in 1997 Britain announced the introduction of new criteria for
considering applications for the export of conventional arms. This was to give effect to its manifesto
commitment not to export arms to regimes that might use them for internal repression or international
aggression. Under the new criteria there was a ban on the export of equipment, such as electro-shock
batons, where there is clear evidence it has been used for torture.
Both Foreign Policy Documents of the 1990s noted that aid and development assistance could be used to
promote good government, including accountability and respect for human rights, as an end in itself and
as a basis of economic and human development. There was an explicit linkage between economic and
political reform and human rights. In 1990, the House of Commons was told that British development aid
to Burma and project aid to Somalia had been stopped on the grounds of human rights abuses while
project aid to the Sudan was being run down and programme aid promised to Sri Lanka had been
postponed. 66 In 1991 the British government bilaterally curtailed aid to Malawi, Nigeria, and the
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Gambia.
The Department for International Development issued a White Paper in November 1997 entitled
"Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century." 67 This discussed the question under
four headings: the challenge of development; building partnerships; consistency of policies, including
giving particular attention to human rights, transparent and accountable government, and core labour
standards — building on the government's ethical approach to international relations; and building
support for development. Although it mentions human rights and development, it does not attempt to




What are the main factors that have shaped British human rights foreign policy since the Second World
War? This chapter suggests that they can be found in three separate areas: Britain's interests; the way it
has influenced and been influenced by the developing international debate and action on this subject; and
the way it works domestically, including the legacy of its historical development.
Over the period in question British governments have acted in the light of both fixed and changing
interests in the context of a long-standing involvement with many corners of the globe. The process of
decolonization meant that British governments became progressively less concerned about the problem
of self-determination in their dependent territories in the late 1950s as more became independent. They
also found it easier to accept the references to national self-determination that had been added to both
Covenants and were, despite these, finally able to sign both in 1968, and eventually ratify both in 1976.
They also found it possible to allow the right of individual petition to the European Human Rights
Commission and the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to British citizens
in 1966 and to citizens of its Crown Dependencies (e.g. Jersey) and its dependent territories as early as
September 1967. 68
The enduring interests continue to be Britain's range of global concerns (many of which can be seen in
the way it acts as a permanent member of the Security Council); its relationship with continental Europe,
both West and East; its relationship with the United States; and the Commonwealth (though the weight
given to it has changed both up and down over the years). The interrelationship between these was
recognized in the 1950 House of Commons debate on the proposed Council of Europe after the
government had signed the Convention on 4 November. The FO minister then stated: "The policy of this
government, and the peculiar function of the United Kingdom, is to reconcile purely European interests
with the wider interests and connections upon which European survival is dependent." The Foreign
Secretary sounded a note of caution at the end of the debate when he noted that human rights issues had
got tangled up with Britain's colonial troubles and its overseas territories. 69
On a regional level, British governments have supported and become more involved with the Council of
Europe and the European Convention on Human Rights. Their regional European interests have been
strengthened since the 1970s through membership of the EU and their involvement in the OSCE process.
Human rights considerations have progressively become more centre stage in both these European
organizations.
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British concern with the United States can be seen in their work with President Roosevelt during the
Second World War and subsequently. They sought to ensure that two Covenants were drafted, in order to
make it easier for the United States eventually to ratify the ICCPR, and to cooperate on human rights
matters with the Carter administration in the late 1970s. On the Commonwealth, as with other
institutions, human rights have slowly been pushed more centre stage.
Britain has also influenced and been influenced by the way the world has developed internationally.
British governmental concern for order and justice in the world overall can be seen in its contribution to
the making of the UN Charter; the submission of a draft International Bill of Human Rights to the United
Nations in 1947; its determination to develop international law, including appropriate global human
rights instruments (e.g. the Covenants; the Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; and,
most recently, the Convention on the Rights of the Child); its changing attitude to self-determination; and
its generally constructive attitude to decolonization as well as its changed views on the question of
domestic intervention in the affairs of states. It is also noticeable in the elaboration of Charter principles,
and in the respect and cooperation Britain has given to the treaty monitoring bodies.
Finally British governments' attitudes to the human rights debate have been affected by government's
historical development and the way it works domestically. Both non-governmental organizations and the
media have affected its thinking. And the beginning of its racial legislation owed much to the
developments at the United Nations.
Labour governments have tended to take more initiatives in the field of human rights and foreign policy.
But, as Evan Luard pointed out in 1980, some double standards remained in effect, both from the
government itself and in the context of public opinion. He maintained that the Labour government's close
economic involvement in South Africa had constrained it to be cautious over sanctions. Its economic and
strategic interests had also prevailed in the context of Iran and of Argentina. He also noted the effect of
British need for oil on criticism of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia. He went on to state: "British
governments have not hesitated to express their condemnation of the policies of, for example, the Soviet
Union, Uganda, Chile and South Africa, because public opinion at home demanded it. They have spoken
out less strongly about the policies of Equatorial Guinea, the Central African Republic, Uruguay, Cuba
and Ethiopia because British public opinion and even British human rights organizations have not
expressed themselves as strongly on that subject, not because it is thought important not to prejudice
relations with those states." 70
These sorts of issues remain a challenge to the Labour government now in office.
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Chapter 5: Japan's foreign policy towards human
rights: Uncertain changes
Yozo Yokota and Chiyuki Aoi
 
Japan's foreign policy towards human rights was almost non-existent until the 1980s. Japan avoided
taking political risks in its external relations as a matter of general principle, as exemplified by its
single-minded pursuit of economic self-interest. Human rights, being seen by Tokyo as highly political
and greatly complicating foreign relations, were not allowed to interfere with central concerns such as the
economy — and national security. This posture resulted in contradictions with its pro-Western
diplomatic allies in multilateral forums. Such a passive stance in human rights diplomacy is, however,
gradually giving way — albeit slowly — to a more active one that gives some importance to human
rights. This shift is still uncertain. It ranges from support for the abstract principles of universal human
rights, and thus opposition to special Asian values, to a new foreign aid policy that sometimes includes
considerations of democratization and human rights in the recipient countries.
 
I. Introduction
In Japan, as in other nations, there is a contemporary effort to associate national history with human
rights. One can read that: "[E]ven before the opening of doors to the world, under the Tokugawa
Shogunate, there were rules and customs in Japan related to human rights and humanitarian concerns." 1
These norms, however, sought to teach rulers principles of good governance, as in: "one should treat
one's subjects and subordinates with benevolence and mercy," based on Confucianism, Buddhism, and
traditional Japanese mores including Bushido. These norms were not based on the concept of human
rights as we understand them today. Such norms reflected not entitlement of persons but wise guidelines
for rulers. They were thus very different from the concept of human rights found in the writings of
Western political philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montesquieu, and John Locke, or in such
Western historical documents as the English Magna Carta of 1215, the Petition of Right of 1628, the Bill
of Rights of 1689, the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, or the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen of 1789.
It is therefore correct for Professors Kentaro Serita and Pierre-Marie Dupuy to begin the analysis of
Japanese practice in the field of human rights by reference to the human rights provisions of the Meiji
Constitution of 1889. 2 Indeed, the Meiji Constitution provided for some basic freedoms and rights,
understood as human rights in the Western sense of the term, such as the freedom of residence and
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movement (Art. 22), the principle of no arrest, detention, interrogation, or punishment except under the
law (Art. 23), the right to a fair trial (Art. 24), the right to property (Art. 27), the freedom of religion (Art.
28), the freedoms of expression, print, assembly, and association (Art. 29), and the right to petition (Art.
30).
However, those rights and freedoms were subjected to the prerogative of the Emperor in the event of war
or national emergency (Art. 31). Furthermore, many of those rights and freedoms were ensured only
within the scope of the law. In other words, such rights and freedoms could be restricted by legislation
passed by the Diet. In 1925, the infamous Maintenance of Public Order Act (Chian-iji Ho) was
promulgated, and under this act serious human rights violations were committed by special police and
other governmental officials. 3
The Meiji Constitution's provisions for freedoms and rights had another serious limitation. Such
freedoms and rights were granted only to Japanese subjects. Accordingly, foreigners in Japanese
territories or non-Japanese residents in territories under Japanese military occupation did not ipso facto
enjoy the constitutional rights and freedoms. Consequently, many Koreans, Chinese, Filipinos, etc.,
suffered from serious human rights violations committed by Japanese military and civilian officials under
their rule without the protection of constitutional provisions.
The situation drastically changed after Japan's defeat in the Second World War. Under the occupation
administration by the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces headed by General Douglas MacArthur,
a new Constitution was enacted. It did not abolish the imperial system itself but took away from the
Emperor practically all of the political powers and prerogatives he used to enjoy under the old Meiji
Constitution. Article 1 of the new Constitution stipulates that "[T]he Emperor shall be the symbol of the
State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides
sovereign power." Article 3 further provides that "[T]he advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be
required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor." In
other words, the new Constitution clearly provides that Japan would henceforth be a democratic state
where the real source of power lies in the people rather than the Emperor.
Based on this democratic principle, the new Constitution contains many provisions for the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Article 11 provides in general terms that "[T]he people shall
not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights
guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future
generations as eternal and inviolate rights." Professor Nobuyoshi Ashibe, a contemporary authority on
the Japanese Constitution, writes that the expression "inviolate rights" contained in this provision means:
"contrary to the rights and freedoms provided in the Meiji Constitution which could be restricted by law,
these fundamental human rights cannot be violated by any State powers including not only the
Government but also the Diet." 4
There are two more articles in the new Constitution related to human rights that are of a more general
nature. Article 13 provides: "All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare,
be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs." Paragraph 1 of Article 14
further provides: "All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in
political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin."
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On the basis of the general provisions referred to above, the new Constitution contains many detailed
provisions for the protection of human rights, which can be classified for convenience into three
categories under the headings: (a) basic freedoms; (b) civil and political rights; and (c) economic, social,
and cultural rights.
First, the new Constitution guarantees to the people such basic freedoms as: freedom of thought and
conscience (Art. 19), freedom of religion (Art. 20), freedom of assembly and association as well as of
speech, press, and all other forms of expression (Art. 21), freedom to choose and change one's residence
and to choose one's occupation (Art. 22, para. 1), freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country
(Art. 22, para. 2), and academic freedom (Art. 23).
Secondly, the Constitution also ensures many civil and political rights, which are much more detailed
and comprehensive than those of the Meiji Constitution. For example, the right of peaceful petition (Art.
16), the right to sue for redress from the state in the event one has suffered damage through an illegal act
of any public official (Art. 17), the right not to be held in bondage (Art. 18), the right to life or liberty,
including the principle of no criminal penalty except according to procedure established by law (Art. 31),
the right of access to the courts (Art. 32), the right not to be apprehended except upon warrant issued by a
competent judicial officer (Art. 33), the right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers, and
effects against entries, searches, and seizures (Art. 35), the right not to be subjected to "torture" or "cruel
punishments" (Art. 36), the right (of the accused in criminal cases) to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial tribunal and to the assistance of competent counsel (Art. 37, paras. 1 and 3), the right not to be
compelled to testify against oneself (Art. 37, para. 1), and the right not to be held criminally liable for an
act that was lawful at the time it was committed and not to be placed in double jeopardy (Art. 39).
Thirdly, the new Constitution further provides for a number of basic human rights that could be broadly
characterized as economic, social, and cultural rights. This category of rights was not found in the old
Meiji Constitution. Article 25, paragraph 1, of the new Constitution, for example, stipulates that: "[A]ll
people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living."
Article 26, paragraph 1, provides that: "[A]ll people shall have the right to receive an equal education
correspondent to their ability." Furthermore, Article 27 provides for "the right to work," while Article 28
provides for "the right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively." Finally, Article 29 sets
forth the "right to own or to hold property and the right to just compensation in case private property is
taken for public use."
As shown above, the provisions for fundamental human rights in the new Constitution of Japan are much
more detailed and comprehensive than those of the old Meiji Constitution. They are also without
restriction by the Emperor's prerogatives, by the government's powers, or by legislation. As human rights
advocates, activists, and specialists now point out, however, legal provisions of human rights are one
thing but the actual protection of human rights is another. 5 Particularly when it comes to human rights
consideration in Japanese foreign relations, the government's stance was more passive than active even
after the Second World War until the mid-1980s. The Constitution's many detailed provisions for
fundamental freedoms and human rights did not directly impact foreign policy to any appreciable extent.
 
II. Domestic factors
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The traditional situation
As with any other state, Japan's foreign policy can be considered as an outgrowth of its domestic political
and social dynamics, interacting with the international environment.
One important domestic determinant of the Japanese approach to human rights abroad is the legacy of its
behaviour in the 1930s and 1940s. After 1945, Japan, unlike some of its Western counterparts, did not
feel itself to be in a position to promote international human rights standards. This was mostly owing to
the recognition of its own serious and systematic violations of human rights committed before and during
the Second World War, particularly in neighbouring Asian countries. Japan thus felt itself to be in a
position to learn, rather than preach, about human rights, which it acknowledged as an imported concept
from the West. Such reserve fitted well with an emerging preference for quiet diplomacy and a
low-profile and non-confrontational approach, or equi-distance stance, to international relations in
general. Thus Japan's "lessons of history" fitted with its emerging national style in foreign policy. Both
history and diplomatic style led to a desire to avoid the subject of human rights in the international arena.
Other important factors also supported this orientation. For much of the time between renewed
independence (1952) and the 1980s, Japan was ruled by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which
reflected primarily business interests and emphasized a foreign policy of economic self-interest. The
destruction caused by the Second World War naturally led to a central emphasis on economic growth and
recovery. This emphasis was generally endorsed by the United States, first Japan's occupier and then its
principal security and trading partner.
These LDP conservative governments built up a strong bureaucratic system that was itself devoted to
traditional concerns in foreign policy such as economic interest and national security (traditionally
understood). It should be stressed that dependence on bureaucracy in foreign policy-making and its
implementation was particularly notable in the field of foreign economic aid, the single most visible
foreign policy area for Japan. In Official Development Aid (ODA) policy, 19 agencies including the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Ministry of Construction
hold their own ODA budget. 6 In particular, with regard to highly technical multilateral economic
assistance, the Ministry of Finance has traditionally exercised the strongest authority over aid policy.
MOF and other economic bureaucracies, particularly the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), have never considered human rights as within their routine competence.
For its part, MOFA lacked a unit specialized in human rights issues until 1984, when the Human Rights
and Refugee Division was created in what was then the United Nations Policy Bureau. The creation of
this division was clearly an important improvement, particularly given that only a few officers had been
assigned to human rights issues prior to its creation. With its initial size of 10 persons, however, it was
difficult for such a small division to do much more than just meet various human rights reporting
obligations under various treaties, and deal with a growing number of Indo-Chinese refugees in the
1980s, and other related issues. 7
Economic ministries such as MOF, MITI, and the Economic Planning Agency, strengthened relative to
politics as well as other bureaucracies during the period of rapid growth in the 1960s, became influential
in determining multilateral and bilateral foreign aid, but their authority and mandate do not touch upon
human rights aspects. Thus Japan's bureaucracy lacked a structure suited to the formulation of foreign
policies that were sensitive to human rights and other political elements. The Civil Liberties Bureau of
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the Ministry of Justice is responsible for domestic human rights issues, but foreign relations do not fall
under its responsibility.
Finally, the mass public supported the elite's orientation toward a conservative and low-key foreign
policy that emphasized economic self-interest under the protection of the US security umbrella. There
was widespread public deference to a conservative and elitist democracy. Interest groups that demanded
a different orientation, i.e. more emphasis on human rights, were weak or mostly lacking in influence.
During this period domestic human rights issues were indeed debated. But, ironically, this domestic
debate served to reinforce passivity on human rights abroad. Because the domestic debates revealed
ideological differences and great complexity, conservative governments found added reason to remain
mostly silent on international human rights. Domestic debates covered such subjects as dowa issues
(group of persons historically considered to belong to a lower caste, thus subject to serious
discrimination), labour rights, the treatment of Koreans residing in Japan, and indigenous Ainu people.
Less politicized human rights issues — freedom of expression, religion, and the press, children's rights,
women's rights, and rights of the mentally handicapped — remained strictly domestic issues. Parts of the
all-powerful bureaucracy that focused on domestic issues might take up such questions, but the Foreign
Ministry and other related offices were indifferent.
However, some of these human rights issues that were debated in Japan began to be raised in various UN
forums, usually triggered by a number of non-governmental organizations, which often put the
government in a defensive position. For example, the International Labour Organization took up the issue
of labour rights in national corporations in Japan during the late 1950s to 1960s at the request of the
labour unions (Sohyo). ILO investigations, although leading to some progressive changes in Japan,
certainly did not encourage conservative governments to take a leadership position on other human rights
issues at the United Nations.
 
III. Indications of change?
Since the mid-1980s, Japan's institutions have become more prepared to deal with human rights concerns
more systematically — at least relative to the past. Japan's more active participation in international
human rights forums contributed to this change. The size of the Human Rights and Refugee Division was
expanded to more than 20 by the 1990s. 8 The Foreign Policy Bureau was created in 1993, supervising
the United Nations Policy Division, the Human Rights and Refugee Division, and other divisions. A
more integrated foreign policy resulted, with more attention to human rights.
In the early 1990s, some signs of change in the conservative political alignment also emerged. Most
notably, the shift in the political power alignment in the "reformist" era of 1993–1994 and the historic
liberal—conservative coalition era of 1994–1996 gave a momentum to addressing issues that had not
been dealt with under conservative one-party rule, 9 including war reparation issues. In general, the
historical consensus on foreign policy preferences among the conservative political forces, the
bureaucracy, business, and the public became disrupted during these eras. The LDP's ties with the
bureaucracy were weakened, and the public, discontented with a number of corruption incidents
involving public officials, had less confidence in the bureaucracy. 10
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One notable example reflecting this changed political environment was the public attention given to the
issue known as "comfort women," and the subsequent actions taken by the conservative—liberal
coalition government on this issue. Following the Miyazawa LDP government's initiative on starting an
investigation — a measure considered to be extremely open by the standard of preceding conservative
governments — plans to deal with this issue gradually materialized under the coalition government. 11
The final compensation plan itself can best be perceived as a result of inter-party negotiation within the
coalition government, indicating increased policy inputs from the former opposition parties and the
changed role of the bureaucracy. 12 The decision-making process also involved independent experts and
non-governmental organizations, encouraging the government often behind the scenes to make a timely
decision and implement the plan. Such a political process was quite different from traditional foreign
policy-making, which was heavily influenced by the bureaucracy and business. This was also a case
where non-governmental organizations in the area of human rights were more active and influential in
their demands on the government. Given the rapid changes in Japanese politics that brought the LDP
back to power, however, one cannot make any firm conclusions about the political foundation of
Japanese foreign policy-making, particularly in the area of human rights diplomacy.
Another case of important change may be in the area of foreign economic policy. The Ministry of
Finance and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs seem to be cooperating more closely and giving more
attention to human rights. This tentative evaluation stems from the adoption of the 1992 ODA Charter (as
explained below), with its provisions on human rights and democracy, and from the expansion of Japan's
aid to former Soviet Union republics and Eastern Europe, where transitions to market democracies have
required new thinking at MOF and MOFA. One study suggests that Japanese involvement in the
politicized East European development encouraged closer coordination between these ministries. 13 Yet
these collaborations appear at best ad hoc and selective. Thus, national domestic factors in Japanese
foreign policy-making exhibit some sporadic changes in selected issue areas, necessitated by the changed
domestic and international environment. There are both continuities and changes.
 
IV. Multilateral policy
Status of the International Bill of Rights
Japan did not become fully part of the international human rights regime until the very end of the 1970s.
This was yet another reason for Japan's mostly passive stance concerning the advancement of
international human rights up until that time. Japan ratified the two basic Covenants on Civil and
Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1979, preceded by two treaties in the
1950s — namely, the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1955) and the Convention for the
Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others (1958). In the
early 1980s Japan started to participate in various UN human rights mechanisms. Japan was elected by
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to the UN Commission on Human Rights for the first time
in 1982, and two individual Japanese experts participated in the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities for the first time in 1984. In that same year, in order to
coordinate activities related to human rights, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Human
Rights and Refugee Division (noted above). Subsequently, Japan ratified a range of human rights
treaties: the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1981); the Convention on the Elimination of
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All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1985); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1994);
and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1995).
As of 1998 Japan had not ratified the First Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, based on the view that its provisions are not compatible with the principles of the separation of
power and judicial independence. 14 Japan also is not a party to Article 41 of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Although Japan has registered no formal reservations with regard to the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, it has put a de facto reservation on its Article 22(2) on the labour rights of
public employees, as well as the related Article 8(2) of the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights. 15 It has put the following reservations on the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights: Article 7(d), in particular the right to remuneration for public holidays, based on the domestic law
that leaves the matter to each corporation and labour union; Article 8, para. 1(d), the right to strike of the
police and armed forces, which is understood by the Japanese government to include fire-fighters and
state administrators; and Article 13, para. 2(b) and (c), the government's duty to introduce free education
progressively in higher education.
The gap between the provisions of the International Bill of Rights and the Japanese domestic legal
system and social practice in some issue areas has been suggested as an explanation for the delay in
Japan's ratifying some international human rights conventions. Domestic controversy has been acute on
such issues as nationality law, labour rights for public workers, the death penalty, women's rights,
minority rights, the rights of elders, and the rights of the handicapped. 16 However, in contrast to the case
of the United States, where resistance is strong against accepting meaningful international modifications
of its national law, Japan has had relatively few public controversies over adhering to international
human rights instruments once the policy has been decided by the government.
Joining the international legal regime on human rights has had some positive effects on some areas of the
Japanese legal system over the long run. For example, in 1985 Japan's nationality law, which had denied
nationality to children born in Japan to Japanese mothers but non-Japanese fathers, was changed in
accordance with international standards so as not to discriminate on grounds of gender. The Covenants
and other human rights conventions, particularly the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, have served as a basis from which to reassess family law and other
domestic laws and practices concerning women's rights, though improvements are still called for by
various civil groups. 17 One notable event in the domestic application of these international instruments
was the case in which the Sapporo District Court of Japan recognized the indigenous character of the
Ainu people, reflecting the debate on the rights of indigenous people at the United Nations.
Japan's earlier position concerning the drafting of the two central Covenants, as expressed in debates in
the General Assembly, is noteworthy. Tokyo tended to see itself as a developing economy and thus
adopted some positions that were usually associated with the global South. On other issues Tokyo sought
a middle ground between Western states and developing countries, in particular, neighbouring Asian
states. 18 In the 1950s, for example, Japan participated in the debates concerning the draft Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Tokyo emphasized its commitment to improving living standards
and the need for international cooperation to achieve it. 19 At the adoption of the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the First Optional Protocol during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly,
Japan generally sided with the non-aligned nations. It argued against the proposed mandatory arbitration
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system, based on the view that such a system might be suited to advanced states but was difficult to
accept for the majority of states with different domestic circumstances. 20 Japan then abstained in the
vote on the First Optional Protocol, on the basis that individual petitions would be an inappropriate
system that would be difficult to administer, likely to be politically abused, and unlikely to be adopted. 21
As Japan joined other UN human rights forums, its activities in human rights standard-setting
accordingly diversified to include a wider range of issues. Normally taking a pro-Western stance, Japan
in principle endorsed both International Covenants in the UN forums — as we have seen. Until the
1980s, however, Japan's position on human rights was rather equivocal. Tokyo observed the
politicization of human rights issues during the Cold War, and especially the differing interpretations by
the Western states and the developing and socialist countries. The differences were pronounced
concerning group rights versus individual rights, and universality versus cultural relativism and
particularism. Japan's commitment to the international human rights principles and standards was
nevertheless strengthened in the 1990s. Japan became more outspoken in its assertion that international
human rights standards are universally applicable to all states, regardless of their social, cultural, or
economic particularities.
In official statements on the occasion of the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna held in June
1993, Tokyo supported the universality and indivisibility of human rights, carefully distancing itself from
those Asian states championing "Asian values." Japan also claimed that human rights should not be
sacrificed to development, and reaffirmed the role of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in
promoting the human rights of individuals. 22 Likewise in the Asia Regional Preparatory Meeting for the
World Conference on Human Rights, held in Bangkok in March 1993, Japan defended the universality
and indivisibility of human rights. It contested the sections of the Bangkok Declaration that opposed
linking aid to human rights. The Japanese delegation stated: "Japan firmly believes that human rights are
universal values common to all mankind, and that the international community should remain committed
to the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... It is the duty of all States,
whatever their cultural tradition, whatever their political or economic system, to protect and promote
these values." 23
Thus, in so far as abstract principles are concerned, Japan's commitment to international human rights
standards became clearer in the 1990s, and its endorsements of international human rights norms became
more explicit.
Regional developments
There is no regional intergovernmental organization for human rights in Asia, unlike most other regions
of the world. There has been a consistent tendency in the Asian region to detach human rights dialogues
from political and economic processes, especially within the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN). State sovereignty is a particularly sensitive issue in Asia. Most Asian governments have
argued that there is a necessity to accommodate multiple types of political systems within the region's
diplomatic and security frameworks. The complexity of the region's colonial experiences, ethnic
compositions, and institutional history on which authorities are founded further adds to the sensitivity of
the issue of sovereignty. 24
Furthermore, relative economic success in the region — until the economic crisis in 1998 — contributed
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to the growing assertiveness of some policy-makers. They claim that human rights are Western concepts
and are not to be accommodated within "Asian ways" of promoting and maintaining domestic stability,
peace, and economic prosperity. 25 Most Asian leaders have been extremely sensitive about what they
regard as Western attempts to influence their domestic affairs. Thus they have long opposed linking trade
or aid with human rights.
In this context the 1993 Bangkok Declaration on Human Rights can be seen as yet another manifestation
of such Asian leaders' dislike of the so-called human rights diplomacy as practised by the Western
nations. In the conference held in preparation for the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, Asian
leaders emphasized that human rights implementation should also consider countries' socio-economic
and cultural backgrounds. China specifically argued that development should be given priority over civil
and political rights in certain circumstances. 26
Japan's main foreign policy interest in the region has traditionally been economic and, even though Japan
has recently sought to assume some political role in the region, it has not been so active yet in promoting
human rights. Its approach to human rights violations in the region has been pragmatic and country
specific. 27
Three interrelated factors account for this pragmatism, in addition to the general sensitivity over
sovereignty in the region. The first factor is the security concern. Japan has long considered it important
to keep China politically stable and economically "modernizing." Hence, it has been hesitant to apply
conditionality to its aid based upon China's human rights record. It believes that an isolated China is
highly destabilizing given the territorial disputes surrounding China, and given the unstable political
situation in the Korean peninsula and in Indo-China. In addition, it understands China as a polity that is
not susceptible to outside pressures, thus negative human rights diplomacy — sanctions and other
punitive inducements — would be counter-productive. Other countries, such as Indonesia, are both
important exporters of natural resources vital to Japan's national security and economy as well as
important markets for its investment and goods, as Japan reduces its dependence on the US market.
These economic factors are closely linked to Japan's security concerns.
The second factor behind Japan's pragmatic approach to human rights in Asia is its identity as a mediator
between East and West. 28 From the mid-1950s, Japan sought to identify closely with Asian countries as
well as to cooperate with the free democratic nations as the foundation of its foreign policy. 29 Further, it
is seeking a more active role in Asia through multilateral political and economic forums such as the
Asian Development Bank, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
network. Such a dual role, however, has been difficult to play in human rights diplomacy. Japan has
often found itself in the awkward position of having to balance Asian and Western preferences. One such
example was the Tiananmen Square incident, where Japan's intermediary efforts evoked considerable
suspicion and criticism among the Western nations. 30 More recently, at the Bangkok meeting preceding
the World Conference on Human Rights, Japan, having supported the universality of human rights, was
subject to considerable criticism by some Asian representatives including China. 31
The third element behind the Japanese reluctance to play Western-style human rights diplomacy in Asia
is its colonial and military history, as we noted earlier. Owing to its historical relations with its Asian
neighbours, Japan has not been in a position to speak strongly for human rights. Even though Japan has
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vigorously pursued its goal of establishing friendly relations and a leadership role in Asia, its true
intentions have often been viewed with suspicion by its neighbours.
In sum, unlike Europe, Asia is far from building a common framework for dealing with human rights
issues within the region. Japan has been reluctant to assume leadership for human rights largely owing to
economic and security considerations, a desire to mediate between Western and Asian states, and its
historical record. True, in recent years, Tokyo has exercised leadership in conflict-resolution and
peace-building activities in Cambodia, in peace-making in the Korean peninsula, and in actions against
nuclear testing in China. But, with the exception of Cambodia, where considerable attention to human
rights was involved, Japan's leadership was shown mainly in the areas of security and development.
At the time of the admission of Myanmar (Burma) to ASEAN, a major event concerning ASEAN, Japan
quietly observed the event, signalling its approval of the ASEAN argument for constructive engagement,
in contrast with some Western governments which were more critical of Myanmar's admission. With
regard to the coup in Cambodia in July 1997, when the then Second Prime Minister, Hun Sen, expelled
the First Prime Minister, in violation of the Paris Peace Agreement and the prior election results, Japan
also took a position largely in line with the ASEAN approach to Cambodia. Unlike some Western states,
Japan did not officially freeze its Official Development Aid to Cambodia, though much of its
implementation in effect ceased after the event. Japan also supported the ASEAN decision to postpone
Cambodia's entry to ASEAN and continued dialogues with the Cambodian government, expressing its
view that peace in that country was indispensable and that human rights must be respected. 32 Japan then
provided both financial contributions and personnel to supervise the general election held in 1998.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the Japanese government has supported the idea of establishing a
regional human rights mechanism. In the UN General Assembly as well as in the UN Commission on
Human Rights, it has sponsored resolutions that state that any region without regional arrangements for
human rights protection should promote discussions towards establishing one. 33 Since 1995 the
Japanese government has also held an international symposium for human rights experts from the region,
with a view to promoting further discussions concerning the possibility for a regional mechanism for
human rights in the Asia and Pacific region. Such an effort may be seen as Tokyo's cautious but
increasingly active stance in the field of human rights.
International financial institutions
Multilateral economic aid through the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and regional
development banks has been an important element in Japan's foreign policy. In addition to bilateral aid,
multilateral aid has served to advance Japan's interests, such as increasing its multilateral influence,
developing Asian markets, promoting favourable relations with recipient countries, and reducing a large
monetary surplus that had attracted considerable international criticism. The importance Japan attaches to
multilateral development agencies has increased in the post-Cold War era, 34 and is likely to remain high
in the near future — even though Japan decided to reduce its contribution to multilateral agencies by
some 10 per cent in 1998 as a result of economic difficulties.
Japan has practically been silent on issues related to human rights in international financial institutions.
Under the banner of "Seikei Bunri," meaning the separation of economic issues from political
considerations, a slogan that has dominated Japanese foreign economic policy since the 1960s, Tokyo
has been rather careful not to be seen as pursuing political objectives through multilateral financial
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institutions. Japan likewise tends to oppose any political conditionality argument in multilateral financial
institutions designed to induce recipient governments to curb human rights violations, especially
pertaining to ASEAN states. 35 This tendency corresponded to the basic thinking in Japan — until the
adoption of the 1992 ODA Charter — that political and human rights conditionalities in development aid
were inappropriate in light of the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of recipient states.
This tendency can also partly be attributed to the fact that the economic ministries, which have
considered human rights issues as outside their competence or concern, hold direct responsibility for
matters related to development banks. Further, the complexity of the development assistance process in
Tokyo, involving close to 20 ministries and agencies, adds to the difficulty of achieving the coordination
required for the integration of human rights with development aid.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is the only notable multilateral financial institution initiated and
shaped by Japan, albeit under the general US tolerance particular to the era around the time the Bank was
created and developed. 36 Since the establishment of the ADB in 1966, Japan has been one of the two
largest shareholders of the Bank, co-equal with the United States. 37 All ADB presidents have been
Japanese, mostly seconded from the Ministry of Finance. Since the mid-1980s, as Japan became
particularly keen to increase its influence in the Bank to suit its general diplomatic agenda, 38 its
financial presence became stronger in the Bank. In 1996, Japan's contribution to the Asian Development
Fund (ADF), a soft-loan arm of the Bank, stood at US$9,351.70 million out of total contributed resources
of US$18,203.26 million. The US contribution was only US$2,287.91 million. 39 Japan's contribution to
the Technical Assistance Special Fund in 1996 amounted to about 56 per cent of the total supplied. 40
Between 1988 and 1996, Japan contributed US$633.9 million to the Special Fund. 41 Thus Japan's
potential leverage in ADB is great, should it choose to link human rights conditions to such financial
contributions.
In line with most international financial institutions, however, the ADB has followed strictly
"non-political" objectives, with particular emphasis on developing infrastructure and industries in the
region. The ADB has been particularly reluctant to link human rights with its operational objectives in
any way. This reluctance can partly be attributed to the sensitivity of the Bank's shareholders, which
include Asian states that particularly disfavour human rights diplomacy. Furthermore, the nature of
Japanese leadership in the Bank can also be considered as a factor behind such reluctance to link aid to
human rights in the Asian context. As noted, human rights did not receive much attention in Japanese
foreign economic policy until 1992 when the ODA Charter was adopted. Even after 1992, Japan's
interest in the ADB's policies and operations remained primarily economic and strategic. As
Woo-Cumings points out, Tokyo's rationale for creating and supporting the Bank was primarily to
augment the market in Asia for Japanese capital and goods. 42 Japan remained committed to trying to
achieve a vertical integration of Asian markets.
The Bank's lending patterns suggest that they reflect Japanese preferences. Indonesia, one of the main
recipients of Japanese bilateral aid, has also been a main recipient of the Bank's multilateral loans.
Indonesia received the highest percentage of Ordinary Capital Resources (OCR) loans among all
recipient countries between 1978 and 1992, receiving more than 30 per cent of total OCR loans between
1983 and 1992. 43 China has also consistently been a major recipient since it joined the Bank in 1986,
receiving 12.3 per cent of total OCR loans in the 1988–1992 period and 31.5 per cent in the 1993–1996
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period. 44 Smaller but growing countries in South-East Asia such as Thailand, Vietnam, and the
Philippines received approximately 6 per cent of total loans in 1996, which coincided with Tokyo's
interest in the South-East region. 45
Some point out that such lending patterns at times conflicted with socio-economic rights in certain poorer
countries in the region. The Bank, however, has put more emphasis on poverty reduction and social
infrastructure since the 1980s and, more recently, on governance issues to increase transparency in
economic management. But, like the World Bank, the ADB continues to resist overt and explicit linkage
to human rights. As at the World Bank, governance issues are understood mostly in accounting terms like
transparency, not in terms of democracy and civil rights.
The general reluctance in the ADB to implement political conditionality based upon human rights
records can be overcome in the case of exceptionally severe human rights violations, under the pressure
of some key shareholders such as the United States. One such case was China, where after the
Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 Japan followed the United States and other Western donors in
suspending ADB loans to China. World Bank loans were also frozen after the event. In general, however,
Japan played an intermediary role between China and major Western donors in the post-Tiananmen ADB
process. This was consistent with Japan's intermediary role in getting China to join the ADB in 1986. 46
After Tiananmen, having supported an early partial freeze on ADB loans to China, Japan then
successfully lobbied in November 1990 for an approval of a US$50 million agricultural loan and a
US$480,000 technical assistance (TA) grant to China. 47 In April 1991, at the ADB Board of Directors'
meeting, Japan pressed for a full resumption of loans to China. 48 These actions inside the ADB
coincided with Japanese actions outside the Bank. The ADB, nevertheless, was not the only agency to
resume loans to China. The World Bank also decided partially to resume loans to China in February
1990, a move that indicated waning US interest in continued sanctions against China through multilateral
banks as well as through private transactions. 49
After the 1997 coup in Cambodia by Second Prime Minister Hun Sen, the processing of ADB loans and
TA grants was suspended, although the implementation of existing loans and TA projects continued. No
explanation was given by the Bank about its position in response to the coup. Given the complexity of
the problems this coup entailed, there was a general lack of consensus on what measures could
realistically and legitimately be taken among the ADB shareholders.
Since the 1990s Japan's traditional development philosophy has been in some disarray, mainly because of
the new thinking about development stemming from the East European situation. There had been a
tendency among the economic ministries in Tokyo to argue that there is an Asian model of development,
which favours political stability and an active and large governmental role, and that this model is more
suitable to developing countries. Preference for this Asian or non-Western model of development
persisted in the Japanese economic bureaucracy, despite rhetoric from other parts of the state rejecting
Asian values and endorsing universal human rights. Japan's continuing support for this model can be
compared to Western liberal models of development integrating liberalization, democratization, and
other human rights simultaneously.
As Japan started to provide economic aid to Eastern Europe, where democratization was an official
objective of the transition from communism that was supposedly as important as the introduction of a
market economy, it found itself supporting both development models — the liberal one in Eastern
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Europe and the illiberal one in the non-Western world. This was not necessarily irrational, but it was not
fully consistent with the new rhetoric, as at Vienna in 1993, in favour of universal human rights.
In 1990, for example, then Prime Minister Toshiaki Kaifu visited Europe and agreed that Japan would
provide economic assistance to Eastern Europe aiming at democratization and privatization. 50 He also
agreed to support the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EBRD is the
only development bank that includes advancing democracy and human rights in its mandate. The Bank
does take democracy and human rights into account in its loan making, and Japan has been supporting
these policies, holding a share of 8.5 per cent, second to that of the United States and the same as that of
Germany, France, and England. 51
Japan's support for the EBRD can be understood as compatible with its policy to collaborate with the
Western states. Japan's involvement in the EBRD is also quite limited compared with that of ADB,
where Japan holds a predominant status and influence in management. However, these developments in
the context of Eastern Europe are adding another dimension to Japanese multilateral aid policy, even
though opinions are not at all uniform among policy-makers about the compatibility of such
developments with the older approach.
United Nations
Since it joined the United Nations in 1957, Japan has attached particular importance to the organization,
placing it in the centre of its foreign policy concerns together with cooperation with Western states. 52
Tokyo has considered it imperative to cooperate with other states in the United Nations to endorse the
purposes of the organization, including human rights, partly as a means to heighten its international
status, which suffered greatly under the legacy of Tokyo's policies in the 1930s and 1940s. As already
noted, Japan's policy towards human rights at the United Nations became more active from the early to
mid-1980s when the government and private experts became members of various UN human rights
bodies. Against the background of membership in the General Assembly, Japan's participation in the
Human Rights Commission from 1982, and its nationals' involvement in the Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities from 1984, enabled Japanese, whether as
instructed governmental representatives or as uninstructed individual experts, to take part in the regular
UN forums concerning human rights, thus diversifying its activities in the field of human rights. As is
true for other states, most uninstructed Japanese experts, although not state officials, are drawn from a
social network that broadly includes state officials, and they normally stay in close contact with state
officials. Japan was also sometimes elected to the UN Security Council, which increasingly dealt with
human rights issues after the Cold war. In addition, after the ratification by Japan of the two Covenants in
1979, Japanese nationals began to be elected to the Human Rights Committee that monitors the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Even though, as we shall see, Japan tends to be clearly cautious in openly practising human rights
diplomacy in bilateral relations, in the UN forums it has maintained in essence a liberal position on
human rights very similar to that of other Western-style democracies. This tendency became clearer as
the 1990s progressed, partially reflecting Tokyo's greater interest in a more active multilateral diplomacy.
This activism, in turn, was said to be linked to Japan's interest in securing a permanent seat on the UN
Security Council.
In grave humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War period, such as in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
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Somalia, Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo), and elsewhere, Japan was in general supportive of
all UN Security Council resolutions and decisions, providing large financial contributions to UN
peacekeeping and humanitarian activities. It has also supported the establishment of international
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. It voted in favour of the draft statute for a standing
international criminal court, linked to the United Nations, at a diplomatic conference in Rome in July
1998. Even though it has not made special efforts to increase the small budget allocated for the Office of
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, a budget amounting to merely 1 per cent of the total UN
budget, it has contributed special resources for its technical assistance and handling of information. Japan
has made major contributions to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, where a
Japanese national, Sadako Ogata, heads the agency centrally involved in many human rights and
humanitarian issues. Yet, within this broader framework of liberal multilateral diplomacy, Japan reserves
some degree of flexibility in its approach towards certain individual countries, as exemplified by its
attitude to China — and more recently to Myanmar.
Since the Tiananmen incident, Japan has joined other Western states in the UN Commission on Human
Rights to sponsor draft resolutions critical of China's human rights record. The draft resolutions, initiated
by the United States and European states such as Denmark and the Netherlands, nevertheless were never
adopted owing to Chinese blocking actions supported by much of the global South. The attempt to pass a
critical resolution gradually lost impetus even among Western states after 1995, however, mainly owing
to shifts in the policies of the larger European states to favour access to the Chinese market. Japan was
among the defectors in 1997, together with France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain, and did not
co-sponsor the draft resolution on China, even though it voted against the Chinese blocking, or no-action,
motion. 53 The loss of Western cohesion on the issue was one factor that encouraged Japan to prioritize
the improvement of its bilateral relations with China, which had deteriorated in 1996–1997 over events
that heightened Japan's security concerns in East Asia. 54
With regard to Myanmar, both the Commission on Human Rights and the Third Committee of the
General Assembly expressed concern over its human rights situation. It was an uncontested fact that the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) government had ignored the 1990 general election
results and repressed political opponents. In the Commission on Human Rights, Japan has not
co-sponsored the resolution on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, adopted every year without a
vote, even though it has welcomed its adoption and endorsed it. 55 Likewise, Japan has endorsed, without
becoming a co-sponsor, the Third Committee's consensus resolution on the situation on human rights in
Myanmar. 56 Yet, in 1990 and in 1991 Tokyo attempted to mediate the positions of the Western sponsors
and Myanmar in the Third Committee. 57 When Sweden introduced a draft resolution in 1990 in the
Third Committee, demanding that the Burmese military government hold new elections and release
political prisoners, 58 Japan proposed that the Committee refrain from taking action that year in view of
the forthcoming completion of the report by the UN Independent Expert on Myanmar, appointed by the
Commission on Human Rights. The reasoning given by the Japanese government was to avoid
prejudging the consideration of that report, or any decision it might lead to. 59 In the following year,
Sweden introduced a new text again addressing the continuing repression of the political opposition.
Japan then proposed to soften the language of the resolution and, with Sweden's concession, the
resolution was adopted without a vote. 60
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Thus in UN meetings in New York and Geneva Japan usually adopted a position in favour of human
rights, but occasionally tried to mediate between Western states and the targets of critical resolutions in
Asia. Even more important was Japan's leadership for human rights in Cambodia, where it led a
second-generation or complex peacekeeping mission. 61 This major field operation, between 1992 and
1996, was headed by a Japanese and largely funded by Tokyo. It sought to organize and supervise
national free and fair elections for the first time in Cambodian history, as well as to carry out human
rights education and to reform the police and military establishments so as to make them more sensitive
to human rights. This is not the place for a detailed analysis of the activities of the UN Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Suffice it to say that its long-term record of success was mixed,
particularly given the unwillingness of some of the major Cambodian political leaders and movements to
live up to human rights provisions in the related agreements. Nevertheless, Japan was certainly a major
player, perhaps the most important state, in trying to create and consolidate democracy with human rights
in Cambodia. Likewise Japan was quite active, including the supplying of military personnel, in a UN
effort to bring a liberal democratic peace to Mozambique. 62 These extensive activities, which in
Cambodia included the placing of Japanese military personnel on the Asian mainland for the first time
since the days of Japan's misguided policies during the 1930s and 1940s, were generally regarded to be




It was in the middle of the 1970s that some aid agencies such as the World Bank began to question the
wisdom of extending financial assistance to countries that were under authoritarian rule and
characterized by corruption. They were pushed into this new orientation by certain Western states such as
the Netherlands and the Scandinavians. They focused on countries such as Chile under Pinochet and the
Philippines under Marcos, and on some African states. For Japan, however, which was becoming one of
the leading donor countries, this policy of linking foreign aid to the human rights record of a recipient
country was not yet a reality. This is confirmed by the fact that annual reports of the Japanese
government on foreign aid in the 1970s made no reference to the human rights situations of the recipient
countries. As noted above, the main concerns of the Japanese aid agencies at that time were economy and
security.
Again as noted earlier, in the 1980s Japan began to pay more attention to the human rights record and to
the condition of the human environment when extending assistance to a developing country. The issue
became acute for Japan, as we have noted, when the Burmese/Myanmar military took power in 1988, and
also when the Chinese authorities used violence at Tiananmen in 1989. There were strong pressures
within and outside of Japan, both public and private, to criticize such repressive acts by the military and
to stop extending foreign aid to these governments. In the wake of these events, the Japanese government
adopted the Official Development Assistance Charter in June 1992, in which the government regulates
how military spending, human rights, and democratization relate to ODA. 63 The core of the ODA
Charter reads as follows:
Taking into account comprehensively each recipient country's requests, its socio-economic conditions,
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and Japan's bilateral relations with the recipient country, Japan's ODA will be provided in accordance
with the principles of the United Nations Charter (especially sovereign equality and non-intervention in
domestic matters), as well as the following four principles:
1. Environmental conservation and development should be pursued in tandem.
2. Any use of ODA for military purposes or for aggravation of international conflicts should be avoided.
3. Full attention should be paid to trends in recipient countries' military expenditures, their development
and production of mass destruction weapons and missiles, their export and import of arms, etc., so as to
maintain and strengthen international peace and stability and from the viewpoint that developing
countries should place appropriate priorities in the allocation of their resources on their own economic
and social development.
4. Full attention should be paid to efforts for promoting democratization and introduction of a
market-oriented economy, and the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in
the recipient country.
Although the ODA Charter is clearly a step forward in the direction of placing human rights as a central
goal of the Japanese government's foreign policy, it is by no means an ideal document from the
viewpoint of human rights. First of all, the human rights element is included as the fourth principle
instead of the first or second. Certainly there is no wording to suggest that the consideration of human
rights in the recipient country is the sine qua non of Japanese ODA. As long as "[f]ull attention" is paid
to "the situation regarding the securing of basic human rights and freedoms in the recipient country," the
aid may continue. Even more troubling, the application of the four principles is subjected to the
maintenance of Japan's bilateral relations with the recipient country and the principle of
"non-intervention in domestic matters." The wording of the Charter suggests a certain reserve on the part
of the Japanese government in addressing human rights abroad. According to one observer, in
"implementing these principles, however, Japan makes it a rule to closely observe trends in the specific
situation in which each country is placed since the security environment surrounding each country and its
cultural and social conditions vary. When there are problems in the eyes of the international community
and the Japanese people, Japan will first confirm the case by checking with the country involved and, if
necessary, express its concern. If the situation is not improved, Japan will review its aid policy toward
that country." 64 The policy toward Myanmar/Burma and China illustrates this sort of flexibility. Tokyo's
willingness to act on human rights is heavily conditioned by other considerations, not least of which is
pressure to act from the West.
As a general background factor behind this cautious flexibility, the importance Japan attaches to the
development of the Asian region in general must be pointed out. In Tokyo's bilateral ODA, Asia has long
been considered as the most important area given the economic and strategic importance of the region. In
the late 1960s, 90 per cent of Japan's bilateral ODA went to the Asian region, with about 70 per cent
concentrating on East Asia. As the recipients of Japanese ODA diversified to include Africa and the
Middle East after the 1970s, the figures went down to between 40 and 50 per cent. 65 In the 1990s, Japan
still provided around 55 per cent of its bilateral ODA to the Asian region, whereas Africa received 12.6
per cent, Latin America 10.8 per cent, the Middle East 6.8 per cent, Europe 1.5 per cent, and Oceania 1.5
per cent (1995 figures). 66
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China has been one of the largest recipients of Japanese bilateral ODA. Since Japan normalized its
diplomatic relations with China in 1972, Japan has sought to develop economic, cultural, and political
ties with the country. In his 1979 visit, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira agreed that the first loan of
{Y}330.9 billion would be provided in 1979–1983, to build up its economic infrastructure. A second
loan followed in 1984–1989 totalling {Y}470 billion, again including transportation, energy,
communication, and other infrastructures. On his visit to Beijing in August 1988, Prime Minister Noboru
Takeshita announced that Japan was prepared to provide a third loan of {Y}810 billion in 1990–1995. 67
Between 1982 and 1986, authoritarian and undemocratic China was the largest recipient of Japanese
bilateral ODA, and between 1987 and 1990 it was the second largest. 68 After dropping to become the
fourth-largest recipient of bilateral aid in 1991 (largely owing to the Tiananmen incident), by 1995 China
was again the largest recipient of bilateral ODA — with technical cooperation in the amount of
US$304.75 million (8.8 per cent of all technical cooperation) and ODA loans of US$992.28 million
(24.07 per cent). 69 Grant aid however was reduced in 1995, following China's much criticized nuclear
tests, from {Y}7.79 billion in 1994 to {Y}480 million (US$83.2 million) in 1995. 70
The Tiananmen incident on 4 June 1989 illustrated that, under pressure from Western states, grave
human rights violations in an aid recipient country can affect Japan's aid policy, despite the strategic
importance of the country. 71 After the incident, though with a delay, Japan followed Western countries
on 20 June in freezing new economic assistance to China. It stopped processing new grants and loans,
while promising to implement already agreed, on-going projects. Diplomatically, albeit in milder
language and with a slower reaction, many of the Japanese policies in the months following the event did
not differ much in substance from those of the Western states. 72 Japan joined other members of the Paris
Summit of G7 states in issuing a communique expressing concern over the incident and approving the
punitive measures taken by individual countries. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did try to
restrict the return of Japanese business to China, a process already under way only one month after the
incident, by issuing a special request to three major Japanese business associations on 22 June that asked
each corporation to decide "with prudence" whether to allow its employees to return to or visit China.
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry postponed the establishment of a business association
for investment in China, which had been planned for 7 June, and lowered China's credit rating to reflect
the higher risks associated with commerce and trade. 73
Tiananmen, however, affected Japanese aid to China only briefly, and Tokyo had already moved to
normalize its relations with Beijing one year later. Even during the Paris Summit, Japan was trying to
persuade other Western states not to pressure China into diplomatic isolation, referring to the importance
of China in maintaining security in the region, which led to the adoption of a joint communique short of
imposing new joint sanctions, while encouraging China to do its utmost to avoid international isolation.
74 In August 1989, in the area of technical cooperation, Japan began to resume some volunteer missions
as well as emergency disaster relief. In September, restrictions on travel to China were lifted. In
December, an agreement was reached concerning the continuation of existing grant programmes. 75 In
early 1990, LDP leaders, in particular former Prime Minister Takeshita, and Japanese government
officials started to discuss a partial resumption of the third yen loan to China. 76 This move was in a way
stimulated by events in the United States, including the approval by President Bush of the sale of three
communication satellites to China in December 1989, as well as his decision earlier in the year to renew
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China's most-favoured-nation status for another year. The World Bank also decided to ease the freeze of
its loans in February 1990. At the Houston Summit of G7 states in July 1990, Japan officially announced
its decision partially to resume its loan programme to China. In late 1990, Japan provided a loan of
{Y}120 billion, and in 1991, {Y}120 billion. 77 Further, on 18 December, a five-year trade agreement
was signed, promising China US$8 billion in technology, plant, and construction equipment in exchange
for oil and coal. 78
Thus, after a brief halt in bilateral aid, Japan's aid programme to China returned more or less to normal.
The resumption of ODA reflected, most of all, Japan's traditional concern for China's importance for the
security and prosperity of the region, and, indeed, for world security. It was understood by the Japanese
government that the isolation of China was a serious matter, and suspension of Japan's ODA, the largest
in the world, was more destabilizing to China than sanctions imposed by other countries. 79 There was
also profound business interest in China, even though some business leaders, such as Takashi Ishiwara of
Keizai Doyu Kai (Japan Association of Corporate Executives), were vocal advocates of Japan acting
closely with other Western states. 80
Overall, the Tiananmen incident again illustrated the difficult balance Japan maintained between its role
as a Western partner and that as an Eastern state. Although economic assistance was halted in line with
the policy of other Western states, Japan, from security concerns, refrained from taking an overly critical
stance verbally, and also from continuing with the cancellation of its ODA to China for any length of
time. Concerns about avoiding criticism and isolation from other Western states had to be balanced
against the danger of isolating China. In addition, as Prime Minister Uno himself remarked on 7 June, it
was widely recognized that past Japanese involvement in China made it inappropriate for Japan to take
sides. He observed as well that Japan's relations with China could not be understood in the same way as
US relations with China were. 81 There was thus persistent support for the principle of non-interference
within the Japanese government and direct reference to human rights was often avoided, even though
there was constant mention of humanitarian concerns. 82
In 1995, in protest against the nuclear tests that China had carried out, the Japanese government applied
the principles of the ODA Charter, thereby withholding its grant aid — except for humanitarian and
grassroots assistance. Despite this action, Japan was still the largest bilateral aid donor to China,
providing more than US$1.38 billion in 1995. 83
As for Myanmar, the Japanese government has applied a policy of constructive engagement, as
exemplified by its actions in the UN forums noted above. However, in terms of bilateral aid, Japan's
action has been more consistent than in the case of China.
Until the end of the 1980s, the Japanese government considered Myanmar (then Burma) to be an
important recipient of Japanese bilateral ODA, together with ASEAN states, for economic and strategic
reasons. 84 After Myanmar was classified as a least developed country (LDC) in December 1987,
Japanese grants to Myanmar increased to about {Y}10 billion in 1988. Loans to Myanmar started in
1969 with a yen loan of {Y}10.8 billion and increased in 1976 to {Y}20 billion, and in 1982 to about
{Y}40 billion. 85 Dependence of Myanmar on trade with Japan was the highest in the region, with its
imports from Japan amounting to over 40 per cent of its total in 1987. Japan was the largest aid donor to
Myanmar, providing more than 71.5 per cent of all aid the country received in 1987 and 80 per cent in
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1988.
However, in September 1988, Japanese ODA to Myanmar in effect had to be halted, 86 owing to the coup
d'etat and lack of normal relations with the new military government. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
communicated to the new government that Japan would be unable to resume economic assistance until
the political situation calmed down and efforts were made to reform the economy. 87 As a result, total
bilateral ODA dropped from US$260 million in 1988 to US$71 million in 1989, US$61 million in 1990,
and US$85 million in 1991, while grant aid also dropped from about {Y}10 billion in previous years to
{Y}3.7 billion in 1988, no grant aid in 1989, {Y}3.5 billion for debt relief in 1990, and {Y}5.0 billion
for debt relief in 1991. 88 The freeze on new aid continues at the time of writing. Nevertheless, Japanese
aid to Myanmar remains by far the largest among the countries of the Development Assistance
Committee (DAC). In 1994, Japan provided US$133.8 million of the total US$142.8 million the country
received as ODA from DAC countries. 89 Moreover, the Japanese government split from the Western
position in order to recognize the SLORC government in February 1989 and started partially to resume
assistance to on-going projects as well as emergency humanitarian relief, including food and disaster
relief. The Japanese government maintains that it has continued dialogues with the Myanmar government
in order to encourage it to release political prisoners. In response to the release of the democratic leader
Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in July 1995, the Japanese government decided to implement
suspended on-going projects and those based upon the assessment of basic human needs. In October
1995, it decided to provide grant aid for the expansion of the Institute of Nursing in Myanmar. However,
as the situation deteriorated again in 1996, no new commitments of foreign assistance have been made.
90
Indonesia, Peru, and Thailand were cases that exhibited less flexibility in Japanese aid policy. Indonesia
has been one of the largest recipients of Japanese bilateral aid, second only to China. In 1987–1990, it
was the largest recipient. In 1995, it was the second largest, receiving about US$892 million. 91 In
November 1991, the Indonesian military harshly suppressed a generally peaceful demonstration in East
Timor, which resulted in more than 100 deaths. This incident did not lead to a halt in Japanese aid to
Indonesia, however, despite pledges by the opposition party, based upon the judgement that diplomatic
pressures from Japan and the international community had led to a calming of the situation and that the
Indonesian government had taken measures to investigate, punish those responsible, and prevent the
occurrence of similar events. 92 In this case, Japan officially took no stance with regard to the
conditionality of aid linked to the human rights performance of a recipient country. Similarly, events in
Peru in April 1992, when President Fujimori resorted to emergency measures to dissolve parliament, or
in Thailand in May 1992 did not lead Japan to reconsider its aid policy to these countries, on the basis
that they were heading back to normalcy under effective international pressures. 93
As regards North Korea, Japan has provided emergency relief, based purely upon humanitarian concerns,
despite persistent problems in the normalization process. In 1997, Japan provided US$27 million in
response to the UN appeal and SFr 11 million in response to the International Federation of Red Cross
appeal. However, North Korea's firing of a missile over Japanese territory in September 1998 forced
Japan to halt these transactions.
The spirit of the ODA Charter has been most closely followed in the context of Eastern Europe. In 1990
Prime Minister Toshiaki Kaifu promised to provide a US$150 million loan through the IMF to Poland,
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technical cooperation of US$50 million, a five-year loan of US$500 million from the Export-Import
Bank, and export credits to Poland and Hungary. 94 Japan has expanded its aid to other East European
countries where democratization is a key issue, even though the sums remain small in comparison with
key Asian aid recipients. As regards African countries, Japan has suspended aid to Nigeria, the Sudan,
and the Gambia, on the grounds of serious human rights violations, and reduced aid to Kenya and
Malawi. 95
Such examples signify an inconsistent application of the 1992 ODA Charter, which would suggest
uneven political support for the text itself. Although the ODA Charter is certainly a cornerstone of
Japanese aid philosophy, inconsistency in its application as well as ambiguity in its content remain issues
to be addressed in the future.
 
VI. Conclusion
This paper has attempted to demonstrate the change that has occurred in Japan's foreign policy on human
rights. Because of various historical, domestic, and international factors, Japan did not have a clear-cut
foreign policy on human rights from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s. But from the 1980s a changing
international environment and, to a lesser degree, changing domestic politics moved Japan to pay more
attention to human rights in other countries. Japan presents an interesting case of a non-Western state
with a different political and foreign policy tradition gradually moving to accommodate increasingly
salient human rights issues.
As part of the Western coalition of liberal democratic states, Japan has been under informal and formal
pressure to act with them in order to advance human rights in world politics. This has been especially so
given the importance of the Japanese economy and associated foreign assistance programme. At times,
and within certain limits, Japan has responded positively to these Western pressures for action on human
rights abroad. Tokyo spoke out for universal human rights when some of its authoritarian neighbours
were pushing "Asian values." It applied some economic pressure on both Myanmar and China in the
name of human rights. It supported a transition to market democracies in Eastern Europe. It made a
major commitment to a liberal democratic state in Cambodia, and a minor commitment to a liberal
democratic order in other failed states such as Mozambique. That Japan had other interests in some of
these situations, such as securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, does not detract from the
reality of its support for democracy and civil rights in several situations.
At the same time, apart perhaps from Cambodia, it is difficult to chart a bold policy of Japanese
leadership in the field of international human rights. Frequently its support for human rights has been
tinged with caution and reservation. Often it has tried to play an intermediary or mediating role between
those Western states willing to press for progress on the human rights front and the targeted Asian states.
Japan has frequently combined its interest in human rights with other interests, particularly economics
and security. Thus its interruption of business with China was brief after the events of Tiananmen
Square, and Tokyo has also been less willing than certain Western states to apply major and consistent
sanctions against Myanmar. For the most part, its policies on trade and aid have not been seriously
influenced by human rights considerations.
Although Japan has been under international pressure at times to play a more active role on human rights,
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the nature of domestic politics in Japan is a restraining factor. Public demand for more attention to
human rights abroad is relatively weak, especially as demonstrated by the lack of interest among
Japanese human rights NGOs and media in human rights situations in other countries. Pressures from the
Diet are also weak, and the strong Japanese bureaucracy is still dominated by economic and security
interests — although there has been some slight change toward incorporating greater concerns for human
rights in agencies interested in UN and refugee affairs. Still, in relation to many of the Western liberal
democracies, Japanese political culture is more deferential than demanding on the issue of human rights
in foreign policy.
There has indeed been change in Japanese foreign policy regarding human rights in the past 50 years, but
the future direction and strength of that change remain uncertain on the eve of the twenty-first century.
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Chapter 6: Russian foreign policy and human
rights: Conflicted culture and uncertain policy
Sergei V. Chugrov
 
Two political myths concerning human rights in Russia are widely aired in the West. According to one of
them, Russia historically followed the lead of the West towards liberalism, and only the 1917 Bolshevik
revolution resulted in mass repressions and the negation of all human rights in the Soviet Union. The
other myth stipulates that Russia has never developed the conditions for human rights and is hardly able
to develop them now. Both arguments appear to be wrong. For centuries, Russia was torn by two cultural
traditions. One of them, the Westernizing one, considers rights of the individual to be its cornerstone.
The other, Slavophile, one accepts authoritarian government and severe restrictions on human rights,
while seeing the source of the country's further development in its own particular traditions. The
Westernizing tradition embraces universal rights, while the Slavophile tradition emphasizes cultural
relativism and national particularism.
The first tendency pushes Russia towards the West, while the second one results in Russia pursuing a
policy of self-isolation. The Westernizing tradition has always been weaker than the Slavophile one. This
does not mean, however, that the seeds of liberal freedoms were eradicated from the national political
culture; they were always there and remain so today. Rather, they are emerging from their suppression.
 
I. Historical introduction
For about three centuries, up to 1480, the Muscovite principality was under the domination of Tatars.
Some students of the Russian mentality see in this experience the sources of Russia's traditional
adherence to non-freedom and its antipathy to human rights issues — as well as of Moscow's intrinsically
aggressive attitude towards neighbouring principalities and countries. Russian authoritarianism was
perhaps personified by Ivan the Terrible. Later, Peter the Great, while visiting one of the British
battleships, wanted to watch a traditional corporal punishment in the fleet (whipping with a seven-tailed
jack-o'-seven) and could not understand why the captain opposed his wish, there being no sailors who
deserved to be punished. In Russia this circumstance might not have been viewed as an obstacle. 1 (On
the other hand, Petrine Russia may serve as an eloquent example of the controversial Westernization of
the country).
Russia turned out to be one of the countries most hostile to the French Revolution. The traditional
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Russian ideal society was a religious community that had no need to defend human rights because Love
and Good took the place of rights. In this model, ideals and not law were supposed to be a guideline. In
reality, there was a mixture of legal and religious rules, resulting in an unstructured complex network of
relations between individuals and the state. This sort of collectivism paralysed much individual
responsibility. In the real life, ethical norms are often in conflict with the law. In the extreme form, under
Love, slavery is a happiness. Russia's strong peasant community (mir) emerged as a complex
phenomenon with many elements of a parochial isolated community based on the idea of sacrificing
individual rights for the sake of collectivist values. This imperative has turned out to be disastrous for
Russia, leading to bloodshed and martyrs. 2 Even many Russian intellectuals of the nineteenth century
demonstrated their rejection of law and put ethical norms in place of law. Thus the Russian legal tradition
is weak.
Nevertheless, it is easy to see a counter-tendency. Catherine the Great, inspired by her contacts with
French Enlightenment figures, initiated elections to a Legislative Commission in 1767 to consider the
problems of rights. After 1861, Tsar Alexander II initiated a discussion about reforming the state's legal
system in order to give rights to the representatives of new estates. It was Russia's initiative that led to
the first world conference in The Hague on international law in 1899 to discuss humanitarian issues.
Peter Stolypin, Russia's then controversial prime minister, forcibly moved peasants to Siberia, but
nonetheless paid special attention to the problem of formal human rights and moved the country closer to
European standards.
The fear of excessive liberties facilitated the acceptance of a totalitarian style of government after 1917.
The very first steps of the Soviet leadership in 1917–1918 provide us with evidence of the new elite's low
opinion of human beings and lack of respect for law. In the 1920s and 1930s, so-called "revolutionary
expediency" was the clear excuse for unbridled violations of human rights. Therefore, the new Soviet
Russia became isolated from the outer world. The division of the world into "bourgeois democracies"
and "people's democracies" explains many conflicts with the outer world, including the 1956 invasion of
Hungary and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. As a counter-example, after Stalin's death, the
Khrushchev "thaw" opened a period of exchanges with the West, thus undermining Soviet isolation.
Some see every crack in isolation as at least a long-term and indirect step forward in the promotion of
human rights. (The opposite is certainly true: any promotion of human rights is a heavy blow to
self-isolation).
The improvement in East-West relations in the early 1970s, known as detente, stemmed from the military
parity achieved by the Soviet Union with the United States. But detente was quickly followed by a
Western foreign policy line emphasizing human rights issues, which forced them to the front of Russian
domestic policies. The human rights issue was important, though not always the key issue, in East-West
relations. Soviet dissidents contributed to the launching of the Helsinki process. The signing of the
Helsinki Agreement on 1 August 1975 was an event of special, albeit ambiguous, importance. On the one
hand, Helsinki diplomacy served as a source of the "new thinking." On the other hand, provisions on
human rights in the Agreement were a source of constant irritation to the Brezhnev leadership.
It has been said that: "It is only continuing and unremitting pressure by the U.S. and the West on human
rights that led to improvements in individual situations and the possibility of long-term systemic change."
3 I find this argument one-dimensional and therefore not totally convincing. Of course, pressure from the
United States and other Western states was a powerful driving force. However, all we know about the
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Gorbachev period testifies that it was a bilateral process because Gorbachev saw more clearly than any of
his predecessors the links between domestic and foreign policy and appreciated that, as long as the Soviet
Union persecuted dissidents, Soviet relations with the West would be based on mistrust. 4
Implementation of at least some human rights was a cornerstone of Gorbachev's new thinking. 5 Yet even
after the attempted coup against this new thinking by hard-line communists, he still saw a preferred role
for his communist party. 6 In May 1991, the notorious decree of 17 February 1967 on repealing the
Soviet citizenship of ÈmigrÈs to Israel was abolished. 7 In foreign policy Gorbachev rejected the
existence of any one correct model of socialism in the spring of 1987.
In summary, Russia has faced great difficulty in coming to terms with human rights in its own culture,
hence the lack of coherence in Russia's foreign policy on rights — and its vacillations between East and
West. The Russian intellectual tradition is plagued by a paradox: the longing for Russia's modernization,
which includes human rights, is matched in intensity only by the fear of it. 8 The central thesis of this




After the honeymoon of Gorbachev's perestroika and the first year of the Yeltsin—Gaidar liberal
reforms, especially with the exacerbation of economic hardships, the wave of enthusiasm concerning
liberal values began to fade in the new Russia. A drift towards relative isolation from the West became
more visible. As for domestic sources of the shift, two major factors — cultural and institutional — were
at work. Many Western experts consider the strengthening of national institutions devoted to the
development of human rights to be the best prevention against grave violations. 9 Russia's case shows
that the political culture is of major importance. Russian society remains a distinctive hybrid system: it
endorses widely recognized liberal rights, while at the same time it is constantly looking back to its
traditions of authoritarian rule. 10
Political culture
The start of reform resulted in a substitution of civil-political for socio-economic rights. Under
communism, the general population, lacking political freedoms, nevertheless benefited from social
welfare. This welfare system, although sometimes a disaster, with hours in line at a doctor's office, by
and large guaranteed minimal standards of socio-economic rights. 11 The reform era brought in political
freedoms but has also almost demolished the old system of social guarantees. This replacement of
socio-economic by civil-political rights was immensely painful for the general population, especially in
the provinces. From the standpoint of an average Russian, freedom of speech led to pornography and the
propaganda of violence, and freedom of conscience threatened to turn into the importation of
pathological sects. Thus those who lost out during the reform period view liberal values mostly as
involving moral decay, excessive luxury, and, above all, the "Mafiaization of Russia." These deviations,
being generally attributed to Western values, result in lingering doubts concerning civil-political rights.
Devoid of socio-economic rights, the general population is not in a position to benefit from the new
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political freedoms. One can also see the widespread rejection of universal human rights norms, which are
considered by many to be uniquely Western ones. One can also understand the strong pressure upon the
Kremlin to assume generally anti-Western policies, and thus save Russia from degeneration under the
Western-dominated international system. Even some politicians of the new generation stress the vital
necessity for Russia not to align only with the West but to search out its own path.
A major cleavage appears to have emerged between the notions of "liberal rights" and "order." In the
nostalgic public view, the former have become a synonym for disorder. As a result, many people appear
to believe that the government should control people speaking out against it and foster appropriate social
attitudes and values. Paradoxically, most advocates of civil responsibility — a group one would expect to
be particularly likely to support human rights — express concern at the excess of political freedom and
free speech, as well as a belief that the government should take more of a role in guiding society. 12
What are the transmission belts of these anti-Western attitudes to decision-making in foreign policy?
Some interest groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) try to pressure the Russian
government into pursuing more anti-Western policies, making use of negative and sometimes distorted
perceptions of the human rights issue by the general public. A part of the Russian establishment,
discouraged by military cuts, stands to gain from the exacerbation of international tensions. Vested
interests of the military and the law enforcement organizations make some of them hostile to respecting
human rights. As for foreign policy decision-making, a 1993 survey of 113 representatives of the Russian
foreign policy elite showed that 52 per cent adhered to Western-type democratic principles while 45 per
cent considered themselves to be advocates of Russia's distinctive way of development. 13
Conflicting views persist regarding human rights versus centuries-old political traditions. The part of
society that has been accustomed to perceiving itself within a system of ideological categories feels the
need for a unifying, central idea. If the concept of human rights does not succeed in establishing firm
roots, especially in a situation of instability and impatience, the concept of national particularism will
triumph. A lack of respect for human rights leads to nostalgic protest, xenophobia, and anti-Western
diplomacy.
Institutions
>From an institutional point of view, by and large Russia has already brought its legal system into line
with international standards. Some articles of the 1993 Russian Constitution concerning human rights
(i.e. Articles 15(4), 16, 18, and 42) declare the priority of international law over national legislation and
the right of any citizen to address the European Court of Human Rights (once the European Convention
on Human Rights had been ratified by the State Duma). 14 By a presidential decree 15 the Commission
on Human Rights was formed. The Russian parliament adopted a federal law for an Ombudsman.
However, the leftist majority in the State Duma did its best to replace the prominent human rights activist
Sergei Kovalyov because of his stance on Chechnya. 16 The confrontation between the executive and
legislative branches of power remains one of the main domestic factors hampering a clear line on human
rights.
Major domestic problems
The impact of traditions and conflicting institutions makes the human rights situation in Russia an object
of criticism from international organizations, Western governments, and NGOs. The issue of capital
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punishment is a salient focus. In new penal legislation, adopted in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev on
15 December 1988, capital punishment remained an exceptional measure until its abolition as a sanction
for high treason and other most grave crimes. 17 Since then, the problem has been monitored by world
public opinion, international organizations, and even committees of the US Congress. 18 After the demise
of the Soviet Union, responding to world public opinion, Russia declared its intention to abolish capital
sentences. A year-long moratorium was to be implemented, but the State Duma has not confirmed this.
Yeltsin declared a moratorium by decree, and starting from the beginning of 1997 death sentences have
not been carried out. 19 Society is split on the problem, as elsewhere, and prospects for the adoption by
the leftist Duma of legislation urging that the current moratorium on the death penalty be made
permanent are vague. 20
The struggle connected with the law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations is a pointed
example of the power of domestic traditions and of the weakness of pressure from foreign human rights
groups. According to its opponents, the 1997 law curbs the activities of all but four religions — the
Russian Orthodox Church, Judaism, Buddhism, and Islam — which are regarded as "traditional" to
Russia. This contradicts the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. The "newer religious groups" and denominations (among
them are Catholics, Baptists, Adventists, etc.) deplore the serious infringement of their rights — being
forbidden to open bank accounts, convene religious meetings in public, or hold property for 15 years.
The President was under direct pressure from the US Senate, which voted in July 1997 (by 94 to 4) to cut
American aid to Russia by US$195 million if the bill became law. Thus, US legislators backed human
rights militants and religious groups to urge Yeltsin to veto the bill. Pope John Paul II also conveyed his
deep concern over the bill, which he believed discriminates against Catholics in Russia.
On the other side, the Orthodox Church threw its weight behind the bill, openly saying that it needed the
law to protect Russia from the depredations of Western missionaries and to prevent the further spiritual
and moral destabilization of the country. 21 The law has also mobilized a strong anti-Western consensus
in the Federal Assembly, where both houses passed it with overwhelming majorities.
President Yeltsin at first vetoed the bill in the summer of 1997, but eventually, in October, signed it after
the Duma introduced some amendments. Signing the bill was not only a symptom of a lack of respect for
the rights of religious minorities but also a new barrier between Russia and the West. 22 In fact, it was a
manifestation of the crucial impact of domestic factors in human rights issues.
Among other serious domestic problems are high-profile murders involving journalists, financial
tycoons, and other prominent figures. In November 1998, the country was shocked by the assassination
of a prominent liberal Duma deputy and human rights activist, Galina Starovoitova.
Human rights organizations around the world challenged the legal judgment against the St. Petersburg
environmentalist Alexander Nikitin as being politically motivated. This former naval officer was
detained in St. Petersburg in February 1996 on suspicion of revealing state secrets to a Norwegian
environmental foundation, Bellona. Nikitin and Bellona have demonstrated that all of the information
they published was from open sources. However, he was kept in jail for a long time.
Another source of concern for the West is the lack of independence of the judiciary, which prevents it
from acting as an effective counterweight to the other branches of government. Judges in Russia
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traditionally remain subject to some influence from the executive, the military, and the security forces,
especially in high-profile or political cases. 23
Thus, as we can clearly see, the emergence of modern institutions such as ombudsmen and human rights
commissions is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for Russia's real adherence to human rights
norms. Unfortunately, Russian institutions reflect an underlying conflicted political culture, and therefore
their record is far from being in full conformity with international rights standards. Constitutional
declarations do not change behaviour overnight. 24
 
III. Multilateral policy
International Bill of Rights
From the very beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union demonstrated a very controversial approach
towards human rights issues. It abstained on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the UN
General Assembly on 10 December 1948, stressing that some of its articles "ignored the sovereign rights
of some democratic governments." 25 Then Soviet diplomats worked hard to shape the two basic
Covenants to the USSR's own views. Moscow formally adhered to both of the Covenants; 26 but, like the
later US policy, it did not accept the Optional Protocol to the Civil-Political Covenant, which permitted
individual complaints about violations, and it argued that only national authorities, not international
agencies, were competent to pass judgement on the implementation of the standards. Russia's voting for
pacts dealing with liberal values was quite formal and legalistic, since virtually all international rights
documents of the period stemmed from compromise between East and West. This resulted in general
language whose essence depended on subsequent interpretation. 27
After the ending of the Cold War, according to the official view, the initial contribution of the Russian
Federation catalysed UN activities on a number of human rights issues. Russia made the protection of
human rights, including the rights of national minorities, a priority of its foreign policy, especially in the
territory of the former Soviet Union. 28 The new Russia professes to emphasize especially civil and
political rights both at home and abroad. 29
Policy patterns
One can outline three different periods in Russian foreign policy and human rights since 1991. From late
1991 to mid-1993 Russia appeared simply to defer to the West in regard to human rights issues. Russian
delegations in UN institutions followed the lead of the West and voted with the US delegation on the
bulk of major issues. Russia was one of the most energetic actors in creating new human rights
infrastructures. For example, it worked extensively on the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
which was adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights in June 1993. Also, being interested in
more focused international support for Russian-speaking minorities in the former Soviet republics,
Russia insisted on transforming the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe into the more
efficient Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
In mid-1993, important shifts in Russia's foreign policy occurred. Moscow's proposed sale of cryogenic
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rockets to India may be regarded as a watershed in its relations with the West. Washington not only
rejected Russia's requests to share military and space technology markets, but exerted obvious pressure in
order to cancel Russia's deal with Delhi. Even ardent supporters of the Russian alliance with the West
were shocked and raised their voices in favour of Russia's pursuing its distinct national interests. After
nationalists emerged victorious at the December 1993 general elections, they pressed the government to
back Belgrade in the violent struggles in the former Yugoslavia. Russian foreign policy seemed torn
between pleasing the West and protecting the Serbs. Later on, Moscow gave diplomatic support to the
Bosnian Serbs against the Croats, the Muslims, and the West, openly challenging the United States. The
period of euphoria over cooperation with the West was over. Officially sticking to its line towards
independent decision-making devoid of double standards, 30 Moscow has become more cautious about
adopting new human rights documents — in part because they make it more difficult to implement
previous obligations. 31
Since 1995—96, notwithstanding formal condemnation of authoritarian regimes, Russia's practical
policies towards them have become more pragmatic and flexible. Moscow demonstrates the legacy of its
conflicted political culture and its mixed record of cooperation with the United Nations and its
mechanisms. On the one hand, Russia usually sides with other Western countries on general issues, such
as the role of the United Nations in the promotion of democratization, respect for the principles of
national sovereignty, etc. 32 For instance, after the United Nations proclaimed 1998 to be the year of
Human Rights, Russia was one of the first countries to form a national committee for the celebration of
the anniversary of the declaration. 33 Russia has consistently abided by the UN Security Council's
resolutions concerning arms embargoes on its traditional allies Iraq, Libya, and the former Yugoslavia at
different stages of UN-sanctioned operations. On the other hand, since 1995, Russia has preferred to
express an independent opinion in matters concerning specific issues. For example, having voted at the
Security Council for prolonging the UN field mission in Eastern Slavonia, Russia also emphasized the
necessity to protect the rights of Serbian displaced persons. Concerning applications filed by the
Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the Registry of the International Court of Justice in 1993,
instituting proceedings against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia "for violating the Genocide
Convention," the Russian judge took the side of Yugoslavia. Judge Tarassov's dissenting opinion was
joined by ad hoc Judge Kreca, who was appointed by, and represented the interests of, Belgrade. 34
Moscow continued to criticize what it considered the West's excessive blaming of Serbia and the Bosnian
Serbs for following the policy of ethnic cleansing. In early 1994, when the United Nations called for the
use of force against the Serbs, Russian top analysts even advised that the State Duma would abstain from
ratifying the START-2 treaty in the event the bombing went ahead. 35 Moscow's efforts to keep a high
profile in foreign policy notwithstanding, in post-Dayton Bosnia Russia has been routinely ignored by
the United States and NATO. As a result, Russia has secured only the right to complain, not to decide. 36
Russia does its best to make UN resolutions less confrontational. 37 At the 1997 session of the UN
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), Russia joined the consensus regarding the former Yugoslavia.
But it made a special statement on the motives of voting, pointing to the necessity of restoring Yugoslav
membership in the United Nations, the OSCE, and other international organizations. On these issues
Russia constantly resists the anti-Serb line of the Western countries.
In its relations with Iraq, Moscow traditionally tries to appease the West. After the General Assembly
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and UNHRC adopted resolutions expressing strong condemnation of the massive violations of human
rights of the gravest nature in Iraq, 38 the Russian Foreign Ministry tried to get the United Nations to lift
the oil embargo against Baghdad. When the UN Security Council relaxed the embargo in 1996 so that
Iraq could purchase food and medicine, it turned out that there had already been multiple contracts to
provide these supplies, but none with Russian companies. The consequences were also painful for
Russian oil companies, which, during the full embargo, had taken Iraq's place in certain markets, thanks
to the similarity in the chemical composition of Russian and Iraqi oil. Russia was forced to leave these
markets when Iraq was allowed to sell some oil once again. The UN Security Council having decided to
extend the oil-for-goods deal in September 1997, Russia abstained, putting forward a specious excuse. 39
Russia's support for Libya is limited and conditional. For example, on 10 July 1997, at the Security
Council's review meeting on Libyan sanctions, Russia insisted on sending a representative of the
Secretary-General to Libya to compile a report on the humanitarian implications of the sanctions regime
for the general population of Libya.
Collective human rights such as the problem of self-determination of peoples had been the focal point of
Moscow's foreign policy during the Cold War, especially the rights of the Palestinian people and the
Middle East peace process. Russia generally tends to vote in favour of support for the rights of the
Palestinians. However, since normalization of relations with Israel, Russia has become far more sensitive
about the wording of related resolutions. 40 When the General Assembly approved a resolution on the
rights of Palestinians in December 1995, by 145 to 2, Russia was among the 9 countries that abstained
(only the United States and Israel voted against it). 41 At the 53rd session of the UN Human Rights
Commission in 1997, Russia supported a resolution condemning human rights violations in southern
Lebanon and in the Bekaa valley region (the United States voted against it and one delegation abstained).
Russia also voted for a General Assembly resolution submitted by the European Union (EU) on Israeli
settlements in occupied Arab territory (the United States voted against and two delegations abstained).
These were not the only examples of the cleavage with the United States on human rights violations in
the Middle East. For the first time, at the 1997 UNHRC session, Russia was not among the co-authors of
the so-called positive resolution on the Middle East peace process, because the US delegation, its major
sponsor, refused to mention in the text the role of multilateral mechanisms and the importance of sticking
to the achieved Palestine—Israeli agreements.
When a UN body takes up human rights abuses in Cuba, Russia quite often sides with the United States
on procedural matters, such as, for instance, extending the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in Cuba at the Human Rights Commission or the Economic and Social Council
session 42 Russia also aligns with the United States on some generalized matters, such as bringing the
observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba into conformity with international law
and international human rights instruments. 43 Russia was among the states that abstained, however,
when the 1997 UNHRC session, by a vote of 19 to 10, with 22 abstentions, adopted the more detailed
and critical US-sponsored resolution on the situation of human rights in Cuba.
Russia's voting record concerning human rights in China is rather contradictory. For example, at the 51st
session of the UNHRC held in Geneva in 1995, the Russian delegation first voted procedurally for taking
up the matter, but then voted against the Western-sponsored resolution condemning human rights
violations in China. 44 At the 1997 UNHRC session, Russia abstained in procedural voting on whether or
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not to adopt any resolution concerning human rights violations in China. This position was obviously
dictated by a new rapprochement between Russia and China and reflects Russia's pragmatic stance. The
situation will tend to reproduce itself until real changes take place in China.
More generally, Russia's voting record at the 53rd session of the UNHRC in Geneva, 10—18 April 1997,
may serve as a clear example of Russia's attempts to shape an independent policy on international human
rights issues. Russia's official position was based on a presumption that the human rights issues should
bring nations closer together rather than dividing them. In Russia's view, a constructive dialogue between
nations should draw on human rights as a universal principle and transform them into a cornerstone of
security and stability.
On Russia's initiative, the UNHRC for the first time labelled the repealing of citizenship as a violation of
basic human rights (the co-authors of the resolution were Mexico, Peru, Nicaragua, Colombia, Portugal,
and Belarus). Russia's initiative condemning the barbaric practices of taking hostages turned into a
consensus resolution that won support of multiple co-sponsors. Russia backed resolutions on human
rights abuses in Iraq, Iran, the Sudan, Burundi, Zaire, Nigeria, Rwanda, Equatorial Guinea, and
Myanmar. Russian diplomats stress that Russia's stance is far from blacklisting these countries but is a
sort of invitation to a positive dialogue with international organizations.
One of the characteristic traits of Russia's foreign policy is consistent support for the idea of the
inseparability of democracy, development, and human rights. Therefore, Russia was one of the most
active co-authors of the resolution on the right to development.
There was an intense struggle regarding an Italian draft resolution on the abolition of capital punishment.
The United States and a group of Asian countries bitterly criticized the resolution, emphasizing the right
of sovereign countries to establish measures of responsibility. The resolution was adopted by 27
(including Russia and the EU) to 11 (including the United States, Japan, and China), with 14 abstentions
(including Great Britain, Cuba, and India). 45
Since the 1993 Vienna Declaration, ongoing political dialogue with the Council of Europe (CoE) has
been a priority for Moscow. Judging by official statements, Russia's foreign policy entrepreneurs needed
membership in the Council in order to protect the rights of Russians in the "near abroad." 46 Actually, an
even more important rationale was to have a say in European affairs. Russia's joining the CoE has been
one of the most controversial decisions in the history of the organization. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of
the mis-named Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, challenged the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe (PACE) deputies in his mocking manner: "If you want to invite Russia, you should
know that you invite Russia as a state and not citizen Kovalyov who dislikes something. He is as sick as
thousands of Europeans who suffer from different diseases." 47 In its Opinion no. 193 on the Russian
request for membership in the Council of Europe, adopted in January 1996, note was taken of the
Russian Federation's intention to settle international as well as internal disputes by peaceful means, as
well as of the commitment strictly to respect the provisions of international humanitarian law, including
in cases of armed conflict on its territory. 48
Russia has become more cooperative with Amnesty International in matters of application of the
Convention against Torture, illegal imprisonment and psychiatric confinement for political reasons, death
sentences, introduction of a civilian alternative to military service, restrictions on religious activities, and
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the situation in Chechnya. 49
The International Red Cross took part in efforts to protect and assist people in order to soften the
consequences of the conflict in Chechnya. In spite of the special status accorded it concerning the
implementation of international humanitarian law by the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocols of
1977, six Red Cross workers were killed in late 1996. After the incident, the remaining members of the
Red Cross had to quit Chechnya since neither the Russian troops nor the Chechen authorities would
provide them with guarantees respecting provisions of international humanitarian law.
Regional developments
Human rights groups have compiled a number of accounts of serious abuses during the Chechen conflict.
Human Rights Watch reported that the Russian military "failed adequately to investigate, let alone
prosecute, the most glaring combat-related violations of humanitarian law." Separatist forces also
violated international humanitarian law by taking and executing hostages and using prisoners as human
shields. The Glasnost Fund established an international intergovernmental tribunal on crimes against
humanity and war crimes in Chechnya, which plans to conduct investigations and forward its findings to
the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights. 50
Moscow's use of force in Chechnya, which showed no concern either about human lives or about the
reaction of public opinion inside or outside Russia, became a test for Western human rights policies. The
reaction of the Western countries and international organizations surprised the Russian leadership, being
far more tolerant than Moscow had expected. The West and international organizations condemned
Russia for excessive violence and human rights violations. However, no country and no organization
mentioned any sanctions or proposed exerting pressure on Russia, considering the Chechen conflict to be
Russia's internal affair or not an issue at all. 51 This was interpreted in Moscow as a carte blanche for
such kinds of military operations not only in Chechnya but in the vast space of the former Soviet Union.
After the Budapest summit of the OSCE held in November 1994, Moscow clearly saw that it would not
be possible to keep the West from an expansion of NATO eastwards. In exchange for dropping attempts
to prevent it, Moscow welcomed the idea of dividing zones of responsibility in Europe along the borders
between the Central European states and the former Soviet Union, with the exception of the Baltics,
which were supposed to belong to the Western zone. This drift toward a more "Great Power" stance and
the ferocity of the military operation in Chechnya were interconnected symptoms of the old imperial
habit. The West chose the lesser of the evils as a way forward, as noted above, but to the detriment of the
human rights issue. 52
After NATO's official decision to expand eastward, the West was stunned by the broad consensus in
Russia against it. If we ignore security considerations, we can see the psychological explanation for this
nationwide anti-NATO consensus. Russian liberal intellectuals had an acute feeling of having been
betrayed by the West. It was a sort of psychological trauma for advocates of rapprochement with the
West, who were shocked by the lack of Western respect for Russia's sensitivities. In any case, the
Russian leadership concluded that Western states are rarely guided by ethical norms in foreign policy.
Thus Russian national interests were increasingly emphasized in foreign policy during NATO's
post-enlargement period.
International financial institutions
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International financial institutions (IFIs) are in the limelight of political discussions in Russia. Two major
questions arise: Would the West significantly increase its credits to Russia if Moscow more carefully
observed human rights? If the IFIs increased their aid to Russia, would Moscow be more active in human
rights observance?
The main international financial organizations appear to be preoccupied more with economic reform —
i.e. Russia's budgetary indicators such as inflation rates, currency reserves, etc. — than with the
observance of human rights. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank consistently
support the Russian government's tight fiscal and monetary policy to bring down inflation in spite of the
fact that many workers are not paid for months. The head of the IMF's Second European Department,
Yusuke Horiguchi, has repeatedly emphasized the necessity for the Russian government to exert pressure
upon huge corporate debtors to cope with the problem of arrears. The head of the IMF, Michel
Camdessue, while visiting Russia, stressed that the "situation when pensioners do not receive their
pensions is really shocking." 53 Also, the World Bank earmarked up to US$2 billion for urgent social
problems, such as helping the government pay wage and pension arrears. 54
But, in general, the IFIs have not let human rights issues affect loans to Russia. The major constraints for
Western assistance to Russia lie not so much in the sphere of human rights but in the economic sphere. If
relations were blocked by poor human rights observance in Russia, the West would have no incentive to
give the large amounts of assistance and credits that it is currently giving. Given the fact that the West is
already giving substantial loans, there is no effective leverage on Russia's human rights policy.
Moreover, in Russia, with the exception of a very narrow circle, the effect of Western assistance is
generally viewed as destructive for Russia's economy, stimulating corruption and criminality, as well as
ruining defence, the social system, science, culture, etc. 55 The mass media are sometimes extremely
outspoken in their criticism of Western assistance. For example, the Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Independent
Newspaper), which is usually viewed as a pro-reform daily, blames the IFIs for distortion of the
economy, immense losses, etc. as well as political manipulations.
The fact that the interests of the IMF and the World Bank are alien to Russia's interests derives not only
from the poor results from reforming the national economy in conformity with their standards. Missions
of these organizations are represented in all countries of the former Soviet Union. It is not by mere
chance that centrifugal trends keep growing every year to the detriment of the countries' economic and
political interests, first of all at the expense of Russia's interests. 56
The linking of IFI activity and human rights would only increase criticism in these circles. 57 It is the
Open Society Institute (George Soros Foundation) that is clearly linking its grants to human rights,
supporting scholars and journalists involved in research or the reporting of human rights issues. It is
noteworthy that Russian humanitarian or human rights centres are totally financed by foreign financial
and charitable organizations. 58
 
IV. Bilateral
Russia's major human rights concerns in foreign policy are focused on the former Soviet Union zone. In
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spite of the existence of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), there is still no viable
mechanism for solving these problems on a multilateral basis. The breakup of the Soviet Union left about
25 million ethnic Russians and Russian speakers beyond the new Russian borders. The years since then
have shown that Moscow remains deeply embroiled in the affairs of all the former Soviet republics.
Indeed, most of those in the Russian state today view the former republics as neither part of their state
nor wholly foreign. Western scholars tend to exaggerate Russia's imperial ambitions. As Bruce Porter
and Carol Saivetz put it:
The CIS is, moreover, only one of several tools Russia has employed to exert its influence in the former
Soviet sphere. Its efforts to retain a measure of hegemony have included economic pressures, such as
manipulation of Russian oil and natural gas deliveries; diplomatic support of Russians living in the Near
Abroad; fiscal inducements, such as debt relief and currency management; and outright military
blackmail, such as threats to keep troops stationed in the Baltic states or the refusal in late 1993 to assist
the government of Georgia against twin uprising unless it agreed to enter the CIS. 59
The source of Russia's diplomatic activities in the "near abroad" is that Moscow in many respects appears
to be extremely sensitive towards developments in the former republics. 60 Acknowledging Russia's
legitimate interests in the region, Western foreign policy decision makers hesitate to recognize what in
any other context would be called a protection racket: encouraging separatist movements under the guise
of defending embattled Russian minorities, and then intervening as a peacemaker when the conflicts
between the separatists and the successor regimes get out of hand. 61 A draft national security White
Paper in 1996 listed among the most serious problems for Russia in the "near abroad" kin ethnic
contradictions, deterioration of the economy, and loss of consumer markets, as well as violations of the
human rights and freedoms of the Russian-speaking population. 62 Violations of minorities' rights within
the "near abroad" would endanger Russia's key interests. Therefore the highest priority for Russian
foreign policy is the relationship with a number of ex-Soviet republics, above all Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan. 63
Ukraine
The rights of the Russian minority in Ukraine have been a target for Moscow's diplomatic activities since
1992, especially in the Crimea. Ethnic Russians there have made enormous efforts to try to get the
peninsula to become a part of the Russian Federation, with Sevastopol as a stronghold of this movement.
However, with the signing of the "big treaty" with Kiev, Moscow has failed to achieve its main goal. The
Crimea remains a part of the independent Ukrainian state, and the problem of the Russian minority
remains unsolved.
The Crimea became part of Russia in 1783 after the Russian victory over the Turkish Ottoman armies.
Over the next century and a half numerous people, mainly Russians, settled in the Crimea. In 1954, it
was transferred to Ukraine by the then Soviet leader, Nikita Khruschev, to commemorate the 300th
anniversary of Russia's merger with Ukraine as a propaganda symbol of the friendship of the two
republics.
The forced deportation of the Crimean Tatars under Stalin fundamentally changed the ethnic balance of
the Crimea. Ethnic Russians were brought in to fill their place. The Tatars were allowed to return to the
Crimea only at the beginning of the 1970s. Up to 100,000 Tatars subsequently sought to move to the
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Crimea, only to be prevented from resettling by bureaucratic resistance, police harassment, and brutality.
According to the 1989 census, the ethnic composition of Crimea is as follows: Russians 67 per cent,
Ukrainians 25.6 per cent (almost half of whom are Russian speakers), Crimean Tatars 1.6 per cent, other
nationalities 6 per cent. Despite substantial regional and some ethnic diversity in the Crimean political
situation, the peninsula was very stable till 1992. In May 1992 the Russian parliament passed a resolution
declaring the 1954 transfer of the Crimea illegal. In July 1993 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian
Federation issued a declaration asserting control over Sevastopol as a Russian town. Ukraine appealed to
the UN Security Council, which confirmed that these decisions were illegal because they contradicted
Ukrainian—Russian treaties and the aims and principles of the United Nations.
At the same time, the passage of a law on language led to a drive for separatism in the Crimea. The
Crimean Republic demanded its reunification with Russia under the guise of separate membership of the
Commonwealth of Independent States. The turmoil in the Crimea demonstrated the anger of the
peninsula's population towards the economic situation and Kiev's policies.
The internal situation has also been complicated by the return of the Crimean Tatars creating additional
social problems. Many Crimean Tatars see the only solution to their socio-economic and cultural
problems in the creation of a single ethnic Tatar state. Thus, Russia's foreign policy faces a series of
challenges vis-à-vis Ukraine. The major challenge is that the open backing of the Russian diaspora might
push Ukraine further in the direction of the West and NATO. This scenario is considered to be a
nightmare by the Russian foreign policy elite.
Belarus
President Alexander Lukashenko, showing little tolerance for dissent and having adopted a dictatorial
style of government, has turned Moscow's relationship with the republic into a legal puzzle. Russian
human rights groups accuse Lukashenko of total disregard for the democratically elected parliament,
which was disbanded in 1996, and of strongly repressing any opposition to his regime. In January 1997,
the Council of Europe excluded Belarus from candidature for membership. Russia insists on the
restoration of the Belorussian membership.
The major concern for Russian diplomacy has become Lukashenko's repressing the press. 64 In June
1997, he made the authorities withdraw accreditation for Pavel Sheremet, the Minsk bureau chief of
Russian Public Television (ORT), accusing him of insulting and tendentious reporting. Within a week,
the journalist and his TV crew were arrested and charged with illegally crossing the
Belorussian—Lithuanian border while filming a report on Belarus's poorly guarded frontiers. Yeltsin
bitterly criticized the president of Belarus, threatening to revise the Statute on the Union between the two
countries. This may be the strongest and most sincere of Russia's condemnations of human rights
violations in a neighbouring state. 65
Russia's painful foreign policy dilemma is whether to strengthen cooperation with Belarus or to break
with Lukashenko, who has amassed a notorious human rights record. On the one hand, Belarus is the first
real candidate for integration. On the other hand, implementation of the document on the forming of the
union with Belarus, signed in April 1997, could mean Russia's losing status in the Council of Europe and
losing face in the world community — because the observance of human rights in the newly emerging
Centaurs cannot be guaranteed. 65 Again we see a pointed example of the Russian difficulty in meshing
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attitudes towards human rights with other policy goals.
Kazakhstan
In 1997, ethnic Kazakhs accounted for only 51 per cent of Kazakhstan's population, and only about a
third in its northern regions. The Russian population is estimated at about 6.2 million. Yet many Russians
say they feel uncomfortable, notably because of an increase in broadcasting in Kazakh and because their
children have to study the Kazakh language at school. Hard-line nationalists in Moscow are trying to
blackmail the Kazakh authorities with the threat of encouraging the secession of its northern and eastern
regions in order to prevent Muslim, Western, or Chinese expansionism in the region. 67 Diplomats are
doing their best to prevent further aggravation of the situation.
The Baltics
Russia's most active diplomatic intervention for human rights reasons occurs in the Baltic countries
(Estonia, Latvia, and, to a lesser extent, Lithuania), after their winning independence in 1991. 68 The core
of the problem is that the plight of the Russian-speaking minorities and Russia's concerns with the shift
of the Baltic states away from its sphere of influence towards the West are closely intertwined. It is clear
that Russia points to violations of human rights in the Baltics while keeping silent on much worse
situations in the Central Asian newly independent countries, such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, whose
governments demonstrate political loyalty to Moscow. Russia is certainly sincerely preoccupied with the
human rights situation in the Baltics. At the same time, it makes use of the human rights issues in purely
political terms to try to prevent the Baltic states aligning with the West.
Many ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Jews have failed to get citizenship in the Baltic
states. Unfortunately, there is little love for them among the indigenous citizens, who remember the
"Soviet liberation" in 1944 as the start of mass repressions and irritating Russification. 69 The situation in
Estonia is, perhaps, the most extreme example of the status of Russian speakers in the region.
Since 1991, Estonia has certainly made considerable progress towards the fulfilment of its obligations
and commitments in regard to the rights of Russians living in its territory. In particular, Estonia has
ratified the European Convention on Human Rights. However, some problematic areas concerning
Estonia's obligations under the European Convention remain. Estonia entered into two commitments
before accession to the Council of Europe: to base its policy regarding the protection of historic
minorities on principles laid down in the Council's recommendation and an additional protocol on the
rights of national minorities to the ECHR, and to treat the "non-historic" Russian-speaking minority
fairly. There are no huge problems concerning "historic" Russians (those who settled before the Soviet
invasion in the Second World War). As for the treatment of the "non-historic" Russian-speaking
minority, who settled during Soviet rule, not all problems are being dealt with in a satisfactory manner.
Over 400,000 of Estonia's population are Russians. 70 According to the official Russian point of view,
they are subject to special hardships, owing to restrictions imposed on them that are more severe than
those on members of majority groups. As we shall see, in reality this large group is devoid of principal
rights.
According to the new Law on Citizenship adopted by the Estonian parliament in January 1995, a person
who wishes to obtain Estonian citizenship cannot apply until he or she has passed two extremely difficult
tests: a general language test and a test on the Estonian constitution and citizenship law. 71 The Estonian
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authorities are thus in practice pursuing a policy of discrimination with respect to the ethnic Russians and
the Russian language, which is the second language spoken after Estonian. 72
Moscow has repeatedly issued diplomatic statements on minority rights since late 1991. On 1 October
1991, the Russian State Council declared that the Russian leadership was responsible for all Russians
living in the former Soviet republics. In February 1992, then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev made it
clear in a speech at a UN conference on human rights that Russia regarded this issue as a very high
priority in its foreign policy. However, Russia has rather limited resources to influence the human rights
situation in Estonia and Latvia. The use of force is ruled out, so Russia has only diplomatic and economic
instruments at its disposal as a last resort to prevent discrimination against Russians there. According to
then Foreign Minister Primakov, Moscow could slap economic sanctions on states accused of mistreating
their Russian minorities. Russia has already linked agreement on an accord defining the border between
the two countries to an improvement in the plight of Estonia's Russian-speaking population. Moscow's
offer of security guarantees to the Baltic states, made in early November 1997, was unanimously
declined by all three countries. Moscow is likely to develop less abrasive relations with the Baltic states
at all levels. However, desperate to keep NATO out of the region, Moscow is likely steadily to increase
political pressure on the Baltic states in order to defend ethnic Russians and to pursue its political
interests there.
Refugees
Russia became a party to international refugee treaties when in 1993 it ratified the 1951 Geneva
Convention and the 1967 Protocol to it. Moscow takes an active part in discussions and in drafting
resolutions on refugees and displaced persons. For example, Russia put forward a proposal to the UN
General Assembly for a conference to identify regional solutions as supported by the international
community, which was held in Geneva on 30—31 May 1996. 73 However, because of various pressures
and overcomplicated formalities (often taking about three months to establish refugee status) inside the
Federation, Russia finds it hard to protect the rights of refugees and displaced persons efficiently.
According to a report by the Human Rights Commission advising the President of the Russian
Federation, the number of asylum seekers in Russia from non-CIS countries comes to around 500,000, of
whom some 46,000 have been registered by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The Federal
Migration Service had given refugee status to only 70 of them by January 1997. In the fall of 1997, the
Office of the High Commissioner asked the Moscow authorities to facilitate formalities for about 15,000
refugees. This came after the office of the UN Centre for Refugees in Moscow had been attacked and
occupied by indignant Africans. 74
The position of CIS refugees and internal forced migrants is even more complicated, in spite of the fact
that in September 1993 Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan concluded an agreement on assistance to refugees and forced migrants.
The main obstacle seriously undermining the safeguards that legislation affords to refugees is the
propiska (residence permit) system. In July 1997, Russia's Constitutional Court ruled that regional
governments cannot charge for the right to live on their territory. However, the propiska system, which
the USSR introduced in 1932, is still widely used in the CIS countries. It was formally abolished in
Russia by Yeltsin in June 1993 and replaced by a system of "notifying" the authorities of the place of
residence. The authorities concerned say they are merely protecting the rights of the local community
from influxes of new arrivals who allegedly threaten economic stability (particularly wage levels), cause
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an increase in crime, place too much strain on the infrastructure, etc. According to the Civic Assistance
Committee, a Moscow-based human rights group, 30 provincial governments around Russia (including
Krasnodar and Stavropol provinces, Voronezh and Leningrad regions, and the city of St. Petersburg)
continue to restrict freedom of residence. The tenacity with which many regions stick to the propiska
system suggests that Russia is not ready for the right to freedom of movement that is enshrined in Article
75 of the Constitution. 75
If they are prevented from registering, new arrivals, who are mostly refugees, are often unable to get
access to public schools for their children. It should be recalled that the International Bill of Rights
provides that everyone has a right to education, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights also reiterates that primary education shall be compulsory, even for children of illegal
immigrants. 76 Under Article 12 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, everyone lawfully
within the territory of a state has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence,
and that right can be restricted only in the cases specified in that article. 77 The Constitutional Court was
under the pressure of regional international law as well since Russia joined the Council of Europe and
was strictly obliged to stick to its treaty norms.
About 9 million people have moved within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since 1989,
most of them involuntarily. This plight has had various causes: violations of minority rights; economic,
social, and ecological problems; armed conflicts; virulent nationalism; insecurity, etc. The number of
people displaced by armed conflicts alone in the CIS is over 3.5 million. Major conflicts are concentrated
in the southern regions. One of Russia's most important foreign policy goals is to play a leading role in
mediating such conflicts in order to avoid further unwanted migration.
For example, about 30,000 Ossets (100,000 according to the Ossetian authorities) have moved from
South Ossetia (Georgia) to North Ossetia (Russian Federation). However, under Russian pressure,
regional politicians agreed in 1996 on the need to address the refugee problem.
Russia is playing a key role in the Georgian dispute with its Abkhazia region, whose leaders keep
insisting on equal status with Georgia within a federation or confederation. Abkhaz sources claim that as
many as 320,000, the majority of the 525,000-strong population registered in the 1989 census, now live
in Abkhazia. Over 100,000 people, including ethnic Russians, have left Abkhazia and gone to Russia.
For Russia, the case of Abkhazia is not so much the problem of Russian refugees as a litmus test for its
foreign policy in regard to human rights violations. Georgia hopes that Russia will bring its influence to
bear for Georgia's unity. Russia is trying to expedite the return to their homes of ethnic Georgians who
fled from the region during hostilities. Moscow cannot openly support the Abkhaz move to secede from
Georgia for fear of the precedent this could set for the many other multi-ethnic republics of the former
Soviet Union. 78 However, it engaged in active diplomacy on the question. Under Russian pressure, the
UN Security Council adopted a resolution on 21 July 1992 approving a Russian peacekeeping mission in
Abkhazia. According to media reports, Russian representative Yuli Vorontsov said that otherwise Russia
would oppose US involvement in Haiti. 79 During the G7/G8 meeting in Denver in 1997, Yeltsin called
for an enhanced UN role in the settlement of conflicts, including the Abkhazian war. 80
In the Tajik war, some 700,000 people were displaced, and the country has actually lost its
Russian-speaking population. 81 In June 1997, Tajikistan and its Islamic opposition signed a peace
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accord, with Russia's active diplomatic mediation.
Some 100,000 people were displaced by the conflict in the Trans-Dniester area. The Russian speakers
left Moldova because of a threat of "Romanization" of the mostly Russian population of the region,
notably the introduction of the Moldovan (Romanian) language as the official language in this
Russian-speaking area. The situation in the Trans-Dniester region is basically frozen. It is still uncertain
whether a political compromise can be reached because the separatists aim at preserving the de facto
independence of Trans-Dniester, whereas Moldova is resolutely against recognizing the region as
enjoying statehood. Russia favours a special status for Trans-Dniester within Moldova, but not full
independence for the region. 82
In both its legislation and its practice, Russia sometimes fails to apply a number of basic human rights
recognized by international law. One of them is the prohibition on forced return based on Article 33(1) of
the Refugee Convention. 83 There is also a general prohibition deriving from Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, prohibiting the expulsion of anyone who is in serious danger of being
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Similarly the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) prohibits the
return, expulsion, or extradition of any person to a third state when there is serious reason to believe that
he or she risks being subjected to torture there. For example, there have been cases of the dangerous
extradition of human rights activists to Uzbekistan; the Russian authorities have also turned a blind eye
to the activities of the Uzbek secret services in Russian cities which target refugees from that state.
It is clear that United Nations assistance programmes for the hundreds of thousands of persons displaced
as a result of ethnic conflicts in the "near abroad" are far from adequate. In August 1994 Yeltsin signed a
decree on the major directions of state policy of the Russian Federation regarding compatriots living
abroad. This proclaims that stopping new flights of refugees is one of the highest priorities of Moscow's
foreign policy towards the "near abroad." Russian attempts to promote the idea of dual citizenship and
also Russian as a second state language in the former Soviet republics cause many accusations about
Moscow's imperial ambitions to re-establish control over the post-Soviet space and represent a constant
headache for the Kremlin. 84
 
V. Conclusions
After the Cold War, Russia made a breakthrough in expanding its formal acceptance of the international
law of human rights. The long-term potential of this breakthrough cannot be overestimated. Nevertheless,
Russia's attitude towards specific human rights issues remains controversial. The authoritarian tradition
remains strong, frequently overshadowing liberal trends in its foreign policy. Therefore, Russian foreign
policy on human rights is marked by uncertainty, competition over values, and lack of predictability.
Another major factor in Russia's ambivalent behaviour in international relations is that it has not yet
formulated its foreign policy doctrine and the place of human rights in it. Formally, Russian authorities
are generally supportive of international law and human rights policies. In practice, foreign policy
institutions are highly selective about endorsement and action (for example, in the former Yugoslavia).
Russia is being pressured by the West to take rights seriously in Iraq or Serbia. The open linkage of
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financial assistance to Russia with observance of human rights is an instrument with limited efficiency.
In some rare cases it may work, but more often it appears to be counter-productive. However, the very
existence of Western models and assistance may help support the development of a political culture more
conducive to Russia's more consistent implementation of human rights standards. Human rights
education is especially needed in Russia, a country without a strong tradition of respect for liberal and
legal values.
One cannot say that Russia's foreign policy is generally opposed to human rights. In fact, Russian
political entrepreneurs clearly understand that a drastic change of political course and a rupture with the
West would result in Russia's isolation. Therefore, Moscow does support some human rights issues and
is cautiously trying to find a niche for them in the new system of international relations.
During the early 1990s in the sphere of foreign politics, the Soviet Union/Russia demonstrated unlimited
readiness to cooperate with the West. Moreover, this often involved real sacrifice. The most spectacular
example was the Soviet consent to German unification with no political conditions and with a hasty
withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev made
serious unilateral concessions to the United States and the West. In return he counted strongly on
Western support on issues of importance to Moscow. Russia's cooperativeness cannot be explained
simply by Western pressure and its victory in the Cold War. Much can be explained by the euphoria of
that time and Russia's alleged joining the system of Western political and social values — including
human rights. In a sense, Moscow offered sacrifices as a token of a common future. However, Russia
would also like to make money, pursue a high-profile policy, and be recognized as more than a loser in
the Cold War or a poor cousin of the United States. The West has lacked imagination in dealing with
Russia, and the window of opportunity has almost closed.
An analysis of the key international factors — security issues and failures in international assistance to
Russia — shows that they are not the main sources of the anti-Western shift in Russian foreign policy.
The West could recognize Russian sensitivity to its loss of superpower status and understand that
Russia's second-class treatment threatens Western interests and human rights in Russia. Unfortunately,
Russia is losing its initial incentive concerning human rights issues in foreign policy.
One cannot change political culture overnight. Continuation of the conflicted political culture has yet to
resolve itself in favour of strong and clear support for liberal rights in Russia — at home or abroad.
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Chapter 7: India's human rights diplomacy:




In the first decades after independence, India became an international advocate of human rights.
Opposing European colonialism and apartheid, and later Israeli actions against Palestinians, it was a
leader among non-aligned nations in a quest to end the state-enforced social inequality that had
characterized the world order in the preceding centuries. India engaged in assertive diplomacy, criticizing
states well beyond the reach of its limited material power. It twice intervened militarily outside its
borders, invoking human rights: opposing the government in East Pakistan in 1971 and aligning with the
government in Sri Lanka in 1987. Before the end of the Cold War, external human rights pressure on
India was low, in spite of events that might easily have occasioned such pressure. For example, there
were anti-Sikh riots in Delhi after the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984, with the clear involvement
of politicians in the ruling Congress Party, yet India faced little criticism about this from other states.
India's foreign policy environment changed abruptly in 1991. The disappearance of the USSR was
accompanied by a multifaceted domestic crisis in India. The USSR had been India's primary arms
supplier and its rivalry with the West had created the possibility of non-alignment for post-colonial
states. India went from being a non-aligned country with room for manoeuvre in a bipolar world to being
a vulnerable state in a unipolar world. The US performance in the Gulf War demonstrated its
overwhelming military supremacy, and the continuing deadly sanctions on Iraq after the war were a
powerful demonstration of unipolar discipline.
The period after 1989 witnessed a profound transformation in India's human rights diplomacy, which
switched from an assertive to a defensive mode. The new world order brought in its train an invigorated
but highly inconsistent international human rights regime dominated by Western states and by influential
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) rooted entirely or mainly in the West. India and other
developing countries struggled to preserve their sovereignty in the face of the changed regime. The early
1990s saw the peak of secessionist insurgencies in the history of independent India, and police and
security forces committed human rights violations while combating insurgents. The government faced
the dilemma that punishing members of the security forces severely or openly was expected to harm their
collective morale. India entered a severe economic crisis in the early 1990s, which also brought home an
awareness of how far India had fallen behind its Asian neighbours in economic development. The
conjunction of international and domestic circumstances led the Indian government to the conclusion that
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the diplomatic activism of the past was no longer wise and India needed to put its own house in order
before giving advice to others.
Although retreating from assertive diplomacy, India became aggressive in the preservation of its
sovereignty, in both substance and appearance. Sovereignty was understood as a necessary condition of
democracy. The structural changes in India during the 1990s did serve to reconstruct internal unity
sufficiently to preserve effective sovereignty. Delhi mounted an energetic diplomatic campaign to rebut
some of the accusations and to persuade several sections of the international community that it had no
deliberate campaign to violate human rights, and that the excesses of its forces were being mitigated
through administrative discipline. In the defensive mode, India's domestic policies and politics became
more directly linked to its diplomatic posture. As the Indian polity stabilized, human rights violations
began to decline and India began to enjoy a modicum of success in its campaign of defensive human
rights diplomacy.
India's human rights diplomacy in all periods has been based on a moral consensus of fluctuating strength
within the polity. Through most of the post-independence period the vast majority of people and parties
have agreed on certain broad values, in particular upon the desirability of democracy within India 1 and
opposition to colonialism and racism abroad. The point of Indian human rights diplomacy has been to
promote, at least rhetorically, selected values in that moral consensus, and to prevent foreign initiatives in
India that would undermine its sovereignty and the effective supremacy of those values. In the early
1990s the strength of the moral consensus in the Indian polity reached a nadir. Centrally, the value of
secularism came under effective assault as Hindu nationalists broadened their popular support using
anti-Muslim appeals and as secessionist movements grew. This contraction of the moral consensus
diminished the credibility, even in the domestic scene, of assertive human rights diplomacy. As the 1990s
progressed, a moral and constitutional consensus was restored. The challenge to secularism was
politically marginalized by the tide of lower-caste political mobilization and upper-caste acquiescence,
and by the moderation of Hindu nationalism. A period of political leadership free from charisma enabled
the judiciary and other non-political institutions to establish unprecedented programmes of action against
various forms of illegality and corruption, with wide popular acclaim. The restored moral consensus
strengthened domestic confidence in India's institutions and in its defensive human rights diplomacy.
There have been limits to the moral consensus, even within the state apparatus. The inability of the
political leadership to discipline the security forces reflects the limitations in its own credibility. All
major political parties have agreed that the security forces should respect human rights in their
operations. Yet widespread corruption as well as divisive politics has diminished the capacity of political
leaders convincingly to represent a national moral consensus in commanding the security forces. The
result is an enfeebled administration that must rely exclusively on bureaucratic means and face a
stringent tradeoff between morale and discipline in the forces. This condition in turn generated a stream
of human rights violations, especially in the first half of the 1990s, and forced Indian human rights
diplomacy on to the defensive.
Indian foreign policy on human rights
A state's human rights diplomacy may be assertive or defensive. Assertive diplomacy will use a variety
of means to influence global human rights practices, agreements, and institutions. It will accuse other
states of violating human rights and pursue those accusations in international institutions or in its direct
relations with the accused and other states. Assertive human rights diplomacy often entails the
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implication that the assertive state has superior knowledge and practice of human rights compared with
accused states. In recent decades, the United States and other Western states have conducted assertive
human rights diplomacy with such broad claims implicit or explicit. Pakistan, in spite of many domestic
and international problems, has conducted assertive human rights diplomacy against India regarding
Kashmir. Defensive human rights diplomacy opposes other states' assertive diplomacy. It usually
proclaims state sovereignty and the adequacy of the state's human rights performance under existing local
conditions and global agreements. It denies the legitimacy of intrusions by international human rights
institutions and foreign NGOs. Defensive diplomacy criticizes other states primarily to question their
standing to conduct assertive diplomacy. China's human rights diplomacy, especially after the Tiananmen
Square incident in 1989, has been defensive. The United States has pursued defensive diplomacy
regarding Israel's actions in its occupied territories.
Defensive human rights diplomacy may be the defence of democracy and sovereignty against imperialist
or aggressive stratagems disguised as human rights concern. Or it may be the use of the state's power and
international institutions of sovereignty to protect a programme of human rights violations. Assertive
human rights diplomacy, similarly, can range from being what it claims to be to being imperialism or
aggression in disguise. One must independently judge the truth of the claims of the instances of human
rights diplomacy.
In the Indian case, the post-Cold War period has witnessed very little in the way of assertive human
rights diplomacy. Indian rhetoric about human rights violations in Pakistan has been more muted than
that of Western human rights organizations. During the Cold War, India had criticized actions resulting
in civilian deaths in the course of Western interventions in the third world. Indian rhetoric about civilian
deaths during the 1991 Gulf War and deaths due to the embargo on Iraq was quite muted, couching its
concerns as humanitarian, not invoking human rights. Both the government and non-governmental
observers in India displayed limited sympathy for Western governmental, media, and NGO criticisms of
other states. Most Indian observers did not consider Western criticism of India to be balanced, and
concluded that Western criticism of many other developing states was equally unbalanced. In addition to
disengaging from Western assertive diplomacy against other states, Delhi was not eager to strengthen the
institutions of international human rights, expecting them to retain structures of adjudication
disproportionately influenced by the West.
India and China arrived at an understanding to undertake joint defensive diplomacy on human rights,
each remaining silent about the other's human rights violations. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square
incident in June 1989, statements from Delhi avoided the suggestion that the Chinese government had
violated human rights. That period was one of improving India—China relations. There was a series of
meetings between Indian and Chinese officials in subsequent months, and Indian official statements
avoided any comment on the incident. 2 China in turn came to India's aid at a crucial vote on a Pakistani
resolution about Kashmir in 1994 at the UN Human Rights Commission.
Indian human rights diplomacy in the post-Cold War period has been primarily defensive. It has
consisted of rebutting charges against India in international forums, making common cause with some
developing countries, using its economic reforms to seek favour with wealthy nations, and, to a degree,
getting better at fighting insurgencies without killing civilians. Although the Indian political
establishment considered many specific human rights accusations by Western sources to be politically
biased, its members were deeply embarrassed by them, and acknowledged that Indian security forces
were committing real human rights violations. The several facets of the predominant Indian attitude on
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these matters were well summarized by Atal Behari Vajpayee, a leader of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), after he led an Indian delegation that successfully blocked Pakistani assertive
diplomacy at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 1994: "For a great nation like us, there
was a certain humiliation involved in having to go around begging for votes on a human rights issue. Let
us now use this reprieve to clean up our act in Kashmir or there will be a Geneva every few months." 3
India has faced numerous armed challenges from groups that are extremely small in relation to the whole
of the country. Active militants in Punjab never numbered more than about 10,000. In Kashmir, militants
have never exceeded 12,000, while the Indian security forces have numbered over 400,000. Secessionist
insurgents have pinned their hopes in part on the prospects of support from other states. Pakistan has
supplied these groups with arms and training, and in Kashmir has sent Pakistani, Afghan, and other
nationals in to fight with local insurgents. However, Pakistan is widely recognized by militant groups as
being an insufficiently powerful ally. A long-term goal has been to gain US and Western support. It is
significant that when Indira Gandhi's Sikh bodyguards assassinated her in 1984, a group of pro-separatist
Sikh immigrants in New York danced in front of the Indian UN mission waving American flags.
Pro-separatist Sikh and Kashmiri immigrant groups in the United States have energetically lobbied
members of Congress. Accusations of human rights violations have been at the heart of the lobbying
rhetoric. Groups aligned with the insurgent movements have played a key role in generating human
rights accusations against the Indian state. These accusations are part of the global political strategy of
the insurgents. They understand the West to dominate the international adjudication of human rights
accusations. Their hope has been to mobilize the centres of world power in their favour to the extent they
can in an otherwise unequal struggle.
The Indian state and much of society have viewed Western and Islamic accusations of human rights
violations in the context of the international strategies of the militant organizations and Pakistan. Indians,
inside and outside the government, have viewed international organizations, human rights NGOs, and
foreign governments less as sincere adjudicators of human rights accusations than as objects of political
struggle and as politically motivated actors.
Although India's economic globalization and liberalization were undertaken for mainly economic
reasons, the benefits in terms of defensive human rights diplomacy were well recognized. Further,
throughout the 1990s there was a sustained government effort to reduce the number of actual human
rights violations, especially in Kashmir, again mainly for domestic reasons, but with its international
reputation being in second place among the expected benefits.
India's efforts to improve the international reputation of its domestic human rights performance did enjoy
some success. The US State Department's annual human rights report in 1996, although critical of India
on many issues, said of civilian deaths in Kashmir:
Civilian deaths caused by security forces diminished for the third consecutive year in Kashmir. The
explanation appears to lie in press scrutiny and public outcry over abuses in previous years, increased
training of military and paramilitary forces in humanitarian law, and greater sensitivity of commanders to
rule of law issues. The improvement has taken the form of increased discipline and care in avoiding
collateral civilian injuries and deaths (i.e., deaths in crossfire). 4
The international context of Indian human rights diplomacy
James Ron observes that in the period 1982–1994 the frequency of use of the phrase "human rights"
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increased six-fold in Reuters World Service news reports, seven-fold in British Broadcasting Corporation
reports, eleven-fold in the Xinhua General Overseas News Service, and four-fold in stories in the Current
Digest of the Soviet Press. 5 This clearly reflects its increasing frequency of use in overall international
and national discourses as well as a growing sensitivity of the international media to the phrase. All this
does not necessarily mean that states, weak or powerful, are more willing now to make sacrifices to
avoid violating the unconditional prohibitions of the doctrine of human rights in their conduct at home
and abroad. Nor does it mean that the international discourse on human rights is gaining in honesty and
consistency.
The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights without a negative vote by the United
Nations General Assembly in 1948 brought into being a qualitatively new international regime of human
rights. 6 It is useful to define the term "international regime" broadly. The regime as a whole includes a
complex of formal international agreements and institutions, a culture of diplomatic practice, as well as a
global array of NGOs advocating human rights. The reason for calling these various elements a single
international regime is that they closely affect each other. In particular, the NGOs can promote a climate
of opinion that influences diplomacy on certain issues, as well as the functioning of international human
rights institutions. For example, Human Rights Watch regularly testifies before the US Congress.
The ending of the Cold War, in transforming international politics as a whole, suddenly transformed the
politics of the international human rights regime. During the Cold War the regime had elaborately
defined norms and standards but weak enforcement. 7 After 1989 it became a regime with elaborate
norms and stronger yet selective enforcement, and with asymmetrical informal roles for different states
and NGOs within the emerging monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. The international human rights
regime is a political structure, and its participants have unequal power and conflicting objectives.
India's human rights diplomacy in the post-Cold War era has been both constrained and enabled by the
politics of the international regime on human rights. The impact of the regime has been multifaceted.
There is a widespread perception in India that the international institutions, diplomacy, and rhetoric of
human rights are biased according to the larger inequalities of power and wealth in the world. Indeed,
many Indian observers have expressed the suspicion that Western governmental and non-governmental
human rights accusations against India are part of a strategy of Western power maintenance. At the same
time, most Indian observers perceive the institutions and practices of the regime at least partially as
reflecting values that India holds and cannot ignore in its domestic or foreign actions. All actors, state
and non-state, who have impinged on Indian human rights diplomacy have also perceived a formal and
informal regime of human rights in the world and have acted on that basis.
An assessment of the performance of the post-Cold War international human rights regime must
acknowledge some major failures and some successes. At present, the regime is best judged not only by
its limited ability to prevent or stop human rights violations, but also by the consistency and
even-handedness with which it criticizes and punishes them. It is clear that many genuine human rights
violations have been criticized and sanctioned by states and international human rights institutions in the
post-Cold War era. Violations in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Rwanda are such cases. In Haiti, the
United States took action in 1994 with the support of the UN Security Council to remove a regime that
was violating human rights from power. Yet there have also been massive failures of the international
human rights regime since the end of the Cold War.
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The UN sanctions against Iraq after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 have caused the largest number
of civilian deaths of any coercive programme in the 1990s and constitute a massive human rights
violation. The sanctions prevented the purchase of food and medicines by Iraq, until they were relaxed
slightly in 1997. Deteriorating nutritional and health conditions in the nation of 17 million have led to
sharply higher death rates. The mortality rate for children under 5 in Iraq has risen six-fold since
1989/90. 8 Two scientists from the United Nations' Food and Agriculture Organization estimated in 1995
that 567,000 children had died as a result of the sanctions. 9 Adult deaths owing to the sanctions also
number in the hundreds of thousands. The sanctions against Iraq have been the most effective and
indiscriminate of the post-colonial period. The UN sanctions resolution against Serbia and Montenegro in
1992 was worded similarly to the resolutions against Iraq, but those sanctions were expected to be and
were far less effective. 10 Thus the sanctions against Serbia did not have a comparable human impact.
The sanctions against Iraq did not merely prevent weapons or industrial imports. Initially the sanctions
explicitly prohibited imports of food and medicine, and later just prohibited exports, achieving similar
results. 11 The United Nations Security Council is the legal agent of the sanctions, but the United States,
and to an extent the United Kingdom, are the principal political agents. The United States used its
political power to maintain the sanctions even as other states have sought to loosen them. The United
States viewed the sanctions as a lever to force the Iraqi people to overthrow Saddam Hussein. President
Bush said to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1991 that the sanctions should remain
in place until Saddam Hussein was out of power. 12
The principal moral debate about the sanctions against Iraq has been not about the number of deaths in
Iraq, but over responsibility for them. The United States has advanced the argument that the Iraqi
government is responsible for the deaths because, had it agreed to the conditions set by the United
Nations, or had Saddam Hussein left office, the sanctions would have been eased or lifted. The logic of
human rights, as advocated by the United States itself, is that certain actions are forbidden regardless of
the behaviour of others. The US position is tantamount to asserting that there are no unconditional human
rights constraints on economic sanctions.
The international community has had very little to say about the human rights implications of the
sanctions against Iraq. The Security Council votes on sanctions have usually been unanimous, with no
state prepared to challenge US power. India joined the rest of the international community in its
diplomatic silence on the human rights aspects of the sanctions, voicing only "humanitarian" concerns
about the impact on the Iraqi people. The gap between proclaimed values and performance has been even
greater for leading Western human rights organizations. Amnesty International's 1995 annual report, for
example, has only two sentences on the topic of the sanctions against Iraq, neither of which suggests that
there are any human rights constraints on the imposition of economic sanctions. 13 Human Rights Watch
has been equally silent on the issue. Physicians for Human Rights issued a strong and detailed criticism
of the sanctions on Iraq in 1991, but fell silent afterwards. 14 The absence of human rights pressure on
the United States on this issue has been all the more tragic because the interests the United States pursued
through the sanctions in their severe form were of secondary priority. Over the years it became clear that
the sanctions were not effective in forcing a popular rebellion in Iraq, yet the United States felt no need
to take further action to that end. More carefully focused sanctions could have prevented the rearmament
of Iraq while sparing the lives of over 1 million people.
The case of the sanctions against Iraq reveals a power structure and a resulting bias in the international
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human rights regime in the post-Cold War era. Because the sanctions were promoted by the dominant
power of the era — the United States — other states chose to maintain a discreet silence. Western human
rights organizations have largely excluded the topic of civilian deaths in Iraq resulting from sanctions
from their reports. The regime has instead focused on accusing weaker states. Biases in the international
human rights regime were keenly recognized within India, and its credibility suffered accordingly.
 
II. Historical origins
Human rights concerns were central to the Indian independence movement. Above all, the movement
abhorred the systematic racial discrimination the British empire embodied. The independence movement
also promoted social reform within India. Of greatest concern was the elimination of caste discrimination
and avoidance of religious bigotry. The adoption of the Constitution in 1951 gave a legal basis to the
quest for social reform. Universal suffrage was implemented in India at a time when European imperial
states continued to disenfranchise their colonized peoples and the United States disenfranchised most
African-Americans.
Indian human rights judgements have been based on a set of traditions and concerns rooted in Indian
history. The independence movement, and the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, recovered from the long
philosophical and religious debate of Indian history a political ideology that transcended the opposition
of a modern West and a traditional India that the British empire had circulated.
Mahatma Gandhi received his professional training as a lawyer in London. He returned to India from
South Africa as one who believed in the ideals of civil liberty in the rhetoric of the British empire. The
1919 massacre in Amritsar of unarmed and peaceful Indian demonstrators by troops of the colonial army
was a turning point in Gandhi's attitude toward the British. The light punishment of General Dyer, the
British commander on the scene, and the indifference of the British public convinced Gandhi and many
Indians that the British rhetoric about the ideals of civil liberty was insincere.
In Gandhi's conception, freedom was indivisible. Freedom from colonialism was morally inseparable
from the elimination of untouchability and other "social evils." At the 1926 meeting of the Indian
National Congress, Gandhi debated with a party colleague about the link between self-rule and
untouchability. Srinivasa Aiyengar said: "Neither foreign nor domestic critics are right when they assert
that untouchability is a formidable obstacle for Swaraj (self-rule). We cannot wait for Swaraj till it is
removed anymore than we can wait till caste is abolished." 15 Gandhi responded that, although the
existence of untouchability was not a valid excuse for Britain to resist the move toward independence,
Real organic Swaraj is a different question. That freedom which is associated in the popular mind with
the term Swaraj is no doubt unattainable without not only the removal of untouchability and the
promotion of heart unity between different sections but also without removing many other social evils
which can easily be named. That inward growth which must never stop we have come to understand by
the comprehensive term Swaraj. 16
In 1928, in an impassioned argument against untouchability, Gandhi compressed his understanding of
freedom into a metaphor: "No man takes another into a pit without descending into it himself and sinning
in the bargain." 17
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The Gandhian conception of Swaraj was different in its logic from the Western conception of human
rights over the course of its evolution since the seventeenth century. It was based on prevailing Indian
assumptions about the nature of persons. Conceptions such as "heart unity" and "inward growth" were
more rooted in the Indian philosophical tradition. The Gandhian prescriptions were directed at society
and not the state. As Donnelly correctly notes, what is distinctive about the Western conception of human
rights is that is formulated as rights against the state. 18 Western liberal ideas arose as a philosophy for
the regulation of bureaucratic states in the metropoles and colonies of empires. Comparable state
development or state-focused discourse outside the West was precluded until the late colonial and
post-colonial period because bureaucratic states developed in the West during the colonial era. Gandhi's
conception of organic Swaraj, not divisible between the national and interpersonal levels, stands in sharp
contrast to imperialist and racist ideas and practices prominent within Western liberalism around 1926.
The Gandhian discourse of Swaraj was the leading edge of a profound transformation of social thought
over the course of the independence movement and, more effectively than Nehruvian socialist rhetoric,
provided the ideological underpinning of a democratic state in a society with deep inegalitarian
traditions.
India's moral reasoning about international human rights is guided by a model of political evil that has
been profoundly shaped by two experiences and by the prevalent constructions of those experiences in
Indian political discourse. The two experiences are the British Indian empire of 1757–1947 and the
separation of Pakistan at the end of the colonial period. 19
British colonialism transformed India from one of the world's wealthiest societies to one of the poorest,
entailing a series of massive unprecedented famines. The first major famine of the British period was in
colonial Bengal in the early 1770s, in which 30—40 per cent of the population of Bengal died. 20 It was
the first major famine in Bengal in 150 years. 21 In the nineteenth century, there were at least 20 million
famine deaths in the British Indian empire. The last major famine in India was in 1942–1943, again in
Bengal, and it cost 2—3 million lives. British actions during this famine, such as refusing to allow food
shipments into Bengal from other parts of India, continuing wartime food procurement from Bengal, and
destroying parts of the food transportation system ostensibly to deny its use to would-be Japanese
invaders, clearly exacerbated the famine.22 22
The British empire also exacerbated, by deliberate action or by precluding or delaying corrective action,
a host of social evils. There was a resurgence of sati (widow immolation) mainly in and around Calcutta
in the 1790s after centuries of relative infrequency throughout India. 23 The British empire initially gave
sati legal sanction and did not ban it until 1829. The British presided over an intensification of caste
discrimination during the first century of their empire. C. A. Bayly writes: "hierarchy and Brahmin
interpretation of Hindu society which was theoretical rather than actual over much of India as late as
1750 was firmly ensconsed a century later." 24 The British colonial authorities, under the leadership of
Warren Hastings, began to enforce the Laws of Manu, a severely hierarchical ancient code, in 1794. The
British also took other steps in this period to give legal sanction to caste hierarchy. Finally, there is a
record stretching back to the mid-nineteenth century of high-level British statements about the advantage
to the empire of Hindu—Muslim disunity, and a record of actions to match. 25 The colonial experience, a
combination of immiseration, political manipulation, and racism, deeply shaped the Indian understanding
of political evil in the twentieth century.
Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy: Chapter 7
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/forsythe/chapter07.html (8 of 22) [8/11/2002 10:08:47 PM]
The rhetoric of the Pakistan movement and the violent partition was the second experience that shaped
the Indian understanding of political evil. The conflict between the Indian National Congress and the
Muslim League in the decades before independence in 1947, and then between India and Pakistan, was
between an ideology of unity in diversity and one of Muslim nationalism. The Indian conception of
secularism took form in opposition to the ideology of the Pakistan movement in the decade before
independence. The Congress spoke of Hindus and Muslims as having a common Indian identity,
common obligations and social bonds, and equal rights. The League spoke of Hindus and Muslims as
two separate nations with no valued social bonds. For the League, the morality linking the two states was
to be international in form; their obligation was to recognize their separation and for each nation to treat
the other fairly and to respect minority rights. On the subcontinent, tens of millions of Hindus and
Muslims lived in areas where they were intermixed. When partition came, millions found themselves on
the "wrong" side. The process of separation just prior to independence turned violent and cost half a
million lives. The Indian secular view has been that there is a contradiction between proclaiming a
religious basis for nationhood and equal rights for religious minorities. A person officially defined as of a
secondary religion could not be consistently treated with equality by the state.
The newly independent state became a strong voice in world affairs for human rights concerns generated
by the model of political evil described above. India was a prominent and consistent supporter of
independence movements in the remaining colonies. It denounced the atrocities of European imperialists
in their colonial wars. India was the first state to denounce apartheid in South Africa as a violation of
human rights. India's criticism of Zionism was based on analogies to the Indian experience of both
colonialism and religious nationalism. India also criticized the bombing campaign by the United States in
the Vietnam War for causing civilian casualties. India's major military intervention in the name of human
rights was in the war in 1971 to aid the secession of Bangladesh after the Pakistani Army had killed, by
conservative estimates, 1 million civilians there and 10 million refugees had walked to India.
The focus on eliminating colonialism and neocolonialism and on opposing religious nationalism made
independent India less sensitive to the new structures of human rights violations that emerged in the
twentieth century. Dictatorial states where oppression was not based on ethnic inequality did not fit the
Indian model of evil. Indians were relatively uncritical of human rights violations in and by the Soviet
bloc. One reason was that the Soviet bloc buttressed India's political autonomy by serving as a
counterweight to Western power, but another was the misfit between the bloc's mode of human rights
violations and the Indian model of political evil.
 
III. Domestic factors
India's human rights diplomacy after 1989 has been profoundly shaped by structural transformation that
has taken place within India in this period. There was an unprecedented crisis with economic, political,
and social facets in 1991 and a new order afterwards. The year 1990 ended with the collapse of a
coalition government of anti-Congress parties that had included both the BJP and secular parties. India
nearly ran out of foreign exchange in the first half of 1991. Economic growth in the year ending in March
1992 was 1 per cent, after 15 years of growth averaging 5 per cent. In May, Rajiv Gandhi was
assassinated, ending the dynastic leadership of the Nehru family. At that point it became difficult to
envision effective national leadership on the basis of historical experience.
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The secular ethos that had governed Indian politics since independence was gravely weakened in 1991.
The BJP and its allies had chosen to claim that a sixteenth-century mosque in the Hindu holy city of
Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh was built on an important temple, although archaeological evidence strongly
suggests otherwise. This campaign triggered a wave of Hindu—Muslim violence in many parts of India.
The polarization between Hindus and Muslims worked to the advantage of the BJP. India's communal
crisis peaked in the period December 1992 to March 1993. In December, a mob assembled by BJP
leaders destroyed the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, with the acquiescence of the BJP state government in
Uttar Pradesh. That triggered a wave of Hindu—Muslim violence. The central government dismissed all
four BJP state governments on the day after the mosque demolition. The presence of such moral
contradiction and uncertainty within the Indian polity further disabled it from conducting assertive
human rights diplomacy. Instead, India had to defend itself against human rights criticism from Muslim
and Western sources.
The early 1990s witnessed the greatest level of separatist insurgency of any period since independence,
attracting the support of up to 5 per cent of the Indian population. An insurgency in Punjab, seeking an
independent Sikh state to be called Khalistan, peaked in 1991. The Kashmir insurgency, which began in
late 1989, gained momentum in 1991. There was also a significant insurgency in Assam, in the
north-east. Although the insurgents had little chance of seceding, the combination of terrorist actions
against local minorities loyal to India and strong support for insurgents from a majority or large minority
of their co-ethnics created conditions ripe for human rights violations by ill-disciplined security forces.
The 1990s also witnessed some important social trends with human rights implications. The 1991 census
recorded an Indian literacy rate of 52 per cent, far below that in East and South-East Asian countries that
had had levels close to India's decades earlier, but above the majority point for the first time. The
women's literacy rate was only 39 per cent. In the 1990s a large literacy movement by the government
and NGOs made over 66 million people literate, about two-thirds of them women. By 1997, the Indian
literacy rate had reached 60 per cent. 26 The 1991 census also recorded a decline in the ratio of women to
men since 1981, down to 927 to 1000. This reflected profound discrimination against girls and women
within families and within society. Income distribution in India remained one of the more egalitarian in
the world, with the richest fifth of households earning 4.7 times the income of the poorest fifth. 27
The conjuncture of the early 1990s precluded assertive human rights diplomacy and made India
vulnerable to human rights criticisms in a variety of ways. The deterioration in the sex ratio as well as
continuing dowry murders, sex-selection abortions, and other discriminatory practices against females
drew national and global attention to the severity of discrimination against girls and women in India.
There was also an upsurge in actions by the security forces and mobs that violated human rights. In the
politics of the period, the erosion of the moral consensus, especially on the question of secularism, made
coherent moral judgement by the polity difficult and undermined both assertive and defensive human
rights diplomacy. There was also a political polarization of society that led dissatisfied minorities, and
their kin living abroad, to appeal to Western states and human rights organizations for support. And
finally, India's heightened economic weakness reduced the cost of accusatory human rights diplomacy
toward India.
The Indian state reacted to the crisis of 1991 primarily by a series of reforms, some planned from above,
others initiated by middle levels of the state. The period also witnessed the renegotiation of a moral
consensus through the workings of the democratic system. Economic liberalization brought an end to the
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foreign exchange crisis within a few months. The crisis and the reforms intensified poverty in the first
year, but that was reversed in later years. After the reforms began, economic growth accelerated,
averaging 7 per cent per annum during the three years before March 1997. One effect of the reforms was
that India became a far more attractive investment destination and export market than it was before,
though still far behind its neighbours in East and South-East Asia. The economic attraction of India
proved to be a lever by which it could limit Western human rights accusations and defend its sovereignty.
Politics were also profoundly restructured in the 1990s, leading to new patterns of empowerment and
participation. That restructuring has enabled a restoration of moral consensus on basic political questions.
The break in the rule of the Nehru—Gandhi dynasty in 1991 brought in its train four critical trends with
implications for human rights and human rights diplomacy.
The first important trend is a substantial growth in parties based on middle and lower castes, leading to
the empowerment of these castes in relation to the upper castes. Previously, most leaders of established
parties, especially in northern states, came from the upper castes, and they sought support from the rest of
society. In the 1990s, parties led by middle and lower castes scored crucial victories. The most critical
instance was the 1993 state elections in Uttar Pradesh, the largest state. The BJP, in the aftermath of the
demolition of the sixteenth-century mosque in Ayodhya, was riding a wave of militant Hindu nationalism
in the state, but in 1993 it was defeated by a coalition of middle- and lower-caste parties. Subsequently,
the BJP gave support during two brief periods to governments in Uttar Pradesh of the Bahujan Samaj
Party (BSP), led and supported mainly by Dalits (ex-untouchables). The BSP used its brief stints in
power in Uttar Pradesh to make substantial and lasting changes in the state administrative personnel, land
reforms, and the development of villages with large Dalit populations. The empowerment of the lower
castes has substantially reduced the social inequalities among castes.
The second trend is that militant Hindu nationalism, which had surged in the late 1980s and peaked with
the destruction of the mosque in Ayodhya in 1992, has subsided. The defeat of the BJP in the Uttar
Pradesh state elections in 1993 marked the turning point. Since then, the BJP and other Hindu
nationalists have moderated their stance toward Muslims. They have ceased their emotional campaigns
relating to contested places of worship and otherwise toned down their rhetoric in relation to Muslims.
Popular support for the BJP has increased since 1993, but within the framework of its moderation. This
has greatly reduced the scale of Hindu—Muslim violence. It has also restored a broad moral consensus
among parties, and has thus strengthened defensive human rights diplomacy. An example of this effect is
that it was the moderate BJP leader Vajpayee who headed the successful Indian delegation at the UN
Human Rights Commission meeting in 1994, at the invitation of the rival Congress government.
The third important trend is that the non-political institutions have gained strength in relation to
politicians and parties. This trend began with the aggressive approach taken by the Chief Election
Commissioner T. N. Seshan from 1994 in enforcing election laws. He succeeded in reducing the scale of
illegal spending by candidates and reducing other election abuses. That was followed by stronger action
by the judiciary against political corruption. The enhanced independence and credibility of the Election
Commission played a key role in giving some international credibility to the elections held in Kashmir in
1996.
The National Human Rights Commission was established in 1993 as a quasi-judicial body to investigate
human rights violations. It was widely reported that this action was taken in response to international
human rights criticism of India. Foreign governments and NGOs have responded positively to the
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establishment of the commission. 28 Although the commission has acted vigorously within its
capabilities, it is fundamentally a supplement to the established legal system.
The fourth trend is the abatement of the Kashmir insurgency. The single most important issue in Indian
defensive human rights diplomacy has been the insurgency and counter-insurgency in Kashmir that
began in 1989. The Kashmir insurgency grew steadily until it began to lose popular support in the
mid-1990s. India sent in 400,000 troops and the insurgents failed to deliver a quick victory. Pakistan's
credibility as a power that could and would give adequate aid to the insurgency waned. The attraction of
joining Pakistan declined as conditions deteriorated there. Pakistan's favouritism toward the pro-Pakistan
insurgency over the pro-independence insurgency was unpopular. As the number of Kashmiri volunteers
waned, Pakistan began to send Afghan and Pakistani militants into Kashmir. 29 They proved unpopular
among Kashmiri Muslims. By the mid-1990s, Indian security forces succeeded in pushing the militants
out of most urban areas in Kashmir, and this reduced the number of instances of troops killing civilians.
In the Kashmir state election of September 1996, voter turnout was 55 per cent even though leading
separatist politicians campaigned door-to-door calling for an election boycott. 30 Several previous
election attempts announced by the Indian government had to be aborted owing to popular hostility and
the insurgency. The successful holding of elections reflects a changed political balance in Kashmir.
Moreover, voter turnout in the September 1996 elections can be taken as an accurate reflection of public
sentiment in Kashmir. There were reports by Indian and Western journalists in Kashmir that in the July
1996 national elections voters were forced to the polls in Kashmir. There were few such allegations in
the Indian or Western media about the September 1996 state elections in Kashmir. In the case of the July
elections, no reporter in Kashmir claimed actually to have witnessed any voter being led to polls at
gunpoint; rather, several journalists reported such claims by some people. There is some evidence of
more subtle pressure to vote by security forces in the July 1996 elections. However, there were no reports
of the security forces taking action against any of the majority of Kashmiris who did not vote in those
elections. In both elections the voting lines were long and voters had to wait for hours. Kashmiri
Muslims have a long record of public demonstrations, they had safety in numbers on voting days, and
there was a large international media presence during voting. Given these conditions, it stands to reason
that, had a significant proportion of voters been coerced, there would have been large protest
demonstrations on voting days. There were not.
The stabilization after the early 1990s restored a moral consensus in the polity. The moderation of the
BJP and the mobilization of the lower castes resurrected Indian secularism. The embracing of economic
liberalization by the United Front government established a broad agreement about the need for a
capitalist developmentalist state, although that consensus remains far from mature. Rival political parties
agree on the need to fight corruption actively and to let the non-political state institutions function far
more autonomously than before. There is a continuing consensus on the need to avoid "a second
partition" of India through the secession of any region. This consensus set the agenda for India's
defensive human rights diplomacy.
Yet this restored consensus carries its own contradictions. Although the mobilization of the lower castes
has deepened democratic participation and increased equality in the public sphere, caste and other
divisions in society continue. Relations between different castes and religions, and between political
parties rooted in these groupings, remain filled with mistrust and manoeuvring. Marriages across
traditional lines remain rare. In these circumstances, the moral consensus is restricted.
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IV. Multilateral policies
Diplomacy in international institutions
India's human rights objectives within international institutions can be understood from some aspects of
its rhetoric in those forums. Indian delegates to the UN General Assembly and UN Human Rights
Commission have repeated certain themes during the 1990s. They have maintained that, in spite of
differences in civilizations and culture, universal norms of human rights are desirable. Salman Khurshid,
then Minister of State for External Affairs, said in 1996 to the Human Rights Commission that newly
independent countries were among the first to give unconditional approval to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights because of their expectation that the comity of nations was finally proceeding to realize
a common vision of a world based on the sovereign equality of nations, where the same rights would be
recognized and the same liberties defended in all parts of the world, despite differences of language,
tradition, culture, and civilization. Khurshid added that "the course of human history has been marked by
the search in different civilizations for ways of expressing and protecting the human dignity of every
individual." 31 India did not intend to assert that cultural differences form the basis of different human
rights across countries.
Indian delegates have consistently criticized Western diplomacy in international human rights institutions
in the 1990s. Salman Khurshid continued in the speech cited above:
Today, we are concerned that the spirit of consensus and cooperation that had marked the adoption of the
Vienna Declaration [of the World Conference on Human Rights of the UN General Assembly in 1993] is
being steadily eroded through the politicization of the human rights agenda (and) the selective targeting
of certain countries. Attempts to make human rights issues a matter of North—South or bilateral
confrontation are an anti-thesis to what we had agreed a few short years ago. The politics of power in
order to establish dominance and legally suspect theories of the right of intervention on humanitarian
grounds unfortunately appear to have become popular with some countries.
Here Khurshid expressed perceptions central to India's defensive human rights diplomacy. Opposition to
the unfair and intrusive use of the international human rights regime by Western countries has been
conceived as a key Indian objective.
Indian delegates have proclaimed that intolerance and terrorism are both violations of human rights and
have urged international human rights institutions to tackle the problem in a manner more sensitive to
Indian concerns. For example, M. A. Baby, a Member of Parliament, criticized the responses of
developed countries to terrorism in a speech in 1997 to the UN General Assembly:
We are however, dismayed, that despite a growing international consensus against the menace of
terrorism and in favour of the need for collective action to combat it, not enough is being done to counter
it. There is justifiable outrage against terrorist incidents when they occur closer to home. But when it
happens elsewhere, even in other democracies in the developing world, the victims become pawns in a
larger game of neutrality and causes, hostages of indifference, or an unwillingness to comprehend the
occurrence of the same phenomena elsewhere. 32
Baby expressed India's frustration that militancy directed at India did not evoke a similar response from
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Western countries as militancy directed at them, and sought more intense expressions of outrage in such
circumstances.
Indian delegates have emphasized the right to development as an important right and have criticized its
neglect by human rights institutions. M. A. Baby, in the speech cited above, alluding to colonialism and
the need to rectify its damage, said that "developing countries see the right to development as the
broadest conception of human rights, one that incorporates the notions of history and telos, of the
deprivations of time past, redress in the present, and the promise of the future." Baby lamented the
marginalization of the right to development: "while the ICCPR [International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights] and the ICESCR [International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights],
and even their Optional Protocols, are seen as comprising an international bill of rights, the Declaration
on the Right to Development is not." He proceeds to argue that "the right to development, like the ICCPR
and the ICESCR, derives from concepts and values inherent in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights." The critical point in the right to development is that it would restrict the rights of developed
countries to impose economic sanctions on developing countries, restrict protectionism in developed
countries, and impose other requirements on developed countries in furtherance of perceived
development interests.
Indian human rights diplomacy in international institutions served its overall defensive posture. The
examples of rhetoric quoted above reveal a presumption of Western dominance of those institutions.
Indian diplomatic rhetoric took the form of appeals to the West and signals to non-Western countries to
join India in a countervailing coalition. Indian delegates repeatedly expressed concerns that the overall
functioning of international institutions was excessively directed by Western countries and inadequately
sensitive to Indian priorities. India sought to insert its concerns into the dialogue of those institutions, and
to prevent them from intruding on its own sovereignty.
India's defensive human rights diplomacy on Kashmir
United Nations bodies have emerged as critical arenas of Indian defensive human rights diplomacy. This
is the result of a Pakistani policy to pursue its claim on Kashmir, especially in the context of the
insurgency there, in multilateral forums, where Pakistan's size disadvantage might be overcome. India
has mounted defences and built international coalitions to block Pakistani initiatives.
India and Pakistan have struggled over Kashmir since their independence in 1947. Pakistanis have
referred to the Kashmir dispute as the "unfinished business of the Partition." Because the British Indian
empire was partitioned along religious lines in 1947, and Kashmir has a Muslim majority, Pakistanis
reason that it should be part of Pakistan. Indians have rejected the theory that Hindus and Muslims form
two separate nations, and thus deny that Kashmir's religious composition is a basis for allocating it to
Pakistan. Indians argue that Kashmir has been ruled from Delhi for millennia and, further, that its
inclusion in India is an important symbol of Indian secularism. For Indian Muslims, who are
approximately as numerous as their co-religionists in Pakistan, India's possession of Kashmir is
especially important since they more than anyone wish to avoid creating the impression that India is
exclusively Hindu. Further, the accession to India by the Hindu king of Kashmir in 1947 following the
armed attack on Kashmir by raiders from Pakistan is the legal basis of India's claim to the territory.
The Indo-Pakistani struggle over Kashmir has been conducted by various means, ranging from open
warfare, to irregular warfare, to global diplomacy. The most crucial episode in the diplomatic struggle
over Kashmir since 1989 was the meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in 1994 in
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Geneva. Pakistan had planned to introduce a resolution critical of the Indian human rights record in
Kashmir. The stakes for both sides were modest but significant. A diplomatic victory for Pakistan would
likely have raised the morale and credibility of Muslim militants in Kashmir. It was clear that all but a
handful of states intended to abstain on the resolution. However, the votes of some Muslim countries
appeared likely to tip the scales in favour of Pakistan. India's delegation was headed by Atal Behari
Vajpayee from the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, Salman Khurshid, a cabinet minister with
responsibility for foreign affairs, and Farooq Abdallah, who had been and later became again chief
minister of Kashmir. The delegation symbolized the unity between Hindus and Muslims in India over the
Kashmir issue.
Indian diplomacy in the months preceding the 1994 UN Human Rights Commission meeting had worked
on several tracks. A European Union delegation of ambassadors had been invited to visit Kashmir and
speak with secessionists as well as Indian loyalists and government personnel. This helped to seal the
European abstention. Moreover, economic liberalization had increased European economic interest in
India. Iran had been a focus of Indian diplomacy as well. Narasimha Rao had visited Iran in the previous
year and had offered to aid it in the area of defence-related technologies while challenging its
fundamentalist ideology. 33 For Iran, Pakistan's quest for Western and US support against India
undermined its own anti-American goals. Further, India had supported China in the United Nations in the
face of Western criticism of China's human rights record. All these moves reaped rewards for India in
Geneva. Iran and China, traditionally two crucial allies of Pakistan, pressured it to withdraw its
resolution altogether. The failure of Pakistan in Geneva demoralized separatist militants in Kashmir. 34
The Organization of the Islamic Conference has regularly issued statements critical of the Indian human
rights record on Kashmir. Indian diplomacy toward this organization as a whole has not been successful.
It has been more successful in regard to most Muslim states. No other Muslim state has taken a vocal and
consistent stand endorsing the Pakistani position on Indian human rights violations in Kashmir. Saudi
Arabia is relatively sympathetic to the Pakistani position, but is muted in its public diplomacy on the
issue. India has consistently sought to build ties with Muslim counties. The main commonality has been
secularism and third world solidarity. This has been a key in building ties with Egypt, Malaysia, and
Indonesia. In the case of Shia Iran, secularism as such has not been a factor, but the Sunni—Shia split
and concern about third world solidarity have motivated Iran to view the Indian position sympathetically.
One issue where India has undertaken some assertive diplomacy is in the condemnation of international
terrorism. The 1994 Human Rights Commission meeting did pass a resolution condemning international
terrorism, with leadership coming from India. Accusing Pakistan of sponsoring terrorism in Kashmir and
other regions in India, the Indian government has sought to isolate Pakistan on the issue of international
terrorism.
Debates about human rights conditions in India
Several groups participate in the global debate about human rights conditions in India: the Indian
political establishment, constitutionalist NGOs, private media, and some opposition parties; unarmed and
armed separatists; Western governments, NGOs, and media; South Asian immigrant groups; Pakistani
government, parties, and NGOs; and Islamic countries. An example of this debate is in a publication by
Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights that makes detailed claims about human rights violations
by Indian security forces and separatist militants in Kashmir. 35 In an appendix, a press release by the
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Indian embassy in Washington rebuts some of the factual claims and challenges the validity of the
report's ways of gathering and assessing evidence.
The international debate about human rights in India entails disagreement on the extent of violations by
security forces. Indian governmental and non-governmental observers contend that a large number of
specific accusations, including some endorsed by Western NGOs, are false propaganda. Secondary
debates on this point revolve around the validity of evidence and the reliability of witnesses. Another
debate involves the question of responsibility for the actions of soldiers. The Indian government has held
that, when security personnel kill unarmed persons contrary to their orders, the sanction of dismissal is
sufficient to absolve the state of responsibility for the crime. Only in the second half of the 1990s have
criminal prosecutions against security personnel for human rights violations been pursued. Amnesty
International and Asia Watch have argued that a far more severe punishment than dismissal is required.
Most of the specific accusations of killing against Indian forces in publications by Western human rights
organizations are by people claiming to be witnesses. 36 The Indian government and media have held that
there is a campaign among separatist organizations to plant disinformation by inducing people to make
false claims. In some cases the evidence is incontrovertible, such as when the person making allegations
has torture symptoms, or when large incidents are described consistently by many people and reported in
the news media. But in allegations of extrajudicial killings, the evidence that the militant in question was
arrested and did not die in battle is sometimes questionable. In the context of rebutting rape allegations
endorsed by Asia Watch, the Indian embassy in the United States wrote:
Asia Watch's tendency to accept allegations as genuine is inexplicable considering that the report itself
recognizes fear of militants among the population. It states that "most Kashmiris are reluctant to discuss
abuses by militants out of fear of reprisal. It is the same fear and element of coercion which forces
innocent civilians to make false allegations against security forces." 37
The Indian government has also challenged a number of generalizations and analyses of motivations
made by Asia Watch about conditions in Kashmir.
The reports by Asia Watch and Amnesty International are vulnerable to criticism on several points, but
nonetheless present a picture of human rights violations in Kashmir, Punjab, as well as other parts of
India that is broadly consistent with information from other sources, notably the Indian news media.
Indeed, what is distinctive about these reports is not the information they present. Rather such reports
compile partially authenticated claims about human rights violations in India and present them to the
international media. The reports have been the occasion of considerable embarrassment to the Indian
government and concerned sections of society. Criticisms by NGOs and other international criticism of
India's human rights record have been a spur to some corrective action, such as improved discipline
among armed forces in Kashmir and the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission.
 
V. Bilateral policy
Three important bilateral relationships in India's human rights diplomacy since 1989 are with the United
States, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan. India has refrained from human rights criticism of the United States for
either international or domestic actions since 1989, in line with its shift to a defensive posture. Instead
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India has sought to moderate US human rights criticism of India. The post-Cold War era has been one of
unprecedented US criticism of India on human rights grounds. Although the level and intensity of US
criticism against India were a fraction of those against China and some other states, Indian sensitivity to
that criticism was high.
The United States began to criticize Indian counter-insurgency methods in Punjab and Kashmir. It also
criticized India for child labour, dowry murders, and other abuses. In the case of Kashmir, the Clinton
administration revived the formulation that Kashmir was a disputed territory. A series of American
statements in late 1993 and early 1994 were perceived by Kashmiri separatists as indications that the
United States was growing more sympathetic to their cause. 38 These statements raised fears in India that
the resolve of the militants would be strengthened by them. In the case of Punjab, several resolutions in
the US Congress, which came close to passing, condemned India for alleged human rights violations
there. These were pressed at the behest of persons in the American Sikh community who had made
significant campaign contributions to US Congressmen. American newspapers harshly criticized India's
human rights record. US news media accounts of Indian human rights issues in the 1990s were sharply
negative and paralleled those of Western human rights organizations. 39
The US Congress and administration, like some other developed countries, pressed criticism of India for
child labour. Child labour is far from being eliminated in some of these developed countries, including
the United States and Britain, in spite of their wealth. The United States has been especially concerned
about child labour in export industries, such as carpets, even though these account for a small fraction of
overall child labour in India. The majority of child labour in India is in agriculture. The United States and
other wealthy nations have taken steps to reduce imports of carpets produced by child bonded labour,
without adequate provisions for alternative sustenance for the children. Government programmes and
NGOs within India that rescue children from bonded labour educate and feed the children afterwards.
Rescue efforts that neglect to support the children afterwards have frequently failed, with the children
returning to bonded labour. India has opposed the inclusion of clauses in the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade that ban trade in goods produced by child labour on the grounds that these would do
little actually to reduce the problem and would harm the exports of developing countries. The only
realistic remedy for child labour is the universalization of primary education. Expenditure on primary
education in India has increased sharply in the 1990s, and a national programme of free lunches for some
schoolchildren began in 1995. Yet India will take several years to attain universal primary education
even if the current growth rate of expenditure is maintained.
There have been some trends limiting US accusatory diplomacy against India. India's policies of
economic globalization have played a key role. Indiana Republican Congressman Dan Burton, who is on
the right wing of his party, introduced a bill every year from 1993 to cut US aid to India on the grounds
of human rights violations in Punjab. In 1995, his bill lost by only 19 votes, whereas by 1997 the margin
of defeat had broadened to 260 votes, mainly owing to pro-India lobbying by US corporations. 40 Indian
immigrants in the United States have also courted allies in the US Congress. There are significant pro-
and anti-India groups in the US Congress, cutting across party lines, which fight regular skirmishes of
letters to colleagues. 41 Finally, the growing power of China has made the United States more conscious
of the need to court other Asian states to balance China's power, and this has also limited America's
critique of India's human rights record.
In 1987, the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was sent to Sri Lanka as part of the Indo-Sri Lankan
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accord. The original intention was for the force to disarm the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
in order to enable political reforms on the island to proceed. India itself had originally aided the LTTE in
reaction to anti-Tamil action and sentiments promoted by the Sri Lankan state. 42 The Tigers chose not to
disarm and instead to fight, and the IPKF fought an unsuccessful three-year war against them. Several
aspects of Indian human rights diplomacy became entangled with this intervention. Throughout India
opposed the division of Sri Lanka on religious lines, seeking to enhance the credibility of its domestic
ideology of secularism and unity in diversity. Over the years, India shifted its assessment of the main
threat to its ideology in Sri Lanka. Prior to 1987, India had accused the Sri Lankan government of human
rights violations against its Tamil minority. After the intervention, the focus of Indian accusations shifted
to the LTTE itself. The IPKF was also accused of committing some human rights violations, and India
prosecuted some soldiers and defended itself internationally against charges it considered exaggerated.
After the withdrawal of the IPKF in 1990, the Indian focus on Sri Lanka abated for a year, until it was
suddenly reactivated in 1991 by the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by an LTTE team. However, Indian
human rights diplomacy toward Sri Lanka remained muted. The Sri Lankan state disciplined its armed
forces more effectively and massacres of Tamils ended, while the LTTE continued a campaign of attacks
against civilians. Indian diplomatic sympathy has remained with the government, and it regarded LTTE
violations in Sri Lanka as crimes under the jurisdiction of the Sri Lankan government.
Indian human rights diplomacy toward Pakistan is highly revealing of the new overall posture. Pakistan
has maintained an aggressive posture of accusatory diplomacy toward India with regard to Kashmir, and
briefly over the Ayodhya issue. India has accused Pakistan of supporting terrorism in Kashmir and other
parts of India, and has held it responsible for human rights violations committed in terrorist actions in
Kashmir and elsewhere. Yet India has been muted in its criticism of human rights violations committed
by Pakistani security forces within Pakistan. The 1990s have been the most violent decade in Pakistan
since 1971. Although the Indian government has made a few critical statements, it has not engaged in a
diplomatic campaign of criticism. This approach reflects the commitment to defensive diplomacy, as
well as a desire to keep international human rights institutions disengaged from South Asia.
The course of the struggle over Kashmir has been decisively influenced by domestic trends in both India
and Pakistan. During the 1990s, events have conspired to shift the balance of power and influence
regarding Kashmir in favour of India. In the summer of 1990, Pakistan appeared to many, especially in
Kashmir, to represent the future. The USSR was in decline and its intervention in Afghanistan had been
defeated by the steadfastness of the US—Pakistani alliance. Pakistan had kept a more open economy
than India since independence and had just instituted a fresh round of market reforms. Its Islamic
political orientation appeared more authentic and coherent than the confusion of inconsistent secularism,
violent separatism, and communal antagonism prevalent in India. And Pakistan was riding the wave of
Islamist sentiment throughout the Middle East and Central Asia. In Kashmir, the examples of the Afghan
mujaheddin and the Palestinian intifada gave new credibility to Islamist sentiment and an insurgency
favouring accession to Pakistan gained a foothold, alongside a pro-independence insurgency. 43 It is clear
that Pakistan gave large-scale material support to both these insurgencies, although aid to the
pro-independence insurgency was later cut off.
As the 1990s progressed, India's economic and political recovery coincided with a multifaceted crisis in
Pakistan. The end of overt military dictatorship upon the death of General Zia ul-Haq in 1988 gave way
to an electoral system without civilian supremacy, what an earlier military dictator of Pakistan had called
"guided democracy." Pakistani presidents, supported by the military, dismissed three elected
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governments before their terms ran out. Unelected caretaker governments then carried out far-reaching
reforms. Further, the military kept a tight rein on the nuclear weapons establishment, Kashmir policy,
and the military budget. Spending over 6 per cent of its GNP on the military, Pakistan could not keep its
budget and trade deficits in check. Its economy has stagnated and it has been forced to borrow from the
IMF with severe conditions. Pakistan also came to be listed by the World Bank as one of the most
corrupt states in the world, and corruption was cited as the main cause in each of its three government
dismissals. Pakistan's two main Great Power allies, the United States and China, began to distance
themselves from Pakistan's stand on Kashmir, especially after 1996. In 1997, the Pakistani Muslim
League won elections by a landslide and amended the constitution to ban presidential intervention. It has
begun to reduce military spending and to initiate talks with India. Yet the ideological disagreement
between Muslim-nationalist Pakistan and secular, Hindu-majority India remains large, and that makes the
Kashmir issue difficult to solve. The swing of the balance of influence in India's favour has created a
modicum of stability in Kashmir, and has led third states to move to a position on the issue more to




The period since 1989 has witnessed a broad transformation of Indian human rights diplomacy. It has
moved from an accusatory approach to a defensive one. This transformation has been caused by both
global and national trends. At the global level, the emergence of unipolarity led to a changed
international regime of human rights. There was a much stronger emphasis on the violations committed
by governments of developing countries against their citizens, deliberately or through negligence.
Civilian deaths caused by the international actions of Great Powers were ignored.
At the national level, India has gone through a profound multifaceted transformation during the 1990s
that has affected its human rights diplomacy in a variety of ways. The economic crisis at the start of the
decade was accompanied by crises in its political leadership structure, national unity, and
Hindu—Muslim relations. As the decade progressed, India resolved most of its immediate crises and
emerged with new structures that replaced the older collapsed ones. The new stronger structure led to an
improvement in the domestic human rights performance, in tandem with a decline in violent challenges
to the state. There was also a moderation of Hindu nationalism, as the simplistic violent techniques of the
early 1990s led to critical electoral defeats. Peace was restored in Punjab. India's human rights and
overall security performance in Kashmir improved. The improved situation led to a more successful
defensive diplomacy in multilateral institutions and bilateral relations. Yet the road back to assertive
human rights diplomacy will be a long one for India.
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At the height of the Cold War, Iran allied itself with the Western bloc. The Shah of Iran, Muhammed
Reza Pahlavi, owed his throne in no small measure to the assistance of the US Central Intelligence
Agency and the British Secret Service, which in 1953 had helped him organize a coup against the
nationalist leader Muhammad Mossadegh. 1
The Shah saw himself as the heir to a thousands-year-old tradition of Persian monarchy. He desperately
wanted Iran to become a modern, industrial state, with an educated populace, but he resisted the notion
that Iran should democratize. 2 Over the years, various American administrations pressured him to open
up the political system, allow for political opposition and elections, and loosen the laws of land
ownership. The Shah periodically made gestures in that direction but refused to make more substantive
changes, claiming the West failed to appreciate the challenges of Iranian society. If ever the pressure
became too great, the Shah would subtly remind Western diplomats that any changes that might result in
upheaval could jeopardize the stability of Iran and thereby undermine Western influence in the "Northern
Tier."
In the late 1970s, however, the Shah faced internal challenges brought on by rapid urbanization and
inflation. His response was often to crack down on opposition, using the security service SAVAK as one
of his primary tools of repression. SAVAK had an unsavoury reputation, and United Nations human
rights forums called attention to SAVAK's tendency to resort to torture, detention without stated cause,
and other violations of international human rights norms.
When US President Jimmy Carter placed at least the rhetoric of human rights at the centre of his
administration's foreign policy, Iran came under intense and unfavourable scrutiny. Even before Carter,
the 1973 Foreign Assistance Act forbade US aid to any government that "practiced the internment or
imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes." The Shah, who was by this time ill with
cancer, reacted to the new American focus on human rights with a series of reforms, decrees, and
gestures. He did allow opposition parties greater latitude, and he apparently closed some of the more
notorious SAVAK detention centres. 3
In 1979, the Shah of Iran was overthrown. Within two years, forces loyal to the Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini came to dominate the post-Shah revolutionary government. The initial opposition to the Shah
was a loose coalition of Marxist guerrillas, radical students, disaffected and underemployed technocrats,
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affluent merchants, liberal intelligentsia, and Shiite clerics. But it was the clerics, and Khomeini in
particular, who commanded the loyalty of the urban masses. With support from the bazaari merchants
and with the income from the many mosque foundations, the clerics were able to mobilize people and
resources more effectively than other revolutionary factions. The radical clerics also were not shy about
using force, and they were ruthless in eliminating opponents.
The resulting Iranian revolution was hostile not just to the old regime but to its international supporters.
As the United States was the primary ally of and patron to the Shah, it received the brunt of the
revolution's animus. Iran's international human rights policy is intimately entwined with its relations with
the United States. Over time, anti-Americanism became institutionalized by the revolutionary regime,
with regular gatherings organized by the clerical authorities that included ritual and repeated
denunciations of the United States as the "Great Satan."
The United States, for its part, demonized Iran as the "godfather" of international terrorism. Under the
successive administrations of Ronald Reagan, George Bush, and Bill Clinton, Iran was singled out as a
"rogue state" and treated as an international pariah.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States government consistently labelled Iran a "terrorist
state." US intelligence agencies saw a direct link between Tehran and Lebanon's Hezbollah faction,
which was responsible for multiple kidnappings of US citizens in the 1980s. Iran was also implicated in
the bombing of American soldiers in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, in 1996. Dozens of Iranian dissidents living
abroad in exile have been assassinated by organized hit squads. In addition to US intelligence sources,
French, British, and German agencies have traced the trail of responsibility back to Tehran. 4
Terrorism is not identical to human rights abuses, though the two often accompany one another. Whereas
the international human rights community has been more careful to distinguish between them, the United
States has tended to lump the two together in its critique of Iran. To that mix, it has added another: Iran's
purported attempt to obtain nuclear weapons. In the words of former Assistant Secretary of State for
Near East Affairs, Robert Pelletreau, "We have deep objections to several of Iran's policies, including its
support for terrorism, pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, support for Hamas and other violent
groups seeking to derail the peace process, subversion of other governments, and a human rights record
which is deservedly condemned by the international community." 5
The animosity between Iran and the United States directly shaped and continues to shape the human
rights policies of the Iranian government. That does not mean that Iran's domestic policies are shaped by
either American or international criticisms. Laws governing property, theft, marriage, and speech stem
from the Koran and Islamic jurisprudence, and have little or nothing to do with the international
community. Yet, even in the domestic sphere, the Islamic Republic of Iran contends with many of the
same accusations that the Shah did.
Although the human rights violations of SAVAK were widely publicized and denounced by the Iranian
opponents of the Shah's regime, once in power these same opponents have committed many of the same
abuses. Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has been repeatedly censured for human rights abuses by the
United Nations. For instance, in 1983, a UN Human Rights Commission report estimated that between
5,000 and 20,000 people had been executed since 1979. The same report documented electric shock
torture, whippings, and mock executions in Iranian jails. The allegations were vehemently denied by the
authorities in Tehran. 6 In 1987, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution expressing "deep
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concern" over human rights violations in Iran, including persecution of religious minorities; the vote was
58 in favour, 22 against, and 42 abstentions. 7
More recently, Amnesty International reported that "thousands of political prisoners" were being held in
Iranian jails, many of them "without charge or trial." The report noted that "flogging and amputation"
were common punishments for persons convicted of crimes such as theft or fraud. Political trials
involving accusations of espionage or "propagating pan-Turkism" fell "far short of international fair trial
standards." And the report also raised the issue of extrajudicial executions of prominent critics of the
regime. 8
In response to international criticism, members of the Iranian government have responded in several
ways. They have denied that the alleged abuses have occurred; they have defended certain practices as
sanctified by Islamic law; and they have attacked the United States for slandering the Islamic Republic
and using international human rights regimes as yet another way to isolate and undermine a government
that it wants overthrown.
Clearly, Iran does not possess a strong domestic legacy of human rights. Both the Pahlavis and the
revolutionary government spoke of basic rights such as education, employment, housing, freedom of
assembly, and fair trial. Yet both the Shah and the revolutionary clerics interpreted all of these human
rights as secondary to the rights of the monarchy (under the Shah) or to the law of God and the Koran
(under the revolution).
Until 1979, Iran had been governed for thousands of years by monarchs. With few exceptions, the rule of
these monarchs was absolute. Traditionally, the clergy deferred to the monarchy; they supported the
monarch as the source of order in society. Even if a particular king was brutal and corrupt, the clerics
tended to believe that even a bad monarch was preferable to chaos. And they believed that, without a
ruler, society would inevitably descend into chaos. At the turn of the twentieth century and for a brief
period in the early 1950s, a constitutional movement flourished in Iran but, each time, traditional Iranian
absolutism trumped constitutionalism, albeit with the help of outside powers. In 1907, both the British
and the Russians supported the king against the reformers, and in 1953 the United States supported the
Shah against Mossadegh.
With the advent of the Islamic Republic, Iran underwent a dramatic change. Suddenly, rights were at the
centre of political debates. Not human rights per se, but rather Islamic rights. The Koran and the huge
corpus of Muslim jurisprudence spoke volumes about the rights of individual believers in relation to the
state and to the ruler. These rights, however, are secondary to the will of God. In the Islamic Republic,
there have been and continue to be heated debates over rights, debates that are bounded by and
complicated by the paramountcy of God, the Koran, and the legacy of Khomeini. Since the election of
the moderate cleric Mohammed Khatami to the presidency in 1997, the internal debate over both human
rights and Islamic rights has intensified. Though Khatami welcomes and even fosters the airing of
different views and different perspectives, the Iranian government continues to exist within the
framework established by Khomeini and the clerics who established the Islamic Republic.
Thus, neither in the past nor in the present does Iran have a tradition of absolute human rights. Rather,
human rights are understood within the context of other rights. In the case of the revolutionary regime
designed by Khomeini, human rights exist only within the framework of an Islamic Republic and Islamic
law. Individual human beings have rights that Islam and God grant to them, not rights that attach to them
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simply because they are human beings. 9
 
II. National domestic factors
In terms of human rights, the two most significant factors in Iran today are Islam and Iranian attitudes
towards the American government. Islam and how it is interpreted by the post-Khomeini regime are
arguably the most important domestic factors in Iran. The revolutionary Shiite ideology of the Islamic
Republic is unique, and it conditions the official attitude of the regime toward all questions. On human
rights, the clerical regime asserts that Islam has its own standards; Iran therefore makes the cultural
relativist argument about human rights and rejects many critiques of its record on the grounds that
Western societies have no authority to impose their standards on Iran. At the same time, whenever they
are criticized for human rights violation, the leaders of the Islamic Republic accuse the United States of
using the international human rights movement to isolate Iran.
World Islamic revolution was both the ambition and the policy of the first Islamic Republic. 10 Various
branches of the revolutionary government sponsored conferences on political Islam that amounted to
primers on how to achieve power. Khomeini called on Muslims everywhere to rise up against their
corrupt leaders and transform their societies according to God's law. These appeals struck a resonant
chord amongst Shiite Muslims in Iraq and the Gulf states, as well as in war-torn Lebanon, where the
Hezbollah Party is funded by Iran. The rhetoric was also revanchist, at times stridently so. Using a
combination of repression and accommodation, Muslim states as disparate as Morocco and Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia and Indonesia tried to stave off the potentially destabilizing influence of revolutionary
Islamic ideology.
By 1988, however, the Iranian government no longer placed export of revolution at the top of the agenda.
As is true for many states, the Iranian regime was not and is not unitary. Different ruling groups in Iran
adhere to different lines on the export of revolution, on political pluralism, and on crime and punishment.
Some retain the early revolutionary fervour, others are simply ambitious for power and influence and
give only lip-service to Islam; some speak of ending Iran's international isolation; others resist any
rapprochement with the United States. With the death of Khomeini in 1989, no one individual appeared
who could subsume the contradictory impulses.
Khomeini's successor as spiritual leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i, represents the powerful "hard
line" of Iranian politics. Yet, though Khomeini until his death in 1989 and after that Khamene'i as
supreme jurisconsult exercise extraordinary powers under the Iranian Constitution, the exact division of
powers and jurisdictions of various branches and ministries has always been vague. This makes any
discussion of Iranian human rights policy (or any other policy) difficult. In short, there is no single
Iranian "human rights" policy.
It has long been accepted by students of American government that bureaucratic politics often lead not to
a unitary policy, but rather to policies. The same is true for the post-Khomeini Iranian state. Not only is
there a range of views, but it is not always clear who is determining policy, and quasi-official
organizations such as the Mustazaffin Foundation may implement policies that are more extreme, more
violent, and less respectful of international norms than the officials of the interior or other ministries.
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On at least one issue, however, there is consensus: in the eyes of Iranian leaders, the United States is the
primary threat to the Islamic revolution. For that reason, Iranian statements on human rights almost
always include statements about the United States. In the eyes of Khamene'i, the most pernicious factor
in world affairs in general and on Iran in particular is "the hegemony of the United States." He has
repeatedly assailed the US government for "its influence and interference in Islamic countries." 11
The Iranian government views the international system through the lens of its distrust of the United
States. In the Iranian view, the international system is dominated by the United States. As the
international hegemon, the United States makes the rules, and these rules are designed to keep any
would-be competitors at a disadvantage. The Iranian revolution embraced an ideology that explicitly and
virulently rejected the United States as a hegemon. This ideology was based on the principle that Islam is
the only true path for Iran, and that the rules of Islam, as explicated by the supreme jurisconsult, are
profoundly different from the rules of the "Great Satan," the United States. In the words of Khamene'i,
"the Islamic Republic's system is standing against this hegemonic system." 12
Believing that the US government is unalterably opposed to Iran, Iranian leaders interpret any
international criticisms of Iranian human rights abuses in light of American attempts to undermine the
revolution. In the words of former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, "I think human rights is
used as an instrument to exert pressure and also to achieve some goals that particularly the United States
pursues. For example, you see in the U.S. an incident takes place, the mass killing in Waco, Texas of the
Davidian sect ... but very soon, they just stifle the matter as if nothing has happened. But if a small
incident takes place in Iran, it is blown way out of proportion and is publicized for years." Rafsanjani
also castigated the treatment of prisoners in the United States and asserted that in Iran, contrary to the
accusations of the US government, Amnesty International, and the Human Rights Commission, prisoners
"visit with their families, and are treated with dignity." 13
From Iran's perspective, the international human rights regime is part of that US-controlled hegemonic
system. Condemnation of Iran's human rights record is, therefore, interpreted by the ruling clerics as an
attack on Iran by the United States and its proxies. It does not matter whether the institutions criticizing
Iran are American, European, Asian, or independent. It does not matter whether Iranian human rights
abuses are publicized by NGOs such as Amnesty International, or United Nations groups such as the
Human Rights Commission. All of them are perceived as part of a hegemonic system created and
dominated by the United States.
For instance, in 1992, Iran reacted angrily to a harsh UN report by expelling all foreign Red Cross
workers from the country on the grounds that the Red Cross had been complicit in helping UN
authorities compile the report. 14 Justifying the expulsion, Iranian officials at the United Nations
criticized Human Rights Commission envoy Galindo Pol for failing to do justice to the status of human
rights in Iran under political pressure from Washington. Iran's deputy foreign minister accused Pol of
copying the US State Department's report on human rights. 15
These allegations were reiterated by Iran in 1996, when a UN special representative on human rights,
Canada's Maurice Danby Capithorne, visited Iran. An editorial in the Tehran Times stated that:
Criteria for human rights are respected by everyone; however, any judgement on the situation of human
rights in a country should be harmonious with the nation's culture, religion and traditions. The special
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envoy should not surrender to direct and indirect pressures from the United States and other Western
powers, whose aims are to use human rights as a leverage against Iran.... One can magnify minute flaws
of any country in order to present it in a bad light. The consequences would be that countries which do,
in fact, violate human rights in a major way take on a low profile, while countries with minor human
rights violations enter the stage for the scrutiny of world public opinion. 16
When Capithorne submitted his report in October, he noted that the condition of human rights in Iran had
deteriorated, with many new instances of arrests of teachers and lawyers who had said or written things
that the clerics found objectionable. 17
The Iranian government's response to American condemnation of its human rights record is not without
foundation. Successive US administrations have been highly selective about which countries they single
out for human rights criticism. Until 1989, countries seen as allies in the Cold War infringed human
rights with the impunity born of the knowledge that the United States and NATO would turn a blind eye.
Even today, US policy on human rights is extremely varied and even contradictory. The case of China
demonstrates these contradictions. The same abuses committed by the Chinese government, including
torture, extended imprisonment without habeas corpus, press and political party restrictions, and
extraterritorial attacks on dissidents, elicit condemnation when committed by Iran but muted objections
when committed by China. 18
Iran's belief that international politics are dominated by the United States and its allies is also hardly
unfounded, nor is its suspicion that US and UN condemnations of human rights abuses are not always as
neutral as they are purported to be. The United States points to the Iranian government as the fount of
international terrorism, both in the Middle East and throughout the world, yet evidence for American
accusations remains flimsy at best.1 19 Certain branches of the Iranian government, and the Mustazaffin
Foundation in particular, may be more complicit than others in funding international Muslim groups who
use violence to achieve their aims. That much seems clear, but the more extreme allegations that inner
circles of the Iranian government order and implement international terrorism are unproven.
Nonetheless, Iran often overstates the influence of the United States on international human rights issues.
America dominates the Security Council, but it has rarely had its way in the General Assembly. And it is
in the General Assembly that most human rights resolutions are debated and passed. Though the Islamic
Republic may be correct that the international system is permeated by American hegemony, in the area
of human rights American officials often struggle unsuccessfully to assert their agenda. A quick look at
the history of international human rights law shows that Europe, particularly the Netherlands and
Scandinavia, has been at the forefront, not the United States.
Furthermore, most human rights organizations have concluded that Iran has severe human rights
problems. The fact that they may not be as severe or as extensive as the United States and the United
Nations allege does not mean that the Iranian government respects human rights, its denials
notwithstanding. 20 Neutral human rights organizations have documented mistreatment of prisoners,
executions, torture, assassination of dissidents abroad, lack of political pluralism, and oppression of
religious minorities. Although the rights record of the "second republic," as post-Khomeini Iran is
sometimes called, has shown improvement, that record is still troubling, the election of Khatami to the
presidency notwithstanding.2 21 Faced with these charges, Iran does not simply deny that abuses are
taking place. Rather, the Iranian government argues that it cannot and should not be judged by a set of
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standards alien to Islam. Unlike many autocratic countries, the Iranian government has an ideology that
justifies policies that the international community labels human rights abuses.
Much of this ideology falls under the category of cultural relativism. 22 According to Iran's leaders, Islam
is a complete system of law and morality distinct from secular, Western law and morality. 23 The
individual in the Iranian revolutionary framework is not free to do as he wants. Rather, he is free to do
God's will, much as the early Puritans in Massachusetts were free to live morally. Islamic law (sharia)
defines the universe of rights. Under the sharia, a chronic thief should be punished with the loss of a
hand. Hence, that is moral. That punishment is right. Similarly, the sharia does not speak of political
pluralism as a right. In fact, according to Khomeini's theory of the supreme jurisconsult, human rights are
adjudicated by the jurisconsult speaking for the Hidden Imam. Whatever the jurisconsult decrees is by
definition right, assuming that his decrees are compatible with the Koran and the sharia.
Iran claims for itself an Islamic tradition of rights and responsibilities. In 1996, the head of the Iranian
judiciary, Ayatollah Mohammed Yazdi, announced a new set of tougher punishments, in accord with
"Islamic penal law." Under the revised code, "a robber or a thief found guilty of robbery or theft for a
fourth time would not be entitled to leave nor to pardon when he is serving his sentence." He described
the laws as "progressive." 24 A month later, commenting on international criticisms of Iran, he defended
the "Islamic penal system" and said that, whether or not Western societies like Islamic proscriptions for
punishment, that system "cannot be altered." It cannot be altered because, according to the clerics who
govern the Islamic Republic, the Islamic penal system is the product of the sharia. It is God's law. Yazdi
announced that, in order to leaven the Western bias in international human rights, Iran had established an
"Islamic human rights commission." 25
Also in 1996, the official radio station of the Islamic Republic launched a weekly programme on human
rights called "Hidden Truth." According to the producers, the aim of the programme was "to unravel the
real essence of the concept of human rights.... The program will look at the various philosophical and
legal aspects of human rights, how the concept is used and abused by various countries and international
organizations, and the situation of human rights in other countries." Much of the programme consisted of
an attack on "Zionist" human rights abuses in the Occupied Territories and American inconsistency in
condemning abuses in some places and not in others. 26
In 1997, Dr. Mohammed Khatami won the Iranian presidential election to succeed Rafsanjani. Khatami
was known as a cultural moderate, and his victory had not been expected. In Iran, his election was touted
as a testament to the openness of Iran's political process. International monitoring agencies concurred
that the actual voting had been conducted fairly and in an orderly fashion, though numerous potential
candidates had been disqualified by a committee of experts who rule on the religious acceptability of
potential office holders.
In speeches and interviews before the election, Khatami spoke about human rights. Time after time, he
pointed to the rights that the Islamic Republic guarantees, yet he also indicated areas where the actual
record fell short. On freedom of the press, he stated that "publications should be the eyes and ears of the
people since their main role is to channel freedoms. A great transformation took place in our country's
press after the revolution." He continued, "[u]nfortunately, self-censorship persists and there is still
intolerance on the part of some officials and organizations with regard to publications." On the rule of
law, Khatami commented that "one of the sources of pride for the system and the revolution which was
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brought about by the efforts and insistence of his eminence, the Imam [Khomeini] (may his soul be
sanctified) was the compilation and ratification of the constitution, a mere eight months after the victory
of the Islamic Republic so that we could all be aware of our rights and obligations within a legal
framework." 27
In another interview, Khatami championed multi-party democracy. "A dynamic and progressive society
cannot strengthen itself without civilized institutions, which include parties.... This culture of
participation and involvement ... should metamorphose naturally so that all the leanings, the factions, and
the press can play a role." In the same interview, Khatami discussed the importance of independent
universities — "the bulwarks of thought and wisdom in our society," the Constitution — "which has
specified the rights and limits of individuals and the duties and powers of the government and each
institution," the rule of law — "what is important is a society governed by law and order that is organized
in such a way that each person is aware of his duties and performs them accordingly," and the status of
women — "women constitute half of our society and every decision that is made regarding society
should take that half into consideration.... Women in our society have been deprived of most of the rights
that Islam has envisioned for them, and the social and external possibilities ... have not been as extensive
as those for men. We should therefore take steps so that this historical tyranny and deprivation is
eliminated." 28
In a dramatic break from the past, candidates during the 1997 presidential election freely and sometimes
bitterly criticized the Rafsanjani government and the Ayatollah Khamene'i for infringing freedoms that
were supposedly guaranteed under the sharia and the Constitution. One candidate stated that "at present
there is no such thing as press freedom in the country. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran is
not a ceremonial publication. The person in charge of the executive authority must feel duty-bound to
implement the Constitution." 29
This ideological framework allows the Iranian government to infringe "human rights" as defined by the
West, particularly in the areas of penal law, court trial, restrictions on women, and political pluralism.
But it also enjoins Muslims to, among other things, protect religious minorities (albeit with certain
restrictions 30) and orphans, because both of these obligations are laid out in the Koran and are therefore
enshrined in the Iranian Constitution. In a long article published in a Tehran newspaper on Islam and
rights, a professor at the Qom religious seminary (where future clerics are trained) spoke of freedom as
"a right bestowed upon every human being by God, and no one is entitled to deprive any individual of
this right.... Freedom is not something granted to people by rulers and legislators." With a logic that
might have warmed Rousseau's heart, the professor asserted that all human beings are blessed with free
will but, "as the result of living in society, man should limit his own free will ... in relation to the free will
and actions of others." That does not mean, this argument continued, that a human being should ever
submit to the dominion of other human beings. "The acceptance of Islam," the professor continued, "and
the call of the prophets does not mean unquestioning obedience to others.... God forbids any compulsion
in religion." In short, faith makes men free, but no one can be forced to accept faith. As a result, the
Koran forbids the establishment of a religious dictatorship, and society will most approximate the
religious ideal when "freedom of thought and expression" is not restricted. 31
It is impossible to listen to this Qom professor or to President Khatami without recognizing that there is
an Islamic human rights ideal and that many Iranians in positions of power and authority take the
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question of human rights extremely seriously. In many respects, the Islamic ideal is compatible with the
international human rights conventions. In some areas where it is not, such as political pluralism and
freedom of the press, the restrictions are not absolute and may not be any more restrictive than certain
limits in Western societies. For instance, the right of free expression is not absolute in the United States,
and it is even more constrained in the United Kingdom by strict libel laws. The difference is that
restrictions in Western societies do not stem from religious law. And, although a council of experts
frequently invalidates the candidacy of parties and individuals who do not meet minimum criteria under
the government's interpretation of "Islamic suitability," political pluralism is rarely without some
restrictions in any country.
However, while Iran defends itself against certain allegations of abuses on the grounds of cultural
relativism, in other areas, the government violates its own constitutionally and religiously enshrined
norms. In short, the Iranian government frequently fails to live up to its own rigorous standards of human
rights.
The most egregious example is the treatment of the Baha'is by the revolutionary government. The Baha'is
are an offshoot of Shiite Islam that the revolutionary regime considers heretical. Although the Koran
enjoins Muslims to protect religious minorities, it also reserves the deepest condemnation for apostates.
The Baha'is are neither particularly numerous in Iran nor particularly powerful, but they have been
hounded, arrested, beaten, tortured, and killed by mobs, by revolutionary police, and by the armed forces.
The regime has frequently assailed the Baha'is as outside the fold of Islam and deserving of death as
heretics.
Just as the war with Iraq provided the new Islamic government with an external enemy to focus the
energies of the country, the Baha'is act as an internal enemy whose presence helps the regime establish
legitimacy. The persecution of the Baha'is acts as a glue for an otherwise fissiparous Iranian populace.
Iranians may be divided between rural and urban, radical and moderate, religious and ostensibly
religious, but they are all one "us" in the face of the Baha'i "them." The Baha'is internally serve much the
same regime-stabilizing function as does the United States externally.
Although the persecution of the Baha'is serves a purpose for the regime, it can be squared with the sharia
only by calling the Baha'is apostates, and that is a highly questionable designation. A similar rationale
underlay Khomeini's fatwa calling for the death of Salman Rushdie. The regime responds to critics
internal and external by saying that it acts in accord with the sharia, but in the case of both Rushdie and
the Baha'is, as well as with its extraterritorial assassinations of dissidents and its restrictions on press
freedom, 32 the regime not only violates international human rights norms but also stretches the sharia to
the limit.
In recent years, Iran has shown some improvement in human rights, though the pattern tends to be two
steps forward, one step back. The revolution has long since lost the fervour of its early years and, like
most revolutions, it has entered its Thermidor phase. Many Iranians yearn for economic stability and
normalcy, and they are increasingly cynical about the religiosity of the regime and its clerics. As a result,
they are no longer as willing to support and aid the government in mass arrests or suppression of political
dissent, and the 1997 presidential elections were the most democratic Iran has ever seen. Though
political parties and candidates still must be approved by a council of experts, the grip of the Iranian
government has loosened, and human rights abuses have consequently decreased.
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III. Multilateral and bilateral policy
As we have seen, in its rhetoric the Iranian government adheres to a set of Islamic human rights
standards. At times, Iranian officials claim that these standards are equivalent or even superior to
international norms. At other times, Iranians defend themselves against criticism from the international
human rights community on the grounds of cultural relativism. Its response to UN human rights
deliberations and investigations is to deflect attention away from its own abuses and toward alleged
abuses by the United States and US allies. Whether it is former President Rafsanjani pointing to events in
Waco, Texas, or officials recalling the downing of an Iranian civilian airliner by the American naval
frigate Vincennes in 1988, 33 Iran tries to shift the international focus away from its own abuses and
towards unpublicized violations in Western countries.
Iran is also a leading advocate of Palestinian rights, and it has repeatedly attacked the United States for
its double standard over Israel. In the words of Sirous Nasseri, Iran's representative on the Human Rights
Commission, "[t]he United States justified Israeli violations of Palestinian human rights and invoked
security reasons and the fragility of negotiations. They turned a blind-eye to atrocities committed by
Israel and established a double standard." 34
Suffering from a US trade embargo and recent US laws that penalize foreign companies for doing
business with Iran, Iran tries to draw attention to the "double standard" whenever it can. As part of its
continuing campaign against Capithorne's report for the Human Rights Commission, Iran assailed the
hypocrisy of the West on the treatment of religious minorities.
The largest religious minority in France and England — the Muslims — is without rights, employment,
or social security. Germany, with its implicit support of racists, periodically attacks the Muslims in that
country.... The nation of Iran has a Constitution. This law may not be satisfactory to those who are
running the New World Order, but is it a violation of human rights to act on and implement what is given
in the nation's constitution? 35
Iran calls on other countries not to follow the US line on Iran. When Japan made a proposed loan
dependent on official Iranian condemnation of terrorism, the Iranian foreign ministry urged Japan not to
buckle under US pressure "to refrain from carrying out business with Iran." Officials remarked that, by
support for terrorism, the US government seemed to have in mind Iran's support for fundamentalist
groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad. Iran vigorously defends its relationship with these
groups, which are, "in the opinion of the Islamic Republic of Iran, struggling to attain their just rights —
there is a difference between their popular struggles and terrorism." 36
In 1996, the US Congress passed the Helms—Burton bill, which penalizes foreign companies for doing
business with Iran and Cuba, because of their alleged support of terrorism and violation of human rights.
The Tehran Times urged the European Union "to take a firm stance against U.S. hegemony." 37 But
though Iran attempts to shift the debate on human rights, its influence in international affairs is limited,
and few countries follow Iran's lead. UN human rights resolutions introduced and supported by Iran,
whether condemning the treatment of prisoners in the United States or the treatment of Palestinians in
Israel, are routinely voted down.
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In its bilateral relations with other countries, the Iranian government must balance the same competing
interests that any country does. At times, pragmatic strategic interests determine policy, and at other
times Iran focuses on human rights, especially in its interaction with other Muslim countries. In its
support for insurgent groups such as Hamas in Israel—Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Iranian
government sought both to extend its sphere of influence and to spread a brand of Islamic revolution that
the early Republic valued greatly. In its relations with the Islamic government of Sudan, Iran has been at
best cool, sometimes competitive, and occasionally hostile. Vying for leadership of the international
political Islamic movement, the governments of the Sudan and Iran have spoken well of each other in
public, but relations have been frosty.
Iranian leaders frequently avowed their solidarity with the Muslims of Bosnia during the mid-1990s, and
Iran was an advocate of international action to prevent the massacres of Bosnian Muslims by the Serbs.
The government also criticized the European Union and the United States for their lack of action in
Bosnia, and it often suggested that the unwillingness of the West to act in Serbia demonstrated a "human
rights for me but not for thee" attitude. 38 The decision by the NATO powers to bomb Serbia in response
to events in Kosovo was welcomed by some in Iran, although the dismal result for the Muslim Kosovars
who were expelled from their homes was interpreted by Iranians as yet another sign of the West's
disregard for the human rights of Muslims.
Iran has vehemently condemned human rights violations in the Gulf sheikhdom of Bahrain, assailing
Bahraini restrictions on press freedom, freedom of assembly, and the religious freedom of Shiite
Muslims. 39 In Algeria, after the military government annulled elections won by fundamentalists in
December 1991, that country was plunged into a brutal civil war. Iran excoriated both the military junta
and the West for supporting it. According to the Tehran Times, "[t]he ruling junta in Algeria is not
serious about putting an end to the bloodshed in that Muslim country.... Those countries that shed
crocodile tears for the people of Cuba, China and other parts of the world claiming these nations are
suffering from a lack of democracy gave the green light to the Algeria ruling clique encouraging them to
annul popular elections." The editorial claimed that, even though the Algerian government infringes the
fundamental rights of its citizens, rights recognized by the UN Charter, the "so-called patrons of human
rights" adopt "a double standard" in the policy toward Algeria. 40
In neighbouring Afghanistan, the fundamentalist Taliban movement took control of Kabul in 1996. The
Taliban are a puritanical Sunni group whose interpretation of the sharia differs significantly from the
ideology of the ruling clerics in Iran, and Iranian official news sources have been highly critical. In the
words of a Tehran Times editorial, "[a] brief survey of the Taliban's record will shed light on the nature
and doctrine of this fanatical and reactionary group which is seeking in vain to seize total political power
in Afghanistan." Among its other crimes, the Taliban militia "banned Afghan women from all kinds of
social activities.... Women are not even allowed to walk freely in the streets.... The group also compels
the men at gunpoint to take part in congregational prayers." The paper called on the United Nations to
intervene, and it warned that if the United Nations did nothing it would be tantamount "to approving all
the inhuman and barbaric acts committed by the Taliban fanatics ... and will seriously undermine the
respect for human rights in Afghanistan." 41 The Iranian government took a position on human rights
violations in Afghanistan that was noticeably more stringent than that taken by the Western powers. Iran
may have had strategic reasons for opposing the Taliban, but there is no more reason to impugn the
integrity of the human rights argument developed by Iranian leaders in the context of Islamic rights than
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there is to question human rights arguments put forth by the US State Department.
 
IV. Conclusion
Though Iran has never embraced the Western notion of universal human rights, the Islamic Republic
does believe in "Islamic rights." In some respects, these are identical to the human rights championed by
the United Nations. The laws of Islam and the Iranian Constitution offer protection from poverty and
arbitrary violence at the hands of either the state or other people; property rights are defined and
respected; and the rule of law is respected. In other areas, such as the treatment of women and crime and
punishment, the Islamic Republic adamantly defends practices that many Western countries view as
human rights violations. And, like most countries, the actual practices of the government frequently
contradict or fail to live up to these ideals. The rule of law is often trumped by arbitrary exercises of
power, and in at least one case, the Baha'is, religious minorities are persecuted.
Iran also suspects the motives of the international human rights movement. Many of the governing
clerics simply do not believe in liberalism or political pluralism as defined by the Western democracies.
Though Khatami has spoken in favour of pluralism, he makes his case on the basis of Islamic
jurisprudence, and he does not embrace Western liberal traditions. At the same time, there is more
genuine intellectual freedom and political participation in Iran than in dozens of countries in the Arab
and Muslim world. Iranian leaders then interpret the denunciation of the human rights community as an
annoying but predictable aspect of the campaign waged against Iran by the United States.
Although there is a thin line between apology for and explanation of Iran's human rights record in the
1990s, the situation is neither as grim as the United States says nor as pristine as the Iranian government
avers. The excesses and atrocities of the early years of the revolution have largely ceased and, as the
revolution becomes more institutionalized and less fervent, the human rights situation has improved.
However, as long as there is an Islamic Republic dominated by the clerics, Iran will continue to interpret
human rights differently than the international mainstream.
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Chapter 9: Human rights and foreign policy in





Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic share the cultural identity of Central Europe, which is
intertwined with Habsburg rule and thus affected by Vienna. "Budapest, Prague and Cracow were not
just suburbs of Vienna," but rather part of a cultural network strongly connected with that imperial city. 1
Political traditions are also common. In 1331 the kings of the three countries (Hungary, Poland, and
Bohemia) met in Visegrád (Hungary) to facilitate their economic ties. Bohemia, Slovakia, and Croatia,
all parts of Hungary at one time, were under the same rule for 473 years. Hungary and Poland were
unified for 172 years, and Poland and Bohemia were officially joined for 183 years. 2 In 1991, the
leaders of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia met in Visegrád and renewed their trilateral
cooperation, including in the field of foreign policy, aiming at full membership in Western international
institutions. All three states felt the need to give attention to human rights through their foreign policies,
in part to meet the expections of their Western colleagues. But all three countries also contained some
cultural aspects generating domestic pressures in favour of human rights — at least at home if not
abroad. This chapter addresses the place of human rights in Hungarian foreign policy, with comparative
attention to the Czech Republic and Poland.
As far as traditions affecting human rights are concerned, Central Europe always had some elements of
social autonomy. In addition, Western versions of Christianity were preserved, as were some separation
of powers and a measure of constitutionality. But the role of the state was stronger and the economy was
weaker there than in the West. 3 The geopolitical identity of these countries "was and is based on a
fundamental duality, on the hope of being accepted into the West and on the fear of being dominated by
the East." 4 Beside this fundamental duality there was a general understanding of the geopolitical
situation: nothing good can be expected from the strongest powers in the neighbourhood. This feeling,
however, was never great enough to unite Central Europe, especially not between the two world wars, in
the shadow of the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, mainly because in the twentieth century the
fulfilment of national aspirations was essentially at the expense of others in the region.
A metaphor frequently used to describe the geopolitical position of especially Hungary, but also of the
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other two states, is the "ferry-state." Culturally and politically Hungary was attracted to the West, but the
strong currents of power relations pushed the country to the East. It found its path to the West twice,
once after the withdrawal of the Turks in the seventeenth century, and again after the collapse of the
Soviet empire in 1989. The Czech Republic and Poland, too, considered themselves Western but often
found themselves within the sphere of influence of an Eastern power. In all three states there was
considerable support for individual rights, but international — as well as domestic — politics prevented
their full development.
A brief look at recent history indicates the main lines of political evolution as regards human rights in
these three states in Central Europe. In the 1920s and 1930s Hungary was an authoritarian state with a
parliamentary facade; real parliamentary democracy never existed. 5 Conditions for human rights were
definitely less favourable in Hungary than in Czechoslovakia (the predecessor of the Czech Republic and
Slovakia) and similar to or slightly better than those in Poland. In the interwar period, Czechoslovakia
was a well-functioning constitutional democracy, which possessed a Constitutional Court with powers
over primary legislation. 6 Both the rule of law and legal science were highly developed in
Czechoslovakia, as reflected in the well-known school of jurisprudence in Brno. 7 Between 1921 and
1926 Poland was a parliamentary democracy; in 1926, however, Marshall Pilsudski returned to power
with the help of a military coup d'Ètat. Pilsudski curtailed political freedoms, although he preserved a
(limited) multi-party system. In 1935, with the acceptance of a new constitution, Poland was similar to
later authoritarian-bureaucratic states in Latin America. 8
After a short and limited parliamentary democracy (1945–1947) in Hungary, the Stalinist period
(1947–1963) was brutal and provoked a revolution and a national uprising (Budapest Autumn) in 1956.
This was suppressed by the Soviet Union, followed by a cruel repression. In the 1970s and 1980s
Hungary was regarded as a reformed communist country, mainly owing to the market-oriented reforms
in the economy. As a reformed country, the state permitted certain freedoms in areas of economic
activity, especially consumer patterns. These freedoms slowly expanded to include other spheres of
society, although fundamental rights were never recognized as belonging to individuals. Fundamental
rights should not be confused with benefits conditionally given upon the "benevolent understanding" of
the party leadership. 9 The Hungarian democratic opposition played a crucial role in undermining the
official communist ideology, while the populist opposition drew the attention of the international public
to the violation of Hungarian minorities' rights in the neighbouring countries. Since there were sizeable
Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states such as Slovakia and Romania, human rights in the form of
minority rights loomed large in Hungarian foreign policy in the first decade after the collapse of
European communism.
After the Czechoslovak communist coup d'Ètat in February 1948 a similar period of "construction of
socialism" started; 20 years later, in 1968, this socialism wore a human face for a brief time under
Alexander Dubcek. The Prague Spring, and the effort to combine socialism with some civil and political
rights, were followed by a Soviet-inspired military intervention by the Warsaw Pact states, and personal
freedom was once again suppressed. The political opposition took the form of a small human rights
movement, the famous Charter 77, which was linked to the 1975 Helsinki Accord and the Western ideas
(and pressure) supporting it.
In Poland, the Catholic Church was able to preserve its integrity and major parts of its social role.
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Furthermore private ownership remained legal with respect to agriculture. Mass demonstrations shocked
the ruling circles in 1956 and in 1970. Personal freedoms were never secure, however, as seen by the
anti-Semitic campaign lauded by the party state apparatus in the aftermath of the Middle East War in
1967. In 1980–1981 the Communist Party was forced to accept the conditions laid down by the
independent trade union, Solidarity. In 1981, martial law was introduced in the country, and as a result
the authorities banned Solidarity. Between 1981 and 1989, however, underground activities were so
widespread in Poland that it was justified to talk about the existence of a second society. After the end of
martial law (1983) the Communist agenda to polish the image of the regime led to a Constitutional
Tribunal (1985) and a Parliamentary Ombudsman in 1987. The latter proved to be truly useful for human
rights practices, mainly because of Ewa Letowska, who filled the job. 10
The Hungarian transition to democracy (1989–1990) was slow because of negotiations and a peaceful
adjustment to the new era that were strictly legally guided. In this process the fact that Hungary is said to
be a nation of lawyers definitely played an important role. 11 In October 1989, "the velvet revolution"
occurred in Prague and it changed the political system. The Polish transition to democracy was also a
negotiated process with certain crucial but tentative elements of compromise (e.g. the first parliamentary
election was only partially free, with the Communist Party having reserved seats in the Sejm).
In sum, Hungary and also Poland have so far had a rather weak democratic culture. It existed, for
example, amongst the nobility in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries. In these two countries, the push
for civil and political rights has reappeared at certain times — in 1956 in Hungary and periodically in the
modern era in Poland. The Czech Republic, on the other hand, has had direct experience of a functioning
liberal or quasi-liberal democracy for some two decades.
Even where democracy has been weak, as in Hungary and Poland, two principles have been reasonably
well accepted, at least in intellectual circles: the idea of constitutionality and the idea of self-government.
The first refers to the operation of the state according to constitutional statutes and its accountability. 12
The second was interpreted by some Hungarian intellectuals to include protection against state power, at
least in the form of what we would now call federalism, if not individual human rights. JÛzsef EÆtvÆs,
13 an eminent thinker, wrote in 1851:
In order to limit state power ... it should also be provided that the individual should not stand isolated
against the state power. Consequently, the only means of protection, in our age, against the omnipotence
of the state is the same which has been serving as protection against any kind of unlimited power for
centuries, namely that villages, provinces and state organs, which link the individual to the state should
be given certain spheres of independent activities thus limiting state power very strictly in practice. 14
Summing up important social and political virtues, in the case of Hungary it is necessary to emphasize
the importance of individual economic freedoms, 15 a preserved sense of legalism1 16 or legal formalism,
17 and sensitivity to minority rights. As far as the Czech Republic is concerned, the tradition of liberal
constitutionalism, along with the spirit of civic action, although damaged by 40 years of communism, is
still the strongest in the former communist Central Europe. Elements of Polish political culture are
supportive of many internationally recognized human rights, 18 and the sense of political pluralism was
preserved in Poland because of the role of the Catholic Church and the "second society." In Poland the
working class was a leading anti-communist force. Yet trade unionism is still the most important
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contributing factor to the "trap of inherited entitlements" 19 — the demand to maintain the material
content of social rights, which is, of course, a phenomenon in Hungary and in the Czech Republic as
well. All three countries became used to an extensive welfare state, which is difficult to reconcile fully




As a consequence of the fall of communism, today the people do have human rights in Hungary but this
does not mean that old social habits, especially patterns of behaviour that reflect the experiences of the
communist period, have totally disappeared. People, unlike laws, have memories and established patterns
of behaviour. These can be changed only gradually, if at all. 20 To transform hearts and minds is much
more difficult than to model constitutions and laws on those of Western democracies, as a Judge of the
Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic pointed out. 21 In an essay written in 1986, a Hungarian
political dissident compared everyday social life in Britain and in Hungary. Unfortunately he missed
three important social virtues in Hungary: privacy — general respect for the private sphere; fairness —
trust in social exchanges; and efficiency in the management of everyday businesses. 22 As of the late
1990s, trust and efficient social management are still serious problems. As far as privacy is concerned, in
the past politics endangered it. Today private consumerism does something almost as irritating. One of
the achievements of "liberalization" under late socialism was some domestic privacy in Hungary,
assuming you did not happen to be a political dissident. Today, even the human body and its intimate
biological functions are perfect targets for aggressive television advertisements, as the flood of
commercials demonstrates. 23 The realm of personal privacy is threatened more by economic than by
political abuse.
Analysing the mood of the public towards human rights in Poland, Professor Kurczewski comes to a
conclusion that is equally valid in Hungary and the Czech Republic:
First, it is difficult to imagine an interest in human rights if poverty, disorganisation and discontent would
exceed a certain level. Visibility of crime, new types of crime, the influx of criminals abroad and the
availability of weapons make crime problems the most vulnerable point in the barrier that divides
societies friendly to human rights from those that put other considerations above human rights. The
Polish police find strong organized crime and a large amount of crime in general, and in this climate very
often ideas focus on that. This has the potential to endanger the proper respect and protection of human
rights. Until now however, the problem has not achieved the scale that would lead to the real
endangerment of the right in question. 24
The fear of rising criminality is the reason Poland, at least theoretically, has preserved the death penalty.
This is also why proposals in favour of capital punishment have re-emerged in Hungary 25 and in the
Czech Republic.
People are becoming accustomed to the legal defence of their human rights, whereas it was natural for
them to turn to the law when there was a conflict over inheritance, for example. This has implications for
foreign human rights policy. In all three states, there is now the possibility of submitting an individual
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complaint about rights violations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Ratification of this
treaty has resulted in a large number of petitions in each state. Apart from this development, the lack of
test cases and the relative weakness of domestic human rights groups continue to thwart the human rights
culture, which is why the role of transnational human rights NGOs (Amnesty International, Interights,
etc.) is still rather important. This, of course, does not mean that the top Hungarian human rights groups
do not engage in valuable work. Here it is necessary to refer to the activities of the following NGOs: the
Hungarian Helsinki Committee, mainly dealing with asylum seekers and victims of the brutality of the
police; the Society for Freedoms, focusing on the rights of mentally ill patients; the Raoul Wallenberg
Society, concentrating on racial discrimination; the Martin Luther King Society, fighting discrimination
against blacks and Asians; the Hungarian Centre for the Protection of Rights, the Roma Civil Rights
Foundation, and the Bureau for the Protection of Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, combating
discrimination against Romanies; and the Shelter Society, providing help for asylum seekers. They
collect evidence of the violation of human rights, publish reports and periodicals, organize protest
activities, build networks which raise funds, and provide legal aid. These activities are becoming more
and more professional. 26
In Hungary, two scientific periodicals are exclusively devoted to human rights (Acta Humana and
Fundamentum). As far as the general press coverage of human rights violations is concerned, police
violence, skin-head brutality against Romanies, and racial discrimination issues in particular attract
significant attention.
Another important factor influencing the mood of the public towards human rights issues, which is to a
certain extent connected with the fear of criminality, is immigration. Reflecting the negative attitude of
the public, the government has put obstacles in the way of asylum seekers. 27 The same is true in the
Czech Republic.
The widespread desire for secure jobs, and for social security in the broadest sense, not only leads to the
"trap of inherited entitlements" but heavily influences voting behaviour. The electorate voted for the
former communists in Hungary in 1994 and in Poland in 1993 because the people wanted to enjoy social
protection again. But in both countries the new socialist parties strictly followed the path of
marketization and the devolution of the welfare system. The search for social security led to the return of
a Solidarity government in 1997 in Poland, and could also easily cause the fall of governments in
Hungary. The Klaus government, which was devoted to strict market capitalism, 28 fell in the Czech
Republic, but more owing to scandal than simply to a rejection of its economic policies. All three
countries under review here continue to struggle to find a stable synthesis between the desire for social
security and the desire for individual freedom — especially in economic matters. The older Western
democracies have found a general zone of consensus about how to combine individual freedom with a
welfare state, even though different political parties compete to move public policy one way or the other.
The new Central European democracies are still trying to establish that general zone.
During the first years of transition from communism to market democracy, the constitutional courts,
especially in Hungary, played a surprising if indirect role in shaping foreign policy on human rights. The
paradigmatic case was the decision of the Constitutional Court of Hungary concerning the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty. 29 At the time of the decision, Hungary was not bound by an
international commitment to remove the death penalty, but the judgment referred to, among others
things, Protocol 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights — which required outright abolition. In
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his concurring opinion, the President of the Court, Judge LászlÛ SÛlyom, stated that it was appropriate
for the Court to examine foreign practice and noted that the international trend had been towards the
abolition of the death penalty. 30 This judgment pre-empted a debate about ratification of Protocol 6 to
the European Convention and of Protocol 2 to the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights.
If one evaluates domestic developments as regards the realization of human rights in Hungary, Poland,
and the Czech Republic through the eyes of human rights NGOs, the general picture is mostly
favourable. These countries are liberal democracies, no political or other extrajudicial killings occur,
habeas corpus exists, trials are fair and public, and there are free elections, free speech, and freedom of
peaceful assembly and association. 31 This does not mean that sometimes serious rights problems do not
arise, but this situation obtains in all liberal democracies. In Hungary, the slow privatization of
nationwide TV channels (which was completed in 1998), abuse by the police, conditions in police
detention facilities, the ill-treatment of the Romany population, and inhuman repatriation of foreigners 32
are all serious. The Commission of the European Union (EU) emphasized two things: corruption and
treatment of Romanies. 33 In the Czech Republic, one finds the problems of access to information by
journalists, abuse by the police, the degradation of the Romany population, and an over-long application
procedure for asylum seekers. 34 In Poland, much scrutiny has been directed to the vague legal
formulation of the law allowing wiretapping, inadequate conduct by the police, the problems of the right
of appeal against a negative decision on asylum, and the legal existence of the death penalty (although it
has been under a moratorium since 1 November 1995). 35 Thus the problems are similar: the
aggressiveness of the police, discrimination against Romanies, bad treatment of asylum seekers,
problems with the right to information and the freedom of the media — to which can be added
declarations of racial hatred by right-wing extremists. Instead of focusing on these defects, however, the
typical man in the street is more likely to mention the inability of the state to serve its citizens: the state
provides insufficient regulations on this or that social service (for example on the rights of physically
disabled), or inadequate conditions in centres for mentally ill persons or in prisons; the authorities exceed
deadlines; court decisions remain on paper, etc. 36 Until a rights culture is instituted at home, human
rights are not likely to be a major issue in foreign policy.
Thus, with the exception of certain issues — the multilateral protection of minority rights in the case of
Hungary, or bilateral relationships including human rights aspects (Hungarian minorities in Slovakia,
Romania, and Yugoslavia; the Polish minority in Lithuania; the Sudetenland question between the Czech
Republic and Germany) — the Hungarian, Czech, and Polish states do not have many other specific
human rights priorities in their foreign policy other than to prove their sincere adherence to international,
especially to European, norms and to the EU common foreign policy. 37 The common foreign policy
goals — full membership in NATO and the EU — create a community of interests 38 in the field of
human rights policy among the three countries. 39
It was symptomatic that until 1998 in Hungary there was no separate unit for human rights in the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 40 human rights issues belonged to different directorates (UN and European
integration). There is, however, a Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad, which is
independent from the ministry. At the time of the preparation of "basic treaties" with Slovakia and
Romania (1994–1996) there was an institutional competition between these two units. The office
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represented the stronger position on minority rights claims, but in both cases the ministry was the
"winner." The ministry emphasized that it was more important to conclude mutually acceptable treaties
— as preconditions of membership in NATO and in the EU — than to demand unacceptably strong




As far as the adherence of Hungary, the Czech Republic (Czechoslovakia before 1 January 1993), and
Poland to the two UN basic human rights Covenants is concerned, these states had already ratified both
during the period of dictatorial socialism in the 1970s without reservations. 41 But, like other socialist
states, they did not at that time ratify Optional Protocol 1 to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which allowed individual complaints before the UN Human Rights Committee.
In 1988–1989, as a reflection of the new domestic politics, Hungary became a very active ratifier of
human rights treaties (the most active among the three and in the Warsaw Pact). 42 Hungary ratified
Optional Protocol 1 to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the (1977) Additional Protocols to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions on Human Rights in Armed Conflict, and acceded to the 1951 Refugee
Convention and its 1967 Protocol. After 1 January 1990, Czechoslovakia and Poland followed this
general line as well — although Poland has failed to ratify Optional Protocol 2 to the Civil-Political
Covenant on abolition of the death penalty. All three states publicly renounced their abstentions in the
1948 vote approving the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the UN General Assembly. Thus all
three are now on record as endorsing the International Bill of Rights.
Regional human rights activities are very important for all three states. Hungary, the Czech Republic, and
Poland actively participate in the system for the protection of human rights of the Council of Europe,
which activity is strongly interconnected with the widespread desire within each to prove their
commitment to the "idea of Europe." 43 One proves that one is European by committing to regional
standards on human rights. All three ratified the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), with reservations of minor
importance. 44 All three accepted Articles 25 and 46 of the Convention on the right of individual petition
and on the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights. As far as the Protocols
attached to the European Convention are concerned, there is almost complete adherence by each of the
three countries, with small differences. Year by year, individual complaints are getting more and more
satisfactory (early applications from Central Europe were frequently unacceptable). 45 National courts in
all three countries are becoming accustomed to basing their decisions directly on the European
Convention on Human Rights; 46 previously they never relied directly on an international treaty. With
regard to the European Social Charter, all three states signed it, and Poland and Hungary have ratified it;
Czech ratification is on its way.
The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, on the basis of its first periodic visits, criticized prison conditions in both Hungary and
Poland. Such issues were raised as insufficient accommodation and recreational activities, or the
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censoring of correspondence. 47 The governments tended to accept these well-documented observations.
48 The experts of the Council of Europe criticized the Czech Citizenship Law of 1992 because it
excluded from Czech citizenship Slovaks who had their permanent residence in the Czech Republic. That
law created a number of stateless persons, and it was also used in a discriminatory manner against the
members of the Romany community. In Slovakia, Romanies who had been arrested but not prosecuted
were treated as not meeting the legal requirements of a clean criminal record in order to apply for
citizenship. 49 The government had failed to respond to criticism of this practice by human rights
non-governmental organizations, but as a consequence of a report by the experts of the Council of
Europe in April 1996 the law was amended.
From the mid-1970s, the diplomatic process known as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE), which later became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
proved important to all three states. Hungarian diplomacy in the 1980s under late socialism took CSCE
humanitarian commitments more and more seriously and tried to use them to justify domestic liberal
steps (in the field of travelling abroad, for example), but Budapest tried to avoid any open confrontation
with the Soviet Union. 50 The ruling political parties in both Hungary and Poland attempted to improve a
range of humanitarian issues, but without changing the existing features of socialism or the one-party
state. A more rigid view existed in Czechoslovakia (and also in the majority of the socialist states), which
saw the whole subject of human rights and humanitarian affairs as a disguised Western attempt to
smuggle a Trojan horse into the socialist camp in order to destroy it. During the second half of the 1980s
at the Vienna Conference on CSCE principles, Hungary became active on minority issues. In 1988,
Hungary supported a Canadian protest against Romania's policy toward its Hungarian minority. For the
first time in the Helsinki process, an ally of the Soviet Union crossed the line between East and West. In
June–July 1990, Hungary was an important actor in the group of states stressing minority rights at the
Copenhagen Conference on the Humanitarian Dimension of the CSCE. 51
When in the 1990s the OSCE addressed human rights in armed conflicts and/or issues of the right to
collective self-determination, Hungary continued its active diplomacy — once again motivated by
concern for the Hungarian minority in foreign countries. Thus Hungary was active diplomatically
regarding the Ossetian, Abkhaz, Chechen, and other conflicts, in order to send diplomatic signals to
Bratislava and Bucharest in particular. The basic message was that major problems can be avoided later
through correct minority protection now.
In general, Hungarian foreign policy has been sympathetic to the human rights activities of the
CSCE/OSCE since the 1980s. 52 In 1995, LászlÛ Kovács, the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
evaluated the human rights commitments of CSCE/OSCE thus: "The political commitments are more
elastic than the legal ones, consequently the political commitments accepted in the context of the OSCE
— thus, in the field of human rights — point further than conventions. Obviously this tendency enforces
the authority of the OSCE." 53
With regard to the international financial institutions, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland are
borrowing states. Thus their voices are far from being important in such institutions as the International
Monetary Fund or the World Bank. Because of their general support for the principle of international
protection of human rights, they are not against the injection of human rights considerations into the
conditions of loans of these international financial institutions. All three countries are founder members
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of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which was the first development bank
explicitly to include human rights requirements in its founding Statute. 54
Hungary, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (1992–1993), actively participated in
the management of such delicate issues as the peaceful transition to majority rule in South Africa,
problems affecting the process of monitoring UN decisions on Iraq, the war on the territory of the former
Yugoslavia, and the establishment of the Criminal Tribunal devoted to the violation of international
humanitarian law there. In the case of South Africa, Hungary's representative compared the transition to
democracy there to what happened in his country:
The dramatic changes which have occurred recently in the eastern-central region of Europe, including
Hungary, bear some similarity to those now taking shape in South Africa. The most critical challenge
that those changes posed for our region was that of ensuring that the transition towards democracy would
take place peacefully. The experience my country has gained in this matter suggests that changes to our
system carried out in our region were helped enormously by the absence of violence. Those changes of
system succeeded in becoming substantial and convincing in nature, to the extent that power was
transferred exclusively by peaceful means, through negotiation mechanisms, by means of agreements
concluded between political partners of opposing camps. That experience has also shown that one must
avoid doing anything that might serve to unleash passions and to set in motion uncontrollable processes,
thus jeopardising the success of the transition itself. 55
Hungary clearly indicated its support for the punitive measures of the Security Council against Iraq in
defence of the right to existence of small states:
A year ago, the forces of an international coalition pitted themselves against Iraqi aggression. They
liberated Kuwait and thus re-established international legality by acting in accordance with the United
Nations Charter. We would like the government of the Republic of Iraq and its high-ranking
representatives who are with us today to understand how a small country such as Hungary was jolted and
distressed — through the implications of this act for international relations in general — at seeing a
country not only invade another but then deny the very existence of that country Member of the United
Nations. Therefore, Hungary has expressed its full support for the measures taken by the Security
Council since the outset of the Gulf crisis. 56
In answer to the Iraqi accusation that the members of the Security Council committed genocide against
the Iraqi people, the Hungarian representative stated: "In our view, that is not the best way to convince
the international community of the need to ease the sanctions imposed on Iraq. It is because of Iraq's
refusal to cooperate." 57
In the Yugoslav crises, for example in connection with the expulsion of CSCE missions by the Belgrade
government, the Hungarian representative tried to act as a protector of the rights of ethnic Hungarians
living there:
The decision of the Belgrade Government was taken at a time when the situation in each of the three
regions continues to be volatile. The international community has had well-founded reasons to
concentrate its attention recently on Kosovo, where tension gives cause for serious concern. However,
the situation is also very fragile in Vojvodina and Sandjak, where the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of ethnic communities are far from being fully respected. We are particularly concerned about
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the situation of the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, which is being continuously threatened and lives
under conditions of intimidation and harassment. As a consequence of this, tens of thousands of
Hungarians have had to leave and seek refuge abroad, mainly in my country. It is not by accident, either,
that at the same time Serb settlers have been sent to Vojvodina in large numbers, moving into the homes
of Hungarians who left the region. Although the methods are somewhat different, the objectives behind
this scenario are all too familiar by now. 58
After UN Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) unanimously approved the establishment of the
Criminal Tribunal, the Hungarian representative underlined the connection between the settlement of the
Yugoslav conflict and the punishment of perpetrators:
Hungary has firmly supported all resolutions of the Security Council concerning grave violations of
international humanitarian law. Hungary is convinced that persons who commit or order the commission
of grave and systematic violations of that law should not escape the hand of justice, and their acts cannot
enjoy impunity. We are deeply convinced that it is impossible to envisage a lasting settlement of the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia, including the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, without the
prosecution of those who massacre and burn children, women and elderly people; who, with diabolical
regularity, shell innocent civilian populations; who practice "ethnic cleansing", the true tragic
implications of which have not yet been fully appreciated; who cut off the water supplies of besieged
communities; who deliberately destroy cultural or religious property, and so on. 59
The Hungarian seat in the Security Council was first taken over by the Czech Republic (1994–1995) and
then by Poland (1996–1997). The Czech delegate, in the debate over the UN Secretary-General's report
on Bosnia and Hercegovina, proved to be almost as passionate as the Hungarian delegate in the previous
quotation:
Some have described the Secretary-General's report as containing "shortcomings", as providing
"insufficient evidence", as containing "arbitrary statements". They have argued that the "alleged" mass
killings and disappearances furthered a "propaganda campaign" of the Bosnian Government, and even
that it was renegade Muslims who slaughtered thousands of their co-religionists.... We would, most of
all, delight in finding out that the Srebrenica thousands were not killed at all, that they had merely been
forgotten — sequestered, perhaps, in some barn in a hidden mountain valley. However, we are not aware
of any such factual evidence. We are not aware of any evidence better than that provided in the
Secretary-General's report, and we agree with him that it is indeed undeniable. 60
The Polish delegate, in connection with the UN role in the solution of another conflict, the Haitian
problem, emphasized two things: the fact that the Polish delegation associated itself with the statement
by the Italian delegation on behalf of the European Union, and the contribution of the UN mission to the
strengthening of the fragile nature of Haitian democracy. 61 The identification with the EU's standpoints
and commitments to international endeavours to promote human rights are common in the foreign policy
of the Visegrád three. The voting behaviour of the Central European states in the Security Council during
the years of almost completely unanimous resolutions is not a real indicator; they just followed the
dominant line. 62
Hungarian leaders delivering speeches in the UN General Assembly in the 1990s attached special
importance to human rights questions. GÈza Jeszenszky, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the first
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freely elected (conservative) Hungarian government, emphasized that minority rights are a part of human
rights:
In our age, the power of human rights has become global and cannot serve any particular interests. The
idea of free individuals in a free world transcends State frontiers and fulfils a mission which will
ultimately lead us to a world without borders.... The Government of the Republic of Hungary devotes
particular attention to the international protection of minority rights. Therefore, we welcome the growing
awareness that the rights of national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities form an integral part of
universally recognised human rights. 63
In the same month (October 1991), Prime Minister JÛzsef Antall, indicating Hungary's commitment to
the principle of self-determination, took a step to correct one of the diplomatic misdeeds of communist
Hungary. In 1975, as a country of the Soviet bloc, Hungary was in favour of the anti-Zionist resolution of
the General Assembly.
The principle of the self-determination of peoples cannot be applied selectively. Peace in the Middle East
can be brought about, inter alia, on the basis of that principle. It is urgent, therefore, that the General
Assembly revoke its resolution on Zionism adopted in 1975. Zionism is the Jewish people's philosophy
of self-determination and the establishment of their own State. The resolution to which I have referred
thus calls into question those fundamental rights of the Jewish people. 64
In October 1994, LászlÛ Kovács, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the socialist-liberal government
(elected in 1994), underlined the universal character of human rights:
By the same token, we believe that the United Nations has not yet exhausted the means available for the
international protection of human rights. We urge the international community to seek new and
innovative means and methods to safeguard the rights and freedoms of our fellow human beings,
wherever they may live. 65
He indicated Hungary's readiness to participate in civic human rights monitoring. 66 In October 1997,
Kovács described the Hungarian contribution to the fulfilment of one of the prerequisites of respect for
human rights — international peace:
It is in this context that in recent years Hungary has increased its participation in UN mandated
peace-keeping operations in a variety of ways, including both infrastructural and logistical support and
the deployment of military and police personnel, an example of which is the Hungarian contribution to
IFOR and SFOR and the considerable increase in the number of Hungarian peace-keepers serving in
UNFICYP. We are pleased that the performance and professional skill of my compatriots engaged in
various such operations all across the globe are considered positively. 67
Hungary took other clear positions on human rights issues in the General Assembly. Budapest welcomed
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action accepted by the UN Human Rights Conference in
Vienna in 1993. It endorsed the innovative procedures developed by various human rights treaty bodies
— such as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on the Rights of
the Child, and the Human Rights Committee — with regard to preventive action, emergency situations,
early warning, and follow-up. 68 Hungary condemned the violation of human rights in Serbia, Iraq, Cuba,
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Myanmar, and the Sudan. 69 Hungary, as well as Poland, attached special importance to the adoption of
the resolution on the establishment of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights 70 and identified itself with the EU statement in support of the High Commissioner's strategy. 71
This identification with the EU's standpoint is the main characteristic feature of the voting behaviour of
Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland in the General Assembly. In 1995–1996, for example,
similarly to previous years, the voting behaviour of the three countries was identical and strictly followed
the line of EU states. 72
The participation of the three Central European states in the work of the UN Commission on Human
Rights reflects their attitude towards leading human rights issues and initiatives. Their policies changed
as a consequence of their transition from dictatorial socialism to market democracy. They became
supporters of Western, especially European, policies rather than followers of Soviet voting patterns and
supporters of draft resolutions introduced by radical developing countries.
The icebreaker of the unity of the socialist camp was Hungary, as already noted with regard to the
Vienna Conference of the CSCE. Hungary focused on Romania's persecution of its Hungarian minority
not only in that regional body but also in the UN's Human Rights Commission. During the era of
European communism, the socialist countries adhered to a tacit agreement not to openly criticize each
other's minority policies. Hungary broke with this tradition and co-sponsored a resolution on Romania in
the UN Commission on Human Rights. The resolution on the human rights situation in Romania 73
noted:
That the Romanian Government's policy of rural systematization, which involves forcible resettlement
and affects long standing traditions, would if implemented, lead to a further violation of the human rights
of large sectors of the population and expressed the Commission's concern at the imposition of
increasingly severe obstacles to the maintenance of the cultural identity of Romania's national minorities.
74
The socialist member states either abstained (Yugoslavia) or did not participate in the vote (Bulgaria,
German Democratic Republic, Ukraine, USSR). The co-sponsors of the original draft resolution, 75 with
the exception of Hungary, were all OECD member states. 76
If one reviews the policies of Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland in the UN Human Rights
Commission during the 1990s, it is fairly easy to conclude that they followed the European, but not
necessarily the US, position on issues touching upon Cuba, 77 Iraq, and Iran, or the question of the
realization in all countries of economic, social, and cultural rights. 78 It is difficult, however, to identify
the dominant human rights theme of the three states. The only exception is Hungary's clear emphasis on
minority and ethnic questions. Thus Hungary was active in the preparation of the resolution on the Rights
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. 79 A Hungarian national
was also active on similar issues in the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities, which reports to the Commission but consists of private individuals rather than state
representatives. On many issues before the Commission and Sub-Commission, such as the human rights
of all persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment or human rights violations in different
parts of the world (Burundi, Rwanda, Myanmar, etc.), Hungarian, Czech, and Polish diplomacy is
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supportive. But these three Central European states normally do not play a leading role in human rights
initiatives; they are European "followers" or "partners." 80
 
IV. Bilateral policy
Hungary's bilateral foreign policy on human rights has been dominated by its concern for ethnic
Hungarians living abroad. As shown above, this concern was not absent from its multilateral policy. But
this concern looms even larger in bilateral relations with its immediate neighbours. Although there is
some variation across Hungarian governments, bilateral policy on rights abroad made in Prague and
Warsaw is quite different, owing to different factual contexts. Thus this section focuses heavily on
Hungary — if only for reasons of space limitations.
Hungary's modern borders had been set in 1920 in the Trianon Peace Treaty and they were reaffirmed in
the Peace Treaty of Paris of 1947. More than 3 million ethnic Hungarians remained in neighbouring
states. Today, 2.0–2.4 million live in Romania, 600,000—700,000 in Slovakia, 300,000–350,000 in
Serbia, and 150,000—200,000 in Ukraine. 81 Hungary is a country where the percentage of national and
ethnic minorities (Slovaks, Germans, Serbs, Croats, etc.) is comparatively small. Consequently, there is
an asymmetry between Hungary and its neighbours regarding the protection of minority rights.
In general, the legacy of Trianon, the "Trianon syndrome," proved to be highly difficult to overcome for
Hungarian foreign policy, with concern for human rights as a modern attachment to this syndrome. The
Trianon syndrome, with its many different meanings, has since the Paris Peace Treaties that concluded
the First World War never ceased to be present in Hungarian thinking on foreign policy. Trianon has
been identified first of all with incapacity in political and economic affairs, with its neighbourhood policy
sentenced to failure, and, last but not least, with the experience that Hungary has become a victim of
Great Power politics. 82
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire brought considerable hope for improvement in the status
of the Hungarian minorities. It presented a historic opportunity to pave the way to a durable solution to
this problem, but as it turned out progress was not possible immediately. More time was needed to
conclude bilateral treaties on this historically sensitive issue. After 1989, Hungary played the role of the
kin-state, demanding protective guarantees. But the neighbouring countries showed a noticeable
reluctance to respond affirmatively. The reasons they behaved this way are complex.
In states such as Serbia and Slovakia, the process of creating a modern nation-state placed great stress on
national and even ethnic unity. In Romania the process was different but the outcome was largely the
same. An overwhelming emphasis on national unity did not leave much political space for the concept of
minorities and minority rights. In all three states, ruling circles tended to view multilingual usage,
especially in the state administration, in schools, or on street signs, as unpatriotic. The same negative
view prevailed regarding claims for local self-government and for the return of properties seized from the
Hungarian community during the Cold War.
The conservative Hungarian government (1990–1994) contributed to these broad feelings. Prime
Minister Jo¥zsef Antall declared himself to be the leader of 15 million Hungarians, although Hungary
has only 10.5 million inhabitants. Antall later said that he regarded himself as a spiritual leader of all
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Hungarians, but the damage had already been done: his words were taken as a clear sign of the rebirth of
Hungarian territorial revisionism. Without underestimating the damage from this clumsy diplomacy, one
can note that, objectively speaking, any kind of Hungarian territorial revisionism is completely
unrealistic. In the most important case, that of Romania, the overwhelming majority of the ethnic
Hungarians do not live in the vicinity of the common borders, and the majority of the population of
Hungary is not interested in any kind of border revision. 83 Maybe what happened in former Yugoslavia
gave the impression to certain policy-makers in the West that the same could occur between Hungary and
Romania or Slovakia, but this danger was overexaggerated. It is also true, however, that it is very
difficult to measure the seriousness of a conflict. The standpoint of the conservative government on the
connection between neighbourly relations and minority issues was clearly indicated by Prime Minister
Antall: "We never said that the minority question was the only factor in interstate relations, but we find it
impossible to have good relations with a country that mistreats its Hungarian minority." 84
As far as the violent conflict in former Yugoslavia itself was concerned (1991–1995), at an early stage
Antall allowed himself to say that the Trianon Peace Treaty and the Paris Peace Treaty had given
Vojvodina, partly inhabited by ethnic Hungarians, to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but
not to Serbia. 85 This seemed to imply that Vojvodina rightly belonged to the former Federal Yugoslavia,
but not necessarily to modern, rump Yugoslavia. This statement, and the selling of weapons to Croatia,
86 clearly gave the impression that the Hungarian government was fishing in troubled waters.
Consequently, when the Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke about the Hungarians living in
Vojvodina as "hostages to the Serbian or Yugoslav army," 87 his words, although reflecting political
reality, did not repair the damage. In any event, Hungary was able to handle the mass influx of asylum
seekers from Vojvodina, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. Budapest did not get involved directly in the
conflict. It basically coordinated its policy with that of leading NATO powers. 88
In 1991 Hungary concluded a bilateral ("basic") treaty with Ukraine in which the parties denounced even
the peaceful revision of borders. They included a declaration with a list of minority rights, framed after
the Copenhagen Declaration of the CSCE. They added the right to autonomy, and a commission was to
set up oversee compliance. Towards Romania and Slovakia the conservative Hungarian government kept
such a declaration as an ultimate bargaining chip, to persuade the two governments to respect the rights
of the ethnic Hungarians. 89
In 1993 Hungary tried to use its political relationships, mainly the German connection, 90 to link
Slovakia's and Romania's admittance to membership in the Council of Europe with their treatment of
minorities. This effort failed in the sense that both states were admitted without preconditions. But the
Council subsequently set conditions for their treatment of minorities, which was to be monitored
(Hallonen procedure). 91 The bilateral relationship with the countries was strained by Hungary's stance.
The socialist—liberal government led by Gyula Horn, elected in 1994, committed itself to speeding up
Hungary's integration into NATO and the EU, even at the price of lowering the importance of minority
rights commitments in the Basic Treaties with Slovakia and Romania. Horn was prepared to offer a
declaration that Hungary had no intention of modifying its borders, peacefully or otherwise. The process
of negotiation was pushed by both the elaboration of the Pact on Stability in Europe and President
Clinton's plan to enlarge NATO eastward. Finally, the Hungarian—Slovak Basic Treaty was concluded
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in the spring of 1995, and the Hungarian—Romanian Basic Treaty in the autumn of 1996 (the signing
partners were Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar of Slovakia and President Iliescu of Romania). Minority
protection was achieved by transferring non-binding international commitments, drawn from the United
Nations, the Council of Europe, and the CSCE, into the text of the treaties. Article 2 of the Basic Treaty
between Slovakia and Hungary states:
The Contracting Parties, in their mutual relations as well as in their relations with other states, shall
respect the generally accepted principles and rules of international law, in particular the principles laid
down in the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter for a New Europe
and other documents adopted in the framework of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe.
Article 2 is vague, to be sure, but Article 15 (4) b is more specific:
[I]n the interest of defending the rights of persons belonging to the Slovak minority living in the
Hungarian Republic, as well as the Hungarian minority living in the Slovak Republic, [the parties] shall
apply as legal obligations the rules and political commitments laid down in the following documents....
The section then lists three documents: the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on
the Humanitarian Dimensions of CSCE, UN General Assembly Resolution 47/135 (Declaration on the
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities) and
Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on an Additional
Protocol on Rights of National Minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights.
This "legislation" of political commitments is not completely unique in international law. For example,
Article 20 of the Czechoslovak—German Treaty of 1992 also "legalizes" the Copenhagen Document. 92
Article 15 (4) of the Hungarian—Slovak Basic Treaty contains the "Most-Favourable-to-Minority
Persons Clause" vis-à-vis the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities:
[A]s regards the regulation of the rights and obligations of persons belonging to national minorities living
within their territories [Slovakia and Hungary] shall apply the Council of Europe Framework Convention
for the Protection of National Minorities adopted and signed by the Contracting Parties on February 1,
1995, as from the date of the ratification of the present Treaty and of the above-mentioned Framework
Convention by both Contracting Parties, unless their respective domestic legal systems provide a broader
protection of rights of persons belonging to national minorities than the Framework Convention.
Beside these regulations, specific minority rights were included in the Treaty, including a wide range of
linguistic rights (Article 15 (2) g): the right to use one's own name, the right to be taught in the minority
language, the right to establish minority schools, etc. Slovakia attached a unilateral explanatory note to
the Treaty claiming that there is no commitment on the Slovak side to applying collective minority
rights, particularly since Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Council of Europe does not include such
rights. 93
The Basic Treaty between Romania and Hungary follows the same line. Article 1 (2) refers generally to
the same documents, Article 15 (2) contains the Most-Favoured Clause vis-à-vis the Framework
Convention, Article 1 (b) refers to international documents in the field of minority protection mentioned
in the appendix as legal commitments (the appendix mentions the same three documents), Article 15 (3)
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deals with language rights. The Treaty has a "footnote" explaining that, according to the understanding of
the parties, Recommendation 1201 does not generate "collective" minority rights. 94
The implementation of these provisions has gone better in Romania under the Constantinescu
government than in Slovakia, especially under Meciar governments. In Romania the political party
known as the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians became part of the ruling coalition in 1997 and was
thus able to achieve an improvement in the treatment of ethnic Hungarians via local governments, as well
as a widening of schooling rights in the Hungarian language. Unfortunately, in Slovakia, tensions
remained between the two countries concerning the great emphasis on the Slovak "state" language, the
opposition to bilingual school records, the failure of local governments to allow the use of Hungarian,
etc. 95 Since the fall of Meciar in autumn 1998, the situation in Slovakia is more promising.
There were, of course, other human rights issues in Hungarian foreign policy besides the minority
question. In June of 1997, Budapest concluded a treaty with the Vatican on state support for the Catholic
church in Hungary and on a schedule for returning former church properties. 96 In 1996 the Hungarian
parliament passed a law on collective compensation for seized personal assets, and the government came
to an agreement on details with Jewish organizations (this duty came from the Paris Peace Treaty of
1947, but under the Soviet system it was never put into practice).
It might be briefly mentioned that Poland and the Czech Republic also faced the question of minority
rights and ethnicity in their foreign policies — but on a much smaller scale than Hungary. After the
renewed independence of Lithuania, issues about the Polish minority in that state generated tensions
between the two countries. For example, planned diplomatic visits were cancelled in protest. This tension
was eased 97 with the help of the CSCE and the Council of Europe, and Polish language and educational
rights became better protected in Lithuania. With regard to the delicate issue of ethnic Germans in the
Czech Republic, a Basic Treaty was concluded between what was then East Germany and
Czechoslovakia in 1973 containing a declaration of the acceptance of the existing borders. Nevertheless,
the sad memory of the German occupation and of the ethnic cleansing of the Sudeten territory by the
Czechs after the Second World War, when ethnic Germans were sent to Germany, had cast a shadow on




Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland, formerly part of the Soviet Zwangsordnung, as well as former
parts of Vienna's empire, now have reasonably well-functioning liberal democracies. This is the
fundamental reason for their sincere if imperfect commitment to international human rights standards —
both at home and abroad. Domestic factors pushing toward greater attention to human rights are
reinforced by key international factors — primarily the requirements for membership in NATO and the
EU. The foreign policies of the three countries toward the international protection of human rights are
generally supportive, although each state puts its own nationalistic stamp on developments.
Hungary, the former "ferry-state" between the East and the West, and closely linked to the Czech
Republic and Poland, seems to be firmly harboured among the Western nations and their emphasis on
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human rights. Its foreign human rights commitments and its home performance are becoming similar to
what one might observe in any core state of the Western world. Because a relatively large number of
ethnic Hungarians are found in neighbouring countries, Hungary's multilateral and bilateral policies both
emphasize the deepening and widening of the protection of minority rights. The conclusion of Basic
Treaties with Slovakia and Romania, which include minority rights standards, is not simply a
precondition for Hungary's membership in NATO and EU, but a starting point for a long process creating
liberal and peaceful relations in the Carpathian basin. Something similar could be said of Czech and
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On 19 February 1997 a brief exchange took place in the South African parliament between Colin Eglin,
an opposition Member of Parliament, and Alfred Nzo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The subject matter
of this dialogue was the impact of human rights violations on South Africa's relations with other
countries. 1 There were three separate but related questions, which may be briefly paraphrased as
follows. First, do fundamental human rights, and violations thereof, have any influence on the South
African government's relationships with governments of other countries and what criteria does the South
African government employ in its assessment of violations of human rights by governments of other
countries? Second, in respect of what countries has the violation of human rights influenced the
government's relationships with the governments of those countries? Third, has the government raised
the issue of the violation of human rights with the governments of any other countries; if so, which
governments? 2 In essence, the exchange was concerned with the role of human rights in South Africa's
foreign policy.
In responding to these questions, the minister offered an affirmation of the new South African
government's position on the role of human rights in foreign policy. With regard to the second question,
the minister stated, in part: "The question of human rights is one of a number of factors that impacts
continuously on the relationship of Government towards all other governments since all countries are
accused, to a greater or lesser extent, of being guilty of some human rights violations." 3 In response to
the third question, he went on to state categorically that "[human] rights considerations are now an
integral part of South Africa's foreign policy and are raised as a matter of course in discussions and
negotiations with other governments." 4 To underscore the point, the minister provided some examples.
Thus, it was stated that South Africa had imposed a moratorium on the export of armaments to Turkey in
May 1995, primarily owing to concern over human rights violations in that country. It was also pointed
out that at the conclusion of former Iranian President Rafsanjani's visit to South Africa in September
1996, "no joint communique was issued because South Africa could not, during bilateral talks, accept the
Iranian standpoint on human rights." 5
The timing of these questions was not accidental. Then President Mandela had just completed a visit to a
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number of East Asian countries. He had been reported in the local media as having declared in the course
of his visit to Singapore that South Africa was not going to base its choice of friends or the conduct of its
foreign affairs on the human rights records of other countries. Rather, that such matters were to be
regarded as remaining within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of those states. 6 Ironically, the
exchange referred to above also took place shortly before rumours began to surface in the local media
that South Africa had quietly lifted its self-imposed embargo on the export of armaments to Turkey. This
was subsequently confirmed by both Aziz Pahad, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Kader
Asmal, a cabinet minister who was also the Chairperson of the National Conventional Arms Control
Committee. In the latter's words, the decision was taken "for political reasons in South Africa's interests."
7
Given these developments, one is compelled to ask: to what extent has the actual practice of
post-apartheid South Africa in incorporating human rights in the formulation and implementation of its
foreign policy accorded with its professed policy on the matter? What contradictions have emerged in
South Africa's attempts to combine ethical considerations, such as the protection and enhancement of
human rights, with foreign policy objectives? How is South Africa's emphasis on the protection of
national interests to be reconciled with the emphasis on the promotion of human rights abroad?
This chapter seeks to examine these questions. The thesis of this discussion can be simply stated. In its
efforts to articulate a human-rights-oriented foreign policy, South Africa finds itself in the age-old
dilemma in which the older liberal democracies of the West have from time to time found themselves. 8
This dilemma is often reflected in the apparent indecision about whether or not to elevate human rights
over state sovereignty; whether or not to privilege human rights concerns in foreign countries over the
advantages of carrying out trade with those countries; and whether or not to give priority to demands for
the protection of human rights abroad over national strategic concerns at home. It will be shown that, in
the final analysis, because of its failure to make clear choices on these competing demands, South Africa
will likely continue to offer general platitudes on lofty principles that cannot be squared with its actual
practice on the interaction of human rights and foreign policy. The most probable result is that foreign
policy formulation and implementation will continue to be characterized by double standards and
inconsistencies. As is argued in this chapter, this is a fairly common characteristic even among countries,
especially in the West, that purport to place a high premium on human rights in the design and conduct of
their foreign policy.
The above thesis acknowledges the fact that the role of human rights in foreign policy has always been a
contested issue in international relations. History shows that the prominence given to human rights in
foreign policy debates has tended to vary depending on the particular paradigm under consideration. It
has been suggested, for example, that the history of East-West relations was in an important sense the
history of a dispute about human rights. 9 Yet, Western countries have not always been necessarily
consistent in their advocacy of a human-rights-oriented foreign policy as far as North-South relations are
concerned. It is generally acknowledged that American foreign policy towards Africa under the
stewardship of Henry Kissinger, for example, was marked by the deliberate exclusion of human rights
considerations from foreign policy. What was more important in the United States' dealings with former
President Mobutu's Zaire, apartheid South Africa, and assorted despotic and undemocratic regimes in
various parts of the continent was the perception that these countries provided a bulwark against Soviet
or communist expansionism in the region. Political repression and flagrant human rights violations did
not feature prominently, if at all, as a restraining factor in the pursuit of American foreign policy interests
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in these countries.
The reasoning behind this approach was that the defence of the morality of state or national interests
must override other concerns. 10 It was an approach that, therefore, deliberately subordinated human
rights concerns to Cold War calculations and resulted in obliviousness, for example, to the claims of
people on the receiving end of oppression and torture in various countries. 11 Mullerson has examined
the inconsistencies and paradoxes of this approach and, not surprisingly, concludes that, with the end of
the Cold War, the interaction of human rights and foreign policy is at a cross-roads. He accordingly
observes that:
During the Cold War, human rights issues in international relations were often used for political purposes
which were far from a genuine concern for human rights. On the other hand, human rights were often
forgotten for the sake of raison d'etat. [Human] rights seem to affect post-Cold War international
relations more than before because there is no longer an overwhelming security threat; instead, there are
multifarious threats to international security, many of which have their origin in the human rights
situation of a particular country. 12
The continuing relevance of human rights to post-Cold War diplomacy is not, of course, limited to
relations between the major powers. It also pervades the interactions between the major powers and the
smaller nations in North-South relations. Moreover, human rights considerations are increasingly playing
a part in the foreign policy calculations and choices of the smaller and middle powers of the South even
in their relations with each other, as the South African policy statements suggest. At least this much can
be discerned from the rhetoric.
 
II. Domestic factors
Previous South African governments never pretended to pursue a foreign policy based upon or informed
by human rights considerations. The new government, by contrast, claims to have introduced human
rights criteria into the conduct of its foreign policy. Yet, as will be seen in this discussion, in some cases
the foreign policy of the post-apartheid government clearly contradicts these self-claims regarding the
incorporation of human rights criteria into foreign policy-making. This can be noted, for example, in the
area of arms sales, in the treatment of refugees and undocumented migrants, and in the context of
relations with governments and regimes that are widely suspected of committing serious violations of
human rights against their own populations.
To date there has not been any official foreign policy document (that is to say, a government "White
Paper") in South Africa. Some critics have argued that this is an indication of a lack of a coherent foreign
policy vision. Thus, commentators have observed that foreign policy-making has been characterized
more by short-term, ad hoc, reaction than by long-term strategic visionary management. Indeed, it has
been noted that it may take some time to refine the process of foreign policy formulation and
implementation. 13 It cannot be denied that the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) has been slow in
articulating a comprehensive new vision to underpin South Africa's proposed international relations
agenda. It was only in June 1996, a full two years after the assumption of power by the new government,
that the DFA released what has been politely described in some academic circles as "a kind of draft white
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paper." 14 However, simply to state this would be to create the impression that no directions or principles
have been enunciated by the policy makers in the DFA since the inception of the new government. It
would also be to overlook the difficulties facing the DFA in its attempts to integrate and change the two
distinct foreign policy traditions of the liberation movement and the previous apartheid government, and
the consultative process it has to embark upon in this regard. To be sure, the foreign policy objectives of
South Africa can be gleaned not only from the discussion document, but also from the various
pronouncements that have been made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his deputy, and also by
former President Mandela himself and the former Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, in different forums
and contexts.
In 1993, before assuming the presidency, Mandela outlined the pillars on which South Africa's foreign
policy would rest. These were that:
issues of human rights are central to international relations and that they extend beyond the
political, embracing also the economic, social and environmental spheres;
●   
just and lasting solutions to the problems of humankind can only come through the promotion of
democracy worldwide;
●   
considerations of justice and respect for international law should guide relations between nations;●   
peace is the goal for which all nations should strive, and where this breaks down, internationally
agreed and non-violent mechanisms, including effective arms-control regimes, must be employed;
●   
the concerns and interests of the continent of Africa should be reflected in [South Africa's]
foreign-policy choices; and
●   
economic development depends on growing regional and international economic cooperation in an
interdependent world. 15
●   
It has been noted that, of these, the greatest attention was given by Mandela to the issue of human rights
and the promotion of South Africa's economic interests, but that developments within South Africa in the
months that followed the publication of these views demonstrated just how difficult it is to combine these
two as guiding criteria for a nation's foreign policy. 16 Shortly after the inauguration of the new
government on 10 May 1994, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated these themes in his first address
to the South African parliament. He declared that South Africa's foreign policy was going to be based on
the following guiding principles:
Firstly, a commitment to human rights, specifically the political, economic, social and environmental
circumstances; secondly, a commitment to the promotion of freedom and democracy throughout the
world; thirdly, a commitment to the principles of justice and international law in the conduct of relations
between nations; fourthly, a commitment to international peace and internationally agreed mechanisms
for the resolution of conflict; fifthly, a commitment to the interests of Africa in global affairs; and
sixthly, a commitment to expanded regional and international economic co-operation in an
interdependent world. 17
However, it should be immediately noted that in further policy guidelines outlined to parliament some
four months later, in August 1994, the minister emphasized that the achievement of South Africa's
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declared foreign policy objectives would be circumscribed by a number of considerations, for example:
that the national interests of South Africa and the security and quality of life of South Africans, as well as
justice and the international rule of law, peace, economic stability, and regional cooperation, would be
paramount. 18
These policy objectives and guidelines have been repeatedly articulated in subsequent parliamentary
statements and debates, as was noted at the outset of this discussion. It is clear that, at least in official
rhetoric, the promotion of human rights is seen as an integral component of the new foreign policy. How
one implements this aspect of foreign policy is, however, not clearly spelled out. It is in the context of the
actual process of conducting international relations that the ambiguities and inconsistencies surrounding
the promotion of human rights through foreign policy begin to emerge. This has been acknowledged by
the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs himself, Aziz Pahad, who observed in September 1996 as
follows:
We start from the premise that South Africa is committed to human rights. The problem we face in this
regard is the issue of possibilities and limitations on South Africa in the real world. How do we get
human rights enforced and implemented in the international environment? There must be a possible [sic]
contradiction between South—South cooperation and the values which we may want to project. There
has to be interaction between theory and practice. 19
The foreign policy of a country is intrinsically linked to domestic politics and framed by the prevailing
global norms. Now, according to the pronouncements quoted above, adherence to human rights forms the
foundation upon which post-apartheid South Africa's national politics are to be conducted. In suggesting
that there must be a contradiction between South—South cooperation and the values that South Africa
may project, Aziz Pahad was recognizing the dual path that the country has to tread. At least two issues
ought to be borne in mind here.
First of all, South Africa is, on the one hand, an African country. As such, it is a member of the group of
nations that comprise the so-called "South" and whose approaches to human rights do not always
coincide with those of Western powers. On the other hand, South Africa is in certain respects "a part of
the West in Africa," as Mills richly expresses it. 20 As such, it aspires to an approach to human rights that
accords with the general tenor adopted by the longer-established Western liberal democracies. Secondly,
South Africa is both an aid recipient and, in relation to some African states, an aid provider. Thus, both
its domestic and foreign policies have to conform to the norms set by Western governments and, to a
limited extent, international financial institutions (IFIs). It is to be noted, for example, that, although it is
not yet the official policy of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to make human rights
conditionality a systematic part of their policies, some Western powers have forced the Bank, but not the
Fund very often, to look at human rights factors on a willy-nilly basis (for example, by insisting on
linking ecological concerns or the issue of good governance to loans). Thus far, South Africa has not yet
had to contend with such demands. In any case, given post-apartheid South Africa's comparatively
commendable record, to date, of human rights observance and democratic governance, it is unlikely that
such conditionalities would be relevant even if South Africa were to become a borrower state from the
World Bank or other IFIs in the foreseeable future. The role of human rights in South Africa's relations
with IFIs does not, therefore, call for any detailed examination in the present discussion.
And, so, we might ask: what are, or have been, the practical manifestations of the ambiguities of South
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Africa's foreign policy? How has the contradiction between "South—South cooperation and [South
Africa's] values" anticipated by Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad been demonstrated? To date, the
implementation of the human rights objectives has been evidenced through such acts as the signing of
treaties, participation in multilateral forums dealing with human rights issues, the redefinition of the
principles and practices relating to the export of arms and other military equipment, and South Africa's
engagement with the question of human rights and democratization in a number of African countries,
notably Lesotho, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire). The ambiguities are
more starkly evident in South Africa's relations with some Asian and Middle Eastern countries, where
trade rather than human rights appears to be the paramount concern; in its relations with Cuba; in its
treatment of refugees, especially those from other African countries; and in the way it seeks to implement
its foreign policy, namely through "quiet diplomacy" or "creative engagement," for example in relation to
Indonesia, as will be discussed later. It is instructive to look at some of these examples in both the
multilateral and bilateral contexts. But, before turning to these examples, it is important to note that a
variety of factors, as well as actors, in the domestic political sphere will continue to be critical in the
process of shaping a human-rights-oriented foreign policy for South Africa.
South Africa, much more so than most other African countries, boasts a vibrant and activist civil society.
A number of civic organizations played a crucial role in accelerating the pace of change and the collapse
of the apartheid order in its final days: the church, youth groups, the labour movement, various civil
rights campaigners and human rights organizations, and so on. Some of these groups have already shown
that they intend to keep watch over the new government's conduct of foreign policy, insofar as
compliance with the government's own declared human rights criteria is concerned. In general, most of
these organizations have insisted that South Africa use its moral authority to promote respect for human
rights around the world, and especially in Africa, and they urge the involvement of civil society in this
process. Thus, organized labour, through the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), has
been very vocal and insistent on the need for the South African government to press for democratic
change in Nigeria and for the betterment of respect for human rights in countries such as Swaziland and
Zambia. Indeed, COSATU went out of its way to pledge solidarity with locally based Nigerian
pro-democracy campaign groups in organizing demonstrations and campaigns against the military
regime of General Abacha after the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his fellow human rights
campaigners in 1995.
Church groups and other civic organizations have also been critical of continued arms sales to rebel
movements and governments engaging in gross violations of human rights or international humanitarian
law. Human rights campaigners and academic scholars have called upon the government to adopt
legislation (and not simply regulations or procedures internal to the government) incorporating human
rights principles into its conduct of foreign affairs. 21 Partly in response to pressure emanating from civil
society, in March 1998 the South African parliament finally adopted legislation barring the provision of
military assistance to foreign bodies or regimes by private persons or organizations from South Africa.
The Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act makes it a serious crime for South African citizens to
become involved in mercenary activity of any kind, inside and outside of South Africa. The legislation
also makes it illegal for foreigners to use South African soil as a springboard against other countries. The
enactment of this law was provoked by the repeated allegations of involvement of a South African
company, Executive Outcomes, in the provision and sponsorship of arms and mercenaries in countries as
far field as Angola, Papua New Guinea, and Sierra Leone.
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In brief, the most important domestic factor that will guarantee the government's compliance with its own
self-declared commitment to human rights is without doubt the vigilance offered by civil society itself.
South Africans are only too aware of the all-too-recent abuse of human rights by previous regimes in
their country. The involvement of previous South African governments in large-scale destabilization
campaigns and cross-border human rights violations in neighbouring countries — Botswana, Lesotho,
and Mozambique — is still fresh in most people's memories. It is these memories that will, in part,
ensure that pressure continues to be brought to bear upon the relevant authorities to ensure full respect
for the human rights criteria that the post-apartheid government purports to follow in its foreign policy.
 
III. Multilateral policy
The South African government has indicated that it proposes to approach the promotion of human rights
abroad, and conflict prevention and resolution, within established multilateral frameworks and
institutions. 22 It has been suggested that there are at least three reasons for multilateral schemes being
better than unilateral or even bilateral approaches to these matters. First, a multilateral forum is said to
have greater legitimacy than a state acting alone. Second, multilateralism increases the effectiveness of
the initiative and the sanction by demonstrating that a large number of states are committed to a course of
action in the pursuit of the common goal of human rights protection. Finally, it is argued, the
employment of a multilateral approach, for example through international or regional organizations, in
turn helps to consolidate the international human rights structures themselves, thereby contributing to the
growth of an international human rights culture. 23 In order properly to assess these multilateral
approaches, first one must look at how international human rights law is encoded within the municipal
legal sphere of the given state; and, second, one should determine how this law guides, or ought to guide,
the state's conduct of its relations with other states and other international actors.
Human rights in the Constitution of South Africa: Status of the International Bill of Rights
The South African Constitution of 1996 was symbolically signed by then President Mandela on 10
December 1996, International Human Rights Day, at Sharpeville. Sharpeville is, of course, tragically
remembered as the scene of one of the most brutal massacres and human rights violations in South
Africa's recent history. The Constitution entered into force on 4 February 1997. It had been drafted and
adopted in terms of Chapter 5 of the interim Constitution of South Africa of 1993, which ushered in
South Africa's first democratically elected government on 10 May 1994, when Nelson Mandela was
sworn in as President.
The 1996 Constitution largely confirms the innovative approach that had earlier been embodied in the
interim Constitution of 1993 in entrenching certain fundamental human rights in a justiciable bill of
rights. 24 The Constitution is also unique among most modern constitutions in according international
law, and in particular international human rights law, a constitutionally defined status within the
municipal legal system and an explicit role in the interpretative process. 25 The Constitution thus creates
a legal and political environment that aims to guarantee and protect the entire range of internationally
recognized human rights for the benefit of all individuals in post-apartheid South Africa. This domestic
protection of fundamental rights complements the international protection regimes established under
international law and institutions.
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A perusal of the rights protected in the South African Constitution of 1996 easily reveals that there is
significant commonality with the rights stipulated in the principal founding instruments of international
human rights law. These instruments, collectively termed the "International Bill of Rights", are: the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966). There are other
aspects of the South African Constitution that are also relevant to any discussion of the interaction
between human rights and foreign policy in the new South Africa. In this regard, one needs to mention
only two such aspects. First, the Human Rights Commission. This is a body established under the
Constitution with powers, inter alia, to "promote the protection, development and attainment of human
rights" and to "monitor and assess the observance of human rights" (Section 184). Second, the
establishment of Parliamentary Portfolio Committees — the so-called "watchdog committees." This
ensures internal scrutiny of all legislative acts by peer committees within parliament. The Parliamentary
Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs is thus empowered to assess the conformity of legislation that
impacts on the conduct of South Africa's foreign policy with the Constitution, including the bill of rights.
This new system also allows non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to lobby parliament, through the
portfolio committees, on proposed legislation or other government policy initiatives. Some commentators
have suggested that this system is ineffective, not least because the DFA is not required to justify any
decisions to parliament. 26 I would argue, however, that potentially this presents human rights NGOs
with an effective, if indirect, mechanism to get involved in the legislative debates concerning human
rights and foreign policy, among other subjects.
The constitutional and legal structures put in place in post-1994 South Africa are clear enough. As stated
earlier, the principal objective is to create a political and constitutional order based on respect for human
rights. It should follow from this that in all its actions — both administrative and legislative — the
government is obliged to abide by the human rights standards and norms set out in the Constitution,
relevant national legislation, and applicable international human rights instruments. There is nothing
startling in the proposition that states must respect the human rights standards and criteria that they
themselves have enshrined in their national constitutions and legislation. The critical question is whether,
and to what extent, these criteria ought also to guide their foreign policy. The practical implementation of
South African foreign policy to date has not accorded with this proposition.
Regional developments
As already noted above, to most observers within and outside South Africa former President Mandela
embodied the ideals of human rights and justice. His stature, with varying degrees of success, enabled
him to assume the role of mediator in civil conflicts in Africa and to position himself to speak up against
human rights abuses by his counterparts elsewhere on the continent. The common global expectation,
going back to the inception of the new democratic order, was that South Africa, through the persona of
Nelson Mandela, would champion human rights throughout Africa and elsewhere in the third world.
It is primarily within Africa that the South African government's attempts at fostering a climate in which
human rights prevail can be seen. The restoration of the democratically elected government of Lesotho
after it had been ousted in a coup d'etat and South Africa's attempts to negotiate with the military rulers
of Nigeria in order to secure the release of political prisoners (as well as its campaign to institute an
investigation into allegations of human rights abuses in the country) are only two high-profile examples
in this regard. To these may be added the involvement by South Africa in the failed mediation between
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Mobutu Sese Seko and Laurent Kabila, whose rebel forces drove the former out of power in the renamed
Democratic Republic of Congo in May 1997. Unfortunately, Nigeria and the former Zaire also happen to
be the two cases that have shown up the impotence of South Africa's self-proclaimed
human-rights-oriented foreign policy. The strong position taken on Nigeria at the time of the
Commonwealth Heads of State and Government Meeting in New Zealand in November 1995 was
significantly softened not too long afterwards. Similarly, concerns over massacres of refugees by the
soldiers of Kabila's Alliance des Forces DÈmocratiques pour la LibÈration du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) in
the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo were played down by the South African
government, apparently in the misplaced belief that a softer attitude in this regard would guarantee the
success of then President Mandela's mediation effort. Despite these setbacks, more recent developments
suggest that South Africa is getting involved as a mediator in the long-running civil war in the Sudan.
Both the Sudanese president and a representative of the major rebel movement, the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA), were in South Africa at the beginning of August 1997 for exploratory talks
with then President Mandela. Thus far, however, South Africa's role has largely been a diplomatic one. It
has resisted calls to send troops to countries or regions afflicted by civil strife, usually citing the
unpreparedness of its national defence force for such operations.
South Africa also has to walk the tightrope between enforcing human rights and being perceived as either
a regional hegemon or a proxy doing the bidding of external powers, such as the United States, that may
be seeking to police and dominate the continent. These perceptions partly explain the reluctance of most
African states to heed South Africa's calls for concerted action in reaction to the violations of human
rights in Nigeria. It is also largely because of this that South Africa now seems to prefer "quiet
diplomacy," which essentially entailed using Mandela's moral authority to intercede in behind-the-scenes
negotiations with foreign leaders on issues of human rights violations in their countries, rather than
venturing into more overt tactics such as the unilateral imposition of sanctions or calls for the imposition
of such sanctions, as was attempted in the case of Nigeria. 27 But, more importantly, South Africa has
also come to appreciate that it is only within the space provided by the relevant regional organizations,
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
that it can most effectively pursue a meaningful human-rights-oriented foreign policy.
The Southern African Development Community (SADC)
South Africa has been a member of the SADC since 29 August 1994. In this brief period, it has already
proved to be a pivotal member of this regional grouping. This period has also witnessed important
developments in the field of human rights promotion. In the first place, SADC established, on 26 June
1996, an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security, with the primary objective of coordinating policies
and activities in areas implied in the title of the entity itself ("politics, defence and security"). But the
Organ is also predicated on a number of guiding principles, among which are the "observance of human
rights, democracy and the rule of law" and the "observance of universal human rights as provided for in
the Charters of the OAU and the UN." 28 In fact, it may be noted that, prior to the establishment of this
Organ, South Africa had already participated in a regional initiative to restore stability and democracy in
a neighbouring SADC state, namely Lesotho.
The government of Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle in the tiny landlocked Kingdom of Lesotho had
experienced months of instability, including an army mutiny, shortly after being elected in the country's
first democratic election in almost a quarter century, held in 1993. In August 1994, King Letsie III
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dismissed the government and in effect implemented a coup d'etat. The ousted government was finally
restored to power only after some high-level diplomacy involving Botswana, South Africa, and
Zimbabwe. These three countries undertook the initiative to enforce what had emerged as an "SADC
regional consensus" on the need to resist unconstitutional usurpation of power and to protect democracy
and human rights.
Alongside this development is the long-standing proposal, dating back to 1994, for the establishment of a
human rights commission or court as part of the institutional machinery of SADC. It is felt that such a
commission or court would ensure a more certain enforcement of human rights in the southern African
region and complement whatever is provided for under existing UN or OAU machinery. 29 It seems apt
to conclude that with its far-reaching domestic bill of rights, which, as we have seen, entrenches the most
widely recognized fundamental human rights, and the emerging human rights jurisprudence from its
Constitutional Court, South Africa stands in a unique position to contribute to, and enrich, this proposed
regional human rights regime among SADC countries.
The Organization of African Unity (OAU)
South Africa has also sought to play a very active role in promoting democracy, human rights, and
conflict resolution within the institutional framework provided by the OAU since its admission to this
continental body on 23 May 1994. South Africa has reiterated these objectives on a number of occasions.
Thus, then President Mandela declared at the summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government
on 8 July 1996 in Yaounde, Cameroon, that "South Africa would not shrink from its responsibility to
help resolve conflict and advocate human rights on the continent." 30 South Africa's advocacy of human
rights within the OAU was strengthened when it acceded to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights on 9 January 1996. The African Charter was adopted by the Organization of African Unity in
1981 and came into force on 21 October 1986. It is the newest of the regional human rights conventions,
with what is claimed to be a distinctly "African character." It draws upon other human rights
conventions, and recognizes basic civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. In addition, it
gives recognition to so-called third-generation (or solidarity) rights: for example, rights to development,
a healthy environment, self-determination, peace, and so on. South Africa has also become involved in
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, which was established to oversee
implementation of the African Charter and to monitor human rights violations reported to it. The current
chairperson of the South African Human Rights Commission, Dr. Barney Pityana, was voted into
membership of the African Commission at the summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government in Harare, Zimbabwe, in June 1997. Another OAU institution in which South Africa is
likely to play an important role is the proposed African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. On 27
February 1998, the OAU Council of Ministers approved the draft Protocol on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights at its 67th Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and
recommended it for adoption by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its summit in June
1998 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. South Africa has already indicated its commitment to the proposed
court. In fact, the South African government hosted the very first meeting of government legal experts at
which the draft Protocol was first elaborated and examined. 31
The United Nations
The previous apartheid regime in Pretoria had tended to view the United Nations and other international
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human rights organizations with both suspicion and disdain. This was hardly surprising, given the
widespread condemnation that apartheid South Africa was subjected to in these organizations. Moreover,
for a period of 20 years, starting in 1974, South Africa was not allowed to take up its seat in the UN
General Assembly, although it continued to be a member of the organization. The advent of a new
democratically elected government, therefore, marked a turning point for South Africa's relationship with
the world body. Not surprisingly, Mandela's theme in his first address to the UN General Assembly since
assuming the presidency was that of "democracy, peace and human rights." He reminded fellow member
states that the great challenge of our age is to answer the question: "[What] is it that we can and must do
to ensure that democracy, peace and prosperity prevail everywhere?" 32
Without doubt, the most significant aspect of South Africa's participation in the United Nations, insofar
as the question of human rights is concerned, was its election to chair the UN Human Rights Commission
during its 54th Session (March—April 1998). South Africa took up its seat on the Commission on 1
January 1997. Here, again, the debate on human rights violations in Nigeria provided South Africa its
first opportunity to translate into practice its verbal commitment to the struggle for human rights in
Africa and elsewhere in the world. It was also an opportunity to promote, in the scheme of its
international relations, the human rights culture that had been laudably incorporated into its national legal
order. South Africa was thus the only African country to support the resolutions on Nigeria both in the
UN General Assembly and (with the exception of Uganda) in the Commission, much to the chagrin of
most African states and the OAU itself. 33 On other human-rights-related matters, South Africa has been
quite content to follow the general line adopted by the United Nations. A case in point is the Western
Sahara: progressive forces and some political groups at home and abroad have criticized the South
African government for not taking a more proactive position and declaring its recognition of the Polisario
Front's unqualified right to self-determination over the disputed territory. Clearly, the solidarity that the
African National Congress (ANC) may have extended to the Polisario Front in its days as a liberation
movement has not been translated into concrete support in the post-liberation era, nor has it persuaded
the South African government to shy away from maintaining fairly close and cordial ties with Morocco.
Like most other African states, South Africa is happy to accept the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic as
a fellow member of the OAU while also acknowledging the legitimacy of the on-going efforts by the
United Nations to negotiate a lasting solution to the dispute between Morocco and the Polisario Front
over the Western Saharan territory.
 
IV. Bilateral policy
Mention has already been made of South Africa's involvement in the resolution of the crisis in Lesotho.
This was a regional initiative undertaken with the blessing of SADC. South Africa has also attempted to
intercede in other situations on a bilateral basis, with mixed results. In 1996, Raymond Suttner, then an
ANC Member of Parliament and Chairperson of the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Foreign
Affairs, identified the principal obstacle here as being the fact that, although South Africa may have
decisive moral power in the world today, it has limited leverage. He argues that:
It does not dispense much aid. Yet it does have some leverage, greater or less in the particular case, in
relation to some states. [Bilaterally], in relation to a relatively powerful state like Nigeria located some
distance from South Africa's borders, its influence is less than in relation to a state like Swaziland and
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possibly also Zambia. It is still less in relation to a power like China, even if South Africa were to have
diplomatic relations. 34
Since these words were written, experience has shown that South Africa's efforts to influence the cause
of human rights in both Swaziland and Zambia have fared no better than in the case of Nigeria. Attempts
to mediate between trade unions and other political groups agitating for democratization and human
rights, on the one hand, and King Mswati of Swaziland and his government, on the other, have so far
remained unsuccessful. Similarly, President Chiluba's government in Zambia was not impressed with
South Africa's attempt to play a mediating role in the crisis sparked by what many viewed as an
undemocratic decision by the Zambian government to bar former President Kenneth Kaunda from
contesting elections for the presidency. 35 South Africa was accused of being partial and biased towards
Kaunda, and therefore unsuited to the role of mediator. It is suggested that perhaps, here, as in the case of
Swaziland, an SADC-led regional initiative might have proved more successful. It is obvious that South
Africa's smaller neighbours are more likely to resist any attempt at unilateral initiatives by South Africa
to intervene in their domestic affairs in the cause of human rights and democracy than they would be if
such initiatives were undertaken as part of a regional, SADC-sponsored course of action. South Africa's
comparative regional strength and its regional power status place it in a vantage position to promote
human rights in the region. However, any perceptions of hegemonic aspirations in either bilateral or
regional interactions with its neighbours are bound to arouse the kind of resistance witnessed in the
reactions by both Swaziland and Zambia.
South Africa's ability to influence countries further afield than the SADC region is also extremely
limited. Except for Nigeria and Kenya, it has very limited trading links with countries known to violate
human rights in Africa, for example Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea, to mention
only a few cases. South Africa is also chiefly concerned with promoting trade and investment. Indeed,
since 1994 it would seem that this concern, rather than human rights issues, has preoccupied its foreign
policy agenda. The promotion of trade and investment is often in conflict with human rights concerns.
This is clearly demonstrated in South Africa's relations with some Asian countries, in particular
Indonesia. Known for its human rights abuses in East Timor, Indonesia remains a chief target for South
Africa's investment portfolio. In June 1996, then President Mandela paid his first state visit to Indonesia
(although it was his third visit to the country). Human rights advocates and activists criticized these new
directions in South Africa's foreign policy. In response, Mandela is reported to have said that South
Africa would not recoil from establishing ties with countries or regions in which human rights violations
had allegedly occurred. 36 During this trip, Mandela also indicated that South Africa would remove
Indonesia from the list of countries to which the sale of arms is prohibited. Such is the inconsistency that
attends the foreign policy of a state that is not in a position to refuse trade from the major transgressors of
human rights. Or, to put it another way, the contradiction embedded in the simultaneous pursuit of
national interest and human rights. South Africa finds itself more in a relation of dependency on Asian
countries than they are on it. In these relations the human-rights-based foreign policy is whittled down to
Mandela simply imploring the leaders of these countries to "start thinking of behaving." 37
A somewhat interesting postscript to the controversy over the Indonesian visit must be recorded,
however. Shortly after his return to South Africa, it was revealed that, while in Indonesia, President
Mandela had in fact requested, and been granted, a meeting with the jailed East Timorese leader, Xanana
Gusmao. This extraordinary meeting took place at a state guest-house on 15 July 1997, with President
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Suharto's blessing. And, within a week of this revelation, Jose Ramos-Horta, exiled leader of the East
Timorese resistance movement and joint winner of the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize, was in South Africa to
hold talks with President Mandela on East Timor on 25 July. This visit was followed five days later by
that of the Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio, whom Mandela had apparently already drawn into these
consultations. 38 Some four months later, President Suharto paid an official visit to South Africa. At the
conclusion of the visit, Mandela announced that he had made a breakthrough in his search for a lasting
solution to the East Timor question. The details of this apparent breakthrough have, however, never been
made public. 39 Talks between President Mandela and the Indonesian authorities seem to have continued
behind the scenes in the ensuing period. Although very little is known about the substance of these talks,
it is just possible that this could turn out to be the one instance of South Africa's "quiet diplomacy" that
may well confound the sceptics and Mandela's critics.
South Africa's relations with Cuba, Libya, and Iran provide an insight into the importance of historical
factors that negate a blanket condemnation and ostracization of all human rights abusers. These countries
supported the liberation movement, hence the reluctance to implement or support sanctions against them
for their human rights violations. South Africa did not bow to pressure from the United States to
implement sanctions against Cuba and voted against two US-sponsored resolutions at the United
Nations: one on the blockade against Cuba, and the other a motion seeking an investigation into alleged
human rights violations in Cuba. The Cuba question has been a highly charged one in political debates in
South Africa, and one that has sorely tested the political resolve of the South African government in the
face of virulent and relentless criticism both from the United States government and from the local
anti-communist lobby in South Africa. This is not the place to explore the complex political
considerations that underlie this question. Suffice it to note that, on the face of it, South Africa's relations
with Cuba seem to contradict the previously declared guiding principles of its foreign policy. As various
commentators on both sides of the political divide have been quick to concede, the value of these
relations is to be measured not in material benefits but in the historical and ideological relationship that
exists between the Castro regime and the liberation movement in South Africa. Here, the ANC-led
government is more concerned to show appreciation for the assistance given to it by Cuba than to remain
faithful to its professed objective of pursuing a foreign policy based on the twin imperatives of human
rights protection and democracy. 40
Precisely the same kind of considerations arise in respect of South Africa's support for the lifting of the
sanctions imposed on Libya for its suspected role in the Lockerbie air disaster. Similarly, Iran remains a
friend of South Africa, despite the criticism voiced in some quarters in the West against the close
diplomatic ties between the two countries. As was noted at the outset of this discussion, South Africa has
openly acknowledged the existence of differences of opinion on human rights issues between the two
countries, but this did not prevent President Mandela from defending these ties and declaring that the
enemies of the West are not necessarily South Africa's enemies. Indeed, this is a refrain that has been
repeated on a number of occasions whenever criticism has been raised by some Western governments
against the initiation or maintenance of bilateral diplomatic or trade relations with countries designated as
human rights abusers, such as Cuba, Libya, Iran, and Iraq. 41
From the foregoing, it is possible to discern at least three overarching principles that underpin South
Africa's bilateral foreign policy. First, there is the principle of sovereignty and protection of the national
interest: here, South Africa insists on choosing its own friends and pursuing any bilateral relations that
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will best advance its national interest. Thus, relations with Iran are partly driven by the need to secure
favourable trading terms for its importation of oil and petroleum products from this Middle Eastern
country. 42 Second, there is the principle of reciprocity: as indicated above, South Africa under the
ANC-led government feels duty bound to reciprocate the assistance accorded to it by certain countries or
regimes during the long years of the liberation struggle. Bilateral relations with Cuba and Libya are
routinely defended on this ground. Third, there is the principle of equal treatment and universality. South
Africa has argued that, because of its professed stance of non-alignment, it will maintain bilateral
relations with all states, irrespective of their political, ideological, or religious orientation, as long as such
relations fall within the overall framework of its foreign policy objectives. What all this implies is that
one, or a combination, of these principles can expediently be used to explain away the awkward cases
where South Africa finds itself dealing with countries whose human rights and democratic credentials
may be found wanting by both international as well as its own domestic standards.
In the area of arms control we once again note the ambiguities of South Africa's foreign policy. In the
first place, decisions were taken to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
and to sign the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Pelindaba Treaty). At the time of writing,
South Africa is one of only 11 countries to have ratified the latter treaty; it deposited the instrument of
ratification with the OAU Secretary General on 27 March 1998. Secondly, there followed the
restructuring of state-owned arms manufacturer Armscor, apparently heralding an attempt to make
domestic changes in the arms manufacturing industry in order to foster the principles of human rights
abroad. The Cameron Commission, appointed to investigate the structure, practice, and policies of
Armscor, tabled its report in July 1995. 43 Many of the recommendations of this commission were taken
up in the restructuring of the parastatal company. Among these was the call to respect the arms embargo
drawn up by the United Nations, thereby ending South Africa's covert sales of arms. Armscor was also
enjoined to uphold transparency and to embrace social values that incorporate the promotion of
democracy, human rights, and international peace and security. The Cameron Commission noted: "The
new criteria for [determining] which categories of weapons may be exported, and to which countries,
should be based above all on South Africa's commitment to democracy, human rights and international
peace and security." 44 Cock notes that, in the 1995 classification of arms client countries, a complete
ban was placed on arms exports to 31 countries where instability or human rights violations meant that
those arms might be put to illegitimate use. 45 Included in this category were Lesotho, Rwanda, the
Lebanese Christian militia, and Nigeria. Another nine countries could receive only "non-lethal
equipment" (for example, Angola and Mozambique), and lighter restrictions were placed on 15 more
countries (for example, India and Pakistan). These restrictions were said to be even stricter than those of
the United Kingdom. 46
The question may still be posed, and Cock indeed poses it: 47 do the manufacturing and sale of arms not
inherently contradict the promotion of human rights, international peace, and security, even if one
screens one's clients? Violence, irrespective of the ends to which it is put, violates the most basic of
human rights, namely the right to life. There is also no guarantee that those not currently on the embargo
list will not at a later stage use the arms they acquire against their own populace, for example in the event
of civil strife. It is also doubtful whether the arguments that are usually proffered, that the sale of arms
abroad is necessary for the country's own security, and that it is a means by which to generate national
wealth, can be supported at any cost to human rights considerations.
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South Africa has already back-tracked on some of its earlier restrictions. A few months after it issued the
list of clients for arms sales, it decided to resort to a case-by-case formula for deciding on prospective
clients. It is this mechanism that allows the country to contemplate, and even defend, the exportation of
arms to such countries as Indonesia, Syria, Rwanda, and Turkey despite the continuing violations of
human rights in these countries and the real likelihood that some of these countries may use those arms to
violate the human rights of their own citizens. South Africa's recent arms trade dealings with Algeria
provide an instructive example.
As was noted above, South Africa chaired the 1998 session of the UN Human Rights Commission. The
question of human rights abuses in Algeria was reportedly addressed during this session, by way of a
statement from the chair. 48 It is interesting to note that South Africa had, prior to assuming the
chairmanship of the Human Rights Commission, already issued a statement, on 28 January 1998,
condemning "in the strongest terms acts of senseless violence," and affirming its support for the Algerian
government "[to] help ensure that the current, systematic genocide of Algerian people is brought to an
end." Significantly, this statement was issued only a day after South Africa and Algeria had reportedly
concluded a deal relating to the latter's purchase of remote-piloted surveillance aircraft. 49 Despite these
developments, it is generally agreed that South Africa was able to speak with an impartial and objective
voice on the human rights situation in Algeria during its tenure as chair of the Human Rights
Commission.
Perhaps the unstated cynical response in all these cases is simply that, if South Africa does not sell arms
to these countries, somebody else will. Alas, this is a familiar response that even the so-called older
democracies have invoked to justify controversial bilateral relations — whether in terms of diplomatic
intercourse, trade, or arms sales — with some of the worst human rights offenders in the world today.
The contradictory stances that some Western countries have tended to adopt in their dealings with the
People's Republic of China, especially in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre,
bear witness to this.
 
V. Concluding observations
It is obvious that high expectations have been placed on the post-apartheid government in South Africa to
lead the way in championing respect for, and protection of, human rights, especially on the African
continent. As noted earlier in this discussion, this is only to be expected. The 1996 Constitution, which
underpins the new political and legal order, is predicated on respect for three fundamental values:
equality, freedom, and human dignity. Indeed, these provide the foundational principles of the
post-apartheid order. These values are also basic to any project aimed at realizing and protecting human
rights in any society.
The reason for adopting an approach that was friendly to international human rights law in the new
constitutional scheme in South Africa is not too hard to find. The apartheid order in South Africa
represented a negation of some of the most fundamental principles of international law:
self-determination, equality, non-discrimination, and so on. During this era, South Africa was also a
major violator of human rights and refused to subject itself to either constitutional or international law
restraints in the field of human rights. It is a commonplace that apartheid South Africa developed a
remarkable degree of antipathy towards — if not an outright disdain for — international law and the
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international community, especially the international human rights movement. It goes without saying that
any meaningful transition to a new democratic order in the country was one that required a commitment
to the acceptance of the need to protect human rights by both national and international mechanisms. The
entrenchment of a justiciable bill of rights and the explicit incorporation of international law into South
African municipal law represent an obvious acknowledgement of this need.
The post-apartheid government has also moved fairly quickly to sign all the major human rights treaties.
Among these are the two International Covenants of 1966, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights, the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the OAU
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. A list of these treaties is
given in the appendix to this chapter. This is a radical departure from the apartheid regime's policy,
which refused to append its signature to any of these treaties.
There can be no doubt that, domestically, post-apartheid South Africa has laid down a firm foundation
for the protection and promotion of all the internationally recognized fundamental human rights. But,
most importantly, the constitution incorporates international law, including international human rights
law, into the domestic legal system. The challenge for the South African government lies in both its
willingness and its ability to translate these lofty constitutional ideals and values into practice. In the
realm of foreign relations, the challenge is to ensure that the domestic commitment to human rights also
informs all aspects of foreign policy formulation and implementation. One way of achieving this would
be to adopt legislation that introduces human rights principles into the government's own actions,
including its conduct of foreign policy. The difficulties, dilemmas, challenges, and, at times,
inconsistencies that attend this process have been noted in this discussion. On the whole, however, it is
fair to conclude that South Africa's efforts at incorporating human rights considerations in the design and
conduct of its foreign affairs represent honest attempts at walking the tightrope between safeguarding
national interests at home and fighting to ensure respect for human rights abroad. In this endeavour,
South Africa has not fared any better or any worse than some of the older democracies in the West.
 
Appendix: Human rights treaties to which South Africa is a party (through
signature, accession, or ratification)
Slavery Convention (1926)
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children (1921)
Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others
(1950)
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age (1933)
Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children of 1921
and the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women of Full Age of 1933 (1947)
Geneva Conventions (I, II, III, IV) (1949)
Final Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and Exploitation of the
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Prostitution of Others
International Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic (1904)
Protocol Amending the International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic of 1910
(1949)
Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages (1962)
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (1948)
Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949)
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977)
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977)
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951)
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967)
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969)
Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1953)
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women (1957)
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966)
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981)
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Human rights as found in international law are a relatively recent addition to the agenda of international
affairs, dating mostly from 1945. Political antecedents, however, have been present in the international
arena for a long time. 1 Moreover, political controversy is not a new feature of the international discourse
on human rights.
Almost two hundred years ago, Napoleon's armies conquered Europe supposedly in the name of "liberty,
equality, fraternity" — and thus arguably to spread the "rights of man" over the old world. During the
height of colonialism in the nineteenth century, the Western version of human rights provided the
foundation at home for the "white man's burden" abroad and its "civilizing mission" as articulated
primarily by the British and French. The rights of man became part of the West's ideological arsenal in
its fight against Nazism and Fascism during especially the 1930s and 1940s. The collective human right
to the self-determination of peoples, championed by President Wilson as a guarantee for peace after the
First World War, became a potent ideological weapon in the hands of African and Asian independence
patriots after the Second World War.
During the Cold War years, the West saw itself as standing for liberal democracy and individual rights in
the face of the totalitarian threat, even as the West was undermining those very same values in places like
Guatemala from 1954. Much of the global South invoked the notions of social and economic rights as the
rationale for their demands for a fairer international economic system. A majority of third world
intellectual and political elites viewed international social justice as their right, while the West, led by the
United States, fiercely resisted all efforts to produce a New International Economic Order.
In Latin America the human rights issue was seen by many on the political right as a useful rhetorical
device in their anti-communist crusade, especially since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
mentioned the right to private property. Much of the political left in Latin America focused on social
justice and denounced the concept of political rights as part of Western imperialism.
Today, although the concept of human rights is still seen by some as an ideological weapon in the hands
of the West or global North, the debate over the universality of human rights appears embedded in a
broader controversy of paradigmatic proportions over the changing notion of state sovereignty in the
modern world. The sovereignty of the state is being challenged ethically, politically, and economically.
>From an ethical perspective, the peoples of the world are increasingly holding national governments
accountable for the way they treat their citizens. Politically, most governments have accepted, at least on
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paper, to adhere to international standards in the treatment of their nationals, also accepting, at least in
principle, the right of other governments and international institutions to hold them to these standards
through international monitoring mechanisms. Last, but not least, the need for national economies to be
directly linked to the global market has opened most societies to international financial and economic
scrutiny. More recently, the international community, led by the World Bank, has begun demanding — at
least spasmodically — good governance as linked to economic transactions.
Latin American societies have been permeated by these controversies over human rights. Their
governments have been, at different historical junctures, more or less involved in the international debate
over human rights issues. The Western hemisphere has the second-best regional system for the protection
of human rights, second only to the Council of Europe. Historically, some Latin American states
championed human rights — such as small Costa Rica. This was certainly true at the time the United
Nations Charter was drafted. Today, with democratically elected governments ruling in most of Latin
America, a positive foreign policy stand over human rights is fortunately becoming the norm, not the
exception. Let us not forget, though, that in the not so distant past most Latin American foreign policies
were devised, in the name of anti-communism, as shields destined to protect military dictatorships while
they waged "dirty wars" against the people. Thus it is fair to ask whether or not Latin American states
will continue to stress human rights issues in their foreign policies.
 
I. Historical background: The asylum tradition
Latin American political elites felt very early on the need to forge principled foreign policy discourses.
Although the concept of "nation" that swept the region during the nineteenth century excluded
indigenous peoples and certain other ethnic groups, the theme of human rights appeared as a key
component of the region's international relations. At home, the Latin American independent republics
aspired to be liberal democracies. Abroad, the first Hispanic American conferences dealt extensively
with a selected number of human rights issues such as slavery, continental citizenship, and asylum. The
latter became an important part of the region's diplomatic tradition.
The exclusive concept of nation espoused by the Latin American founding fathers might explain the
elitist conception of asylum that they forged, primarily offering protection to the cosmopolitan elites to
which they belonged. During subsequent years, however, the region's asylum tradition evolved into a
broader humanitarian practice protecting large numbers of individuals who had been obliged to abandon
their homes because of political persecution (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil during the 1970s)
and indiscriminate violence (Central America during the 1980s).
The first reference to the right of asylum and the codification of extradition appeared in the 1848 Latin
American Confederacy Treaty. The right of asylum would later be codified by the 1877—1880 Treaty of
Extradition — where for the first time a clear distinction between criminal and political offences was
made — and subsequently by the 1889 International Criminal Law Treaty, the 1928 Havana Convention,
and the 1933 Montevideo Treaty. 2 These documents essentially stated the inviolability of the right of
asylum. They also established the concomitant obligation of the granting country to prevent the
beneficiaries of its protection from engaging in activities targeted against their country of origin. At a
time when national borders were still in flux, and political persuasions — conservative or liberal — were
as strong as national allegiances, the practice of political asylum granted by friendly countries to their
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neighbours' political opponents was at its core a functional mechanism for the protection of the nascent
civilian political elites. The consolidation of national armies at the end of the nineteenth century would
change the nature of civilian politics; however, the practice of diplomatic asylum remained and over the
years benefited broader categories of political opponents.
Countless opponents to military strongmen ruthlessly ruling in different Latin American countries during
the 1950s — Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Perez Jimenez in Venezuela, Rojas Pinilla in
Colombia, Stroessner in Paraguay, and Somoza in Nicaragua — found protection in Latin American
embassies and refuge in civilian-ruled Costa Rica, Mexico, and Brazil. Similarly, during the struggle
against General Batista's dictatorship in Cuba, Latin American embassies in Havana offered protection to
large numbers of Castro's supporters. Subsequently many of his opponents would be sheltered until 1961,
when, following Washington's leadership, all Latin American governments, except Mexico, severed
diplomatic ties with the revolutionary government of Cuba. In the 1970s, some countries became safe
havens to thousands fleeing repression: Chilean, Argentinian, Uruguayan, and Brazilian intellectuals and
artists were allowed to find new homes in the northern part of the subcontinent — particularly Costa
Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela. 3
The 1980s witnessed more than 2 million people forced to abandon their homes as a consequence of
armed conflicts in Central America. Most of them became refugees in their own countries — displaced
persons. But at least 200,000 received formal refugee status in neighbouring countries — Mexico,
Honduras, and Costa Rica — where the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
established numerous camps. Opponents to the Central American military regimes had been granted
political asylum by the Costa Rican, Nicaraguan, and Mexican governments since the beginning of the
decade. Political preferences played increasingly important roles as the Mexican and Nicaraguan
authorities welcomed mostly sympathizers of the leftist insurgencies, whereas the Guatemalan
government allowed the foes of Sandinista rule in Nicaragua to settle in its territory.
In August 1987, after almost 10 years of civil strife, the Central American presidents committed
themselves to seek political solutions to the armed conflicts that opposed them and divided their
societies. Invoking the right of Central America to self-determination, they asked external powers —
namely the United States and Cuba — to cease supporting their political allies on the ground. Among
their multiple commitments to promote democracy, they agreed to respect the right of the displaced
populations to return to their homes and asked for the international community's assistance. In September
1988, the Central American governments met in San Salvador with UNHCR and donor agencies'
representatives and devised a reinsertion strategy to be known as CIREFCA (from the Spanish acronym
for the International Conference for Central American Refugees). CIREFCA's Plan of Action
(1989–1994) expanded the concept of refugee to include not only the internally displaced, but also those
who had stayed, thus addressing in more general terms the socio-economic consequences of being
uprooted. The reinsertion process was conceived as an integral part of other efforts towards peace and
democracy; respect for human rights was at the core of the whole endeavour. 4
The very important part played by the international community in the solution of the refugee crisis in
Central America and in the following peace process should not obscure the crucial contribution
specifically made by Latin American diplomacy, and the extent of Mexico's leadership role. It is
undeniable that the Mexican authorities were concerned about Central American unrest spilling over the
border, fearing that violence would engulf their southern states — Chiapas, Tabasco, Quintana Roo, and
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Campeche. However, Mexico's foreign policy behaviour also stood out as symbolic of shared Latin
American paradoxes in the conduct of foreign affairs. Mexico was active on matters that deeply affected
other countries, but at home it tried to cling to a long-standing tradition of absolute self-determination.
The ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party was highly reluctant to endorse any scheme that seemed to
intrude on what was called the country's internal affairs. Be that as it may, within the conceptual
framework of a Latin American "collective security regime," Mexico and other states were willing to
provide crucial humanitarian and diplomatic initiatives — in this case high-profile diplomacy in favour
of a political solution to the Central American conflicts. 5
Thus we see that the long-standing tradition of honouring political asylum in Latin America led in
contemporary times to great attention to refugee matters in foreign policy. This focus was combined with
efforts to provide security in the region, especially in Central America in recent years. Increasingly, even
in Mexico, international solutions were needed for humanitarian and political problems, which reduced
the commitment to an expansive and absolute view of state sovereignty. The focus on human rights (as
linked to security) was not forced on Latin American states by outside powers and organizations, but
evolved through various state foreign policies in the region.
 
II. Domestic factors: More political space for rights
Most Latin American states, having been victimized by outside intervention, historically defined the
protection of state sovereignty and the endorsement of the traditional principle of non-intervention as
their paramount goals in foreign policy. Repressive states obviously had an interest in these claims, to
shield their repression from outside scrutiny. But more progressive Latin states also were highly
nationalistic, because their experience suggested that the US government would join local and
transnational business interests to block progressive social and economic change. 6 Against this
background, it should not come as a surprise that the Latin American political left, including the
moderate left, tended to see the renewed human rights discourse from the mid-1970s as another excuse
for US intervention.
Although geopolitical considerations raised by the traditional US foreign policy establishment made
many of President Carter's initiatives look vain at best, hypocritical at worst, his human rights foreign
policy had an everlasting impact on Latin American perceptions of Washington's loyalties. It
demonstrated to Latin American reformers that the alliance between the US government and right-wing
sectors, although still possible (as the Reagan administration would prove in Central America), had
ceased to be "automatic." President Carter showed that Washington could eventually tolerate reform in
Latin America and to certain extent even promote it. Carter's emphasis on human rights in Latin America
opened much-needed political space, which allowed activists — locally as well as internationally — to
voice their demands for greater respect.
Latin American constitutions read well on paper, but actual respect for human rights had been
inconsistent at best in most Latin American countries, particularly concerning the rights of the most
vulnerable sectors of society such as indigenous populations, the working poor, racial and ethnic
minorities, and women. Despite spasms of major repression, as in El Salvador in 1932 and in Colombia
during 1948–1958, political repression in the region had been selective and largely buffered by the
practice of diplomatic asylum. The 1973 military coup that overthrew the democratically elected
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government of Salvador Allende in Chile inaugurated an era of widespread and brutal repression.
Indiscriminate abuses against the entire population were aimed particularly at decimating the new
generation of political and intellectual leaders who had in large numbers supported President Allende's
regime in the region's most stable democracy. Military coups soon followed in Uruguay that same year,
and in Argentina three years later; repression worsened elsewhere. 7
Long-standing international religious groups and human rights non-governmental organizations
(HRNGOs), such as the World Council of Churches, the International Commission of Jurists, the UN
Quaker Office, the International League for Human Rights, the Federation Internationale des Droits de
l'Homme, and Amnesty International, were the first to denounce the abuses. They also had been active in
denouncing repression by Franco in Spain, Salazar in Portugal, and the Greek military dictatorship.
Along with a small number of Scandinavian and West European governments, they constituted what
appears today as "the first generation" of activists denouncing human rights abuses by the Latin
American military governments.
The coup d'état in Chile — and Washington's involvement — stimulated the creation of new human
rights organizations in the United States (e.g. the Washington Office on Latin America, the Lawyers
Committee for International Human Rights). Both joined the transnational human rights coalition early
on. Private philanthropic institutions such as the Ford Foundation were, as their main funders,
instrumental in the creation and development of the transnational human rights coalition that would
eventually include Latin American HRNGOs as well. 8
In Latin America, the first HRNGO, the Argentinian League for the Rights of Man, had been created in
1937 in opposition to General Uriburu's military coup. The Paraguayan Commission for the Defence of
Human Rights, created 30 years later, in 1967, was only the second one. 9 After 1973, the progressive
worsening of the human rights situation in the region prompted the creation of multiple organizations in a
relatively short period of time. Some resulted when victims of human rights violations or their families
got together and demanded the truth (e.g. the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo in
Argentina, the Myrna Mack Foundation, and the Group for Mutual Support in Guatemala). Other
HRNGOs were established by religious organizations as vehicles for their pastoral work (e.g. Vicaría de
la Solidaridad in Chile, Justice and Peace in Colombia, and the Brazilian Commission for Peace and
Justice). A third type of HRNGO resulted from the gathering of concerned professionals, such as lawyers
and journalists. Many such professionals, or their closest relatives, were victims of human rights
violations themselves. This situation led to the creation of professional groups such as the Peruvian
Institute for Legal Defence and the Colombian Commission of Jurists. Finally, several regional Latin
American HRNGOs or coalitions of HRNGOs were established (e.g. the Andean Commission of Jurists
and SERPAJ, the Latin American Service for Peace and Justice). 10
A heterogeneous and informal human rights coalition emerged on a transnational scale that was capable
of creating and mobilizing considerable political capital and of moving the issue of human rights from
the periphery of the international community's concerns to the centre. In spite of formidable official
opposition, Latin American HRNGOs, supported by their international counterparts, the international
press, and progressive governments, were capable of creating political space for the region's democratic
transition.
HRNGOs played particularly important roles where transitions to democracy resulted from
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internationally brokered and carefully negotiated political agreements. In Central America and Haiti,
human rights observer missions worked closely with local groups, setting the context for fairness in
internationally monitored elections that led to democratic governments. HRNGOs contributed decisively
to investigating past abuses and establishing institutional and, when possible, personal responsibilities for
them. They were also instrumental in pushing for a restructuring of the armed forces, the abolition of
compulsory conscription, and the creation or re-establishment of civilian police forces.
In the realm of foreign policy, very early in the transition process HRNGOs pushed for the prompt
ratification of international human rights agreements such as the two Basic Covenants — the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) — as well as the inter-American human rights
protection instruments (see tables 11.1 and 11.2). Although with reservations, most of the Latin
American governments had signed the treaties; however, many had failed to ratify them. Human rights
activists thought, correctly, that legislative ratification of these Covenants would serve as benchmarks
and oblige governments to guarantee certain standards of respect that otherwise the newly established
civilian authorities might not be willing — or able — to assure.
With the exception of Cuba, by 1998 all the other Latin American countries were ruled by democratically
elected civilian authorities. Democracy has conferred broad legitimacy on civil and political rights as
valid guiding principles for Latin American polities. Once again the written constitutions endorse liberal
democracy. Unfortunately, in spite of the generalization of fairly elected civilian governments throughout
the continent, human rights violations continue on a larger scale than one might expect. Democratic
institutions are still weak: legislators are ill prepared, courts are inefficient, corruption is rampant in all
branches of government and at all levels, and the dominant political culture still reveals troublesome
authoritarian dimensions. The drastic economic liberalization policies favoured by the international
financial institutions — commonly known as structural adjustment programmes — have been relatively
successful in reducing inflation and spurring economic growth. The goal of reducing deficits, however,
has been pursued by sharply reducing social spending — which was never very high to begin with.
Poverty has grown throughout the continent, and the gap between rich and poor, the greatest of any
region, has widened.
Citizen security has become a constant preoccupation for all sectors of Latin American societies, as is
true in the newly democratizing states of Eastern Europe. Common crime, once confined to the poor
neighbourhoods of the cities, today is prevalent and does not spare anyone. Drugs and drug trafficking
compound the problem. In some countries such as Venezuela and Brazil, not to mention Colombia, the
levels of violence have attained alarming levels. Among the worst human rights offenders are often the
police forces. This police brutality is reinforced by an extremely inefficient judiciary, and by the middle
classes' penchant for confusing poverty with criminality. In Brazil, for example, police have become
notorious for killing marginalized Brazilians such as street children and landless peasants. Most victims
are young, poor, and black. In Venezuela, democratically elected governments during the past 35 years
have not been able to curb abuses. In fact, the number of human rights violations is increasing. This
context undermines an emphasis on human rights, as many middle- and upper-class elements stress law
and order rather than rights.
During the past decade, state-sponsored violence has receded even in countries such as Colombia,
Mexico, and Peru where guerrillas are still active. Colombia is the Latin American country where the
worst violations of the right to life and to physical integrity are taking place. Political violence, common
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crime, and drug trafficking appear closely intertwined. Assassinations, extrajudicial executions,
kidnappings, disappearances, and forced displacements abound. The situation for human rights continues
to deteriorate in general. This generalization may be less true in Guatemala, Haiti, and Peru where human
rights violations were widespread, but the situation in these three countries has improved — at least at
the time of writing. In Guatemala and Haiti, progress can be partially attributed to the presence of
international observers. In Peru, the apparent defeat of the Shining Path guerrillas has reduced their
capacity of exerting violence. Moreover, extrajudicial executions and disappearances have diminished.
However, the levels of political violence are still too high even compared with other Latin American
countries, and a lack of due process is prevalent. The treatment of prisoners continues to be a major
issue, and the democratic process has been severely restricted. Mexico is going through its worst political
crisis since the 1911 Revolution and one of the worst economic crises of the twentieth century. Standards
of living markedly deteriorated in the late 1990s, while common crime has alarmingly increased. Police
are among the most lawless of Mexican authorities. They are notoriously corrupt and brutal. According
to Amnesty International, the Mexican army and other security forces have extensively used torture in
Chiapas in their fight against the Zapatista rebels. 11 Political murder was obvious in early 1998.
The human rights situation in Cuba merits a special mention. Undoubtedly, the Cuban revolutionary
government has made a considerable effort to advance the Cuban population's economic and social rights
and to maintain them despite the hardships imposed by the demise of the socialist bloc and the tightening
of the US economic embargo. However, the constant violation of Cubans' freedom of association and of
expression, and the right to due process, is notorious. 12
It is not difficult to understand why human rights issues continue to be major concerns for most Latin
American governments. However, by accepting international oversight, those Latin American
governments most genuinely committed to improving their countries' human rights situation are using
foreign policy as an additional instrument to try to consolidate liberal democracy. Along with
information from HRNGOs, governments striving to be rights protective use international legal
instruments as power resources in their struggle to control authoritarian circles and strengthen control
over their reluctant armed and security forces.
 
III. Multilateral human rights policy
Priorities in the global debate
Since 1945 many Latin American states have shown shifting priorities in the global discourse on human
rights. State foreign policies in the hemisphere have reflected a lively domestic debate about whether all
rights are really interdependent, a view endorsed in numerous UN resolutions. Some believe priority
should be given to the collective and mostly economic right to national development — a "right"
approved by the UN General Assembly in 1986 but not codified in treaty law. Others believe that
individual social and economic rights should take priority over civil and political rights. These two
positions have been influenced by both Marxist theory and the rhetoric of third world solidarity. But
others in Latin America endorse the traditional US position that civil and political rights are most
important. Of course, military and other authoritarian governments have argued that it was necessary to
suspend most human rights for the sake of "national security."
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By the 1960s, a group of leading Latin American economists from the Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLAC) — a subdivision within the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
— had coined a new theory of development. According to their central hypothesis, underdevelopment
was not a "stage" — as classical economic theory argued — but had historically constituted the
"necessary condition" for the growth and development of the colonial and neo-colonial powers. The
theory went on to state that the basic mechanism for this occurrence had been a net transfer of wealth
from the underdeveloped South to the developed North, as the decreasing ratio between the international
prices of raw materials and the prices of manufactured goods clearly indicated. 13 There followed the
strategy of forming international price cartels by the Southern countries, among which the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) became the better known and (temporarily) the most
powerful. 14 These events fit with the growing demand for recognition of the "third-generation" right to
development as a collective human right.
At the United Nations, demands for greater "international social justice" became the third world
countries' rallying cry. First there was the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), where the Group of 77 was formed with the mandate of articulating the
concerns of the third world. Subsequently, at the General Assembly, the non-aligned countries became an
important voting bloc. In both forums Latin American diplomacy — led frequently by Cuba, Mexico,
and Venezuela — championed not only the right to development but also the idea of economic and social
rights as a precondition for genuine respect of individual political and civil rights. 15
In the framework of North—South contradictions, socialist countries considered themselves objective
allies of the developing countries and supported third world demands at the United Nations. By doing so
they naturally furthered Washington's initial impulse to view the whole debate on economic and social
rights as a communist plot.
The idea that the right to development should be guaranteed by the rich countries as reparation for past
grievances informs the current discussion concerning the indivisibility between civil and political rights
— which are most commonly accepted as human rights — and economic, social, and cultural rights —
which many continue to characterize as goals and aspirations. However, the history briefly noted above
— with Latin American states deeply involved in international diplomacy — clearly constitutes an
important antecedent to the current discussion on the need to promote development strategies that do not
curtail the realization of the whole array of human rights. The current international discourse on
"sustainable human development" reflects this concern that attention to civil and political rights not
exclude the socio-economic context — defined in terms of both individuals and nations.
By the end of the 1970s, the same intellectuals who had first advanced the idea of socio-economic rights
in various forms were now being persecuted as communist agents by the military dictatorships that ruled
their countries. The need for protecting basic civil and political rights became a matter of life and death
and mobilized important sectors of international public opinion, particularly in Europe. In the United
States, President Carter had put the issue of human rights at the forefront of his administration's foreign
policy — at least in terms of rhetoric. In reality, his administration undertook many initiatives for civil
and political rights in Latin America, as in Nicaragua under the Somoza dynasty. In the long term,
despite all its inconsistencies, Carter's rhetoric in favour of human rights, plus several initiatives such as
the attempted protection of prisoners in places like Chile and Argentina, changed the correlation of
political forces in the hemisphere to the detriment of the principle of the supremacy of state sovereignty
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— and to the detriment of the "national security state" as practised by military elites.
With the end of the Cold War, the old argument that branded economic and social rights as the creation
of communist governments — led by the Soviet Union — has become irrelevant. However, the
protection of social, economic, and cultural rights continues to be largely neglected, today in the name of
free markets. 16 The remaining challenge is how to design a viable and politically acceptable human
rights strategy that effectively promotes the interrelatedness of the two sets of rights. 17 The challenge is
especially difficult because the United States does not accept socio-economic rights as true human rights.
Today, all Latin American governments have signed and ratified the most important international human
rights treaties — the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. With the exception of Cuba — which once accepted the 1948
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man — all other Latin American and Caribbean
governments have also ratified the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. 18 Two Latin
American governments, Costa Rica and Uruguay, were the first to propose, 50 years or so ago, the
creation of a UN Human Rights High Commissioner. A Latin American diplomat, from Ecuador, became
the first person to occupy the post created by the UN General Assembly in 1994 following the
recommendation of the 1993 UN Vienna Conference on Human Rights. 19
The inter-American human rights system
If we look at political culture on a hemispheric or regional basis, and when we see that culture translated
into regional international law, we can see that conflicts abound. The drive for democracy and
rights-protective states, and even for a rigorous regional system for the protection of human rights, has
been accompanied by many authoritarian governments and much brutal repression. The latter elements
were frequently supported by Washington in the name of freedom from communism. Thus there has been
a profound conflict in Latin America between liberal and illiberal elements. At the close of the twentieth
century, liberal elements held the upper hand.
During February and March 1945, at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, the
governments of the Americas declared their adherence to the principles of international law guaranteeing
the essential rights of man and appointed a commission of jurists to draft an American Declaration. 20
The inter-American system of human rights protection and promotion formally materialized in 1948
alongside the Organization of American States (OAS), when the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man was approved in Bogota, Colombia.
At that time, most pro-fascist dictators had been replaced in Latin America by well-meaning civilian
democrats who, confident in the virtues of liberal democracy, were genuinely interested in promoting
rights-protective countries. To a great extent, the first steps to establish an
inter-American system of human rights were taken as symbolic gestures signalling Latin American
support for Western democratic values. Subsequently, liberal democracy and the accompanying belief in
human rights would become pawns in the East-West superpower rivalry. Democracy became equated
with anti-communism and the protection of human rights was superseded by national security
considerations. Regional freedom from communism was accompanied by the suppression of individual
freedom within many Latin countries.
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The hemisphere went through its first Cold War crisis in 1954: Washington suspected President Arbenz
of Guatemala of harbouring communist sympathizers and saw his reformist policies as threats to freedom
in the Americas. The United States sought the support of Latin American governments for a series of
diplomatic sanctions against the Arbenz regime, which it obtained in exchange for the Eisenhower
administration's commitment to increased economic aid to the region. Despite the fact that Arbenz had
been elected in relatively free and fair elections, the Central Intelligence Agency organized the overthrow
of Arbenz and supported the establishment of brutal military government, a chain of events endorsed by
most neighbouring states.
As is well known, a second Cold War confrontation in the Americas centred on Cuba, beginning with
Castro's revolutionary triumph in Cuba in January 1959, and peaking in October 1962 with the missile
crisis. In August 1959, when foreign ministers from the OAS member states convened in Santiago de
Chile during their Fifth Consultative Meeting, Fidel Castro had neither openly adhered to
Marxism—Leninism, nor declared his regime's allegiance to the socialist bloc. However, his pervasive
anti-imperialistic rhetoric, wide-ranging populist measures, the arbitrary and harsh treatment meted out to
former supporters of the deposed Batista regime, and the general absence of due process were considered
ominous signs by Washington. This perception was shared by most other governments in the region. As
in 1954, hemispheric governments elevated fear of reform movements and deference to Washington over
tolerance of political diversity. There was also genuine fear that Castro would indeed move toward
communism and an alliance with the Soviet Union. This fear allowed Kennedy to present a united
regional front to Khrushchev during the missile crisis. Traditional Latin suspicions of Washington's
intentions were somewhat appeased by President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, which at least
promised the foreign assistance Latin American governments had been demanding since the end of the
Second World War.
In the midst of these Cold War tensions, hemispheric states created the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in 1959. If the objective were to avoid radical political and social revolutions that would
lead to "other Cubas," an international legal instrument guaranteeing the protection of human rights was
widely seen as useful. The Inter-American Human Rights Commission was created by a plurality of
votes, with the declared goal of offering legal options to counter tyranny and oppression. It is composed
of independent experts rather than state representatives. As such, the Commission was seen as an interim
solution — until an Inter-American Court of Human Rights could be created. 21 The 1969
Inter-American Human Rights Convention — legally in force for consenting states since 1978 — finally
established the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Convention incorporated the Commission's
role, without precluding the Commission from acting apart from the Convention.
To date, the Commission has been the most active organ of the inter-American regime for the protection
of human rights. This is not only because of its independent membership, but also because, as part of the
OAS, it has jurisdiction over human rights matters apart from the regional Convention on Human Rights.
A number of states have failed to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The Commission,
although lacking supreme and binding authority, has nevertheless carried out many investigations and
issued many reports. This was true, for example, of the Commission's response to complaints of human
rights violations in Argentina (prior to Buenos Aires' ratification of the Convention in 1984); in Brazil (a
few months before Brasilia's ratification of the treaty); and even in Cuba (whose membership in the OAS
was suspended in 1963 and which today is the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean that has
not ratified the Inter-American Human Rights Convention). Latin American governments, however, have
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never authorized the Commission to deploy human rights observer missions. The OAS currently sends
electoral observers to member states, but has never established human rights observer missions. 22
The inter-American human rights regime has not been as effective as its companion system under the
Council of Europe. During the Cold War, the hemisphere manifested numerous governments that
elevated suppression of "leftist" movements over defence of human rights — to a much greater extent
than in Europe. Washington's security concerns in the hemisphere led it to support this repression —
again to a much greater extent than in Europe. The inter-American regime, essentially an
intergovernmental system with pockets of uninstructed officials, was ineffective at eliminating gross
violations of human rights by its member states. 23 However, if the inter-American system of human
rights protection had been less than fully effective as an instrument for enforcing compliance from
governments, its diplomatic usefulness became clear when its reports helped denounce and isolate the
governments with the worst human rights records. Indeed, among the finest hours of the Commission
were the 1978 and 1980 reports presented at the respective OAS annual assemblies. Thus the
Commission served as a focal point for all those circles resisting repression.
Between 1975 and 1989/90, of 267 cases cited in the Commission's annual reports, the governments of
Chile, Argentina, Nicaragua, Peru, and Cuba were the most frequently named, closely followed by the
governments of Bolivia, Haiti, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Paraguay — with more than 10 citations
each. 24 The Commission has also acknowledged two complaints, in 1988 and 1989, by the National
Action Party (PAN) against the government of Mexico, concerning the violation of political rights as
well as their right to due process. A complaint from the Yanomani Indians against the government of
Brazil concerning the violation of their rights has been recognized as valid too. 25 Although the Mexican
government ratified the Convention in 1982, and Brasilia did 10 years later, neither government has yet
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. 26 Such situations highlight the continuing role of the Commission.
Ironically, with the spread of democratic government in the region, the caseload of the Commission and
the Court has increased rather than declined. The Court has ruled 17 times on cases concerning Peru (4),
Honduras (3), Argentina (2), Guatemala (2), Surinam (2), and Venezuela, Nicaragua, Colombia, and El
Salvador (1 each). Peru, Honduras, Surinam, and Colombia have been condemned to reparations. Of the
17 rulings of the Court, 8 were issued between 1986 and 1992, and 5 were issued in 1995.
For its part, the Commission has remained highly active. For example, it organized extensive
consultations on a Declaration of Indigenous Rights. The Canadian Bar Association, the American
Anthropological Association, and the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, among others, were invited
to discuss the draft, which should soon be presented at the OAS General Assembly for its approval.
Concerning women's rights, the Commission has named a special Rapporteur to establish if domestic
legislation and actual legislative and political practices truly guarantee the rights of women according to
American legal instruments. 27 The Commission's report on the status of women's rights will make
recommendations to the governments for improving their standards, particularly concerning the
protection of women subject to domestic violence.
Hemispheric states also inject human rights in the summit diplomacy of the Americas, the other
important multilateral forum in the Western hemisphere. Within the agenda put forward by the Plan of
Action signed in December 1994 by the participating heads of state and government at the hemispheric
summit in Miami, a Working Group on Democracy and Human Rights was established, coordinated by
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the governments of Brazil and Canada with the assistance of the OAS. This group concentrated on four
key areas: developing democratic culture, encouraging greater transparency and the rule of law,
strengthening electoral processes, and establishing priorities for the promotion of human rights. Thus the
working group signalled the region's interest in improving the quality of democracy as the best way of
protecting and promoting human rights.
Now that the hemisphere manifests more genuine or aspiring liberal democracies, the regional system is
working better and may begin to approximate its European model. The key to regional protection is the
absence at the national level of abusive regimes that refuse to be bound by the rule of law. Liberal
democratic governments, in essence respectful of the rule of law and of their citizens' fundamental civil
and political rights, are more amenable to accepting the regional — and global — human rights
protection mechanisms and view them as compatible with domestic objectives. There is thus less tension
between claims to human rights and claims to state sovereignty. The Latin American countries'
commitment to the inter-American human rights system is made evident by the increasing — albeit still
largely inadequate — budgetary allocations for the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and
Court. 28 Furthermore, some governments are using these international mechanisms to strengthen
democratic control over military and security forces. The policy of the Colombian government is a case
in point. President Samper has requested the presence of an international human rights observer mission
in an attempt to strengthen the executive's capacity to monitor and check human rights violations in its
territory.
Latin American new political regionalism: Protecting democracy and improving its quality
Democratically elected leaders are genuinely trying to close the gap between the internationally
recognized human rights to which their countries have subscribed and actual governmental agencies'
everyday practice. 29 As indicated above, this quest is made difficult by several factors: economic
conditions, political history, and bastions of illiberalism, particularly in military circles. Awareness of
domestic and regional deficiencies in the human rights field has caused most Latin American states to
eschew an activist foreign policy on most global issues.
The region's historical economic weakness and lack of financial autonomy have reinforced the dominant
pattern of "small-state" reactive diplomacy, basically concerned with keeping foreigners at bay.
Following the realist paradigm, which the majority of Latin American foreign policy establishments have
favoured, national interest has indeed been equated with the pursuit of state power — defined in terms of
national autonomy. Latin American solidarity has been seen as an important foreign policy tool by most
countries; collective diplomacy has been sought, as a means of defending common interests against
foreign encroachment. Fear of Washington's intervention is legendary.
Consistent with this tradition, Latin American democratic regimes today have not established activist
foreign policies on most global human rights issues. A state like Costa Rica may take some initiatives on
human rights education in the UN Human Rights Commission, but most Latin and Caribbean states tend
to focus their foreign policies on human rights on two subjects: application of international standards in
the domestic legal order, and the workings of the regional human rights system.
Despite important progress, consolidating the rule of law is still an aspiration for most hemispheric
societies, and the protection of human rights continues to be an important issue in domestic policies.
Although only Cuba among hemispheric states is under the scrutiny of the UN Human Rights
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Commission, it has been well documented that countries such as Peru (which paradoxically has recently
been elected by ECOSOC to the Commission 30), Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, inter alia, have serious
problems of human rights abuses. 31
Realistically aware of the remaining power of the armed forces, Latin American civilian leaders have
tried to use regional institutions to protect liberal democracy in the various nations. Yet they remain
trapped by their traditions. Although the OAS voted in September 1994 to support Father Aristide as the
rightfully elected leader of Haiti in the face of military opposition, the OAS still could not bring itself to
endorse a US-led use of force to guarantee democratic governance. Washington had to turn to the United
Nations, rather than to the OAS, to secure a resolution authorizing "all necessary means" — meaning the
use of force. Latin states were in favour of democratic government, but not in favour of legitimizing yet
another use of force in the region by Washington. The same pattern had played out earlier when
President Bush deployed force in Panama, arguably in favour of the elected Endara government and
against the authoritarian Noriega government. With some justification, the OAS refused to endorse that
use of force either. Thus the OAS has certainly gone on record in favour of liberal democracy, but not so
clearly in favour of the use of force to secure or defend various manifestations of liberal or almost-liberal
democracy.
The background to this tension merits summary. The OAS's 1991 Santiago Declaration committed
hemispheric governments diplomatically to support any elected regime threatened by hostile forces. The
Santiago commitment has since been reaffirmed by the Washington Protocol, which provides for the
expulsion of a state from the OAS in the event of the overthrow of a democratic regime, and the
Managua Protocol, which commits member states to the active promotion and consolidation of
democracy and to preventive efforts against threats to democratic regimes. This evolving regime of
democracy protection proved to be an effective deterrent in Guatemala in 1991 when the elected
president himself sought the support of the armed forces against the elected Congress. 32 In a volte-face,
Washington was a staunch opponent of this auto-golpe. The OAS was less successful in Peru in 1992
when President Fujimori attempted something similar. However, after condemning the coup, the OAS
was able to send a fact-finding mission. Diplomatic pressure was instrumental in convincing President
Fujimori to accelerate his original timetable and convene a Constituent Assembly that would restore
democratic legitimacy to his government. Nevertheless, Peruvian democracy remains quite imperfect by
liberal standards.
There are other examples of Latin diplomacy working for liberal democracy. In Central America, much
Latin diplomacy has been directed not just to simple peace but to a liberal democratic peace. During the
1980s, the governments of Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela, opposing the Reagan administration's
policy towards Central America, formed the Contadora Group. They were soon joined by the
governments of Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. According to most analysts, this Contadora
diplomacy was instrumental in slowing down the militarization of the Central American conflicts.
Although its mediation effort was not fully successful, it laid the groundwork for the subsequent Central
American negotiated peace settlement — a settlement linked to the goal of liberal democracy in places
such as Nicaragua and El Salvador. The eight Latin American foreign ministers of Contadora and its
Support Group — along with the UN and OAS secretaries-general — formed the first verification
commission of the Esquipulas II agreement.
The Rio Group, which succeeded Contadora, now includes all South American governments — plus
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Central American and Caribbean participation based on a rotation system. The Rio Group constitutes an
important venue for Latin American and Caribbean multilateral diplomacy, where democratically elected
heads of state and government periodically confer. The underlying theme of the high-level gatherings has
been how to address their countries' current security concerns (drug trafficking, money laundering,
corruption, common crime) effectively from a liberal democratic perspective. 33
Mercosur, South America's regional integration treaty, has a "democracy clause" that automatically
suspends any country's participation in the regional arrangement in the event of a military coup. 34 A
timely intervention by Brazil's and Argentina's foreign ministers was crucial in avoiding a military coup
in Paraguay in 1995.
The Ibero-American summits — the periodic gatherings of all Latin American and Iberian heads of state
— have also made a practice of explicitly subscribing to the principles of representative democracy and
explicitly evoking the rights of free speech, religion, and assembly. The summits have become important
venues allowing Latin American governments to implement an activist stand in promoting human rights
in Cuba. During the 1996 Ibero-American summit in Vina del Mar, by signing the final joint declaration,
Fidel Castro committed himself to the respect of these rights. In the future his peers will undoubtedly try
to hold him accountable for his promise.
Although the great majority of Latin American and Caribbean governments object to the US
Helms—Burton legislation, which seeks to punish those parties using expropriated American property in
Cuba in profit-making activity, and have opposed the broader US economic embargo against Cuba for
several years, they are withholding full admission for Cuba into the most important regional integration
arrangements in the name of the "democracy clause." Most Latin states, however, have resumed
diplomatic and consular bilateral relations with Cuba.
 
IV. Two examples: Costa Rican and Argentinian foreign policies and human
rights
Historical background and domestic constraints only partially explain Latin American policy behaviour.
International determinants are also important factors to take into account. Among them, US foreign
policy has historically constituted the external variable par excellence. Insofar as human rights have been
an important theme of the United States' foreign policy, Latin American governments have tended to
address human rights first and foremost as a component of their overall relationship with Washington. As
far as human rights are concerned, neither Costa Rica's nor Argentina's foreign policies, although quite
different in content, constitute exceptions.
Costa Rica's principled diplomacy
Economic conditions and the country's geographic isolation during the colonial era created the
foundations for the establishment of a fairly democratic and stable political order during the republican
era. Many Costa Ricans owned land — very small parcels in most cases — but private ownership and the
ensuing shortage of labour helped blur class lines quite significantly. To a great extent, the economic
system led to a greater tolerance of others and a suspicion of extremes in political affairs. Additionally,
unlike many areas of the Spanish empire, where the Church acted as a repressive force, fostering social
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stratification, in Costa Rica the Church remained weak throughout the colonial era. When independence
from Spain was declared, in 1823, basic forms of political, economic, and social institutions, allowing for
evolution toward a form of capitalistic democracy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, were in
place. There were problems of race, economic disparity, and social stratification, but they were relatively
mild compared with other parts of Central America. The long and destructive struggles that plagued other
Latin American governments never afflicted Costa Rica, thus reducing the core international powers'
rationale for intervention.
Influenced by nineteenth-century liberalism, the leaders of the Costa Rican ruling class promoted many
of their ideas in the Constitution of 1871, a very progressive document even by contemporary standards.
Costa Rican elites shared a commitment to expanded education and political opportunities and the
separation of church and state. They abolished capital punishment, created a tolerance for non-Catholic
religions unparalleled in the region, improved educational opportunities, and allowed for journals and
newspapers to thrive.
Costa Rica's democratic development quickened in the first part of the twentieth century. Direct election
of the president was introduced in 1913. After General Rodrigo Tinoco's short-lived military dictatorship
(1917–1919), reformers created a national agency to monitor elections (1925), established the secret
ballot (1928), and made voting compulsory (1936). Electoral fraud was not fully eradicated until 1948,
but elections became more meaningful.
The military was never a powerful institution, and its weakness removed another repressive force that
undercut democratic development in other Central American republics. In 1918, Costa Rica's military
had 5,000 soldiers and 700 policemen. By the mid-1940s, its military had shrunk to only 300 soldiers,
with a police force of just over 1,100.
By 1940, when Costa Ricans abandoned the classic liberal political model and tried to implement a
reformist agenda, the realities and myths surrounding Costa Rica's historical development had created a
belief among most US observers that in its political, social, and economic institutions Costa Rica more
closely resembled the United States than most countries in Latin America. 35 The Costa Rican
government of Dr. Rafael Calderon Guardia enacted a very progressive labour code, and created social
security and public health systems with the support of the local communist party without arousing major
opposition from the Roosevelt administration.
Although Calderon's government enjoyed some autonomy in domestic policies, in international affairs it
chose firmly to support the Allies throughout the Second World War, accommodating US demands on
issues such as the handling of German and Italian nationals and the question of diplomatic recognition of
Peronist Argentina. By the end of the war the Calderon government had placed more than 200 people of
German and Italian descent in internment camps in the United States. 36 Costa Rica's policy towards
other Central American republics had historically been ambivalent. Costa Rican elites, uneasy with the
authoritarian practices favoured by their neighbours, had oscillated from cautious engagement to outright
isolationism. Calderon Guardia's own authoritarian bent led him to establish a very close relationship
with General Anastasio Somoza, the Nicaraguan strongman.
The results of the 1948 presidential elections, unfavourable to a second Calderon candidacy, were
annulled. This was the last of a series of violent incidents that had marred the political scene since the
end of the war. Under the leadership of Jose Figueres Ferrer (Don Pepe), the democratic opposition
Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy: Chapter 11
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/forsythe/chapter11.html (15 of 26) [8/11/2002 10:11:39 PM]
organized a successful armed uprising. Don Pepe's ideas had a profound impact on his country's policies
and political culture.
In his book Ideario Costarricense (1943), Figueres had outlined a proactive engagement in favour of
democratic movements fighting against the dictatorships in Latin America as the most important goal of
the foreign policy implemented by a truly democratic government. The new Constitution, which was
voted during his first term, was very much influenced by his social democratic ideology. The document
acknowledged the state's responsibility for stimulating production and promoting the equitable
distribution of wealth. It mandated the creation of autonomous government agencies to guide and
regulate the economy and social services programmes and created a civil service. The Constitution also
established the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, with the rank of "fourth branch of government," extended
suffrage to women, and ended legal discrimination against blacks from the Limon area. In 1949, a
constitutional amendment ratified the December 1948 Provisional Junta's decree abolishing the armed
forces.
In December 1947, Figueres, along with exiled leaders from Nicaragua, Venezuela, and the Dominican
Republic, had signed the Caribbean Pact and created the Caribbean Legion, a political alliance aimed at
overthrowing the region's dictators. Despite Figueres' claims that Costa Rica constituted the weakest link
in the dictatorial chain, the group chose to concentrate its efforts against the Dominican Republic's
dictator. Only after Trujillo defeated an invasion in early 1948 did the Legion turned its attention toward
assisting Figueres in Costa Rica. 37 Jose Figueres and his party Liberacion Nacional would not forget
their friends on the democratic left. 38
Needless to say, Figueres' aid to the Caribbean Legion was a potent irritant to successive US
administrations, which considered his alliance with the group and support of its activities as a threat to
the region's status quo. The attacks on Washington's dictatorial allies in the Caribbean Basin diverted
American attention and energy away from more important matters in Asia and Europe. Despite the
pressures to abandon his friends, Figueres continued to assist the Legion's attempts to establish
democratic governments in the region, justifying his work as "moral and necessary." 39
According to the Costa Rican Constitution, foreign policy is the purview of the president of the Republic
and the relevance of its profile has depended on the type of presidential leadership. As a general rule,
Figueres and subsequent presidents from the Liberacion Nacional party have had more active foreign
policies than other parties' presidents. In the absence of a professional diplomatic corps, the only other
important figure in foreign policy decision-making has traditionally been the minister of foreign affairs.
40
Figueres' successor, Otilio Ulate (1949–1953) abandoned the anti-dictatorial crusade and, like previous
Costa Rican governments, backed Washington's initiatives at the United Nations as well as the OAS. It
was during his administration that Costa Rican diplomats began explicitly referring to "absolute respect
of human rights" as one of the goals of their country's foreign policy, and framing their anti-communist
stance as well as their anti-colonialist and anti-apartheid policies in those terms. 41 At the OAS, Costa
Rican diplomats played an important role in the creation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,
which was recognized by the inter-American community when it decided to locate the Court in San Jose.
Without abandoning altogether their country's traditional position against military dictatorships,
Francisco Orlich's government (1958–1962), Figueres' third administration (1970–1974), and Oduber's
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government (1974–1978) focused their foreign policy on North—South issues. At a time when most
countries were ruled by military governments, Costa Rica would have been almost totally isolated.
During his last administration, Figueres even abandoned his practice of withholding diplomatic
recognition of de facto governments, but allowed his country to become a safe haven for South American
and Central American political refugees. Daniel Oduber Quiros, who would later become a prominent
leader of the International Socialists, along with presidents Luis Echeverría from Mexico, Carlos Andres
Perez from Venezuela, and Alfonso Lopez Michelsen from Colombia (the only remaining civilian
leaders in Latin America at the time), set up an informal "foreign policy coalition." The goal of this
informal group was to foster democratic solidarity while supporting the creation of a new international
economic order more favourable to the third world.
The Nicaraguan insurgency revitalized Costa Rica's anti-dictatorial sentiments and Costa Rica became
not only a safe haven but also a very important source of support for the Sandinista rebels. The day
Somoza abandoned Managua, all the churches in Costa Rica tolled their bells. On 19 July 1978, every
Costa Rican was a Sandinista. President Carazo's administration, although not a Liberacion one, opted
for an activist foreign policy along the lines established by his predecessor. For example, Costa Rica
became an observer at the Non-Aligned Movement, recognized the Polisario Front, and established
diplomatic relations with most of the African and Asian countries. The traditional human rights discourse
was toned down in favour of more contemporary third world concerns.
President Monge (1982–1986) was the opposite. He inherited a disastrous domestic economic situation at
a time when Washington had declared war on the Sandinista regime. President Monge allowed the
United States to train anti-Sandinista combatants on the Costa Rican northern border and an increased
militarization of the country's police forces. His government abandoned the social democratic alliance,
which would henceforward be known as the Contadora Group, and opted for an unconditional diplomatic
alignment with the Reagan administration. In compensation, the country's external debt was successfully
renegotiated and aid from the US government flowed generously, which undoubtedly eased the pain
inflicted on the middle classes and the popular sectors by stabilization and structural adjustment policies
implemented by his government.
Not everyone in Costa Rica approved of Monge's foreign policy choices. Public opinion was extremely
divided. An important section — including former President Figueres — strongly opposed them and
proposed to declare Costa Rica's neutrality in order to reverse the country's increasing involvement in the
Central American wars. According to them, this would allow for appeasement with the Sandinistas
without having to condone Nicaragua's growing authoritarianism.
Oscar Arias (1986–1990) proposed a different foreign policy course to his countrymen. The Arias Plan
sought to complement Costa Rica's non-involvement in the region's conflicts, not with traditional Costa
Rican isolationism, but with an active search for regional peace and democracy. One of the most
innovative aspects of the peace framework proposed by Arias, which the other Central American leaders
accepted in the Esquipulas Accord, was their commitment to respect human rights and hold
internationally observed elections. Guaranteeing respect for democracy and human rights was therefore
made a regional priority. 42
At home, President Arias instigated legal reforms giving the people new instruments to demand respect
for their rights. He successfully proposed the creation of a new constitutional chamber of the Supreme
Court where anyone could directly complain if they thought that their rights had been violated.
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His successor, Jose María Figueres Olsen (Don Pepe's son), constructed his foreign policy around the
theme of sustainable development and thus introduced the idea of environmental rights into the equation.
The Central American presidents established a Sustainable Development Regional Alliance (ALIDES),
which has become one of the cornerstones of the integration process. In the Alliance, the signing
governments pledge themselves to a wide range of new policies that interpret sustainable development to
include improved social equity, expanded democratic political participation, and increased respect for
cultural, gender, and human rights, in addition to ecological sustainability.
Argentina's nationalism and foreign policy
Argentina was also an isolated backwater in the Spanish American colonial empire. But unlike Costa
Rica, which exported coffee and bananas, Argentina supplied Western Europe with the foodstuffs it
needed. The pampas, among the most fertile lands in the world, were exactly what was required to
produce the grains and meat the new industrialized countries needed to feed themselves. Great Britain,
Argentina's principal customer until the 1950s, supplied the capital in the form of investment in the
railroads, docks, packing houses, and public utilities. Foreign investment also came in the form of British
firms that handled insurance, shipping, and banking. Like Costa Rica, Argentina was underpopulated.
The badly needed workers came from southern Europe, primarily Spain and Italy. By 1914,
approximately 30 per cent of the Argentinian population was foreign born (13 per cent in the United
States).
The high degree of foreign economic involvement became a target for Argentine nationalists.
Dependence on foreign resources also contributed to on-going Argentine self-doubt about the country's
capabilities of achieving a more self-sufficient economy and an authentic "national" culture. This
self-doubt has permeated Argentina's foreign policy until very recently.
The 1912 electoral reform gave all Argentine males over 18 years of age the right to vote. At the time
only 1 million qualified. The electoral laws excluded women — women would be given the right to vote
in 1946 by Peron — and also left outside the political system at least half of the male adult population
who had not undergone naturalization. Voting was mandatory, and voter participation was generally
high: 70–80 per cent of eligible voters cast ballots in presidential elections. 43 Unfortunately, electoral
fraud and demagoguery were widespread.
In 1930, the slow progress achieved since the 1912 electoral reform was halted and civilian democracy
was overthrown by a military coup. Under the leadership of General Jose F. Uruburu, a first attempt at
establishing a corporate state was made. It was not completely successful this time, and civilian politics
had to be partially reinstated.
As the war spread in Europe in the early 1940s and the Axis armies seemed invincible, the Argentine
military longed for a steady, sure leadership in their own land. Congress was dissolved in 1943, the end
of political parties was decreed in 1944, and very few civilians were allowed to serve in the government.
In 1946, General Juan Domingo Peron, former Labour Secretary and Minister of Defence of the military
governments, won the elections by a landslide.
Internationally the Argentine military refused to join the US military-led effort, opting for a "neutrality"
that would allow them to continue selling essential foodstuffs to Britain while withholding their political
and military allegiance during the hostilities. Argentina finally declared war on Germany barely a few
months before the Third Reich armies were crushed by the Allies.
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Peron reorganized the state following corporatist principles. He also reduced foreign influence in the
economy. In 1946 he reorganized the Central Bank so as to increase control over all foreign-owned
monetary assets. In 1948 his government nationalized the British-owned railways, still the heart of the
national transportation system. Also nationalized was the leading telephone company (US-controlled
ITT) and the French-owned dock facilities. In July 1947, Argentina had paid off its entire foreign debt,
which according to Peron amounted to a "declaration of economic independence." He was re-elected in
1951, thanks to the overwhelming support of newly enfranchised women voters and of the working
classes.
In 1953, Peron's second term was abruptly terminated by his fellow officers outraged by his
government's increasing reliance on labour, the most radical sector of his movement.
A new attempt at ending military rule began with the 1958 presidential election. The victor was Arturo
Frondizi, who had mounted an aggressively nationalistic campaign and had been able to attract some
Peronist support. He was ousted by the military two years before the end of his term. Arturo Illía, elected
in 1963, after a previous election had been annulled by the armed forces, was also ousted by the military
three years later. Apart from a three-year Peronist hiatus (1973–1976), the armed forces would govern
Argentina for the next 13 years. The military would prove to be the worst human rights abuser in the
history of the South American country.
In spite of their very narrow margin of autonomy vis-à-vis the military, the two civilian presidents,
Frondizi and Illía, were able to conduct fairly independent foreign policies. There were two basic foreign
policy themes: the right to self-determination and economic nationalism. Neither support for human
rights nor buttressing democratic regimes was compatible with the principle of non-intervention.
Frondizi invoked only the right to self-determination during the main foreign policy crisis of his
administration: the Cuban revolution. The Argentines abstained in the OAS when Cuba's membership
was suspended in 1962 at the VII consultative meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the OAS member
states. A few months later, however, Frondizi was obliged to severe diplomatic ties with Havana,
pressured by the Argentine armed forces, which were interested in accessing US military aid at the time.
President Illía would invoke the same principles during the Dominican crisis. Like most other Latin
American governments, rather than condone US unilateral intervention in the Caribbean island, the
Argentinian government voted for the formation of an inter-American force, but the Argentine military
did not participate. 44 In 1964, the Argentinians became observers at the Non-Aligned Movement, the
principal third world forum.
The second important theme of both civilian presidents' foreign policy was that of economic nationalism.
Argentine diplomacy was an articulator of the region's stance at the first UNCTAD as well as a
proponent of the OAS's Latin American Economic Commission. Social and economic claims were
integral components of the policy, but they were stated on behalf of the collective — the nation — not of
the individual.
During the military dictatorship, the main goal of foreign policy was to conceal from the outside world
and/or to justify the excesses committed in the name of "national security doctrine." The tense relations
with Washington following President's Carter decision to suspend US military aid, loan guarantees, and
donations were little by little replaced by a "pacific coexistence." The business community lobbied hard
in both countries for more flexibility from both ends. 45 The Argentine military agreed to allow the OAS
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Commission to send a fact-finding mission. In exchange, Washington authorized a multi-million credit
from the Eximbank for the purchase of US-made turbines for the hydroelectric project of Yacitera.
In a gesture of defiance, the Argentine military had refused to join the US-sponsored trade embargo
against the USSR following the invasion of Afghanistan. Moscow had become one of Argentina's main
trading partners and also one of Buenos Aires' main supporters in the United Nations in favour of its
claims for non-intervention. In spite of the increasingly close relationship between Argentina and the
USSR — and despite President Reagan's staunch anti-communism — his administration made the
Argentine military its South American closest ally. The Argentine military were sent to Central America
as advisers in counter-insurgency. Most observers agree that it was the warm relationship the Argentine
military government had developed with the Reagan administration that led General Galtieri to suppose
he would have at least Washington's tacit support after invading the Malvinas/Falkland Islands.
The Argentine armed forces' debacle precipitated the demise of the military regime. Raul Alfonsín, the
Radical Party's candidate, surprisingly won by a landslide. Domestically his priority was to consolidate
democracy, particularly by establishing firm civilian control over the military.
The new regime faced serious problems. First was the commitment to prosecute the military personnel
and police who had killed or disappeared more than 10,000 suspects. Alfonsín owed his election to this
commitment and to the Argentinian people's demands for justice. The new civilian government had to
face impossibly thorny questions: Where did the criminal responsibility end? How many officers should
be brought to trial? and the biggest unknown of all: Would the civilian government survive such an
attempt? The second major problem was the economy. The country could not make the payments on its
huge foreign debt and in 1983 inflation had reached 400 percent. Despite the repression, the Peronist
labour unions still yielded considerable power, so economic policy based on "shock therapy" was
impossible to implement. The third major problem for Alfonsín was to build a strong power base that
would allow him to confront the two other challenges faced by his government.
Foreign policy was a key element of Alfonsín's survival strategy. Risking the loss of the much-needed
US government support to conclude successful negotiations with the international financial institutions,
he chose to set an independent course for Argentina concerning the Central American wars that was
closer to European and other Latin American foreign policies than to Washington. Alfonsín and his
foreign minister, Dante Caputo, thought that a firm international stand in favour of democracy, pluralism,
human dignity, and human rights achieved through political negotiations was the best way to use foreign
policy as a tool in their quest to strengthen civilian control over the military. Concerning human rights
specifically, the Argentine Congress ratified the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights
and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1986.
Alfonsín's government charged the nine military commanders-in-chief for crimes ranging from murder to
rape. Five were convicted and given prison terms. Three of the four acquitted were later tried by military
justice and sentenced to prison. However, a military revolt in 1987 protesting against the impending
prosecutions forced Congress to exempt all officers below the rank of General and several attempted
coups convinced Alfonsín of the need to implement appeasement strategies vis-à-vis the military or risk a
bloodbath. 46
Alfonsín's successor, Carlos Menem, chose to concentrate domestically on the economic restructuring
that would inevitably pitch him against the still powerful trade unions. He decided to pardon the military.
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He needed the political space to attack the economic paralysis. Several months after taking office he
issued sweeping pardons for participants in previous military revolts and in December 1990 he pardoned
the former leaders of the military government and commuted their sentences. One of the goals of these
measures was to change his country's international image to one of a mature democracy and for that he
needed a functioning economy.
In his foreign policy, Menem chose to abandon Argentina's traditional non-interventionist stance and
distance from US foreign policy and, on the contrary (like Costa Rica), chose to align himself closely
with Washington's policies. His government dropped all militaristic aspects of foreign policy. The
Argentine military participated in the UN-endorsed Persian Gulf war effort and since have participated
extensively in peace-keeping operations and international observer missions. The Menem government
also signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco — declaring Latin America a nuclear-free zone — and
has thus abandoned Argentina's nuclear policy.
President Menem actively supported the UN embargo against the military dictatorship in Haiti, and
Argentina is the only major Latin American country that has not objected to the Helms—Burton
legislation against Cuba. In exchange for Argentina's support, President Clinton declared the South
American country a major non-NATO ally, a distinction long coveted by the Menem administration.
Argentina's alignment with Washington's policies and its belonging to the West is not questioned any
more. However, human rights have not become a primary concern for the Menem government. Once
very active, the domestic human rights movement has been declining since the 1990s, which might
explain why the government's domestic record is not as good as it should be.
While human rights abuses have not completely disappeared (although they continue to diminish), in the
economic realm the structural adjustment and stabilization policies have taken a very heavy toll on the
standards of living of most Argentinians. Journalists reporting on government corruption are still being
intimidated — the assassination of one photo-journalist prompted massive popular demonstrations
demanding a thorough investigation and full disclosure. In 1997, Amnesty International cited reports of
torture and ill-treatment of detainees in police custody, and of killings by the police suggesting possible
extrajudicial executions. According to the same source, widespread demonstrations against government
economic policies were routinely forcibly dispersed by police who beat and ill-treated demonstrators. 47
Increased police accountability and a more efficient judiciary are considered to be pressing needs by the
vast majority of the Argentine public.
Contrary to the region's foreign policy tradition, in the 1940s Costa Rica's reformist leaders chose to
protect their state-centred political model from outside intervention by espousing some of the most
important US foreign policy concerns. Faced with such an overwhelming power asymmetry, they soon
realized that the only way of shielding themselves from outside intervention was by becoming a
preferred US ally — certainly the best Central American one.
Argentines, who for a long time cherished regional power ambitions, confronted with the superpower's
own hegemonic designs chose to protect themselves from foreign powers, championing the cause of
non-intervention in the internal affairs of the American republics. For most of the twentieth century
Argentina's diplomacy tried to enshrine the principles of non-intervention and the right to
self-determination in the inter-American system, but, lacking the power resources to impose them,
Argentina's foreign policy makers never transcended the legal and rhetorical dimensions. Today,
Argentine civilian governments, particularly President Menem's, have adopted a foreign policy strategy
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very similar to the one favoured by Costa Rica's leaders during most of the twentieth century. Argentina's
economic privatization reforms and its peace-oriented foreign policy, along with a very friendly attitude
towards most of Washington's diplomatic initiatives, have earned the country the status of a non-NATO
major ally of the United States. The Argentine government was an early supporter of international
intervention in Haiti, and the country's armed forces have been part of a great number of UN
peacekeeping operations. Clearly breaking with the past, Argentina has been one of the most outspoken
Latin American critics of Cuba's human rights violations. Ironically, Costa Rica has kept a lower profile
in its criticism of Castro's regime, and has recently established a desk at the Spanish Embassy in Havana,
uncharacteristically opting to distance itself from US policy.
 
V. In sum
In the post-Cold War era, a process of conversion from the imperative of state security to an aspiration
for human security is slowly taking shape in Latin America. The region's traditional perception of its
extreme vulnerability to foreign intervention is being gradually replaced by a more confident relationship
with the international system. Most of the countries seem quite comfortable in an interdependent world
and a wide spectrum of sectors in Latin American societies are willing to accept a diminished
sovereignty in exchange for enhanced human security. Instead of seeing the international system as a
source of threats, following in the footsteps of HRNGOs the region's democracies are increasingly
considering it a source of power and learning to use it to their advantage. For example, civilian
governments often invoke the international human rights covenants and ask for assistance — human
rights monitors, electoral observers — from the international community in order to eradicate the
authoritarian pockets still remaining in Latin American societies and polities.
Latin American human rights foreign policies are being conceived as key components of democratic
consolidation. They are used either as devices to extract power resources from the international system
for strictly domestic purposes, or as elements of a multilateral and regional strategy for maintaining
representative democracy as the region's preferred form of governance.
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Chapter 12: An overview
Jack Donnelly
 
The preceding chapters have surveyed the international human rights policies of several diverse
countries. Although the selection is not entirely representative — in particular, countries that even today
largely overlook human rights in their foreign policy have been ignored, for obvious reasons — it is
sufficiently broad to allow some preliminary conclusions about the state of human rights in post-Cold
War foreign policy. Many states in the post-Cold War world include respect for internationally
recognized human rights as part of their national self-images and as an objective in their foreign policies.
Few, however, make more than occasional, modest sacrifices of other foreign policy interests in the name
of human rights. In this concluding chapter, I will try to draw attention to both the reality and the limits
of states' concern with international human rights.
Realists, who still dominate the intellectual and policy-making mainstream in most countries, properly
emphasize the characteristic unwillingness of states to sacrifice material interests. Nonetheless, the fact
that human rights are a bounded or secondary interest makes that interest no less real than those with
higher priority. If the impact of limited interests is limited, that is still an impact. Even where human
rights do not decisively tip the decision-making balance, they still may have some weight. And when a
decision does hang in the balance, even the small additional weight of human rights considerations may
prove to be decisive in determining national policy.
Human rights advocates properly emphasize the growing prominence of human rights in the foreign
policy rhetoric, and even practice, of most states. Human rights today have become firmly entrenched on
the foreign policy agendas of many, perhaps even most, states. The clear influence of human rights
norms and values, as well as the importance that states give to verbal and symbolic dimensions of foreign
policy, suggest further limitations in realist theories. Many states simply do not define their national
interests entirely in terms of power, or even material interests.
Nonetheless, although in the late 1990s more and more states talk about human rights, probably with
greater sincerity than in the past, few consistently do much more. And no state places human rights at the
top of its agenda. In few are international human rights even near the top. This concluding chapter
attempts to expand on this summary account of limited (but real) progress and impact, drawing heavily
on the preceding case-studies. In addition, it highlights important elements of diversity in the
international human rights policies and practices of contemporary states.
 
I. Human rights and national identity
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This volume has argued that for states, as for individuals, what one does is shaped by who one is.
National interests are not given simply by objective factors such as geography, history, or position in the
balance of power. Furthermore, national identity, like personal identity, is significantly a matter of ideals
and aspirations. The national interest is a matter of what a state values, which is determined in part by
how that state sees itself, both nationally and internationally. The international human rights policies of
most states are in significant measure identity based; that is, they reflect the extent to which (national and
international) human rights values have shaped or re-shaped understandings of who they are and what
they value. The clear evidence of the preceding chapters is that many — almost certainly most — states
today identify more strongly with internationally recognized human rights than even a decade, let alone
half a century, ago.
Alternative identities
The characteristic identification of late-twentieth-century states with human rights, however, must be
seen in historical context. Iran, whose reluctance to identify itself with human rights seems so anomalous
today, is much closer to the cross-cultural and trans-historical norm. Human rights have become central
to the self-images of most states only in the past several decades — in many cases, only in the past
decade or two.
Claims of superior civilization — for example, Roman, Christian, Muslim, European, and Chinese —
have been a much more common basis for foreign policy than identification with a common humanity. In
Western and non-Western societies alike, the right to rule has more often rested on a divine mandate, or
simply superior power, than on popular sovereignty. Tradition and the demands of social order have
justified many more governments than the rights of the citizenry have. The rights of a few, determined by
birth, wealth, power, religion, virtue, age, race, or ethnicity, usually have been seen as superior to the
rights of many or all.
Almost all societies have believed that rulers ought to treat their subjects fairly and seek to realize their
interests. Few, however, have recognized rights of subjects (citizens) that can be exercised against their
rulers. For example, Qing emperors and medieval European princes recognized a divinely ordained duty
to rule justly. This heavenly obligation, however, was not accompanied by rights of the subjects to enjoy
such rule. With such internal rights conceptions, it was inconceivable that human rights would have a
place in international relations.
Even where rights of the ruled have been recognized, they have typically been seen as special, rather than
general or universal, rights. For example, England's Magna Carta arose from a struggle between the king
and the nobility in which the rights of the ordinary Englishman were never even considered. Even
Britain's "Glorious Revolution" of 1688 was only about the rights of Englishmen. As Edmund Burke a
century later noted so forcefully, these are very different from the rights of man. 1
The rise of human rights identities
The United States was the first country to place natural rights — the rights of man, or what we today
more inclusively call human rights — at the heart of its national self-definition. 2 Many Americans have
attributed this to superior virtue. Others, more plausibly, have pointed to the relatively flexible class
structure made possible by the lack of a hereditary nobility, by massive immigration, and by the vast
supply of "vacant" land. We should also note that Americans were among the first to have the language
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of natural rights readily available in their political struggles. 3 Soon after, inspired by both the general
idea and the American example, others, beginning in France in 1789, advanced similar claims of rights.
Human rights were part of the founding self-image of the states of Central and South America, when they
threw off Spanish (and Portuguese) colonial rule. But the tortured fate of human rights in most of Latin
America since independence — Costa Rica over the past half century has been the exception that proves
the rule — makes India a much more interesting case. Indian independence in 1947 gave considerable
additional impetus to the post—Second World War surge of decolonization. And, as Sanjoy Banarjee
emphasizes in chapter 7, India's identification with the human rights values of self-determination and
racial equality was (along with its relatively great power) central to its leadership efforts in the third
world during the Cold War era.
Countries without human rights in their founding myths have in recent decades increasingly incorporated
human rights into their national self-conceptions. In South Africa, for example, human rights became a
central part of the national self-image through a revolutionary (although not especially violent) political
transformation that brought the end of apartheid. Russia and Hungary might be interpreted in the same
light. 4
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands represent the path of evolutionary transformation. Although
one can point to no decisive turning point, by the end of the Second World War both countries had come
to identify themselves with the cause of universal human rights — at least at home. And once they had
dismantled their colonial empires, in part through the influence of human rights ideas (in both
metropolitan and colonized political communities), human rights emerged as an increasingly prominent
part of national identity and foreign policy.
Dutch relations with Indonesia provide a striking example. Immediately after the Second World War, the
Netherlands fought to maintain colonial rule. In the 1960s, massive Indonesian human rights violations
were met by little more than muted verbal condemnation. By the early 1990s, however, as Peter Baehr
shows in chapter 3, the Netherlands was willing to accept modest but real economic and political costs,
and face the stinging charge of neo-colonialism, to press concerns over Indonesian human rights
violations.
National and international dimensions
In all these cases, national and international ideas and values interacted dynamically. The international
dimension has been perhaps most striking in cases of revolutionary transformation, going back at least to
Tom Paine's pamphleteering on behalf of the American and French revolutions.
In India, Gandhi learned from his earlier South African experiences and, like many later nationalist
leaders in Asia and Africa, effectively used the "Western" language of self-determination and equal
rights against colonialism. The struggle against apartheid in South Africa had an important international
dimension that ultimately changed the foreign policies of most Western countries, turning even American
conservatives such as Newt Gingrich against support for continued white rule. Beyond any material costs
associated with economic sanctions, this weakened the sense of legitimacy and resolve of many white
South Africans.
In the Soviet bloc, the Helsinki Final Act and the follow-up meetings of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) provided important support for human rights activists, especially in
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Russia and Czechoslovakia, and contributed subtly but significantly to the delegitimation of totalitarian
rule. 5 Gábor Kardos in chapter 9 even suggests that the most important human rights activity of
post-Soviet regimes has been to incorporate international norms into national law and practice.
The international dimension is also clear where human rights have been incorporated into national
self-images by more evolutionary means. In most of Western Europe, participation in the Council of
Europe's regional human rights regime has placed national rights in a broader international human rights
perspective. Britain's decision in 1997 to incorporate the European Convention directly into British law is
a striking example of the inter-penetration of national and international rights conceptions. A very
different kind of international impetus was provided, in Europe and elsewhere, by Jimmy Carter's 1977
decision to make human rights an explicit priority in American foreign policy. It is no coincidence, for
example, that the 1979 Dutch White Paper followed closely on the US example.
International human rights ideas have penetrated even Iran. As Zachary Karabell indicates in chapter 8,
Iranian authorities and associated scholars, in addition to criticizing international human rights norms,
have argued that these values are both prefigured by and largely incorporated in Islamic law. We should
also note that the Iranian revolution that overthrew the Shah was a broad-based social movement that
included human rights advocates who have been forced underground, but not eliminated. One might even
suggest that recent "reformers" within the Iranian government, and their (apparently quite numerous)
supporters in Iranian society, have been at least indirectly influenced by international human rights
norms.
Independent human rights activists with prominent transnational connections — for example, Aung San
Suu Kyi in Burma and Jose Ramos-Horta in East Timor — are an increasingly prominent feature of the
political landscape. In addition, ordinary citizens have more and more come to frame their political and
economic aspirations in terms of respect for human rights. Such individuals, and the groups that they
represent and participate in, are nodes for an increasingly transnational process of normative
transformation that is reshaping notions of political legitimacy and national identity — and, through
these mechanisms, national foreign policies.
 
II. Self and other, inside and outside
Human rights are held by all human beings, regardless of who or where they are. Thus authoritative
international documents characteristically use formulations such as "Everyone has the right" and "No one
shall be." To identify with human rights is to identify with all human beings, regardless of nationality (or
other status). To identify with human rights is to deny (at least some) fundamental moral differences
between ourselves and others.
Talk of national identities, however, underscores the continuing power of particularistic, differentiating
self-images. In addition to seeing ourselves as human beings, and thus part of a cosmopolitan moral
community, we see ourselves as citizens — Indians, Costa Ricans, Hungarians, South Africans,
Americans — as well as members of diverse ascriptive and voluntary groups, such as women, Asians,
Europeans, Muslims, Catholics, workers, teachers, electricians, farmers, fathers, sisters, children, football
fans, hackers, environmentalists, and human rights activists.
Although national identities may be neither as flexible nor as varied as individual identities, they have
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multiple elements, which we have seen may change over time. No country's national self-image is
exhausted by a commitment to human rights. For example, although Baehr, with little exaggeration, calls
human rights a "sacred subject" in contemporary Dutch policy, he also emphasizes the continuing
importance of a competing mercantile national self-image. Sergei Chugrov, in chapter 6 on the Russian
Federation, argues for a deep cultural split that leads to a simultaneous identification with and rejection
of "Western" human rights. In this section, I will explore some of this multiplicity by examining
dominant conceptions of the boundaries between self and other and between inside and outside.
Nationalist and internationalist identities
Are nationals and foreigners, "self" and "other," seen as fundamentally different or alike? Imagine an
ideal-type continuum. One end point would be marked by a purely national identity that denies any
significant similarities between nationals and foreigners. Nazi Germany perhaps approximates this
nationalist extreme. The distinction between civilized and barbarian peoples, drawn for example by
classical Greeks, Qing Chinese, and nineteenth-century Europeans, also lies toward the nationalist end of
the continuum. 6 The other end point would be a purely cosmopolitan identity that completely denies the
moral or political significance of national (and other) differences. Religious figures such as Jesus Christ,
Mohammed, and the Buddha provide the clearest examples. Movements, both religious and secular, that
profess and seek to spread a universal model of social organization and values provide an approximation
in political practice.
Most of the countries considered in this volume fall near the middle of this continuum. The persisting
centrality of national (and subnational) identities precludes a deeply cosmopolitan self-image in all
contemporary states. But extreme isolationist nationalism is rare. Therefore, I will refer to (relatively)
nationalist and (relatively) internationalist self-images, which help to shape states' choices of which
rights receive special foreign policy attention, in which areas of the world.
Iran presents by far the least internationalist human rights vision among the countries surveyed in this
volume, and one of the least internationalist (along with countries such as Burma and Saudi Arabia) in
the contemporary world. In its foreign policy, Iran identifies primarily with co-religionists. Iran is
committed to what it sees as universal (Islamic) values, but in a particularistic way that largely ignores
the rights and interests of foreign non-Muslims. Difference rather than similarity is emphasized in
dealing with what the rest of the world — and sometimes even Iran, as in the case of Bosnian Muslims
— calls human rights issues.
Russia has endorsed the language of internationally recognized human rights. Nonetheless, most of
post-Soviet Russia's bilateral human rights diplomacy, as Chugrov notes, has been directed toward
Russian minorities in the "near abroad." Although minority rights certainly are important human rights,
this near-exclusive focus on discrimination against co-nationals represents a self-identification that
emphasizes the difference between self — Russians or, more broadly, Slavs (e.g. in Bosnia) — and other.
India's recent emphasis on issues of intolerance and terrorism is in some ways similar. Human rights
issues tend to be viewed through the lens of national and regional concerns: communal strife throughout
the subcontinent, plus the volatile combination of political and communal conflict in Kashmir and Sri
Lanka. But India's focus has been more on a class of violations than on the particular characteristics of
those whose rights are violated. Furthermore, the traditional Indian emphasis on self-determination and
racial equality has involved a substantially more internationalist commitment to common values shared
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despite other, often dramatic, differences. Although less nationalist than Russia, India's international
human rights policy has largely been restricted to these rather narrow sets of rights. Its much broader
domestic commitment to human rights has not been significantly expressed in its international human
rights diplomacy.
The orientation of the Netherlands is more fully internationalist, involving a fairly comprehensive foreign
policy commitment to international human rights. Although focusing on violent abuses of rights to
personal security in prominent bilateral human rights disputes (Indonesia and Surinam), Dutch
international human rights policy has stressed both civil and political rights and economic, social, and
cultural rights. For example, development assistance is seen as an integral part of Dutch international
human rights policy, in contrast to the largely tactical linkage characteristic of US policy. In addition,
although former Dutch colonies do receive special consideration, and commercial interests are hardly
ignored, the bulk of Holland's development assistance goes to countries chosen on the basis of shared
values, need, and geographical diversity — in sharp contrast to, for example, France and the United
States.
The United States lies closer to India than to the Netherlands. The American definition of human rights,
which denigrates economic and social rights, is highly selective. Nonetheless, the American focus on
civil and political rights is somewhat broader than that of India. And the global scope of American
human rights initiatives, especially in the post-Cold War world, involves an unusually close
identification of national and international human rights interests. 7
Openess to international society
States differ not only in the ways in which they associate themselves with human rights violations and
struggles abroad, but also in their openness to international human rights pressures. 8 The Netherlands
lies at the internationalist end of this spectrum as well. Holland freely submits itself not only to regional
and international human rights scrutiny but to multilateral guidance. For example, Dutch
non-discrimination law has been substantially reshaped through the Council of Europe's regional human
rights regime, individual petitions to the Human Rights Committee, and decisions by the European
Union's Commission and Court of Justice. In the Netherlands, the commitment to international human
rights is for local as well as foreign consumption.
The United States, by contrast, is extremely reluctant to open itself to international scrutiny — although
somewhat less reluctant than even 20 years ago. For example, when the United States finally ratified the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1992, it refused to accede to the (first) Optional
Protocol, which authorizes the Human Rights Committee to receive individual petitions. More recently,
the United States has resisted allowing Americans to be subjected to the independent authority of the
proposed international criminal tribunal.
Iran's attitude is even more hostile to international scrutiny, as reflected in its paranoid, conspiratorial
vision of American hegemony. India's more moderate sensitivity to outside human rights pressure is
much closer to that of the United States. Although a leader in aggressive international human rights
campaigns against apartheid, racism, and colonialism, India has consistently rebuffed international
campaigns directed against its own practices. And, like the United States, it has refused to participate in
the Optional Protocol's system of individual communications. 9
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Banerjee, in discussing this pattern of Indian foreign policy, distinguishes between assertive and
defensive international human rights diplomacy. This formulation usefully points to a characteristic style
of "addressing" international human rights concerns, namely, ignoring them or denying their legitimacy.
But when he writes of India and China undertaking "joint defensive diplomacy on human rights, each
remaining silent about the other's human rights violations," 10 a decision to ignore human rights
violations (or subordinate them to other national interests) is perversely described as a defensive human
rights policy.
Targets of bilateral and multilateral international human rights initiatives do increasingly face the need to
respond. Political alignment and appeals to sovereignty and self-determination provide less insulation
than during the Cold War. Responses, however, can be defensive and nationalist, as is typical of
countries such as India, Iran, and the United States, or open and internationalist, as is often the case in the
Netherlands and Costa Rica.
India and the United States nonetheless remind us that nationalist defensiveness need not reflect a poor
human rights record. India has for 50 years had one of the better domestic human rights records in the
third world. Likewise, US opposition to international scrutiny is more principled than evasive, reflecting
a deeply rooted sense of "exceptionalism" and an unusually stringent conception of sovereignty.
In discussing international norms, it is essential to recall that, in addition to human rights, sovereignty
and non-intervention are vital norms of international society. All states, in fact, have a deeper and more
enthusiastic commitment to sovereignty than to human rights.
We must not overestimate either human rights or sovereignty in their characteristic struggles. Although
somewhat less jealous of their sovereignty than the United States or India, even Costa Rica and the
Netherlands are not even close to giving it up even in the limited domain of human rights. For example,
Costa Rica, when faced with an adverse ruling on the rights of journalists from the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights in an advisory opinion that it had itself requested, simply ignored the Court. But the
centrality of sovereignty to all states should not obscure the fact that they have very different
understandings of its appropriate scope and implications, which reflect relatively nationalist or
internationalist self-images. The Netherlands, for example, sees itself more thoroughly as part of
international (and European regional) society than does the United States; it participates in international
society less selectively and less conditionally. The Netherlands is more willing to accept awkward or
inconvenient (international and regional) norms and obligations, especially when there is a general
commitment to a particular field of international activity (as in the case of human rights). As Baehr
reminds us, we should not idealize Dutch policy. Nonetheless, Dutch international human rights policy
rests on a comparatively deep commitment to international human rights norms and full participation in
global and regional human rights regimes. The Dutch often see the range of sovereign prerogative as
significantly limited by international human rights law. India and the United States, in contrast, see a
greater tension between sovereignty and international human rights — at least when it comes to their
own sovereignty. Not just on human rights, but in most other issue areas as well, India and the United
States are very reluctant to accept the idea that they should bring their own divergent practices into
conformity with international norms. They are much more likely to remind others of their sovereign right
to pursue their own interests, as they see them, even when those interests conflict with international
norms.
It is worth re-emphasizing that this has little to do with widespread systematic deviations from
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international norms. India, Costa Rica, and the Netherlands have few significant substantive
disagreements about international human rights norms. The United States asserts its sovereign right not
to be scrutinized almost as forcefully for civil and political rights, where normative differences are
minor, as for economic and social rights. Openness to international scrutiny is a matter of national values
and attitudes that are in principle (and in these cases in practice) independent of the substance of national
human rights ideas and practices.
National attitudes towards international human rights
The two dimensions of attitudinal variation discussed above can be combined in figure 12.1. This
diagram maps the space occupied by the countries considered in this volume, which in this regard
accurately represent the range of international attitudes (although the sample over-represents the top-right
quadrant). The vertical axis, however, is severely truncated from what is theoretically possible. Figure
12.1 excludes cosmopolitan conceptions, of which there are no examples among contemporary states.
Even within the realm of internationalist (as opposed to cosmopolitan) openness, considerable vacant but
theoretically possible space at the top is not represented.
I want to draw attention to three features highlighted by figure 12.1. First, although many states today
accept substantial international monitoring, even the most internationalist reserve a near-exclusive
national right to implement and enforce internationally recognized human rights. Even where
international monitoring is accepted, states reserve a right to implement the findings of supervisory
committees. The global human rights regime is largely a system of national implementation of
international human rights norms. (The European regional regime is the exception that proves the rule.
And even the European Court of Human Rights relies ultimately on the willingness of states to give
national legal force to its findings.)
Second, the fact that countries are arrayed along a single diagonal reflects the tendency for
internationalist (or nationalist) orientations to apply both when adopting international norms and when
deciding whether or not to open oneself to international monitoring. Although states are at liberty to
endorse internationalist norms but assert a sovereign right not to be scrutinized by other states or
multilateral bodies — as many European states did in the 1950s — adopting more internationalist human
rights norms seems to exert a strong pull toward greater openness to international scrutiny.
Third, were we to compare the distributions 25 and 50 years ago, for both our subset of case-study
countries and the full universe of states, we would see a clear progression towards greater
internationalism on both dimensions. This is another way of noting that human rights have become a
much less controversial and more firmly established subject on international agendas.
 
III. The intensity of human rights commitments
International human rights policies are (at most) one part of national foreign policies, which all states
consider to be driven primarily by the pursuit of the national interest. Therefore, unless we implausibly
assume that international human rights take priority over all other national interests, human rights must
sometimes be sacrificed to other interests and values. How often and in what circumstances are states
characteristically willing to subordinate international human rights concerns? How much do states value
international human rights? Answers to these questions are less encouraging (from the viewpoint of
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human rights advocates), and considerably less internationalist, than the analysis so far might suggest.
Tradeoffs
Consider another ideal-type continuum. A state might in principle put international human rights at the
bottom of its priorities (unwilling to sacrifice any other interest in the pursuit of international human
rights objectives) or at the very top (willing to subordinate all other interests that conflict with its
international human rights concerns). The chapters in this volume suggest that most contemporary states
lie toward the minimalist edge of this continuum. Human rights typically (but not always) lose out in
conflicts with most (but not all) competing foreign policy objectives.
Imagine a simple foreign policy model with four interests: security, economic, human rights, and other.
The chapters above provide no examples of states sacrificing significant perceived national security
interests for human rights. Security conflicts may have somewhat moderated in number and intensity in
many parts of the globe in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, human rights may be less often "trumped"
by national security. But this is a change in the frequency of conflicts, not in the relative rankings of
international human rights and national security. 11
The chapters above do show states occasionally giving human rights priority over economic interests.
For example, although Baehr emphasizes the limits of Dutch sanctions against Indonesia in the early
1990s, the Netherlands did accept modest but real economic (and political) costs. Such behaviour,
however, is the exception rather than the rule, even for the Dutch.
International responses to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre illustrate the range of responses
characteristic even in high-profile cases. 12 Most states that had substantial economic relations with
China did adopt aid, trade, or investment sanctions. Japan did so with considerable reluctance, great
inconsistency, and for the briefest possible period — yet with real costs to Japanese firms. The United
States, by contrast, responded with sufficient vigour that economic sanctions were the central issue in
US—Chinese relations until 1994, and a major irritant into 1997. The Netherlands and the United
Kingdom took something of a middle course, in the context of a broader European response.
India, however, remained largely silent and thus indirectly, but intentionally, supportive of China.
Russia, which also shares a border with China, largely restricted itself to verbal criticism. Japan's
reluctance to pursue sanctions had important security as well as economic dimensions. Even the United
States never consistently applied the military and political sanctions it announced. 13 Tiananmen thus
illustrates both the characteristic subordination of human rights to national security and the occasional
willingness of states to subordinate economic interests to human rights.
The residual category of "other interests" is so broad that little of general interest can be said. It is worth
noting, though, that in most countries human rights could be usefully separated from the "other" category
only relatively recently. And in most countries today there are more interests in the "other" category that
human rights (at least occasionally) effectively compete with than even 10 years ago.
Choice of means
So far we have measured the intensity of states' commitment to human rights by the interests they are
willing to subordinate. We might call this the foreign policy opportunity cost of human rights initiatives.
Intensity of commitment can also be measured by the direct costs a state is willing to bear, as seen in the
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means characteristically used to pursue international human rights objectives. When other interests do
not override international human rights, how far are states willing to go?
Although there is a close relationship between these two measures of intensity of commitment — the
higher the ranking of an interest, the more likely a state is to use strong means to realize it — the
analytical distinction is sometimes useful. For example, even if human rights remain below security
concerns, we still need to know which means a state is typically willing to use when security interests do
not preclude action. To take an example from a different issue area, one of the striking changes in
international relations over the past century has been the decline in the willingness of states to use force
on behalf of economic interests, despite the fact that economic interests have not dropped significantly on
the foreign policy agendas of many, if any, states.
International human rights interests are almost never pursued with military force. Only when faced with
genocide or severe humanitarian emergencies have states used force to pursue international human rights
bilaterally (e.g. India in East Pakistan [Bangladesh]) or multilaterally (e.g. Rwanda, Bosnia, Somalia). 14
Furthermore, over the past half-
century, most such massive and severe emergencies have not mobilized international armed force. Even
in the post-Cold War era, forceful responses have not been universal. Consider, for example, the refusal
to use force to halt the genocidal civil war in the Sudan. We should also emphasize that even a country
like the Netherlands is reluctant to risk the lives of Dutch soldiers when it does participate in
peacekeeping operations, such as those in Bosnia.
Moving down the ladder of strength of means we find occasional uses of trade and investment sanctions,
most notably in the international campaign against apartheid in South Africa in the 1980s. But strong
economic sanctions, as we have already noted, remain exceptional. States will sometimes pay more in
money than in lives, but not all that often.
Aid is more regularly used to pursue international human rights objectives. Although aggregate data
show only a modest relationship between foreign aid allocations and the level of respect for human rights
in recipient countries, 15 aid allocations have in many particular instances been altered in response to
human rights violations. Although the United States provides the greatest number of examples, the
Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom have also used aid regularly in the past decade
or two to attempt to influence international human rights practices. Even Japan, which has historically
been extremely reticent about linking aid and human rights, has included human rights considerations (at
least formally) in allocating development assistance since 1992.
We should note, however, that aid and (especially) trade have been used primarily punitively to pursue
international human rights objectives. The Netherlands (along with so-called "like-minded countries,"
such as Sweden, Norway, and Canada) has made a fairly concerted effort over the past two decades to
direct aid to rights-protective regimes, not just away from rights-abusive regimes. 16 In recent years,
other countries have begun to give greater consideration to aid as a positive instrument in the pursuit of
human rights — an inducement and reward, rather than just a punishing sanction. 17 Nonetheless, most
states remain much more willing to use aid to punish bad human rights performance — and even then
with little consistency — than to reward good performance. 18
Verbal rather than material sanctions and inducements provide the heart of most international human
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rights initiatives. Condemnations of violations and praise for good or improved performance are the most
common means used by all states to further their international human rights objectives. Although words
may be cheap, rarely are they free, especially in the world of diplomacy. In any case, verbal policy is an
important and appropriate means for pursuing human rights, like other, interests. Furthermore, as I will
argue in more detail below, verbal policy may help to alter or maintain the international normative
environment within which states act.
States also regularly engage in symbolic action such as recalling ambassadors, suspending educational,
cultural, or sporting exchanges, endorsing international investigations, and voting for condemnatory
resolutions in international organizations. Even aid sanctions are often largely symbolic. For example,
Dutch aid to Indonesia in the early 1990s was less than 2 per cent of the world total, and Japan responded
to Holland's cuts by increasing its own assistance to Indonesia.
A growing number of states also provide direct and indirect support to local human rights activists and
non-governmental organizations doing human-rights-related work. Such support may cross over from
symbolic to material action. Even here, though, the material action is relatively indirect, channelled
through local human rights advocates, rather than direct bilateral or multilateral action against another
state.
In summary, we can say that international human rights initiatives are almost always subordinated to
security interests, and usually subordinated to economic interests as well. Although virtually all foreign
policy instruments have been used by states in pursuing international human rights objectives, from
private diplomatic initiatives up to the use of force, the means used are usually verbal and symbolic.
Nonetheless, international human rights initiatives are an increasingly common part of the foreign policy
of most states. When human rights concerns coordinate rather than compete with other foreign policy
interests — for example, in India's opposition to genocidal massacres in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) or
US policy toward post-Tiananmen China — relatively forceful responses become possible. And the case
of Rwanda, however tardy and weak the international response, suggests that in at least some extreme
cases states will agree to use force to protect internationally recognized human rights even in the absence
of supporting security or economic interests. 19
 
IV. Evaluating international human rights policies
Most states in the contemporary world are more concerned with human rights at home than abroad.
Liberal democratic regimes in particular regularly tolerate international human rights practices they
would not even consider accepting nationally. Although cosmopolitan moralists may condemn this
"inconsistency," it is an inescapable consequence of a world of sovereign states. States have a special
legal and political responsibility for the rights and interests of their own nationals. National foreign
policies are supposed to treat the interests of nationals and foreigners differently.
Not all differences, however, will be acceptable to states that have included international human rights
among their foreign policy interests. Which are deemed acceptable and which are not raises important
issues of moral and policy consistency that may influence the efficacy of international human rights
policies.
The purposes of human rights policies
Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy: Chapter 12
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/forsythe/chapter12.html (11 of 19) [8/11/2002 10:12:43 PM]
Before we can say much about the consistency (or efficacy) of states' international human rights policies,
we need to know what they are attempting to achieve. The "obvious" goal of altering the behaviour of the
country targeted by a particular initiative requires little comment. But many, perhaps most, international
human rights initiatives have other purposes as well. Therefore, they cannot be evaluated simply —
perhaps not even primarily — by success or failure in altering the human rights practices of targeted
states.
An immediate and tangible impact need not even be among the goals of well-designed human rights
initiatives. For example, India did not expect to change South African policy by supporting UN
resolutions condemning apartheid. Holland did not imagine that suspending aid to Indonesia would alter
the policies of the Suharto regime. No reasonable American expected that sanctions imposed after the
Tiananmen massacre would establish democracy in China, or even return the country to the level of
political openness it had reached in the late spring of 1989.
In these examples there was some hope of contributing to eventual changes. But, even here, the kinds of
changes aimed for are varied. Deterring similar violations in the future may justify pursuing initiatives
for which a state expects no tangible impact in the target country. A level of pressure that cannot be
expected to alter behaviour in the immediate target may have a tangible impact on a weaker or more
dependent country. Even in the immediate target, it may reduce or forestall repeat violations. Having
previously been called to task, even states that refuse to remedy past abuses may be willing to moderate,
or even eliminate, future abuses. International pressures on Chile and Argentina in the 1970s and El
Salvador and Guatemala in the 1980s suggest the possibility of moderating future violations even by
relatively recalcitrant regimes.
Even where there is no long-run expectation of altering behaviour in the target state, international human
rights initiatives may reasonably be undertaken. For example, the aim may be to "punish" rather than to
"reform." Even if competing interests or limited resources preclude altering behaviour in the target, states
may reasonably choose to impose costs on those who violate internationally recognized human rights.
Given the reluctance of states to use strong means on behalf of international human rights, such
"punishment" most often is sadly, even ludicrously, weak. Nonetheless, imposing some costs on
rights-abusive regimes is usually preferable to imposing none.
A more diffuse objective of international human rights initiatives may be to contribute to maintaining or
transforming the international normative environment. Rather than seek to alter particular practices in
any country, the aim may be to influence dominant conceptions of political legitimacy. Post-communist
governments in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, for example, saw themselves as beneficiaries of
such a normative transformation, and their enthusiasm for strengthening the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe reflected their desire to contribute to its maintenance. American and
European pressures for multi-party elections, especially since the end of the Cold War, have often been
directed at influencing broader standards of legitimacy, beyond any impact they may (or may not) have
in the immediate target country.
The "precedents" of international human rights policies, however, may have an internal rather than an
external target. Their aim may be to establish or support a pattern, or future stream, of foreign policy
initiatives. When the Carter administration suspended US aid to Guatemala in 1977, the purpose was at
least as much to set a new precedent for American policy as it was to alter Guatemalan human rights
practices. Baehr suggests that the precedent established by strong Dutch sanctions against Surinam in the
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1980s helped to tip the balance in favour of sanctions against Indonesia in the 1990s. Sanctions that had
little discernible short-or medium-term effect in Paramaribo seem to have had a significant medium- and
long-term impact in The Hague. 20
Finally, irrespective of any immediate or long-term impact — direct, indirect, or diffuse; internal or
external — states may undertake international human rights initiatives because they are legally,
politically, or morally demanded. The US Congress has required the President to impose sanctions for
certain human rights violations, perhaps most notably in the Jackson—Vanik Amendment's requirement
that trade preferences be denied to countries that restrict emigration. Internal (and even international)
political pressure may leave foreign policy decision-makers little choice but to act, as illustrated by both
American and Japanese sanctions against China after Tiananmen. Occasionally, a response to
international human rights violations is even seen by states as morally demanded, irrespective of legal or
political pressure. Rwanda and Somalia seem to have fallen into this category in the foreign policies of a
number of states.
Hard as it may be for realists to comprehend, states sometimes find it important to stand up for what they
value, independent of any other pressures or expected impact, at home or abroad. Such symbolic acts of
"witness" — acting out of respect for and to give voice to one's values — may influence the international
normative environment, have a long-run impact on the target (or another) state's human rights practices,
or sustain a desirable pattern of foreign policy practice. But even if they do not, they may be demanded
for their own sake.
We cannot understand many international human rights initiatives without considering the fact that they
are perceived as morally desirable, perhaps even demanded. As we have seen, states are much more
likely to "do the right thing" when the costs are low or other interests provide additional incentives.
Nonetheless, international human rights initiatives occasionally are undertaken primarily because they
are right. And even when self-interest is a large part of the motivation, international human rights
initiatives often do reflect a solidaristic identification with the rights or well-being of foreigners.
Selectivity and consistency
This appeal to morality, however, raises the tawdry image of trading moral values off against material
interests. If human rights are moral values, how can they be appropriately or "consistently" sacrificed to
non-moral interests? How can we "put a price" on life, liberty, and suffering?
Such questions rest on a contentious conception of morality. For example, utilitarianism and other
consequentialist moral theories see morality as centrally concerned with calculating relative costs and
benefits, rather than rigidly following a moral law. But even if we conceive of morality as a matter of
categorical imperatives, challenges to the "consistency" of international human rights policies often
confuse foreign policy and moral decision-making.
Realists rightly remind us that foreign policy decision-makers are required by their office to take into
account the national interest, which is (at most) only partly defined by morality. Moral perfectionism is
an inappropriate standard for foreign policy. Many realists, however, go too far when they categorically
denigrate morality in foreign policy. The national interest may — and today for many states does —
include a moral dimension. Moral interests are no crazier an idea than economic or security interests. The
task of the statesman is to balance competing national interests, whatever their character.
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Nonetheless, the realist tendency to contrast material and moral interests does point to a significant
problem. The differences between human rights and, say, national security seem to be matters of quality,
not mere quantity. How then are we to treat like cases alike — consistently — in the absence of a
common metric? To pursue the balancing metaphor, how much does one unit of national security
(whatever that might mean) weigh relative to a unit of human rights?
But is the problem all that much more severe for human rights than for, say, economic interests? As I am
writing this, controversy is raging over Chinese launches of American satellites. Beyond partisan politics,
of which there is much, the dispute involves fundamental disagreements about the relative weights that
ought to be assigned to the security and economic interests involved. Such disputes seem very similar to
those over the place of human rights in Sino-American relations.
Consider also the choice of means. How many American (or Pakistani, or Canadian) lives was it worth to
save hundreds of thousands of Somalis from starvation in 1992? To save a smaller number of Somalis
from factional warfare among their leaders in 1993? There is no apparent qualitative difference between
such calculations and those involved in, for example, the Gulf War. How many American (or British, or
Dutch) soldiers was it worth to expel Iraq from Kuwait? To overthrow Saddam Hussein? The problem of
competing incommensurable interests is a general problem of foreign policy, not one restricted to human
rights and other moral interests.
Issues of consistency do have a special force in moral reasoning. The "golden rule" of doing unto others
as one would be done by underscores the fact that morality in significant measure means not making an
exception for oneself (or those one is aiding). But, even from a purely moral point of view, only
comparable human rights violations require comparable responses. Human rights may be "interdependent
and indivisible," but that does not require an identical response to every violation of every right.
Even from a purely moral point of view, considerations of cost may be relevant. Few would consider the
United States to be morally bound, all things considered, to risk nuclear war in order to remedy human
rights violations in China simply because it acted relatively strongly to remedy similar violations in, say,
Guatemala. Conversely, the fact that no state is willing to threaten the use of force to free Tibet from
Chinese domination, thus risking nuclear war, does not mean that considerations of moral consistency
preclude the use of force in, say, East Timor. That option is precluded instead by competing economic
and security concerns. Balancing competing values requires taking account of all the values involved.
And consistency requires treating like cases alike all things considered, not just looking at similarities in
human rights violations.
Furthermore, to address only moral (in)consistency is to address but one part of the relevant foreign
policy. In addition to the authoritative international human rights standards of the Universal Declaration
and the Covenants, which can be taken as a rough approximation of an international moral standard,
states must consider their own often much more limited international human rights objectives, as well as
other aspects of the national interest. Even if a state's actions or policies are morally inconsistent, they
may be consistent from a foreign policy point of view.
For example, George Bush extended most-favoured-nation trading status to China in 1990 but denied it
to the Soviet Union. Looking solely at human rights behaviours — Tiananmen versus perestroika,
glasnost, new thinking, and the collapse of the Soviet empire — this seems wildly inconsistent. But
considering all the interests involved, it is plausible, if controversial, to find no foreign policy
inconsistency. Bush argued, not implausibly, that his actions properly balanced a complex set of
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competing security, economic, and human rights interests.
Consider again the "precedent" of Surinam for Dutch policy toward Indonesia. Would it have been
"inconsistent" not to have suspended aid? Perhaps. But it might instead have reflected a reasonable and
consistent calculation that the economic and security costs in Indonesia were sufficiently great to justify,
perhaps even require, subordinating Dutch international human rights concerns.
We can know whether different responses to comparable human rights violations represent inconsistent
foreign policy only if we know all the interests involved and the values (weights) attached to them.
Alleged inconsistencies in international human rights policies may be — and I would suggest often are
— consistent policies based on a relatively low weighting of international human rights interests. It may
be inconsistent, from an abstract human rights point of view, for Hungary to undertake international
initiatives on behalf of the Hungarian minority in Romania, but not on behalf of Russian minorities in
Lithuania or Ukraine, or of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka. But there is no evident conflict with the
Hungarian national interest.
Hypocrisy, error, and inattention are no less common in foreign policy than in other human endeavours.
But, in considering the issue of consistency, we must not confuse the standards of international human
rights norms, nationally defined international human rights objectives, and the national interest more
broadly conceived. Furthermore, all three must be distinguished from foreign policy actions that reflect a
relatively low evaluation of a state's international human rights interests.
Human rights, as we have seen, usually have only a secondary place in the scheme of foreign policy
interests. Human rights policies are at best a part — most often a rather modest part — of the foreign
policy of most states. Therefore, it is unavoidable that even well-designed foreign policies will treat
comparable human rights violations differently.
Towards more effective international human rights policies
Inconsistency may indeed reduce the efficacy of even well-meaning and otherwise well-planned
initiatives. I would argue, however, that, although little in the preceding chapters speaks directly to this
issue, much of the real and remediable (more than moral) inconsistency in international human rights
policies arises from inattention and lack of coordination. Foreign policy, whether addressing human
rights or other interests, tends to be made on a case-by-case basis, with relatively little coordination or
strategic vision. Balances are struck not by omniscient rational actors but in more or less intuitive ways
by usually harried decision-makers grappling with the particularities of pressing issues.
Bureaucratic politics also play a role. The frequent conflicts between human rights and national security
officials are well known. Regional branches within the foreign ministry may operate with very different
baseline assumptions and expectations. Those working with international financial institutions may come
to the table with a very different perspective than those working with human rights institutions.
Bureaucratic organization thus may be significant to the success of a state's international human rights
policy. For example, during the Carter administration, human rights concerns were infused more broadly
through the foreign policy bureaucracy by devices such as the creation of a Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs within the US State Department and the inter-agency "Christopher group," as well
as by congressionally mandated reporting (which required local embassies to give greater attention to
human rights issues). The recent reorganization of the Dutch foreign ministry reflects a similar effort to
integrate human rights concerns more into day-to-day work, rather than as a separate consideration added
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relatively late in the decision process.
The other principal source of inconsistency, I would suggest, is a tendency to overly grand policy
pronouncements. Perhaps the classic example is Jimmy Carter's claim that human rights were the "heart"
of American foreign policy. Having thus raised unrealistic expectations, many observers came to judge
American actions as heartless and inconsistent.
Both kinds of inconsistency, however, are rooted in a relatively low valuation of international human
rights. Excessively grand rhetoric is a sign of an interest having a lower value in practice than policy
pronouncements suggest. And the higher an interest is valued, the more a state is likely to struggle
against the tendency toward bureaucratic fragmentation. The biggest "problem" is that foreign policy
decision-makers often value human rights less than human rights advocates would like them to. In most
countries, the single greatest contributor to more effective international human rights policies would be
to increase the priority of human rights relative to other foreign policy objectives.
Consistency is a matter of correctly adding up the various prices and values already assigned to foreign
policy interests. Sometimes just calculating correctly will be enough to get "better" human rights policies
(judged from the standpoint of human rights advocates). This is especially true in foreign ministries
where realist rhetoric has special force or in countries where national security and economics ministries
dominate the decision-making process. But a much greater contribution — again, measured from the
perspective of human rights advocates — could be made by "getting the prices right," by increasing the
price states are willing to pay in order to achieve their international human rights objectives.
This is one final way to restate the central argument of this chapter. Human rights have a greater
prominence in the contemporary foreign policy of more states than at any other time in the past. The end
of the Cold War has removed, or at least moderated, many impediments to more effective international
human rights policies. But, while international human rights are working their way up the foreign policy
agendas of a growing number of states, in few if any have they come even close to the top.
 
Endnotes:
Note 1: In addition, of course, the rights of English women (and many other groups) were not at issue in
either of these charters of rights. "Englishmen" meant, at best, propertied male citizens — and not even
all of them were able to enjoy these rights equally.  Back.
Note 2: From a vast literature see especially Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987); Hunt is particularly good on the combination of US confidence
in its positive leadership with its racism. T. Davis and S. Lynn-Jones, "City upon a Hill," Foreign Policy,
no. 66 (1987), 20–38; these authors place the chauvinistic rhetoric of Ronald Reagan in proper historical
context. Richard Rosecrance, America as an Ordinary Country: US Foreign Policy and the Future
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976); Rosecrance compares lofty American expectations with the
early demise of the "American century." The journalist Thomas L. Friedman notes that even foreign
circles of opinion, in Lebanon for example, looked to a magnanimous and altruistic United States to save
them from their own political deficiencies, in From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Anchor Books,
1989).  Back.
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Note 3: The idea of human rights — rights that one has simply as a human being and may exercise
against one's own society and state — was almost completely absent from political debate prior to the
more radical stages of the English Civil War of the 1640s. It did not enter the mainstream of political
debate in any country prior to the mid-eighteenth century.  Back.
Note 4: Such a reading would view Marxism—Leninism—Stalinism as a rejection of ostensibly
universal but in fact bourgeois "human rights" in favour of, initially, the dictatorship of the proletariat,
and, ultimately, a form of socialism that transcends individual rights. An alternative interpretation,
advanced by many Soviet bloc theorists in the 1970s and early 1980s, would say that the Soviet model
rested on an alternative (and more genuine) conception of human rights. Although I reject this reading
(see, e.g., Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western
Human Rights Conceptions," American Political Science Review 76 (June 1982), 303–316), it would
imply that in 1989 the dominant conception of the substance of human rights changed, following on a
more evolutionary transformation that occurred during the Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and post-Helsinki
eras.  Back.
Note 5: See, for example, Sandra L. Gubin, "Between Regimes and Realism — Transnational Agenda
Setting: Soviet Compliance with CSCE Human Rights Norms," Human Rights Quarterly 17 (May 1995),
278–302.  Back.
Note 6: We should note, however, that the Greeks and Europeans also recognized very important
differences, such as those between Athenians and Spartans or Germans and French, among "civilized"
peoples. Furthermore, China saw civilization as accessible (through emulation and extended tutelage) to
those who were not Han Chinese.  Back.
Note 7: Ironically, Iran, for all its substantive differences from the United States, presents a similar
combination of the aggressive promotion of allegedly universal values with a very strong nationalist
twist. For completeness, we can place Japan and the United Kingdom somewhere between the United
States and the Netherlands. South Africa, which as chapter 10 indicates is still struggling to determine
how internationalist a vision it wishes to pursue, belongs in the same range of the spectrum. Hungary lies
in this middle range as well: its special attention to Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries
would seem to place it much closer to the United States than to the Netherlands, but its identification
with Europe pulls in the opposite direction. Costa Rica falls near the Netherlands, close to the
internationalist boundary of contemporary international human rights policies.  Back.
Note 8: Kathryn Sikkink draws a very similar distinction in "The Power of Principled Ideas: Human
Rights Policies in the United States and Western Europe," in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane,
eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1993).  Back.
Note 9: Of the countries considered in this volume, as of 28 May 1998 Costa Rica, Hungary, the
Netherlands, and Russia were parties to the (first) Optional Protocol. India, Iran, Japan, South Africa, the
United Kingdom, and the United States were not. (Information taken from the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights' Web site http://www.unhchr.ch, at
http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part_boo/iv_boo/iv_5.html).  Back.
Note 10: See page 181 above.  Back.
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Note 11: This assessment may be too harsh and static, as a result of assuming a fairly conventional
definition of national security, which, for all the talk of common security, peace building, and the like,
remains the understanding most commonly held by contemporary states. For an introduction to
alternative ways of conceptualizing the relationship between human rights and security, see David P.
Forsythe, Human Rights and Peace: International and National Dimensions (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1993) and, much more briefly, Jack Donnelly, "Rethinking Human Rights," Current
History 95 (November 1996), 387–391. For example, an emphasis on personal security for citizens
would make human rights and national security in many instances complementary rather than competing
concerns. On the broader issue of reconceptualizing security in a multilateral context, see Emanuel Adler
and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998),
especially Emanuel Adler, "Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE's Security Community-Building
Model."  Back.
Note 12: For a brief overview, see Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 2nd edn., 1998), chap. 6.  Back.
Note 13: The other countries considered in this volume either were preoccupied with internal issues or
had no significant economic relations at stake.  Back.
Note 14: Some might want to add the inclusion of human rights into UN peacekeeping missions in
countries such as Guatemala and Angola. In such cases, however, the willingness to use force on behalf
of human rights was modest and entirely conditioned on human rights issues falling within a broader
international peace and security mandate. The same is even more clearly true of humanitarian operations
in northern and southern Iraq; the human rights of the Kurds were an afterthought, and those of the
southern Shiites an even later (and more modestly felt) thought.  Back.
Note 15: There is a fairly substantial quantitative literature on human rights and aid in US foreign policy.
David Carleton and Michael Stohl, "The Foreign Policy of Human Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 7
(May 1985), 205–229, present a classic finding of no linkage. David L. Cingranelli and Thomas E.
Pasquarello, "Human Rights Practices and the Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American
Countries," American Journal of Political Science 29 (August 1985), 539–563, argue for a modest but
statistically significant relationship. Some of the most sophisticated recent work has been done by Steven
Poe and his colleagues. See, for example, Steven C. Poe and James Meernik, "US Military Aid in the
1980s: A Global Analysis," Journal of Peace Research 32 (November 1995), 399–411; Steven C. Poe
and Rangsima Sirirangsi, "Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid during the Reagan Years," Social
Science Quarterly 75 (September 1994), 494–509; Steven C. Poe, Suzanne Pilatovsky, and Brian Miller,
"Human Rights and US Foreign Aid Revisited: The Latin American Region," Human Rights Quarterly
16 (August 1994), 539–558; and Steven C. Poe, "Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Aid: A Review of
Quantitative Studies and Suggestions for Future Research," Human Rights Quarterly 12 (November
1990), 499–512.  Back.
Note 16: See, for example, Olav Stokke, ed., Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty: The
Determinants of the Aid Policies of Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (Uppsala:
Almquist & Wiksell International, 1989).  Back.
Note 17: Proposals to establish trade preferences for rights-protective regimes, however, have not been
seriously considered, at least in the United States, GATT, and the WTO. For one interesting academic
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proposal, focusing especially on labour rights, see George DeMartino, "Industrial Policies versus
Competitiveness Strategies: In Pursuit of Prosperity in the Global Economy," International Papers in
Political Economy 3 (No. 2, 1996), 1–42, at pp. 28–34  Back.
Note 18: The rationale for this approach might be that respect for internationally recognized human
rights should be routinely expected from all states, rather than treated as an internationally praiseworthy
achievement deserving reward. Although I have considerable sympathy toward this view, it ignores the
political realities of achieving progress in implementing human rights, especially when starting from a
record of substantial, systematic violations. Working positively to support governments making human
rights progress may be a far more effective strategy than using aid punitively, if only because systematic
violators are unlikely to be swayed by the modest amounts typically involved in aid sanctions.
Conversely, international financial support for governments making real progress is not only powerful
symbolism but may in some cases have a real political impact.  Back.
Note 19: NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia in response to repression and ethnic cleansing in Kosovo,
which began as I was completing final revisions on this chapter, also suggests a growing willingness to
overrule arguments of sovereignty in the face of severe humanitarian crises, at least in a regional context.
Although security interests have been appealed to in justifying the attacks, that rationale seems weak and
poorly thought out. The real driving force does seem to be humanitarian crisis. But the continuing
reluctance to impose sanctions on Turkey for its systematic human rights violations in Kurdish areas of
its country nicely illustrates the enduring priority of security concerns over human rights even in the
Western/NATO region.  Back.
Note 20: A different sort of primarily internal orientation is represented by the efforts of newly
democratic governments in Argentina, Chile, and a number of countries to associate themselves with
international human rights norms and initiatives in order to strengthen national human rights initiatives
and to mobilize national support for human rights.  Back.
Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy: Foundations of Peace
 
Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy: Chapter 12
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/forsythe/chapter12.html (19 of 19) [8/11/2002 10:12:43 PM]
Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy: Foundations of Peace, Edited by David P. Forsythe (ed.)
 
Postscript: The Kosovo crisis
David P. Forsythe
 
As this book was being completed during the spring and summer of 1999, the Kosovo crisis erupted in
the Balkans. It is highly relevant to the subject of human rights and foreign policy in comparative
perspective. We did not want to delay the book project by rewriting various chapters, but we did want to
make the book as timely as we possibly could. Hence the decision was taken to add this postscript, even
though at the time of writing the full outcomes are not entirely clear.
It is still true in general, as Jack Donnelly noted in his concluding chapter, that although most states now
talk a great deal about human rights in foreign policy, they are still reluctant to incur heavy costs in blood
or treasure to protect rights beyond their borders. Relatively painless diplomacy for rights is one thing,
but military intervention or disruption of important trade is another. As I noted in chapter 2, after the
Cold War there was a clear pattern showing reluctance by the United States to take costly action abroad
for internationally recognized human rights: in the armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia 1992–1995;
regarding the arrest of those indicted for international crimes in that area from 1993; in Somalia from the
autumn of 1993; in Rwanda in 1994; in what became Democratic Congo during 1995; and so on.
Although other states like Britain and France were willing to take some casualties through participation
in United Nations military operations in places such as Bosnia, they too showed little eagerness to
intervene to stop atrocities in places such as Rwanda and Democratic Congo, not to mention Algeria and
Sri Lanka. As Peter R. Baehr showed in chapter 3, even states like the Netherlands that pride themselves
on commitment to internationally recognized human rights were not anxious to take casualties in
defending supposed safe areas like Srebrenica in the Bosnian war. Japan had been willing to exercise
diplomatic leadership for a liberal democratic peace with human rights in Cambodia. But it eschewed
forceful action to dislodge the Khmer Rouge from its sanctuary, and it was well known that the Japanese
were averse to taking any casualties for the sake of human rights in Cambodia.
The Kosovo crisis deviates to some degree from this pattern. The crisis shows, among other things, the
difficulty of precisely predicting the future based on history. It takes only one major case to alter or
refine an evident historical pattern. The general problem has regularly reappeared in social science
analysis. Reference to another sequence is instructive.
A persuasive case can be made that Nikita Khrushchev was acting on rather clear history when he tried to
place attack missiles in Cuba in 1962. John Kennedy had not been forceful in interaction with the Soviet
First Secretary during their debates at the world fair, the US President had not reacted strongly when the
Berlin Wall went up, and Kennedy had not been decisive and determined when he called off plans for the
United States to provide air cover for the otherwise doomed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. If the West
could place missiles in Turkey aimed at the Soviet Union, why could not the East have missiles in Cuba
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aimed at the United States?
From this view, it was rational for Khrushchev to think that Kennedy would not react strongly to the
introduction of missiles in Cuba that, although they could strike parts of the United States mainland, did
not change the strategic balance between the two superpowers in any meaningful way. Soviet submarines
could already strike much of the United States with their missiles. Soviet missiles in Cuba were more a
political than military issue. Yet Kennedy did react strongly to Soviet initiatives in 1962 regarding Cuba,
to the point of threatening strategic nuclear war over the missiles and letting the Soviet leadership choose
whether to back down or fight. So a historical pattern may yield to new calculations. Kennedy had indeed
appeared weak up until October 1962, but he toughened considerably — wisely or not — during the
Cuban missile crisis.
The Kosovo crisis represents that rare situation in international relations in which a group of important
states altered the immediate past pattern and decided to risk at least some significant things for matters
that were primarily and significantly related to human rights — although more traditional geo-political
considerations were not totally absent. The actions of the Western liberal states, through the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), constituted as principled a major use of force that one can identify
in the post-Cold War period, and relatively more principled than some past uses of force that were
accompanied by claims to humanitarian intervention. I refer to uses of force by India in
Pakistan/Bangladesh (1971), by Vietnam in Cambodia (1979), by the United States in Grenada (1982),
etc. Ironically, however, the NATO use of force in 1999 remained controversial in many quarters, and
not just in Federal Yugoslavia.
I see no reason to doubt NATO's many statements that the trigger for systematic air strikes in Federal
Yugoslavia was widespread persecution and repression of ethnic Albanians in the previously autonomous
region of Kosovo, combined with the refusal of the government of Slobodan Milosevic to negotiate a
peaceful settlement of the ethnic conflict acceptable to the international community. Just as Milosevic
had brought about the breakup of Communist Yugoslavia through his assertions of Serbian power at the
expense of other ethnic groups, and just as he had actively supported ethnic cleansing and other gross
violations of human rights in Bosnia during 1992–1995, so he had organized systematic persecution and
repression of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. As a result, more and more ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
had become radicalized and had joined the armed opposition — the Kosovo Liberation Army. Organized
and systematic Serbian repression had been primarily responsible for a low-level guerrilla and civil war
in Kosovo, in which violations of the laws of war such as the killing of civilians and captured combatants
were carried out by both sides.
What was primarily at issue in Kosovo in 1999 was the nature of Europe. Was it to be rights protective
under the banner of liberal democracy, or was it to encompass a chauvinistic and brutal leader like
Milosevic? What was primary to NATO were humane values, not protection of strategic resources or
alliance partners. Serbian persecution of ethnic Albanians was all the more uncomfortable for NATO
because it had passively watched the gross violations of human rights in Bosnia during 1992–1994
carried out primarily by Serbian parties. In Bosnia, Europe was once again the scene of ethnic cleansing
and concentration camps. NATO had not reacted quickly or decisively in Bosnia and the situation had
become worse. When the United States and NATO became more active and forceful in 1995, the Dayton
peace agreement resulted. Milosevic had proved flexible in the face of NATO air strikes, and after
Dayton the situation clearly improved in relative terms, even if falling far short of the consolidation of a
stable democratic peace. NATO tried to apply these lessons to Kosovo in 1999. It was at least a shift
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from previous policy, although not a total break with it.
True, commitment to human rights within Europe was not the only issue involved in the Kosovo crisis.
President Clinton spoke about the stability of neighbouring states like Albania and Macedonia. There
was a fear that continuing Yugoslav repression would drive many of the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo into
those neighbouring states — or even into the Yugoslav province of Montenegro — in such numbers that
they would prove destabilizing. Indeed, this was the short-term result of NATO's air strikes, as
Yugoslavia actually intensified its repression of the Albanians. But, in the long term, NATO was able to
coerce Milosevic into allowing a more autonomous Kosovo, and allowing most Albanians who wanted to
do so to return to their towns of habitual residence.
Then there was the issue of NATO itself. Recently enlarged, what was the point of NATO if not to
guarantee liberal democracy within Europe? Given the weakness of the Russian Federation and its
dependence on Western assistance and investment, NATO was certainly not needed for its original
purpose of protection against traditional inter-state attack from the East. If NATO could not act "out of
area" in such places as the Balkans in the name of human rights and democracy, there would be
increasing calls for its dissolution. Doing away with NATO might be good or bad, but as long as it
existed it needed a practical mission.
Moreover there was also the concern that Greece might be drawn into the general conflict in ways that
proved disruptive to a NATO alliance that included Turkey. Greece had an ethnic Albanian minority, had
already engaged in conflict with Macedonia on various issues, and had seen fit to cooperate with the
Serbs on still other issues. Surprisingly enough, the Greek government held relatively firm during the
weeks of NATO's bombing, despite its public opinion that was decidedly pro-Serbia. But continued
instability in the Balkans was definitely not in the interest of NATO, which already was dealing with
Greek—Turk friction on its southern flank.
Once engaged, if NATO did not follow through expeditiously and prevail, its future power would be
questioned. Likewise, if the United States led NATO into action in the Balkans but did not prevail,
United States leadership in Europe would be suspect.
So there were a number of essentially political questions at issue in NATO's involvement in the Kosovo
crisis. Yet the main reason given for the air attacks was genuine: the desire to protect ethnic Albanians
from persecution by an illiberal Milosevic regime. If ever there were an essentially humanitarian
intervention, at least in motivation and intent, this was it. Other claims to strictly humanitarian
intervention had not measured up to that standard. India had partitioned arch-rival Pakistan in 1971;
Vietnam had set up the friendly Hun Sen puppet government in Cambodia in 1979; the United States had
ousted the leftist government of Maurice Bishop in Grenada in 1982; and so on. Particularly in the last
case, arguments about humanitarian intervention — namely the rescue of American medical students —
were essentially a smoke screen for geo-political and ideological strategy.
Serbian repression and intransigence explain the remarkable NATO unity, based on Western public
opinion, in support of the 1999 intervention. All 19 NATO members stuck with the air attacks, despite
various controversies, throughout the bombings. True, some states seemed less committed than others.
Italy expressed a desire for an early end to the violence. Germany floated a peace plan during the second
week of attacks. Greek support was clearly suspect. And so on. But despite debate about various aspects
of NATO's approach to Kosovo, the West showed exceptional unity. This was because the West held
much of the high moral ground in the face of clear and major violations of human rights by the Milosevic
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regime — against the background of similar violations encouraged by Milosevic in Bosnia. Eventually
trainloads of ethnic Albanians dumped by Serbia on the borders of neighbouring states conjured up
memories of other European trains — carrying Jews to the concentration camps of Hitler's Third Reich.
To say that NATO had primarily a largely disinterested or altruistic or humanitarian motivation to its
action in Kosovo is not to say that the air strikes were uncontroversial. Legally speaking, NATO did not
make a strong argument for justification. The UN Security Council had not explicitly authorized the use
of force. The West, fearing Chinese and/or Russian vetoes, did not want to put the question of using
force to a vote. If a resolution authorizing force had been presented and vetoed, although the onus for
blocking action would have been on Beijing and/or Moscow, it would have proved more difficult to go
ahead with the bombing. Federal Yugoslavia had not militarily crossed an international frontier at the
time the air strikes commenced. Thus it was difficult to argue that NATO was acting in self-defence or in
response to a threat to the peace or breach of the peace.
NATO did not argue explicitly, clearly, and forcefully for the concept of humanitarian intervention: the
right of outside parties to use coercion to try to protect the rights of those persecuted or repressed within
a state. Such a concept was not part of the UN Charter, was disliked by much of the global South, which
feared Great Power intrusion into their "domestic" affairs, and might be misused against Western
interests in the future. The claim to humanitarian intervention was a fairly radical claim, and NATO
lawyers seemed to prefer the more cautious — but mostly unconvincing — claim that previous UN
Security Council resolutions had implied authorization for the use of force in Kosovo. Four states of the
West had taken this same line in 1991 when forcefully intervening in northern Iraq to protect Iraqi Kurds.
So in 1999 NATO allocated to itself the right to enforce protection of human rights in Kosovo, which
made rather large parts of the world nervous. But the counter-option was even more unattractive: to stand
aside, as in Bosnia, and observe ethnic cleansing and something on the verge of genocide transpire in the
midst of Europe.
Thus Federal Yugoslavia, supported by states such as Russia and China, argued that NATO was engaged
in aggression. The argument went as follows: Yugoslavia was acting within its own territory; thus the
concept of state sovereignty prevailed; a state had the right to suppress an armed uprising; outside states
had no right to compel Belgrade to take any particular course of action regarding the ethnic Albanians.
According to the UN Charter, international peace should prevail, especially when the core issue relates to
outsiders' conceptions of "justice." Peace was to prevail over a contested version of justice. Under the
UN Charter, the only just war is a defensive war.
There were other complications for NATO. We have already noted that for a time its air strikes produced
exactly what it said it wanted to prevent: increased repression of the ethnic Albanians, and increased
pressures on neighbouring areas from hundreds of thousands of forced migrants. Furthermore, the air
strikes clearly killed and wounded a number of innocent civilians, while appearing to some to be
disproportionate to the original human rights violations. On the first point, international law had never
been clear on the amount of "collateral damage" to civilians that was permitted while engaging in attacks
on permissible military targets. On the second point, regarding proportionality, it was difficult to say with
precision whether sustained bombing of the military capability of Yugoslavia, including much of its
industrial and communications infrastructure, was legitimate. Some of this bombing produced
considerable environmental damage — as when NATO bombed a chemical plant near Belgrade. Some
observers, and not just in Yugoslavia, believed NATO's course of action, whatever its intentions, was
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worse — doing more harm — than the original situation. The cure was supposed to be better than the
disease. There was, after all, such a thing as the hell of good intentions.
It is relevant to note that the main reason NATO engaged in air strikes — supposedly to deter Milosevic
from further actions against the ethnic Albanians — was precisely the assumption that Western public
opinion would not tolerate body bags coming home from a military operation that did not involve the
core or vital national interests of the NATO states. This lesson was learned not just in Vietnam but also
in Lebanon in the early 1980s and Somalia in the early 1990s — and in Bosnia as well. Western public
opinion, and related legislative opinion, while backing NATO's controversial course of action during the
bombing, did not demand a costly ground war. In this sense there was considerable continuity between
the West's response in Kosovo and previous dilemmas in Rwanda and Bosnia.
After two weeks of military action, including the capture by Yugoslavia of three American military
personnel, public opinion hardened — at least in the United States. A similar trend had occurred in
particularly France when Serb parties had held Western personnel hostage in Bosnia and used them as
human shields. Thus for a time there was increased talk in the West of committing ground forces in
Kosovo, and the Clinton administration moved toward a call-up of the military reserves. But Milosevic's
decision to accept NATO's terms for halting the bombing settled the military issues.
Kosovo was not Rwanda, or Algeria, or Chechnya. In Kosovo, NATO took the decision to engage in
forceful intervention largely for human rights reasons. This, after all, was Europe, and NATO had been
profoundly embarrassed by its lack of action in the very nasty Bosnian war. The most recent and local
lesson of history seemed to be that Milosevic would yield to force, and that use of force was the only
way to stop another huge tragedy. But Kosovo was far more important to Milosevic than Bosnia had
been, and events in Kosovo had far greater impact on his personal power than events in neighbouring
areas in the past. So he stood firm during the early weeks of NATO attacks, was prepared to engage in
truly massive and open and gross violations of human rights, and thus exposed evident weaknesses of
NATO military strategy. Yet in the end NATO prevailed, with the help of Russian mediation.
At least in Europe, in 1999 the member states of NATO were indeed prepared to undertake significant,
costly action to try to protect the rights of others. NATO put its prestige on the line and spent a
considerable sum of money, even if it adopted high-altitude bombing to minimize Western casualties.
The realists continued to object, arguing that real national interests lay in improved relations with China
and Russia and in more attention to terrorism, especially when linked to weapons of mass destruction.
Kosovo, even with gross violations of human rights, was far down their list of priorities. For NATO,
however, what was at stake in Kosovo was not just the rights of ethnic Albanians but the moral and
political composition of Europe. And in that the Western states came to believe they had a vital national
interest. NATO's grand strategy was liberal — to create a rights-protective Europe — even if its military
strategy and tactics were decidedly realist — to prevail by force of arms.
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